Below is a historical listing of the combat ships of the Navy. The count includes carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and amphibious ships. It does not include logistics support ships, mine warfare vessels, patrol craft, hospital ships, JHSV, and the like. I have also not included the LCS in the count since it currently has no combat capability. If/when it does, I'll include it.
Year Count
1980 392
1985 421
1990 405
1995 283
2000 243
2005 220
2010 225
2012 210
Data is taken from http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm
The trend is undeniable. The combat fleet is getting steadily smaller. Already, 13 ships have been announced for retirement next year although there are attempts underway in Congress to provide funding to retain 2-4 of those ships so the final number may vary. Even with a couple of scheduled commissionings, the net result will be a decrease of several ships for 2013.
While some may argue that today's ships are more capable than ever before, it's disturbing that combat power is being concentrated in ever fewer numbers which means the loss of any single ship is becoming ever more devastating. This phenomenon results in a situation where commanders are more and more reluctant to put ships in harm's way. We're already seeing this in the Navy's refusal to stand near a coastline due to the presence of shore launched anti-ship missiles which means that amphibious assaults must be conducted from well out to sea. I'll set aside the issue of whether that's ultimately a good thing or not and simply note that it's driven by fear of loss rather than tactical advantage.
The combat fleet is headed towards a level of 150 or so in the moderately near future (not withstanding the current administration's 30 year shipbuilding plan which is pure fantasy) given the budget limitations and the Navy's single-minded focus on building ever bigger and more expensive ships.
Compare the Navy's trend to China's and ponder the implications for yourself.
I'll update this from time to time.
Saturday, September 29, 2012
Friday, September 28, 2012
Amphibious Connectors
An amphibious assault? We all have the mental image of hulking amphibious ships lurking on the horizon and Marines storming the beach. But how did the Marines get from the ship to the beach? Well, a variety of ways, I guess, from the futuristic (though they’re actually getting quite dated!) looking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft to the ubiquitous Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) to helos and now MV-22 Ospreys among other means. All of these vehicles can be collectively referred to as connectors. Simply put, the connector is the transport between the ship and shore.
The connector has the potential to be both a potent enabler of the amphibious assault force as well as a bottleneck and vulnerability.
As an enabler, the connector should be able to transport Marines and their gear quickly, safely, and, ideally, with a little bit of inherent firepower to provide some support at the point of landing. The Marines should land in good physical shape and intimately integrated with their gear. In other words, they should be landed in peak physical readiness for battle.
As a weakness, the connector represents a potential bottleneck if there are too few connectors to transport sufficient numbers of Marines and weight of gear in a given time frame. Marines and gear sitting piled up on ship waiting around for connector transport are a recipe for disaster.
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| LCAC |
Similarly, the connector represents a possible vulnerability. Just as naval tacticians recognize that it’s far better to shoot archers than arrows, so too would any enemy recognize that it’s far more efficient to kill loaded connectors rather than deal with landed Marines. Unfortunately, current connectors are slow and unarmored for practical purposes relative to the modern missile age.
The current connectors are aging rapidly and most are only marginally suited for the modern battlefield. The AAV has been serving since the early 1970’s. The AAV’s long anticipated replacement, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is now a dead program with no other replacement in sight. The LCAC entered service in the mid 1980’s and only 91 were built. In addition, they’re large, slow (relative to missiles), attractive targets. MV-22s are great for rapid transport of troops but can’t carry heavy gear. The CH-53E heavy lift helo entered service in 1981 and airframes are being used up rapidly. And so on …
All right, so the existing connectors are aging and ill-suited. Can’t we just design new ones? Well, therein lies the initial problem and the crux of this discussion. What basic conceptual design is needed? Do we need a traditional short range amphibious vehicle or do we need a very long range, way-over-the-horizon vehicle? Are we doing traditional beachfront assaults or airborne, inland, maneuver warfare assaults?
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| Cancelled EFV |
The Marines tried to develop the EFV which is a short range beachfront assault vehicle despite the fact that both the Navy and Marines have stated that amphibious ships can’t survive within 50 miles of a defended beach due to the proliferation of shore launched anti-ship missiles. In fact, for a decade or more, the Marines have embraced behind-the-lines, bypass-the-beach, maneuver warfare doctrine. That being the case, why have they been fixated on the EFV? Even now, with the cancellation of the EFV, they seem to be looking for yet another short range, slow, AAV-like replacement, suggesting a continued emphasis on short range beachfront assaults which is at odds with public statements regarding assault distances.
On the other hand, the Navy is currently building a new class of amphibious ship (LHA-6) that doesn’t even have a well deck! OK, so that means we’re going to be doing long range airborne assaults, right? That’s fine except how do you transport M-1 Abrams tanks and all the other Marine combat vehicles and tons of gear and supplies by air? The MV-22 can carry troops but not much more. But wait a minute, didn’t the Navy just build an entire class of new LPD-17 class amphibious ships with well decks? So, I guess we are doing beachfront assaults.
You see the problem? I don’t think the Navy and Marines currently have a clear consensus on what type of assault operations they want to conduct in the future. Of course, they could just opt to try and cover all possible scenarios but the cost of that would be staggering.
The Navy and Marines need to agree on how amphibious assaults will be conducted in the future and then start designing new connectors that complement that vision.
On a related note, here are some capacity/range figures for aerial connectors as cited in an NPS thesis (1).
