LCS is a Frigate!

As reported across numerous Internet web sites, the Navy will change the LCS designation to FF, meaning frigate.  I said the Navy would engage in a PR blitz and this is the latest volley in the PR campaign.  Does the Navy really believe that changing the designation will fool anyone into believing that the LCS is suddenly and magically a modern frigate?  Heck, you’d have a hard time making the case for the LCS as a legitimate corvette by today’s standards!

If they're going to make up designations that don't apply, they should have just called it a BB, meaning battleship, to make it really sound impressive.  If we had 52 battleships, that would give the Chinese pause.

Honestly, you’d think this was another humor piece on my part but, I swear, you can’t make this stuff up!

LCS:  “Don’t be about it, talk about it.”

Death of a Salesman

We’ve noted the beginning of a PR campaign by the Navy in support of the barely changed LCS.  Well, it turns out that the Navy attempted to hire a New York marketing company to help them come up with a campaign to sell the “new and improved” LCS.  ComNavOps has obtained a recording of the initial meeting between the Navy and the marketing company.  Here’s the transcript.

Ad Executive:  Gentlemen, it’s an honor to assist the Navy.  Let me tell you just a bit about our company.  We can market anything and I do mean anything.  You may not know it but we were the ones who convinced people to pay several dollars for a bottle of water.  Yeah, that’s right!  The same stuff you can get for free from any tap in America and we sold people on paying through the nose for it.  So, what does the Navy want to sell? 

Admiral:  Well, we’ve got a ship that has an image problem and we’re afraid that it’s only going to get worse after we promised that we’d come up with a new frigate and, instead, just made a few minor tweaks and kept the same old ship.  We need to make everyone believe that it’s a brand new, amazing ship.

Exec:  No problem.  That’s what we do.  So, what’s notable about this ship that we can build hype around?

Adm:  Well, it’s fast.

Exec:  Fast!  That’s great.  People love speed.  What does the ship do with its speed?

Adm:  Nothing.  We haven’t found a use for it, yet.

Exec:  Ummm …  OK, not a problem.  Let’s take a different approach.  Everyone loves a giant steel battle machine.  We can …

Adm:  Sorry to interrupt but the ships are mostly aluminum.

Exec:  Aluminum.  ALUMINUM?!  My rowboat is made out of aluminum and it dents every time I hit a lilypad.  Plus, one time I put my camp stove in the boat before the stove had completely cooled and it nearly melted a hole in the boat.  You people build ships out of aluminum?  You’re kidding me!  Well, that won’t work.  What about guns?  America loves guns!  We can sell that.  I assume the ship has a great big gun?

Adm:  Ah, the gun doesn’t work.  When the ship goes too fast, the gun vibrates and we can’t hit anything.

Exec (jaw hanging open):  You’re killing me, here.  You gotta give me something to work with. 

All right, what if we make this a documentary marketing campaign?  You know – focus on actual patrols and the adventures of the ship and crew.  According to the notes you provided, you’ve got 4 ships in commission with around 16 commission years among them.  You’ve got to have some great war stories we can sell, right?

Adm:  Ah, we haven’t actually deployed any of them, yet.  Well, we did send one to Singapore for a PR tour but it wound up spending most of its time in port, being repaired.

Exec:  You’re yanking my chain, now, aren’t you?  Seriously, nobody would build a ship this pathetic.  There’s no way to sell this and believe me, we can sell anything to anyone.  Heck, we’re the guys that Lockheed Martin hired to sell the F-35 to the Marines.  I thought that was a tough one but this is ridiculous.  I’m sorry Admiral, come back when you have something we can work with.

LCS PR Campaign Begins

Once the Navy opted to pass on any significant improvement in the LCS, it was obvious that they would embark on a significant public relations (PR) campaign.  You know, if you can’t make it better, make it sound better.  Well, here’s a bit of the initial campaign as reported by USNI website (1).

“Rear Adm. Peter Fanta said the Navy had the option of building, ‘four to six exquisite ships’ with all the advances in technology possible, while knowing such a program ‘will take the next 15 to 20 years’ to complete.

‘Or I can build 20 modified LCSs in less than half the time,’ a plan the Navy is following in its small surface combatant program. He said those ships would be more survivable in air and surface fights and not only recognize a submarine operating nearby but know when a torpedo is heading her way than the current LCS. The ship also would be better armed for offensive operations and capable of operating in small surface groups.

The idea is to make sure an ‘enemy has to worry about me coming to get him,’ Fanta said at a session on the opening day of the Surface Navy Association’s 2015 symposium.”

So, Adm. Fanta says that the Navy knows that building “exquisite” ships with “all the advances in technology possible” would be a silly thing to do?  Perhaps he’s unfamiliar with the LCS program which attempted to jam all the possible remote, unmanned, network advances in technology into one ship?

