Friday, September 9, 2016

Another Marine Aviation Acquisition?

What has gotten into the Marine Corps?  They’re being led by lunatics intent on remaking them into a mini-Air Force.  The latest is this report from Breaking Defense website about yet another new aircraft that the Corps wants.

“It’s an unmanned tiltrotor designed to give the Marines a drone that can do everything the Air Force’s armed MQ-9 Reaper does – and more. Especially taking off and landing from ships or from land where there’s no runway.

“I think there is a big need for a UAS [unmanned aerial system] that can go aboard the sea base,” Davis [Lt. Gen. Jon “Dog” Davis, Marine deputy commandant for aviation] told me in an interview last week. “General Neller says he doesn’t need a Reaper, but he needs a Reaper-like capability that can go from the sea base.” Gen. Robert Neller is the Marine Corps commandant.” (1)

Do the Marines really need to duplicate yet another Air Force capability?  Yes, a vertical takeoff and landing capability sounds nice on paper but haven’t we already given the Marines gigantic carriers that UAVs could operate from?  Do we really need to start another acquisition program that duplicates the mission of a Reaper?  Is this really the best use of the Marine’s limited budget?

“The desire for a Marine Corps Group 5 UAS is outlined in the official Marine Aviation Plan 2016, which labels the concept the MUX, a tortured acronym standing for “MAGTF Unmanned Expedition Capabilities,” the acronym within an acronym MAGTF standing for Marine Air Ground Task Force.

“The Marine Corps requires a UAS that is network-enabled, digitally interoperable, and built to execute responsive, persistent, lethal, and adaptive full-spectrum operations,” the document says. “The concept of employment will be shipboard and expeditionary.”

The Aviation Plan says that the MUX would be “a multi-sensor, electronic warfare” aircraft with “strike capability at ranges complementary to MV-22 and F-35,” referring to the Marine Corps version of the Osprey and the new Joint Strike Fighter. Such a shipboard compatible armed drone, the plan adds, will give Marine commanders “flexible, persistent and lethal reach.” (1)

Multi-sensor, electronic warfare, strike aircraft?  That’s a lot more than a simple recon drone!  What do the Marines need this thing to do?

“Such a drone, he [Davis] said, could be “your picket. It could be out there protecting the ship, protecting the fleet, giving us the deep view out there of the battle space when I don’t have manned platforms up.” (1)

Protecting the fleet???  Now the Marines are branching out into fleet AAW and ASuW?  Have they got their core mission down so well and have so much extra budget that they can expand into Navy missions?



I’m not going to bother describing this aircraft in detail.  The more important takeaways from this are:

  • Who’s running the Corps?  Clearly, the ground component has been relegated to an afterthought.  The Marines are shedding tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment while aviation assets are being promoted and prioritized.  Aviation rules the Corps.

  • What’s the mission?  Once upon a time, the Marines were our 911 force with a specialization in amphibious assault.  Now, by their own choice, the Marines are an expeditionary third air force with little high end combat power and what they have is rapidly shrinking.  What do they offer that is not redundant with the Army or Air Force and can’t be done better by the Army or Air Force?  Note the priorities – they’re not ground related.  Where’s the same zeal for tanks, artillery, combat engineering vehicles, amphibious assault vehicles, landing craft, electronic warfare, mobile anti-air vehicles, etc. that the Corps is showing for aviation assets?  Where’s the enthusiasm for ground combat?  Do the Marines think the next war will be a neat, clean, digital, affair where no one gets hurt and is conducted from afar using remote control and everyone gets to go home and have dinner every night after the day’s sortie is done?  The Corps has lost sight of the mission.

Finally, here is a disturbing quote from the article.

“I sense a lot of desire from the traditional ground component of the Marine Corps to support special operations, much like the U.S. Army Rangers. Having a higher-tier UAS is part of that.” (1)

If that is at all reflective of reality, the Marines have truly lost their way.  Supporting special ops is not their core mission.  Has the Corps really forgotten why they exist?  It would appear so.  This is very disappointing.




