Near Miss

The USNI website reports a near miss flight incident between an Air Force RC-135 and a Russian Su-27 (1).

"The American aircraft was flying in international airspace when it encountered a Russian Su-27 fighter over the Sea of Okhotsk. The Air Force plane took evasive maneuvers to avoid hitting the Russian jet, which reportedly came within 100 feet of the U.S. aircraft.

Pentagon officials have characterized the incident as a blatant attempt to disrupt or interfere with U.S. operations in the area ..."

No mention is made of any supporting combat platform providing assistance to the Air Force plane.

You'll recall that we recently discussed the hazards associated with surveillance flights and passages for unarmed ships and planes and the need to provide immediate armed support to avoid another EP-3 or Pueblo incident (see, “Independent Operations”).  The post was directed at operations near China but Russia, clearly, must now be included in the discussion.

We seem determined not learn any lessons about protecting and supporting our high value assets.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2014/06/04/pentagon-russian-flanker-near-miss-u-s-air-force-jet#more-7974

The Myth of Modularity

Modularity. 

Payloads over Platforms. 

Ford pickups over Ferraris. 

Certain ideas get repeated so often that eventually discussion of their underlying validity (or lack thereof) gets bypassed and the discussion moves on to implementation.  Diversity is one example.  Despite absolutely no evidence that diversity offers any advantage, the national discussion bypassed the validity of diversity and moved straight into methods for achieving it.  Similarly, modularity has moved beyond discussion of its merits (or lack thereof) and straight into methods for achieving it.

CNO Greenert has been one of the biggest champions of modularity with numerous public statements espousing payloads over platforms but with little discussion of the actual merits.  Are modular payloads really the universal solution to all our tactical, technological, engineering, and budgetary challenges?  Navy leadership would assure that they are.  Are they, though?

Let’s consider a simple example.  We want to win a car race.  How do we do it given that we only have a pickup truck at our disposal?  Well, modularity would suggest we simply put a bigger engine (the module, in this case) in the truck.  Unfortunately, about half way through the first lap our truck would find its engine failing due to an inadequately sized exhaust system, its brakes overheating and failing because they aren’t properly sized for the power of the engine, the acceleration would be incapable of competing with the other true race cars because the gearing isn’t optimized for the engine, its tires would be shredding due to the high speeds, stress, and friction induced heat, and, worst, we’d crash because the steering and suspension couldn’t handle the high speed cornering.  In short, our modular pickup truck would get blown away by the specialized race cars whose every component was exquisitely optimized for racing.

What went wrong?  We had a modular approach and should have won, shouldn’t we?  The problem is that our module, the engine, was not tightly integrated with the rest of the truck (the platform) and to achieve maximum performance, it must be.

Now, if we want our modular truck to simply be as cost efficient as it can, we could add a more fuel efficient engine and we’d see improvement.  That’s an undemanding requirement that could be met by a module change.  Even there, we still wouldn’t achieve as good cost efficiency as a vehicle whose every component was designed for cost efficiency and tightly integrated to function together towards that end.

We see, then, that the weakness of modules is that, by their very definition, they are not tightly integrated with the carrying platform.  Lack of integration means, by definition, that performance must be sub-optimal.  That’s OK if the module’s task is undemanding.  Want to change a plane from a transport role to a cargo role by removing the modular seating?  No problem.  There’s no real penalty for the resulting cargo plane being a bit less efficient than a purpose designed cargo plane. 

However, when we start applying modularity to combat we run into the race car problem.  Asking an LCS to become an ASW platform by loading the ASW module (assuming it worked!) is asking a sub-optimal ASW vessel to go up against a dedicated, optimal submarine totally designed to kill ships.  Sub-optimal versus optimal.  The winner is going to be the submarine. 