Adm. Fanta also believes that the Navy could build 20 LCSs in 7-10 years.  Again, perhaps he’s unfamiliar with the timeline of LCS production?  June of this year will mark the 10 year anniversary of the start of LCS construction and there are 4 ships in commission, currently.  Despite this, he believes the Navy can build 20 LCSs in that same period?  I get his point and there’s nothing wrong with a bit of hyperbole but at least check your facts, Admiral.

Moving on …

Fanta describes the modified LCS as more survivable in combat and better armed for offensive operations.  Well, I guess that’s technically true but the improvement is miniscule and was a severe disappointment to all observers.

Finally, he states that the “enemy has to worry about me coming to get him”.  Really??  I’m pretty sure no enemy commander is staying up at night worrying about the LCS!

People, this is just the beginning of the PR blitz.  As the Navy would apparently say,

“Don’t be about it, talk about it!”

(1) "SNA: Surface Leaders Make the Case for the Modified Littoral Combat Ship", John Grady, 13-Jan-2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/01/13/sna-surface-leaders-make-case-modified-littoral-combat-ship

V-22 For Navy COD

The Navy has decided to buy 12 V-22 Ospreys for its carrier delivery (COD) role (1) which is currently filled by the C-2 Greyhound.  The Greyhound, you’ll recall, is a variant of the E-2 Hawkeye.

At a quick glance, the V-22 and C-2 appear to have very similar cargo and passenger capacities.  The main difference appears to be in their range.  Wiki cites the V-22 as having an 880 nm range while the C-2 is listed at 1300 nm.  I would have assumed that range was a pretty important factor for reaching carriers well out at sea but, to be fair, I don’t know what the range requirements are. 

The other aspect of this decision that is somewhat puzzling is that the C-2 is supportable on the carrier in that it shares commonality with the E-2.  How will a V-22 be supported?

I have no problem with selecting the V-22 but it is a slightly puzzling choice when range and support are factored in.  I hope this is not a politically motivated decision that sacrifices performance for political expediency. 

(1) "Navy Decides to Buy V-22 Ospreys for Carrier Delivery", Richard Whittle, 13-Jan-2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/navy-decides-to-buy-v-22-ospreys-for-carrier-delivery/

UCLASS Controller

Our past discussions have touched on the use of the F-35 as a local controller for an Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) strike aircraft.  The concept is that we are not at the stage of autonomous programming behavior that would allow the UCLASS to truly function on its own in a contested and complex environment so the F-35 would act as a man-in-the-loop local controller for the UCLASS.  Let’s look a bit closer at this concept.

We have to start by stipulating that this is almost entirely uninformed conjecture.  There is no official doctrine related to this that I’m aware of.  Further, the UCLASS not only hasn’t been built, yet, but hasn’t even been spec’ed.  In fact, we don’t even have agreement on the conceptual scope of the UCLASS design.  There are two camps, one pushing for an ISR UCLASS and the other for a full, deep penetration strike aircraft. 

Further, we have no concrete description of what “control” entails.  Is it remote control flying all the way to the target?  Is it analyzing sensor data and then designating targets and allocating ordnance?  Is it simply being available as a human fail safe but otherwise remaining inactive during the course of the UCLASS mission?  Something else?

Thus, it’s premature, at best, and irresponsible, for sure, to begin analyzing the F-35/UCLASS control methodology so that’s exactly what we’ll attempt to do!

The success of the concept depends, in large measure, on the degree of physical separation (the range) between the UCLASS and the F-35.  If, because of ECM, jamming, and communications difficulties, the F-35 has to fly wingtip to wingtip (on a relative basis, not literally) all the way to the release point then there’s no need for the UCLASS – the F-35 would already be there and could simply release the ordnance itself.

Control distance is also an issue as it relates to the F-35’s survival and involvement in combat.  If the F-35 has to be close enough to the strike area that enemy fighters and SAMs can find it and engage, the F-35 will probably be too busy to fighting for its life to control another aircraft.

Thus, the control range is a critical factor but it’s the realistic control range that can be achieved in an electromagnetically contested environment with active enemy ECM and jamming.  Currently, we believe that we can control UAVs half-way around the world but we’re going to find that in a war against a peer our communications and control capability is going to be seriously degraded.  ECM, jamming, degraded GPS, loss of satellite comm relays, and cyber attacks will conspire to render our peacetime expectations completely invalid.  Similarly, our optimistic assessment of the control distance between an F-35 and a UCLASS is, undoubtedly, going to prove invalid.  I would guess that the control distance will be a degraded line of sight, meaning around half line of sight.

I also wonder about the control signal reception and transmission.  Will the F-35 control aircraft have to maintain a specific attitude relative to the UCLASS in order to maintain a directional link and antenna geometery?  Will a maneuvering F-35 disrupt its own control signal by masking and unmasking its antenna?  I have absolutely no idea.  I merely pose the question.