(1)Breaking Defense website, “EXCLUSIVE: Meet Bell’s V-247, Armed Tiltrotor Drone For Marines”, Richard Whittle, 29-Aug-2016,


Wednesday, September 7, 2016

Where's the Escort?

We’ve discussed the highly aggressive (unsafe) intercepts performed by Russian aircraft against US ships and planes.  Yet another one has just occurred with a Russian fighter intercepting a P-8 Poseidon in an unsafe manner by passing within 10 ft of the US aircraft (1). 

Of course, there’s always a chorus of cries for more restraint and appeasement by the timid crowd.  Apparently, there’s no amount of provocation that will elicit a reaction from these people – but that’s not the point of this post.

The point is, where’s the US escort for a high value unit like the Poseidon?  This is our newest and most capable maritime patrol aircraft.  Do we really want to risk having it forced down and captured by Russia, to be stripped of all secrets as happened to the EP-3 that was forced down, seized, and stripped by the Chinese a few years ago?  Doesn’t basic common sense suggest that a high value unit like the P-8 have a protective escort readily available?


P-8 Poseidon - We're Going To Lose One


I’m not suggesting that the escort instantly fire on any Russian aircraft it sees but there can’t be anything wrong with exhibiting some aggressive intercept flying of our own on any approaching Russian aircraft. 

I’ll repeat my past call.  Let’s respond or leave.  If we’re not going to protect our own forces then let’s leave the disputed areas.  There is absolutely no point to having military forces in a region if we absolutely refuse to take action no matter the provocation.


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(1)CBS News website, “Russian jet flies within 10 ft of US Navy aircraft”, Associated Press, 7-Sep-2016,


Iranian Ransom Payment

You all know that the US paid $400M in cash to Iran in what was clearly a ransom payment for the release of the two captured boat crews, recently.  It now comes to light that an additional $1.3 billion (billion with a “b”) was also paid in cash to bring the total recent payments to $1.7B. (1)

The administration has come up with all kinds of stories about these payments in an attempt to portray them as normal business dealings (with Iran??) and whatnot.  Since they could have been paid at any time over the last decade or so, the timing pretty cleary demonstrates that they were ransom payments for the release of the boat crews.

The funds came from a Treasury Department slush fund known as the Judgment Fund.  Use of these funds allowed the President to bypass Congressional approval.

On a seemingly unrelated note, the Navy is reporting on a near daily basis that Iranian vessels are harassing US warships on an increasingly aggressive basis.  A recent example is the report that three US ships were harassed in a single day.

“Three more U.S. ships were harassed by Iranian patrol boats over three incidents on Wednesday, U.S. 5th Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban told USNI News on Thursday.” (2)

So, setting aside geopolitical questions about dealings with Iran, my question to all those advocates of a policy of restraint out there is, how’s that appeasement working out?

We’re not getting much for our ransom payment are we?  Appeasement is not working any better for us than it did for Neville Chamberlain.  History is pretty clear about the outcome of appeasement.



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(2)USNI News website, “Three More U.S. Navy Ships Harassed By Iranian Patrol Boats”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Aug-2016,


LCS Engineering Review

The Navy ordered an engineering stand down for all LCS ships after the fourth major engineering casualty in the last year and, specifically, the two most recent engineering mishaps.  The suggestion in the order is that poor training was at fault.  Here’s what VAdm. Tom Rowden had to say,

“These stands down allowed for time to review, evaluate, and renew our commitment to ensuring our crews are fully prepared to operate these ships safely.” (1)

OK, I’m going to assume that Adm. Rowden’s statement wasn’t just for public relations cover.  I’m going to assume that it was a genuine and accurate statement.  Typically, these stand downs are 24 hours.  So, in that short period, whatever it was, the Navy and the LCS community managed to completely review the ship’s personnel, their level of training and knowledge, their competency, review all applicable engineering procedures, evaluate the entire training pipeline, and assess that the crews are fully prepared to operate the ships safely?  That must have been some busy 24 hours!