In contrast to a generic, modular ASW platform, an optimal ASW platform should have quieting built into every component from the first rivet on up.  Every piece of machinery must be acoustically isolated.  The engines should be selected for acoustic and motive performance in the ASW operational speed range.  The sensors should be tightly integrated into the seaframe so that self-noise interference is absolutely minimized.  The hull, itself, should be sized and shaped to minimize self-noise and maximize maneuverability within the range of tactics that will be used.  That kind of integration and ultimate capability can’t be achieved simply by loading a module onto any old platform and, yet, that’s exactly what the Navy wants to do.  We’re intentionally developing a second tier fleet while our enemies are doing their best to develop optimized, focused, lethal platforms.

Modularity is fine for non-combat applications but has no place in combat.

FY 2015 Costs

The House Appropriations Committee released their draft defense spending bill for 2015 and it contains some informative numbers.

Navy shipbuilding is budgeted $14.3B for 6 ships (type unspecified).  That’s an average of $2.4B each.  Further, assuming a lifespan of 35 years, procuring 6 ships per year equates to a 210 ship fleet.  That’s a far cry from the 300+ ship fleet that the Navy and the current administration would like us to believe is coming.  The numbers are what they are.  The fleet is steadily shrinking.

Everyone’s favorite, the F-35, is budgeted for $5.8B for 38 aircraft (versions unspecified).  For you JSF fanboys who seem unable to do the math, that’s $153M per aircraft.  Don’t you hate actual numbers when you’re trying to argue for something?  I know, I know, once we hit serial production the cost will drop to ten dollars each – heck, we may even make money on each one built!

The EA-18G Growler is budgeted at $975M for 12 aircraft which is $81M each.

These aren't final numbers, of course, but they are interesting.

Soft Kill CEC

The Navy has developed, and continues to refine, its Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for use in anti-air warfare.  Briefly, CEC allows data sharing among individual ships which allows a group-centric engagement capability.  The shooting platform does not necessarily have to be the platform holding sensor contact on the target.  Thus, the entire group becomes a single AAW entity.  I’m not sure how far along that path the Navy has progressed.  Remote missile launch has been demonstrated but whether the software control has progressed to the point of allowing a group to function as a truly integrated single unit is an open question.  Just as Aegis, in full auto mode, makes its own assessment of threats and allocates the best weapons to counter them, so too could a group be controlled to make best use of the individual unit’s inventories and capabilities, at least in theory.

We’ve discussed that soft kill anti-air defense methods have a significantly better proven track record of success than hard kill methods (see, "AAW - Hard or Soft Kill?").  We’ve also noted that soft kill system upgrades and improvements are significantly cheaper than the pursuit of ever newer and more capable missiles and launch systems.  As we’ve pointed out, the Navy needs a balance between the two approaches.  Unfortunately, the Navy’s historical focus has been on the hard kill approach to the detriment of soft kill technology.

Thankfully, the Navy has begun to focus a bit of attention on upgrades to the venerable SLQ-32 ECM/ESM system.  That’s fine but it’s still just a bit-wise approach.  What’s needed is the soft kill equivalent of the CEC system – a soft kill cooperative engagement capability (SK-CEC) that treats the entire group as a single entity and assigns defensive actions based on the group’s capabilities which are, in turn, determined by the individual ship’s inventories, capabilities, detection thresholds,  positions, priorities, etc. 

Current soft kill efforts are conducted by individual ships acting in their own defense or, possibly, on behalf of a nearby ship.  The problem with this is that an action that might benefit one ship might endanger another.  The Royal Navy witnessed this in the Falklands when an escort’s decoys saved the escort but had the unintended effect of redirecting the attacking missiles to the very ship the escort was trying to protect.  SK-CEC would, theoretically allow the group to act as a single entity with defensive actions taken in consideration of the overall welfare of the group and with consideration for the group’s defensive priorities (which individual ship(s) have the highest protection priority).



Soft Kill CED - The Next Step?



Of course, the ultimate development in cooperative engagement would be to unite CEC and SK-CEC to create a single hard and soft kill defensive system.