Let’s move on to the actual control.  Are we going to ask a single pilot to fly his F-35, monitor threats to his own aircraft, fight for survival, and simultaneously control some number of UCLASS?  This sounds like way too much of a workload for a single pilot.  That leaves us with the need for a two-seat F-35.

Aside from the fact that there is no two-seat combat F-35, can a backseat operator effectively control another aircraft while his own plane is engaged in combat and pulling high-g’s or will the combat maneuvering render any hope of control null?  It would take a very calm, cool, and collected backseater to methodically work his control charges while the aircraft is fighting for its life!  This gets back to the previous question of standoff distance between the F-35 and UCLASS.  Without knowing the control distance, we can’t really address this aspect intelligently.  Still, it seems quite likely that a two seat F-35 will be needed since by definition these missions will be in the heart of enemy defenses and the F-35 pilot will probably be fully occupied monitoring and maneuvering to avoid those defenses.

Now, let’s consider the opportunity cost associated with this concept.  If the UCLASS requires an F-35 controller, that means we need to send two aircraft (or whatever the control ratio is) to execute a single ordnance release.  Not very efficient.  Further, tying up F-35s as controllers means that they can’t be executing another mission – the opportunity cost.  Worse, the controller would be the Navy’s absolute top of the line aircraft – almost a double opportunity cost hit.  It would be one thing if the controller were a helo that didn’t have any other high priority mission to do anyway but the F-35 will, presumably, be in ultimate demand and tying them down as controllers is a big hit on the air wing’s overall capability.  Of course, to be fair, if the target is sufficiently valuable then the opportunity cost is worth it.  However, the implication of that is that only a very small handful of missions would justify the use of the UCLASS/F-35 combo.  In that case, one has to question the usefulness of the UCLASS to begin with.

Another variation to the control scheme that has been proposed is a string of relay aircraft sending control and/or data streams back to the carrier.  This simply takes the preceding concept and multiplies it in regards to the opportunity cost.  If we have to dedicate several F-35s to each UCLASS we’re killing our combat efficiency.

Frankly, I don’t see the value of the strike UCLASS and the need for an F-35 controller (if, indeed, it does!) diminishes the value even further.

Attack Transport

The backbone of the American amphibious fleet in WWII was the attack transport, designated APA, which carried troops, their equipment, and around 20 landing craft to get them ashore.  Over the course of the war, hundreds were adapted from civilian ships or purpose built, many as sub-types of the Victory ships.  A typical example was the Haskell class, built during the last couple of years of the war.

Class:                         Haskell Class APA

Length:                       455 ft

Displacement:           6900 t (light)

Troop Capacity:        1500 troops

Cargo Capacity:        150,000 cu.ft., 2900 tons

Cost:                           $2M ($34M in 2014) – data from Wiki Victory ships

Contrast those specs to today’s Wasp class LHD.

Class:                         Wasp Class LHD

Length:                       831 ft

Displacement:           40,000 t

Troop Capacity:        1900 troops

Cargo Capacity:        ??

Cost:                           $1B each ?

The Wasp is twice the length and several times the displacement – a much bigger vessel.  Despite the size difference, the troop capacities are similar.  I’m not suggesting that the two vessels are, overall, equivalent.  The Wasp operates an aviation group and offers extensive medical facilities among other capabilities. 

Even a comparison of landing craft is not really relevant.  The Haskell carried around 20 landing craft while the Wasp can operate 3 LCACs or several LCMs in addition to helos which perform a landing craft role, to an extent.

There are two key points, here, and they’re related.  First, on a relative basis, the troop and cargo capacities of the Haskell are excellent and surpass the Wasp. 

Second, is the cost.  Unfortunately, I can’t find definite cost numbers for the Haskell but, presumably, they’re similar to the Victory ship costs.  Clearly, the cost per embarked troop strongly favors the Haskell class.  That’s not surprising given that they were essentially civilian ships and had limited functions.

What does this suggest regarding future amphibious force structure?

We’ve created a modern amphibious ship that has a LOT of capability but that capability comes at great cost and great risk.  If we lose an amphibious ship we lose a huge amount of capability.  Further, the emphasis on the aviation side has resulted in a ship that has a limited capacity to actually land the embarked troops and cargo in an opposed landing scenario.  Helos are marginally useful to move troops or very light equipment but are extremely vulnerable.  LCACs are not currently envisioned as first wave landers.  In addition, as we’ve previously discussed, the numbers of landing craft are too small to sustain a landing in the face of any attrition at all (see, "Amphibious Assault Attrition").

