Women SEALs

You’ve all seen by now that SecNav Mabus has instructed Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) to integrate women into the SEAL teams.  He has not qualified his remarks with “if they can meet the standards”.  He has simply told the Navy to make it happen.  Of course, out of the other side of his mouth, he claims that standards will not be modified.  Well, I’m sorry but there is only one way any woman can become a SEAL and that’s by lowering the standards.  We’ve all seen film of SEAL training.  Only a few of the toughest, strongest men can meet the standards.  There is no possible way that any woman can do it.  The Rangers were told to pencil whip a woman into the unit and now the SEALs are being told to do the same.

You’ll also recall that SecNav ignored the Marines documented performance shortcomings of women in training.

This is simply a political agenda placed ahead of national security, combat performance, and common sense.  Worse, this actually does a disservice to women by mandating their inclusion in a job they aren’t qualified for.  This is affirmative action at its worst.  Every woman in every job will be looked at with suspicion and the belief that they didn’t get their job fairly.

If CNO Richardson had an ounce of integrity he would resign in protest as would his replacement and his and his …  If the CNO isn’t safeguarding the integrity of the Navy and the trust of the sailors and American people then who is?  It’s certainly not SecNav Mabus.  Mabus is an embarrassment to the nation and an affront to true women’s rights.

MEU/ARG Final Analysis

We’ve been discussing the MEU/ARG for a few posts and we’ve looked at the number of MEU/ARGs deployed at any given moment, the fact that ARGs are being split up and the ships are operating independently, the LSD is being replaced by a highly questionable LX(R) based on the LPD-17, and so on.  The central issue, however, is whether the MEU/ARG concept represents a useful military force in today’s world.  In order to answer that, we need to look at a few specific questions.

• Is the MEU sized and equipped to perform useful missions?
• Is an amphibious assault (whether airborne or waterborne) a viable operation?
• Can low end, peacetime operations be better and more cheaply performed by Army units?
• Can the MEU/MEB/MEF contribute to high end combat operations to a degree sufficient to justify their cost?

Let’s answer these one at a time.

Is the MEU sized and equipped to perform useful missions?

The Marines state that the MEU is the smallest unit capable of the full range of combat operations. 

A MEU is certainly adequately sized for many peacetime missions such as hostage rescue, embassy protection or evacuation, or very small scale raids.  That said, the MEU operates under one severe limitation.  Marine tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment can’t get ashore other than by waterborne delivery over a beach or through a port.  This limits the range of operations requiring that kind of combat power to those within a relatively very short distance from the beach or port.  This also eliminates the possibility of quick reinforcement of an operation.  Loading, transporting, unloading at the beach, assembling, and moving to the site of an operation takes far too much time to be a practical option in most scenarios.  Inland aviation assaults, the current Marine trend, all but eliminates the use of armor/artillery or the possibility of heavy reinforcements.  That raises the question, then, of whether the MEU is properly equipped for these missions as just a light infantry force.  The specter of Mogadishu looms over any light infantry operation  - what seemed like overwhelming force to arrest two men turned out to be woefully inadequate.   

This suggests the following question.  Given the types of missions commonly undertaken or anticipated, should the MEU be equipped not with tanks and artillery but rather with lighter gunned vehicles and more heavy mortars that can be air-transported?  The answer would seem to be a resounding yes.  Whether such a vehicle is practical is a question. 

Alternatively, should the MEU retain its armor and heavy artillery but add the aforementioned lighter equipment?  Of course, that leads to budgetary and ship storage issues (which might be solved by adding a fourth ship to the notional ARG?) that are not easily overcome.

Thus, the MEU seems to be inappropriately equipped for the common peacetime missions it might be called on to perform.  However, a MEU is also tasked with high end combat as part of a larger MEB/MEF.  Is the MEU adequately equipped for high end combat?

Every potential enemy is gearing up for high end, high explosive combat with new tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, artillery, etc.  This is the world the MEU will enter if it comes to high end combat against a peer or near-peer.  The MEU is lightly armed and armored for such encounters.  The magnitude and intensity of high end armored combat is beyond the scope of this post but it seems fairly evident that the MEU is under equipped for high end combat.

Thus, the overall conclusion is that the MEU is inappropriately equipped for both the low end peacetime missions and high end combat.