The core of CEC or SK-CEC systems is the software.  As we’ve seen with the JSF and other advanced programs, this type of advanced and complex software development is challenging, to say the least.  On the plus side, the software can be developed without need of significant hardware until it’s reasonably advanced and ready for real world testing.  We don’t have to actually build ships in order to develop the system.  Development would not be cheap but it would not require insane amounts of money like the JSF or Ford programs.

We seem to have a foreseeable block of time without undue commitments (unless we plunge into another nation building exercise!).  Now is the time to work on an SK-CEC system in conjunction with SLQ-32 and other soft kill technology improvements.

Let’s speculate a bit further …  Given the rabbit hole of escalating costs for hard kill systems in the face of ever more deadly, fast, powerful, and capable anti-ship missiles, one could imagine that a preferred approach might be to drop area anti-air hard kill efforts and focus, instead, on a combination of soft kill and point defense hard kill.  Consider the benefits to the offensive capability of the fleet if such an approach were taken.  Burkes would become instantly more powerful offensively since the bulk of their VLS cells could be devoted to Tomahawks!  Now, for those of you who are already foaming at the mouth and twitching at your keyboards, I’m not yet advocating that this is the correct approach.  Honestly, I don’t know enough about the detailed performance of the various hard and soft kill components to make an accurate and objective assessment of the proposition – and neither do you.  I’m simply taking the hard versus soft kill issue to a logical conclusion.  Whether it’s a good conclusion, I can’t judge but it’s certainly worth thinking about given that our present approach is becoming unsustainably expensive and technologically too challenging.  Let’s face it, hitting a super/hyper-sonic, maneuvering, ECM-capable anti-ship missile with another missile is incredibly difficult currently and may soon become impossible on a practical basis.

The Navy already recognizes the difficulties, bordering on impossibilities, of successfully engaging anti-ship missiles with the current Aegis/CEC system - it’s  why the Navy has moved the amphibious assault point from the horizon to 50+ nm offshore.  The situation is only going to get worse as regards hard kill defense so now is the time to concentrate on soft kill methods.  The money that we’re going to begin pouring into Burke Flt IIIs might be better spent on soft kill methods.  We need to refocus on soft kill approaches and begin working towards an SK-CEC system. 

CNO's Focus on Peace

CNO Greenert is a prolific writer and speaker.  Unfortunately, he is also a prolific purveyor of pacifistic policies (a little alliteration, there).

Greenert has authored another of his frequent Proceedings articles (1).  This one espouses the global networked navy, a variation of the 1000-ship Navy idea.  He describes a loose network of navies that form a global force for good (couldn’t resist that one) and whose individual members come and go as their individual national interests presumably come and go relative to specific issues.

Aside from the obvious problem of trying to count on network members who may or may not participate depending on what the issue of the moment is, the main problem is that this concept is dependent on a group of navies that are, frankly, not very capable.  While this may be fine for dealing with pirates or providing humanitarian assistance on a small scale, it fails utterly when it comes to actual combat against  even a moderately capable enemy. 

This focus by CNO Greenert illustrates his main failing.  He is a peacetime, peaceful activity oriented leader.  We've previously discussed his failure to follow his own tenets (see, "CNO's Tenets - Walking or Just Talking?").  His focus is on the very low end of the naval mission spectrum.  He wants the LCS because it’s a smaller ship that won’t intimidate the navies of other countries and can better engage with them and their small vessels (he has actually stated that).  The Pacific Pivot seems to consist of sending LCS’s to Singapore.  He wants generic platforms that can accept any payload (we’ve already debunked that idea - see, "Payloads Over Platforms?") which is an accounting approach to combat rather than a warfighting approach.  He’s sacrificing ship maintenance, flight hours, and readiness in favor of humanitarian assistance.  He’s focused on building JHSVs, MLPs, AFSBs, etc. – and counting them as warships! – rather than MCMs, combat capable frigates, strike cruisers, and whatnot.  If push comes to shove, he’s already indicated that he’ll retire a carrier rather than halt LCS production (or the LCS follow on).  I can go on but you get the idea and you know the litany as well as I do.



The Navy Uncaged?