Perhaps the time has come to take a page from the WWII model by separating the troop/cargo transport and landing function from the aviation support function.  A modern Haskell, meaning a commercial cargo/transport/landing ship, could be built for $100M-$200M.  Separately, a new small helo carrier could fill the aviation and medical functions – a scaled down America without the troop berthing and support and without the ground combat equipment storage.

A commercial transport ship would need an easily deployed landing craft that could be carried in large numbers on the transport as was done in WWII.  Of course, such a landing craft does not currently exist but that should not be too difficult to develop.

The helo carrier could, of course, also operate an F-35B if those prove viable.  Such a carrier would, presumably, be significantly smaller, cheaper, and less expensive to operate than the current big deck amphibs.  When the well deck, Marine berthing, Marine equipment storage, and all the troop support functions such as food storage, galleys and mess, water requirements, heads, etc. are removed from the big deck amphib we should have a greatly reduced size carrier. 



APA - Model For The Future?



In conjunction with a discussion about a small helo carrier we need to recognize that helos are not a viable assault landing craft.  As landing craft, they’re limited to transporting a small raiding force.  Thus, a helo carrier would de-emphasize the vertical assault function and optimize the aviation element for close air support and counter-helo work.  The transport helos should be reduced in number and used for short battlefield troop movements.  In addition, eliminating the helo landing function would free up capacity on the helo carrier for more attack helos or F-35Bs.

A small transport would not be a viable “cruise” vessel.  The cramped spaces would not be conducive to a several month deployment as is currently done to maintain an afloat MEU.  The transports would be used only as needed which would have the side benefit of reducing operating costs.

In fact, it might be possible to combine the Maritime Pre-Positioning ship function with such a use-only-when-needed transport.  The transports could be pre-loaded with Army/Marine gear and marry up with their troops when needed.  This might also reduce or eliminate the need for the inefficient MLP if the transport can unload directly to its own landing craft.  The key, of course, is developing a suitable landing craft.

A small transport is not the most efficient amphibious vessel.  For ultimate, pure efficiency we’d need a mammoth vessel capable of holding the entire Marine Corps, all their equipment and supplies, every required landing craft, and the entire helo and fixed wing aviation force.  Of course, that would provide the enemy with a single target which would have a very short life expectancy.  Even the current sized amphibious vessels offer very tempting targets.  Consider that a MEU only has three ships – sink one and the assault is over.  Yes, I know that a MEU is not a full-fledged assault force but the idea and the vulnerability scales up to MEB or whatever size force the assault needs.  The more we can break up the assault force and distribute its equipment, the better.  C’mon, we figured this out in WWII.

I do not advocate a blind return to the past but I do advocate a very careful consideration of past practices before we abandon them and this is one of those instances.  We learned how to conduct amphibious assaults in WWII and our methods were based on hard earned experience.  Before we turn away from those practices and move in a different direction we need to be sure that the move is a wise one.  Our modern tendency to concentrate our amphibious forces in fewer, larger ships may not be wise or affordable.  It’s time to bring back the simple attack transport.

What Gun?

The Marines are planning to have the F-35 go operational in mid 2015 and the Navy is looking at late 2018 or so.  Of course, “operational” means different things to different people.  To you and me, operational means fully combat capable and ready to carry out any mission.  To the F-35 program office and the individual services, operational means able to fly and, perhaps, carry out some functions, though not all – maybe not even close to all.

For example, the F-35’s gun (25mm GAU-22) is not scheduled to become operational until 2017, at the earliest, as reported by Defense News website (1).

"The gun on the F-35 joint strike fighter remains on schedule to go operational in 2017, the Pentagon said Wednesday."

“GAU-22 was planned to go operational with the block 3F software. That software is scheduled to go online in 2017, with low-rate initial production lot 9.”

The key point in this is that the gun’s operation is tied to software and the F-35’s software has been notorious for slipping its schedule.  The odds that the 3F software will be ready as scheduled are very poor.

Reports indicate that the Marines will declare initial operational capability (IOC) with the Block 2B software which reportedly includes 89% of the code needed for full functionality.  While 89% may sound pretty good, recognize that the 89% includes all the basic take-off and flying code.  The question you should be asking is how much of the actual weapons capability is included in that 89%?  Is it 10%?  50%?  Who knows?  We know it doesn’t include a gun.  We know it doesn’t include the full sensor fusion that is supposed to be the “magic” of the F-35.  What else is not included?  I strongly suspect that it’s most of the weapons and combat capability.

Various GAO and DOT&E reports suggest software delays of a year or more are coming, as regards IOC.

So, will the F-35 be operational for the Marines in 2015?  Well, as an infamous person once said, “It depends what the definition of is, is.”  Operational depends on what your definition of operational is. 

(1) "F-35 Program Office: Gun Remains On Schedule", Aaron Mehta, 7-Jan-2015

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/01/07/f35-gun-on-track/21401907/