Hmm …  I’m starting to think that I shouldn’t take Rowden’s statement at face value.  I’m starting to think that maybe it was just a PR cover stunt that accomplished absolutely nothing.

But, wait, there’s more!  According to Rowden there’s more training and reviews on the way.

“I have asked the Surface Warfare Office School (SWOS) commander to review the wholeness of our LCS engineering education and training to include the testing and retraining of all LCS engineers,” Rowden said.  “This training will occur over the next 30 days and will allow the SWOS leadership to review our training program and determine if other changes need to be made to the training pipeline.” (1)

Outstanding!  The LCS engineers, who have each spent years mastering their profession and then an additional year or so qualifying for LCS engineering in the most advanced and rigorous training in the Navy, are now going to be retrained in 30 days!  If we can completely retrain engineers in 30 days, why did it take so long to train them the first time?  Again, the 30 day “training” period is a joke.

It gets better though.

“According to the service, “the required engineering training will be conducted by the SWOS’ engineering team, who will develop both a level-of-knowledge test and specialized training that will be deployed in the next 30 days to the LCS engineering force.” (1)

So, the LCS training program which took years to develop is now going to develop a completely new test and specialized training, also in 30 days.  Again, not really credible, is it?

Unbelievably, there’s still more!

“The commanding officer of SWOS is also conducting a comprehensive LCS engineering review, which will likely take 30-60 days. From there, more adjustments may be made to the engineering training pipeline.” (1)

So, the carefully crafted LCS training program and engineering training programs, developed by many brilliant people, the best the Navy had to offer, over the course of years, is now going to be comprehensively reviewed and adjusted by the commanding officer of SWOS.  If he’s that amazingly good that he can do this along with all his other duties in a span of 30-60 days, why didn’t we have him develop the training programs originally and save untold millions of dollars and years of time?  Yet again, this is pure bilgewater.

And finally,

“In addition to announcing the stand down and the retraining, the service also announced following Sunday’s return of Coronado to Hawaii NAVSURFOR sent a team to the ship “to take a holistic look at the engineering program on board. A preliminary investigation will provide an initial assessment and procedural review of the situation, and any shortfalls will be addressed quickly to get the ship fixed and back on deployment,” read the statement.” (1)

So, yet another team is going to take a “holistic” look at the engineering program.  Setting aside the buzzword bingo aspect of a “holistic” look, this team is going to provide an initial assessment, review, and corrections in an even shorter time – virtually instantaneous, it would appear!  Why do we need all the other reviews if this one can fix everything instantly?  Setting that aspect aside, shouldn’t this kind of review have been conducted, oh, I don’t know, say, when the first LCS was built?

This sudden frenzy of LCS reviews and assessments and retraining is just blatant PR attempts by the Navy to look as if they’re doing something.  It’s also an attempt to avoid being up front and honest and simply saying, “We screwed up the manning levels and training beyond belief and now we need to start over.”

Does this surprise anyone?  You cram high tech, complex equipment that requires careful care and attention into a ship that is horribly undermanned by engineers who have a hundred other duties besides engineering and then wonder why the equipment isn’t operated properly?  If this is a surprise, it’s a surprise only to the Navy.  The rest of us have seen this coming for years.  And this is just the tip of the iceberg.



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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Ordered Littoral Combat Ship Engineering Stand Down, Retraining Ongoing”, Sam LaGrone, 5-Sep-2016,


Monday, September 5, 2016

Exploring Distributed Lethality

As regular readers know, ComNavOps has not been a fan of the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  In its original, articulated form, the Navy wanted to arm every ship that floated including amphibious ships, logistic ships, MLPs, MCM, and so on.  That’s just stupid.  Those ships are far too valuable to risk having them within attack range of enemy ships – if you’re in attack range then you’re also in range to be attacked.  Risking vital support ships just to carry 8 Harpoons is idiotic, but, hey, that’s the Navy for you.

Of late, I’ve heard less about arming support ships and more about focusing on arming the LCS as the distributed lethality platform.  Of course, arming a warship isn’t exactly distributed lethality;  it’s just making a warship what it’s supposed to be – a warship.  The only reason this is even a point of discussion is because the Navy has built a class of warship that has no useful weapons!