Is an amphibious assault (whether airborne or waterborne) a viable operation?

In past posts we’ve discussed and analyzed the ability of the MEU to conduct waterborne assaults and found that a lack of connectors leaves the MEU unable to get armor ashore in the initial waves and sustain combat operations.  We’ve also noted that aviation assaults are extremely vulnerable to shoulder launched SAMs and guns, lack the ability to transport any heavy weapons, and do not have the transport capacity to sustain an operation.  Thus, an aviation assault is viable only for the very low end of the combat spectrum and even that is risky (Mogadishu, for example, though that was not a Marine operation).  Combine this with the Navy’s complete absence of gun support and an assault doctrine that is total fantasy and it’s clear that assaults are not viable under any but the most benign conditions.

Can low end, peacetime operations be better and more cheaply performed by Army units?

I don’t know enough about Army units to evaluate this.  I simply pose the question in light of the immense cost of maintaining a 30+ ship amphibious fleet for relatively little return.  There have been very, very few actual amphibious operations over the last several decades.  Yes, Marines have been involved in a great deal of combat but as regular ground troops rather than amphibious assault forces.  Given today’s global reach by the Air Force, Army units could probably handle any peacetime operation that a MEU might be tasked with.  What are the economics of the two approaches?  I don’t know.  I suspect that the Army approach is much cheaper.  Let’s face it, 30+ amphibious ships don’t come cheap!

Can the MEU/MEB/MEF contribute to high end combat operations to a degree sufficient to justify their cost?

The Corps, in general, is shedding tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment in favor of “lightness” and crisis response, which means low end operations.  Again, this means that the MEU (for the rest of this discussion, MEU is understood to include MEB/MEF) is ill-suited for high end combat.  That’s basically the Corps’ stated position.

The purpose of the Marine Corps, at the high end of the spectrum, is to seize landing spots, whether beach or port, for follow on forces.  In addition, they may perform flanking or diversionary assaults.  The key part of this, the part that sets the Marines apart from the other branches and represents their unique contribution to the US military is their ability to conduct amphibious assaults.  As WWII taught us, assaults are violent affairs and require as much “explosive” power as possible.  Unfortunately, this is almost opposite of the direction the Marines are now headed. 

So, how does a lightly equipped MEU contribute to the violent and explosive world of high end combat?  Well, since armor and heavy equipment can’t be transported inland that means that inland combat contributions can only be light infantry affairs.  In high end, peer combat that’s a scenario for disaster.  For the beach/port seizure scenario the MEU lacks connectors to get armor ashore in the initial waves, lacks naval gun support, can’t get AAVs ashore without violating the 50+ mile standoff that the Navy insists on, and has inadequate numbers of tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment even if they could get them ashore.  The MEU lacks AAW and Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) protection.  Further, port seizure is a specialized operation that will, undoubtedly, require specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics which we don’t currently have. 

Considering all this, it seems clear that the MEU is not well suited to high end combat and, worse, is steadily moving further away from that capability as it sheds tanks and artillery in addition to personnel. 

To return to the main question of whether the MEU/ARG concept represents a useful military force in today’s world, the answer seems to be either no or a very limited, qualified maybe.

Now, some of you have already decided that ComNavOps is anti-Marine Corps.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  What I am, is dead set against the path the Marines are currently on which is converting a potent fighting force to a light infantry, crisis response and humanitarian assistance organization. 

I believe we do need the capability to seize beach/port landing spots and engage in high end, violent combat to do so.  The lesser, peacetime missions are simply subsets of that.  We need to analyze the requirements of beach/port seizure and begin rebuilding to that capability.  We need to figure out how to get armor ashore in the initial waves, how to get AAVs ashore, how to provide AAW and C-RAM protection, completely revamp our assault doctrine to something we can actually do, and figure out how to provide large explosive naval gun support, among many other needs.  Do that and the MEU will again be a useful military force.  Right now, it is not.

Disaggregated ARG Operations

Continuing our discussion of the LX(R) and amphibious groups, let’s look at the current Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) trends. 

Marines traditionally deploy as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisting of around 2300 troops, 4 tanks, a half dozen artillery pieces, a dozen or so LAVs, a dozen or so AAVs, and a couple dozen mixed helo and fixed wing aircraft.  This force is distributed among three amphibious ships which comprise the ARG.  Historically, the MEU/ARG train together and deploy together so that the full capability of the MEU is available at all times.  Two or three ARGs have usually been deployed at any given moment.