While peacetime activities make up 98% of the Navy’s tasking, it’s the CNO’s job to feed and care for the gorilla that only gets let out of its cage 2% of the time.  Do that and the 98% will take care of itself.  Fail to do that and the 2% will not take care of itself.  Instead, the Navy will find itself lacking and in desperate trouble when we need the gorilla and find we have only a tiny, but cute and cuddly monkey.



The Navy desperately needs a warrior as CNO.

(1) US Naval Institute Proceedings, “Forging a Global Network of Navies”, Adm. Johathan Greenert, USN and RAdm. James Foggo III, USN, May 2014, p.22

The Future of the Surviving LCS's

The LCS buy has been truncated at 32 vessels.  It’s even possible that Congress will not fund that many.  The current budget markup has reduced the requested LCS buy for 2015 by one.  Regardless, the Navy has not yet addressed the impact of the truncated buy on the future roles of the surviving LCS’s and, in particular, the impact on the existing module procurement plan.  Presumably, the planned 60 odd modules will be reduced to around 32-35.  The next logical question is what mission sets will the reduced modules be?  How many ASW?  How many ASuW?  How many MCM?

At least one of the questions is easily answered.  There will be few, if any, ASuW modules purchased.  The ASuW module borders on useless.  The main weapon of the module will be either the tiny and very short ranged Griffon or the now out of production Hellfire.  I can’t see the Navy spending money on a failed module for a truncated class.

The ASW mission is needed but the module is struggling and has reverted to existing, off-the-shelf technology.  There’s no need to procure modules that simply duplicate existing capabilities with no improvement.  On the other hand, there’s nothing wrong with a competent ASW capability that simply duplicates existing technology.  The problem is that the hull, itself, is not optimized for ASW and that’s likely to make the LCS a better target than hunter.  Still, the Navy may see a need for an ASW LCS.

The MCM mission, on the other hand, is desperately needed.  The Navy, entirely through their own fault, has allowed the Avenger class MCM and other MCM assets to literally rot away in anticipation of the LCS taking over the role.  Ignoring the self-inflicted origins of the MCM crisis, the Navy must have MCM vessels and, at least in the Navy’s mind, there is no other option than the LCS.  ComNavOps knows there are other, better options but that’s a topic for another time.  I’m sure the Navy sees a need for at least 24 MCM vessels, if not more – that was baked into the original LCS class and module procurement plan.  Thus, at least 24 of the 32 surviving LCS’s will be MCM variants. 

At that point, with only 8 additional vessels, does it make sense to even bother with ASW and ASuW modules?  The ASuW module certainly makes no sense.  A weak case could be made for 8 ASW LCS’s, I suppose.  The logical course would be to convert all 32 vessels to MCM.  This would greatly simplify logisics, training, and maintenance.  Trying to maintain a logistics support system and training pipeline for only 8 ASW modules makes no sense.

Another plausible scenario is that the 32 LCS’s could be split along version lines with the 16 LCS-1 class dedicated to ASW and the 16 LCS-2 class dedicated to MCM.  This makes less conceptual sense and leaves the Navy’s MCM capability at a paltry 16 vessels but it may appeal to the Navy if the particular characteristics of the two classes dictate it.

We see, then, that the most reasonable use of the surviving LCS’s is as MCM vessels.  Of course, given the Navy’s demonstrated indifference towards mine warfare (truly baffling given the proliferation of mines in the inventories of potential enemies and the historical impact of mines) it is quite likely that the Navy will come up with some other course of action.

What Use, the Navy?

The Navy exists for one reason and one reason only:  to fight and win wars.  The Navy (and the military, in general) is the gorilla that is let out of its cage to destroy the enemy when diplomatic efforts have failed and conflict is the only means of resolution left.  As such, the Navy must be bigger, meaner, and more powerful than any possible enemy.  The Navy must be capable of delivering vast amounts of destruction on demand.  CNO Greenert recognized this imperative with his “Warfighting First” slogan, although he has spectacularly failed to implement it.