Let’s focus on arming the LCS with a credible anti-ship missile.  We’ll assume it’s the Harpoon, for sake of discussion, although the Navy is also looking at the NSM and other options.  Let’s further assume that the LCS will carry 8 Harpoons on two Mk 141 rack launchers which has been the standard Harpoon loadout on every ship that has carried Harpoons since the Perry FFGs.  It’s also possible that the LCS will only carry a single launcher which would mean just 4 Harpoons.  The number of missiles is likely a weight related issue given that the LCS is hard up against its weight margins.  For our discussion, the number of missiles doesn’t matter.

So, conceptually, how does this distributed lethality work?

Well, the LCS will have a 100 nm (the exact range depends on the exact missile but this is a good discussion figure) missile and a 20 nm targeting radar.  This is the first challenge in distributed lethality – how does the distributed shooter find a target?  The Navy’s answer is that targeting will come from off board sensors like a P-8 Poseidon, F-35, or Triton UAV.

What happens when an off board sensor finds a target?  In the case of the manned aircraft, does the pilot instantly radio the LCS and tell them to launch a missile?  Of course not.  The pilot doesn’t know what distributed shooters are available.  Further, the pilot doesn’t know the various missions that are on-going in the area and what priority the target he’s found would have.  He doesn’t know the weapon loadouts on the various distributed shooters.  He doesn’t know what missions the distributed shooters are currently on and whether it’s worthwhile to disrupt their current mission.  He doesn’t know whether it’s better to reveal the distributed shooter’s position by attacking or if it’s better to pass up the shot and stay hidden.  In short, the pilot doesn’t have the necessary situational awareness to make a “shoot” call. 

The pilot will simply transmit the information back to the local task group or regional commander for evaluation and decision.  The commander (presumably an Admiral and his staff) will get the information, weigh it against all of his tasks, and decide what to do about it.  You know how those things go.  We’re probably looking at a many hours long process to arrive at a decision. 

Side Note:  What does the off board sensor platform do while waiting for a decision to be made?  If he moves on or returns to base, contact is lost.  Given that the target is moving, the target co-ordinates are lost and the ability to launch an attack is lost if the delay is an hour or more (a ship moving at 20 kts has now displaced from its original target location by 20 nm).  Of course, we can always launch an attack at a predicted location and hope for the best but that’s a rapidly diminishing likelihood of success that, if it fails, will waste a shooter’s load and reveal its location for no gain.  Alternatively, does the off board sensor platform try to stay in contact for, potentially, many hours while waiting for command to make a decision?  Given the relatively short endurance of aerial platforms, that may not even be possible.  If possible, it may not be wise to stay tied to one location near an enemy.  That’s a good way to get shot down!

Let’s say a decision is made to launch an attack.  If there happens to be a shooter within range then the rest is simple.  The shooter is sent targeting data and the attack occurs.  More likely, there are no shooters in range (or not enough shooters in range – an attack will likely require multiple shooters to have a good chance of success).  More hours will pass while the shooters maneuver into range (refer again to the previous side note).  Once all the shooters are in position, the attack occurs.

So, setting aside the issue of trying to operate a data network in the face of peer level ECM, there is nothing wrong with the concept of distributed lethality.  It can find targets and attack them with any available distributed shooter ship.  The major issues would seem to be the process of simply making a decision whether to shoot and what to do with the off board sensor while that decision making process and shooter assembly plays out.

As I pointed out earlier, this is not really distributed lethality but simply networked warships akin to the Navy’s AAW Co-operative Engagement Capabiity (CEC).  Regardless of the semantics, it can work, though clumsily. 

One other possible scenario is that the LCS’ own helo or UAV is used to provide off-board target detection.  A helo or UAV is relatively short ranged which is not a problem since the Harpoon is relatively short ranged.  The problem is that the helo/UAV is also relatively short endurance – a few to several hours – and that assumes the target was located early in the flight.  More likely, the target is located during the second half of the flight with consequently much shorter target contact endurance.  As previously described, locating a target is only part of the process.  A sufficient number of shooters still need to be moved into position and that can take many hours, depending on the dispersal of the shooters. 