The MEU/ARG is the nation’s forward deployed, quick reaction force.  The idea is that the force is already on site and ready for action when trouble occurs.  There is no need to assemble, train, and transport those forces.  The MEU/ARG is already there.  Of course, that assumes that the MEU/ARG is in the right spot to begin with.

Now, however, we are seeing new trends in ARG deployments.

1. Only one ARG is deployed at a time.
2. The ARG is splitting into individual ships rather than staying as a group.

These trends are a consequence of budget constraints.  Well, more accurately, they’re a consequence of priority constraints rather than budget.  The Navy has prioritized new construction over deployments, maintenance, training, etc. but that’s a topic for another time.

Considering the size of the world and the number of potential hot spots, a single deployed ARG is less than optimal, to say the least.  Of course, one can debate the entire forward deployed MEU concept but that, too, is a topic for another time.  The Navy/Marines are committed to the MEU/ARG concept so we’ll go with it for the sake of this discussion. 

The hope is that the MEU/ARG is deployed to the most likely place it will be needed and is, therefore, on-scene when trouble occurs.  With only a single ARG deployed, what are the odds that the group will be at the right spot at the right time?  Consider all the potential hot spots in the world right now:  Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Africa to name a few.  Consider the immense geographical area those spots cover.  One, or even a few, ARGs cannot hope to cover all those.  Even covering a single general area is a challenge.  Consider the Chinese area which includes the East and South China Seas out to the first island chain and beyond.  That’s a huge area to cover even for a dedicated MEU/ARG and that’s just one of the potential hot spots in the world.  I don’t envy the person who has to decide where in the world to send the only deployed ARG.

In addition to having only a single deployed ARG, the Navy has taken to dispersing the ARG.  Each of the three ships is being sent off on independent operations.  As long as the MEU is not called on to act, that’s fine.  Three ships can do more port visits, flag showing, partner training, or whatever than a single group can.  Of course, most of those types of missions don’t call for an amphibious ship and could be handled by lesser, much cheaper ships.  However, if the MEU has to act, the dispersed force becomes a problem.  A single ship contains only a third of the MEU’s combat capability (that’s not true since the ships are different sizes and the combat capability is not necessarily uniformly distributed but we’ll conceptually treat it as thirds for the sake of discussion) and that’s not much if combat is required.  Of course, the MEU could simply wait until the dispersed ARG reassembles but that negates the quick reaction concept which is the reason the MEU exists.

Quick reaction - what does that mean?  Well, it’s all relative.  If an embassy is suddenly attacked (Benghazi, for example), quick reaction means within the hour and the MEU will have only what it can instantly transport via helicopter.  If an unfriendly country is building up force for a cross border excursion, quick reaction might mean days or weeks in which the MEU can slowly assemble, unload, and prepare for combat.

Historically, the most common MEU actions are embassy defenses and evacuations, civilian evacuations, rescues, raids, and humanitarian assistance (shouldn’t be a military mission but it is).  These kinds of missions tend to crop up quickly and with little notice thus “quick reaction” tends to be on the order of hours.

So, what does “quick reaction” mean in relation to the dispersed ARG?  It means that an independently operating ship may well find itself in the position of having to conduct a mission on its own with only a third of the MEU’s capabilities.  That’s a sure fire recipe for getting in over one’s head – for getting involved in an action that is beyond the capability of the fractional MEU. 

In independent operations, an individual amphibious ship can carry several hundred troops.  That’s kind of an odd amount for operations – more than a Company, less than a Battalion.  Presumably, the MEU’s tanks and artillery would be evenly distributed if the ARG’s ships were disbursed.  That would give each ship one tank and an artillery piece.  Again, that’s an odd amount.  It’s not how tanks and artillery are organized, trained, or operated.  The embarked Marines would constitute a very lightly armed force, incapable of any kind of sustained operations.  The danger is that, eventually, they’ll get dropped into a situation they’re not equipped to handle and find themselves in over their heads with no help to call on. 