The far, far, far, far secondary task is to patrol the world’s seas during peacetime and, insofar as possible, keep and promote that peace by providing presence, deterrence, security for global shipping, and the hundreds of other necessary peacetime tasks. 

The irony is that the secondary task makes up 99% of the Navy’s activities.  Nonetheless, the Navy’s leaders must firmly grasp the reality of the Navy’s priority and that is warfighting.  Every ship design, every piece of equipment purchased, every manning decision, every research project, and every weapon system must be focused with laser precision on the Navy’s core purpose of warfighting.

Unfortunately, the outlook of the military, in general, and Navy leadership, in particular, suggests that we have been too long without a reminder of the Navy’s true purpose and that not only has a peacetime mentality taken hold but, even more disturbing, the lessons of history are being misinterpreted.  Consider this passage from a recent Proceedings article (1).

“Senior U.S. military officers now say, ‘We are not posturing to plant the flag in the capital.’  At the high end, warfighting today is IAMD-centric [Integrated Air and Missile Defense] and not about regime change.  Deterrence and conflict prevention are all about competitive strategies, as we know from winning the endgame in the Cold War.  U.S. combatant commanders today are tasked with shaping the regional security environments in the areas of responsibility.”

That seemingly simple and innocuous statement encapsulates a great deal of folly, ignorance, and naiveté.

Let’s break it down.  “We are not posturing to plant the flag in the capital.”  Nothing should be further from the truth.  Consider the multitude of historical examples involving the planting of the flag versus not.  WWII was a prime example of planting the flag, firmly and unequivocally, in the capitals of Germany and Japan.  The result?  Both are now pillars of the global community.  On the other hand, consider the examples of N. Korea and Iraq (Desert Storm).  In each case, we fought a partial war to an indefinite conclusion, chose not to plant the flag, and have had to live with years of costly and difficult consequences.  For decades we’ve had to pay an enormous price to contain a now nuclear armed, belligerent, and insane N. Korea.  Our failure to plant the flag at the conclusion of Desert Storm led directly to having to fight Iraq a second time.  The cost to plant the flag in Germany and Japan was a bargain of untold magnitude compared to the ongoing problems resulting from our failure to do so in N. Korea and Iraq.  We see then, that the statement, “We are not posturing to plant the flag in the capital.”, derives from a failure to learn the lessons of history and demonstrates a folly and ignorance of the action-consequence link that is staggering in its magnitude. 

Consider the next sentence, “At the high end, warfighting today is IAMD-centric [Integrated Air and Missile Defense] and not about regime change.”  At the high end, war is all about regime change or at least it should be, as we just pointed out.  If we don’t end a war decisively and overwhelmingly we’ll continue to pay for it for years to come and may well wind up refighting it.  This statement is a complete failure to recognize what war is and what the Navy’s purpose is.  This is ignorance on a grand scale.

“Deterrence and conflict prevention are all about competitive strategies, as we know from winning the endgame in the Cold War.”

The Cold War was not won because of our deterrence or conflict prevention strategies.  The Cold War was won because we committed to preparing for the ultimate war and demonstrated that we were committed to winning it totally and decisively.  Our preparation for total war led the Soviet Union to engage in an arm’s race that their economy could not sustain.  Yes, there were many other factors at play and I’m simplifying but the point is that timid, half-measures of conflict prevention were not what won the Cold War.  Americans seem to have a chronically hard time recognizing that the rest of the world respects strength.  But, I digress … 

Our current crop of military professionals appear to be misinterpreting the lessons of history.  We seem to want to re-interpret history through a lens of wishful thinking and a haze of peaceful intentions.  Well, it didn’t happen that way and it won’t happen that way in the future.  China, for example, has no more respect for our peaceful gestures than the Soviet Union did.  We can remember our lessons or we can pay in blood to have them re-taught to us by countries that have learned the proper lessons.

(1) US Naval Institute, “Modernize Aegis for Naval Dominance”, John Morton, May 2014, p.60.