Of course, a squadron of LCS can operate together, in close proximity, so that upon target detection most or all of the shooters will be in range or can achieve firing positions in short order.  The flip side of having a squadron operate in close proximity is that it greatly increases the likelihood of the group being spotted and attacked before they can accomplish their purpose.  Close grouping of the shooters inherently contradicts the concept of “distributed” lethality.  If you’re going to have a squadron of LCS operate in close proximity then you may as well just have a single Burke which could not only carry as many weapons as a squadron (assuming a vertical launch anti-ship missile) but could also defend itself which a squadron of LCS cannot.

Let’s now consider what the distributed shooters are doing when they aren’t actively shooting.  Presumably, the shooters are cruising around in enemy or contested waters looking for targets.  However, given the mismatch between the shooter’s sensing range, even using helo/UAVs, and the enemy’s sensors (land based Over The Horizon radar, submarines, AWACS-ish aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs, and larger ship radars, it is more likely that the shooters will be found before the shooters can find the enemy.  Thus, the shooters will be sunk one by one.

In the classic distributed lethality model, especially as espoused by Hughes, being detected doesn’t really matter because the individual shooters are cheap and expendable and individual losses create, hopefully, flaming data points due to the enemy revealing their location(s).  Of course, if the enemy attacks with land based anti-ship missiles or aircraft, they haven’t really revealed anything, have they?  It’s only if they attack with ships that they reveal anything we probably didn’t already know. 

So, the likelihood is that our distributed shooters will be destroyed piecemeal for no gain until a suitable target can be found.  If the shooters were cheap enough this might be acceptable.  However, an LCS currently costs $500M - $750M after including post-delivery construction, Government Furnished Equipment, and modules.  The “frigate” version will be even more expensive – likely $750M - $1B.  I’m not sure that a $500M - $1B ship can be considered expendable and sacrificing several just to obtain a single attack opportunity is unlikely to be a beneficial trade.

This also raises the question of how many LCS’s are available for use as distributed shooters?  Let’s assume we build the full 40 that are currently planned.  Of those, 12 are scheduled to be dedicated MCM vessels.  Would we really want to risk our very rare and very valuable MCM vessels?  Remember, when the LCS-MCM comes on line we’ll retire the Avengers and those 12 LCS-MCM’s will constitute our entire ship-based MCM capability!  So, if we don’t risk those as distributed shooters, that only leaves us with 28 possible distributed LCS shooters.  Another 12 or so are scheduled to be dedicated anti-submarine (ASW) ships.  The same logic applies.  Do we really want to risk them?  In this case, the answer may be yes because we do have other ASW assets throughout the fleet.  But, if we opt not to risk them, that drops the available distributed LCS shooters to 16 or less. 

If half to two thirds of  the LCS’s are in port at any given moment, and that’s being generous given the reliability issues, scheduled in-port maintenance requirements (every two weeks), and extremely limited endurance (8-14 days with the current crew levels), then we’re looking at only a half a dozen LCS being available as distributed shooters at any given moment.  That’s not a lot and won’t cover much area!

The LCS’ very limited endurance (8-14 days) combined with the maintenance model that requires the ship to put into port every two weeks (hence, the designed limited stores endurance) makes the LCS a very poor choice as a distributed shooter – no surprise, it’s a poor choice for anything! 

Worse, the requirement to put into port every two weeks implies that it will have to leave the war zone for two weeks or more every two weeks.  The enemy is not going to allow us to use a port located in the contested region.  Thus, the LCS will have to leave and travel to a protected or safe port well back from the war zone.  The LCS will use up most of its at sea endurance and two week operating window just traveling to and from its maintenance ports!  I don’t think the Navy really thought through the use of LCS’s in combat and has not thought through the use of the LCS as a distributed shooter ship.