While we can probably get away with a light force for embassy evacuations or low end hostage rescues, those kind of situations have a way of spiraling out of control – witness the Somalia Blackhawk incident.  Further, we have all manner of forces that can do the same job without the added expense of operating amphibious ships.  Airborne divisions and Special Ops forces can deploy from the US for those rare occasions.

On the other hand, for the 99% of the time that the ARG, whether aggregated or disaggregated, is not actively conducting combat ops, the missions are well within the scope of a single amphibious ship:  show the flag, port visits, cross training with foreign nations, etc.  Of course, those missions are well within the scope of a yacht with an American flag or a Cyclone class PC – they don’t have to be conducted by one of the most expensive ships in the world carrying a third of a MEU.

Thus, there seems to be little benefit to disaggregating the ARG.  It splits the combat power of the MEU to a dangerous level and gains nothing that can’t be provided by an American flagged yacht.  Independent operations are a very questionable concept that is driven by budget rather than operational or tactical requirements.  In short, if it’s worth deploying a MEU/ARG, keep it together!

LX(R)

Let’s take a closer look at the LX(R), the replacement for the LSD-41/49 class.  To refresh our memories, here are some specs on the LX(R) and LSD-41.

Whidbey Island LSD-41       LX(R) (San Antonio LPD-17)

Length:                       610 ft                                      684 ft

Displacement:           16,360 t                                  24,900 t

Speed:                       22 kts                                      22 kts

Draft:                          21 ft                                         23 ft

Connectors:               4 LCAC or 21 LCM-6            2 LCAC or 1 LCU

Troops:                       400-500                                 700-800

Hangar:                      none                                      1 large helo or 2 smaller helos

Flight Deck:               2 landing spots                      2 landing spots

Well Deck:                 440 ft                                      170 ft

Cost:                          $339M(1981)                         $2.0B (2012)

Navy cost estimates for the LX(R) are on the order of $1.5B per ship.  Of course, we know that Navy cost estimates are uniformly, grossly underestimated so the actual cost will probably be on the order of $2.5B as we previously noted (see, “The Definition of Insanity”).  LX(R) contract issuance is scheduled for 2020 with delivery following in 2026.

The choice of the LPD-17 to be the basis of the LX(R) is odd on multiple levels.  The purpose of the LX(R) is to perform amphibious assault and yet the LX(R) will have a well deck half the size of the LSD-41 that it’s replacing.

The LPD-17 was one of the worst construction programs in the Navy’s history and that’s saying something.  The ships suffered from extensive manufacturing defects and quality control issues, were delivered unfinished, and continue to suffer from construction related problems.  This seems to make the LPD-17 an odd choice to base another class of ship on.

An interesting note is that the LX(R) will abandon the enclosed mast of the LPD-17 in favor of a conventional mast according to artist’s concept drawings.  Presumably, this is an attempt at cost savings although the Navy encountered interference problems with the enclosed mast and considered dropping it during the LPD-17 production run.

For a ship seemingly ill-suited to its purpose, why was the LPD-17 chosen as the basis?

The LSD did not have the ability to effectively operate independent of its ARG.  This is, apparently, the main justification for using the LPD-17 base seaframe.  The LPD’s aviation and command and control capabilities allow it to operate independently, according to the Navy.  One can debate the independence trend but this appears to be the rationale.

Of course, there’s also the ever-present poltics/jobs issues that can dictate directions in acquisition programs that otherwise make no sense.  Is that a major factor in this choice?  You can make your own decision on that.

Thus, the LX(R) has two general uses:  as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and operating independently.  Let’s look a bit closer at both those roles.

As part of an ARG, the LX(R) takes the place of an LSD.  Unfortunately, it costs the MEU/ARG two LCACS.  On the plus side, it potentially brings a couple of extra helos to the ARG, depending on the helo type.  It can also carry a few hundred more Marines although the benefit of that is questionable since aggregate ARG troop carrying capacity was not previously limited.  The major impact, therefore is the loss of two LCACs.

In independent operations, the LX(R) can carry 700 troops.  That’s kind of an odd amount for operations – more than a Company, less than a Battalion.  Presumably, the MEU’s tanks and artillery would be evenly distributed if the ARG’s ships were disbursed.  That would give the LX(R) one or two tanks and one or two artillery pieces.  Again, that’s an odd amount.  It’s not how tanks and artillery are organized or trained.  Alternatively, they might not get any tanks or artillery.  In either case, the embarked Marines would constitute a very lightly armed force.  The danger is that, eventually, they’ll get dropped into a situation they’re not equipped to handle and find themselves in over their heads with no help to call on due to acting independently.  In fact, the entire concept of independent operations is questionable but that’s a topic for another day.