Let’s now look at this from the enemy’s perspective.  One of the claimed benefits of distributed lethality is that it hugely complicates the enemy’s job.  He won’t know which ships can shoot and will have to assume they all can.  Supposedly, this somehow complicates his day to day life.

In war, each side will attempt to sink every enemy ship they find, right?  It doesn’t matter if the ship is armed or not.  It doesn’t matter if the ship is a warship or cargo vessel.  In short, the enemy will attempt to sink every ship they find.  So, if the enemy will attempt to sink every ship they find, how or why does it matter if the ship is a distributed shooter?  They’re going to try to sink it anyway.  I’m failing to see how the enemy’s tactical position is more complicated.  If they see an LCS, they’ll sink it (it’s not like the LCS can defend itself) whether it has Harpoon missiles on board or not. 

I’m mentally wargaming this from the enemy’s perspective and I just don’t see how the question of whether an LCS is armed or not affects anything the enemy will do.  The enemy’s task is:  see a ship, sink a ship.  It’s not:  see a ship, decide whether it’s a distributed shooter or not, maybe sink it or maybe not. 

If the reverse were true, that the enemy could not, or did not want to, sink a non-distributed shooter ship then their tactical situation would be greatly more complicated.  They’d have to somehow make a definitive determination of the target ship’s weapon load out which would require additional recon assets and time and add a great deal of uncertainty to the tactical picture.  However, that’s a ridiculous scenario.  In a war, the enemy will, see a ship, sink a ship, and not care what weapons, if any, it was carrying.

So, the claim of distributed lethality being a complication for the enemy seems unfounded.

Considering all of this, the concept of using the LCS as distributed shooters seems like a costly, high attrition exercise for relatively little benefit.  Further, the very LCS maintenance model and associated limited endurance make the LCS ill-suited as a distributed shooter. 


Friday, September 2, 2016

Are You Freaking Kidding Me?

Are you freaking kidding me????

As reported by USNI News, the Navy is going to conduct an in-depth review of the Ford because of all the problems it’s encountered (1).  The review is being triggered by a memo request from Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s chief buyer, to SecNav Ray Mabus.

“The review – outlined in the memo to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus from Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall – calls for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to take a closer look at key subsystems of the carrier that Kendall said could hamper the “schedule and performance” of Ford … “

This makes, what, about 900 reviews the Navy has conducted in the last year to investigate badly flawed programs.  If they truly need all these reviews then they have no idea what they're doing.  What has been the result of all these reviews?  In almost every case, no matter how flawed the subject, the recommendation and result is to stay the course.  What’s the point of reviews that don’t change anything?

Don’t we have an Admiral in charge of carriers?  Yes, we do!  Program Executive Officer (PEO) Aircraft Carriers for the Navy is RAdm. Thomas Moore.  He’s the guy with complete responsibility and authority for seeing to it that the Ford is progressing smoothly.  If things have gotten so bad that the Pentagon’s chief buyer has to mandate a review, shouldn’t we start by firing the PEO?  Where’s the accountability.  What’s that phrase?  “Not on my watch.”  Well, this has happened on his watch and he needs to be held accountable.

“What we have to determine now is whether it is best to ‘stay the course’ or adjust our plans, particularly for future ships of the class,” Kendall wrote, “The first step in that process has to be a completely objective and technically deep review of the current situation.”

The first step has to be a completely objective and technically deep review of the current situation??!  Are you freaking kidding me?  Shouldn’t a completely objective and technically deep review of the current situation be performed every day, if not every hour, in PEO’s office?  If we don’t have a completely objective and technically deep review of the current situation sitting on PEO’s desk, right this moment, and updated every hour, then PEO needs to be fired.

“The memo identified five areas the 60-day review will cover: propulsion and electrical system components, Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), Advanced Arresting Gear, Dual Band Radar and Advanced Weapon Elevators.”

Are you freaking kidding me??!  We need 60 days to figure out what’s going on?  I’ll repeat, if PEO Moore hasn’t got an up-to-the-minute completely objective and technically deep review of the current situation sitting on his desk then he needs to be fired.  We don’t need 60 days – 60 minutes should suffice and should be about 59 minutes more than we need.  If we truly need 60 days, those 60 days should be dedicated to a Court Martial of PEO for dereliction of duty.

“With the benefit of hindsight, it was clearly premature to include so many unproven technologies in the Gerald R, Ford.” 

Are you freaking kidding me??!  Benefit of hindsight??!  Every blogger and commenter with a double digit IQ, and most of the ones with a single digit IQ, knew and stated that trying to incorporate so many non-existent technologies into a production ship would cause problems.  Aside from the incredibly obvious common sense that would preclude such a course of action, the history of the LCS and the F-35 should have made it clear that concurrency and the incorporation of non-existent technology is idiotic and leads inexorably to cost overruns and schedule delays.

RAdm. Moore - PEO Carriers - Fire Him!


Don’t try to ease the blame by claiming the problems only became visible with the benefit of hindsight.  Anyone and almost everyone saw this train wreck coming many years ago.  Only the idiots running the Navy failed to see it.  The rest of us saw this with absolute certainty and said so long ago.

So, what does the Navy think about the state of the Ford?

“Those new technologies, “compounded the inherent challenges of a first in class design,” Navy spokeswoman Capt. Thurraya Kent said in a Tuesday statement to USNI News.  “Consequently, a comprehensive test program, the most integrated and complex shipbuilding test program to date, was developed to address the integration of these technologies. This test program has proven to be highly effective at resolving many first-of-class ship issues through the testing of developmental systems onboard CVN-78 and proving the performance of these systems.””

The Navy is quite pleased, it appears.  The test program has proven to be “highly effective” at resolving issues, the Navy claims – so effective that the ship is only billions of dollars over cost and looking to be around two years overdue for commissioning.  Even better, the Navy has hinted that many of the new technologies will be non-functional when the ship is commissioned.  Isn’t a commissioned ship supposed to be ready to fight?

This is the Navy’s idea of “highly effective”?  This is the Navy’s idea of how to run an acquisition program?  This is the Navy’s idea of sound project management?  This is the Navy’s idea of cost control? 

Are you freaking kidding me?

The Navy is in absolute denial.  People at the top need to be fired for this.

The Detroit Lions, long time joke of the National Football League for their perennial losing ways, once had a coach named Darryl Rogers in the mid-1980's.  After a few dismal losing seasons, he was frustrated, depressed, and wanted out.  He disgustedly remarked to a reporter, "What does a coach have to do around here to get fired?"

What does an Admiral in the Navy have to do to get fired?



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(1)USNI News website, “Pentagon Conducting New Review of Gerald R. Ford Carrier Program”, Sam LaGrone, 30-Aug-2016,


Thursday, September 1, 2016

Those Add-On Costs Add Up !

The Navy loudly and proudly announces shipbuilding contracts for seemingly low prices (that’s a relative phrase!) but fails to announce quite as loudly and proudly all the add on and follow up costs to that go into producing an actual delivered, functioning ship.  Here’s a recent example of a contract award for additional post-shakedown work.

“BAE Systems Southeast Shipyards Mayport LLC, Mayport, Florida, was awarded an $11,891,935 cost-plus-award-fee contract for the accomplishment of Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) for one Freedom variant Littoral Combat Ship.  The PSA encompasses all of the manpower, support services, material, non-standard equipment and associated technical data and documentation required to prepare for and accomplish the PSA.  The work to be performed will include correction of Government responsible trial card deficiencies, new work identified between custody transfer and the time of PSA, and incorporation of approved engineering changes that were not incorporated during the construction period which are not otherwise the building yard's responsibility under the ship construction contract.  This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $74,741,487.” (1) [emphasis added]

So, in addition to the cost of the hull contract, we can add another $75M (of course the options will be exercised!).  Note that none of this includes other add-ons like Government Furnished Equipment (GFE).

Let’s be fair to the LCS program, this type of additional cost occurs with every ship of every class.  It may be common but it also obscures the true cost of a ship and makes oversight very difficult.


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(1)Defense.gov website, contract listings, 29-Aug-2016