Also noteworthy is the significantly larger cargo capacity of the LX(R) over the LSD-41 which would be beneficial in supplying the sustainment phase of any operation, no matter how small.

The LX(R) also further cements the Marine’s movement away from amphibious assault and towards vertical assault as evidenced by amphibious ships with no or smaller well decks, an emphasis on the MV-22, and the decades long lack of interest in a substantially upgraded replacement for the obsolete and doctrinally ill-suited AAV.

It’s evident, then, both from what the Navy has stated and a logical assessment of the evidence, that the LX(R) is intended to be an independent operator and the LPD-17 base sea frame was chosen for this reason.  Whether that rationale is wise is another topic.

LX(R) and LCAC

The LCS received intense scrutiny at its inception and that scrutiny continues to this day.  The Zumwalt, by comparison, has received almost none (baffling, huh?).  Somewhere in between is the LX(R).  Let’s take a couple of posts to look a bit closer at the LX(R).  We’ll start with just a quick peak at the LCAC carrying capacity of the LX(R).  This is just setting the stage for a few upcoming LX(R) posts and is not intended to be a deep analysis.  Read this post as a simple factoid, so to speak, that acts as a lead in to more posts.

The Navy intends to replace the LSD-41/49 class ships with a new LX(R) class.  One of the key differences between the old and new ships will be the well deck space and, in particular, the LCAC capacity.  Let’s take a closer look.

The LSD-41 Whidbey Island class dock landing ship is an 8 ship class with the ability to carry 4 LCACs or 5 LCACs if the cargo ramp is raised.  That’s 32 or 40 LCACs, total.

The LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class dock landing ship is a 4 ship class with the ability to carry 2 LCACs.  That’s 8 LCACs, total.

In total, the LSD-41/49 class has a capacity for 40-48 LCACs.

The Navy is planning to replace the 12 LSDs with 11 LX(R)s.  Each LX(R) will carry 2 LCACs for a total of 22.

So, the amphibious fleet will go from 40-48 LCAC capacity to 22.  That’s quite a drop for an amphibious fleet that is already sorely lacking sufficient ship to shore connectors.  Does that signal that the Navy/Marines are getting out of the amphibious assault business altogether, or that the Marines are betting on shifting from amphibious assault to vertical assault, or that they’re just idiots?  I have no idea what the official line of thinking on this one is.  For the moment, ponder this and we’ll take a closer look in a bit.

LSD-41 Class - 4 LCACs

LX(R) Class - 2 LCACs

Sneak peak:  There is actually another, more likely, explanation (although don’t discount the idiocy explanation!) which we’ll cover shortly.

Show Me The Money!

Show Me The Money!

How often do our discussions result in statements to the effect that “we can’t afford that” – whatever that is.  It might be a new ship or weapon.  It might be reserve fleet maintenance.  It might be upgrades to keep a ship or aircraft in service longer.  It might be simple maintenance to keep ships functioning and combat ready.  It might be realistic training.  It might be whatever.  Inevitably, though, someone attempts to shut the discussion down with a comment about costs.  Those people are both shortsightedly right and overall stunningly wrong.

Statements that we can’t afford something are correct – if nothing changes.  If we keep doing the same stupid things we’ve done then we’ll have no money for the things we should do.  This blog is partly about the things we actually do but also partly about the things we should be doing.

*whine*  We can’t do xxxxxxxx because we don’t have the money.  *whine*

Well, here’s where the money comes from:  don’t engage in stupid programs that contribute nothing to our national security.  What programs and money am I talking about?  For starters, these:

Zumwalt – This program is going to cost around $30B in production and R&D and will give us 3 ships of highly questionable military value.  Two of the ships are already too far along to realize much savings from canceling them but the third ship should be terminated which would save a couple of billion even at this point.  I would even suggest that the second ship be completed and idled to eliminate operating costs.  The first ship can be retained and operated as a test bed.

LCS –This program still has around 40 vessels to go depending on the degree of construction on current builds.  At $500M per, that equates to $20B for construction.  In addition, 40 modules at, say, $50M each equates to another $2B.

F-35 – The Navy plans to buy 820 F-35B/Cs.  At $150M each, that’s $123B.  Yikes!  Kill this steaming pile of a program.

Ford Class – This program has set new standards for profligate spending.  The Ford will cost $15B+ by the time it’s operational.  The follow on ships, CVN-79 (Kennedy) and CVN-80 (Enterprise) will likely cost $12B or so each.  What will these ships gain us?  Very little.  The EMALS is a nice enhancement from a maintenance perspective, if it works, but it offers no performance improvement.  There are vague claims about less stress on the aircraft but that is backed up by no data and every aircraft we have is fully capable of withstanding those stresses so there is no real gain.  On the negative side, the EMALS is a massive electromagnetic beacon broadcasting the carrier's location for all to see.  Claims of increased sortie rates have been debunked and our carriers are not sortie rate limited anyway since the air wings have shrunk to nearly half their size.  Returning to the baseline Nimitz class would have little or no operational impact and would save several billion dollars per ship.

Burke Flt III – This program will provide a very marginal vessel with insufficient growth margins upon commissioning and a radar that does not meet the desired requirements.  Ten or twenty of these ships at $2B each equates to $20B-$40B.

LX(R) – This ill-considered replacement for the LSDs should be immediately terminated.  The LX(R) will have only half the well deck of the LSD-41 class that it’s replacing.  The dozen or so proposed ships will cost around $2.5B each (at best!) and would save $30B.

SSBN(X) – The replacement for the Ohio class SSBN is larger than the Ohios while carrying several less missiles.  This class should be terminated and redesigned to a smaller size resulting in $0.5B savings per ship for a $6B total savings.

Of course, the cited savings cannot be fully realized.  Many of the programs still need a product.  The LX(R), for example, still needs to be built and the money would come from the savings.  However, if the ships were built to commercial standards with significantly reduced combat capabilities, the savings would still be substantial.

Now, merely canceling these programs and then embarking on equally ill-considered and poorly managed replacement programs would accomplish nothing.  We’ve discussed better alternatives to most of these programs and these would have to be implemented in order to realize the savings.  Further, the replacement programs would have to be well run:  no concurrency, completed design plans prior to construction, well thought out CONOPS prior to design, contracts with massive penalties for quality failings, accountability in the Navy ranks with long term program assignments and firings and courts-martial when costs are exceeded, aggressive use of NAVSEA to ensure quality and firings and courts-martial when failures occur, honesty and transparency towards the public and Congress, and not a penny more beyond the cost estimates with firings and courts-martial if the cost estimates are exceeded. 

I’ve shown you the money.  Now, let’s rebuild the Navy!

The Night Before Christmas

'Twas the night before Christmas, and all through HQ

Not a ship was stirring, not even the crews;

The watch stations were manned though few seemed to fear,

That a blip on the screens would ever show there;

The Admirals were nestled all snug in their racks;

While visions of railguns danced in their heads;

The Chiefs in the goat locker, and I in my Whites,

Had just settled down with no enemy in sight,

When o’er the 1MC there arose such a clatter,

I sprang from the head to see what was the matter.

Away to CIC I flew like a flash,

Tore through the passage and threw open the hatch.

When what to my wondering eyes did appear,

But an incoming bogey, already too near,

With an evasive maneuver so lively and quick,

I knew in a moment we might take a hit.

More rapid than Hornets the bogey still came,

So I called for a scramble and called them by name:

"Now, Hornets! now, Turkeys! now Rhinos I call!

Launch the alert fighters, now launch them all!

The intercept geometry didn’t look right,

I knew then and there we were in for a fight;

The sensors were locking, the missiles spun up,

We might be beaten but we’d never give up;

And then, in a twinkling, we made our ID

It was just Santa;  I should have known it was he.

His sleigh was more stealthy than a Raptor could be;

And unlike a Lightning, it could pull lots of g’s.

As we secured from GQ and began to stand down,

I started to smile and loosen my frown.

A wink of my eye and a shake of my head

Soon let the crew know they had nothing to dread;

And then we received a general broadcast,

A hearty Ho, Ho! As his blip faded fast.

But I heard him exclaim, ere he drove out of sight—

“Merry Christmas to all, and to all a good night!”