MV-22
5 ton external, 50 nm range
10 ton internal, 100 nm range
CH-53E
18 ton external, 215 nm range
15 ton internal, 230 nm range
(1) Naval Postgraduate School , Thesis: Cost Benefit and Capability Analysis of Sea-Base Connectors, Justin Dowd, Sep 2009, p. 17-18
Monday, September 24, 2012
USS Ponce - Afloat Forward Staging Base
Navy Times has posted a short article (1) describing the initial deployment of the USS Ponce which is the amphibious ship that was converted into an afloat forward staging base. Among other possible uses, the ship will provide mine countermeasures support, SOF support and command facilities, area surveillance via UAVs, mothership maintenance support to smaller vessels, and so forth. This is still a somewhat experimental concept in terms of opertional concepts and usefulness but it is good to see the Navy get more use out of an older amphibious ship rather than retire it.
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| USS Ponce Recovering UAV |
I wonder how combat, damage control, command, and discipline are handled? I know little about this aspect of the Navy but it’s a fascinating area.
(1) Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/09/ap-navy-floating-base-gets-workout-092212/, Adam Schreck, Sep 22, 2012
Thursday, September 20, 2012
Asymmetric Advantage
The general media has gone to great lengths to point out, correctly, that many of our potential enemies have or are pursuing asymmetric advantages. Mines, small boat suicide attacks, small boat swarms, fast attack missile boats, intermediate range ballistic missiles, small and quiet non-nuclear subs, and so forth. What isn’t discussed is the fact that the US possesses, or could develop, asymmetric advantages of our own.
Our two biggest conventional advantages are technology and money (current budget problems notwithstanding!). These can be leveraged into asymmetric advantages. What kinds of asymmetric advantages? Well, this is where the imagination can go wild. For the sake of brevity, I’d like to nominate one particular area that few other countries or non-state actors can match and that would provide disproportionate advantages for us.
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| Underwater Glider UUV |
In real estate it’s location, location, location. In war it’s recon, recon, recon. Where’s the enemy and what are they doing? If you know that, the battle gets a whole lot easier. Call it intel or surveillance or recon or whatever, the ability to monitor the enemy is a priceless advantage. Of course, the Navy already has many systems for collecting intel: submarines, satellites, electronic signal intercepts, and so on. To a greater or lesser extent those systems all collect information from a distance or, in the case of subs, put themselves at risk to get up close. Why not develop systems that can get extremely close and have little risk of detection? Well, in fact, the Navy is working on just such systems in the form of unmanned vehicles, both aerial and subsurface.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are solidly into their development curve and offer well known and powerful surveillance capabilities as demonstrated over today’s battlefields. They do have a few disadvantages or limitations such as being fairly detectable, if one wishes to look for them, they have relatively limited range and endurance, and they are susceptible to control signal disruption. These issues are undoubtedly being addressed.
Let’s look a bit further at Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). By comparison to UAVs, UUVs are in their infancy. The Navy and industry are currently developing a variety of UUVs and there is no point attempting to describe specific systems. Conceptually, UUVs offer the potential to retain many of the advantages of UAVs while avoiding some of the limitations.
UUVs, by their very nature as underwater vehicles, are extremely difficult to detect. Consider how hard it is to detect a full size submarine and how much harder it must be to detect something a fraction of that size. Once deployed in their operating area, UUVs can provide very close range surveillance of ships, mines, subs, harbors, coastlines, water conditions, geography, etc. with little risk.
Various technologies are being explored which may allow UUVs to operate almost indefinitely, thereby overcoming one of the limitations of UAVs. Solar power, wave regeneration, thermal recharge, ionic recharge, etc. are all methods that offer the possibility of extremely long endurance. Consider the advantages inherent in a UUV that can loiter for days or months, undetected, and providing continuous monitoring of an area.
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| Undetectable and Long Endurance |
As the imagination expands a bit, the possible uses for UUVs are almost limitless. Imagine being able to attach small shaped charges to an enemy ship in its own harbor, or being able to have a small UUV attach itself like a limpet to a ship or submarine to provide continuous tracking, or, with some lead time, mapping out a minefield. The possibilities are endless!
Of course, there are associated problems. Underwater communications is challenging. It does no good to collect information if it can’t be transmitted. Remote underwater control is even more difficult, bordering on impossible over any significant distance. UUVs would largely have to operate autonomously. Still, as with UAVs, these problems can be solved over time.
UUVs offer a potential asymmetric advantage that is extremely powerful and well worth continued intense development. Few other countries and no non-state groups can either utilize or counter this technology. The Navy would do well to commit significant resources to developing this potential advantage.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
Listen To Your Enemy
Listen to your enemy. He’ll tell you what he fears most.
Let’s take the case of China . The U.S. military is dithering over its overall force structure and the Navy seems totally lost as far as having a coherent vision of what the fleet should look like. More LCSs? Less? Are carriers obsolete or still a potent weapon system? Do we need more amphibious ships? With or without well decks? Anybody want a frigate? Should we have small missile boats?
In theory, we should be able to turn to our uniformed, professional naval strategists for guidance although that seems to be producing nothing but conflicting signals. Fortunately, there is one other source of expert opinion on the Navy’s fleet composition and that is China . Who better to tell us what our strengths and weaknesses are and what weapons and platforms threaten them the most? But they’d never tell us that, you say? Sure they will – if we listen closely. In fact, they’ve been telling us all along.
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| China's Biggest Fear? |
The Navy moves ships through Chinese “controlled” waters all the time. Which ship movements do the Chinese protest the loudest about? The carriers! China has repeatedly warned the U.S. against deploying carriers in “Chinese waters”. They don’t protest destroyers and they’re certainly not going to protest the LCS anytime soon. The Chinese fear the U.S. aircraft carrier.
What else is China telling us? In addition to verbal protests, the Chinese are telling us what platforms they see as valuable by their own building program. Obviously, they’re trying to build platforms that they believe have the most value. What are they trying to build? Two ship types jump out. One is the aircraft carrier. They’re pushing hard to develop their own carrier capability. That should tell us how they perceive the value of a carrier. Odd, isn’t it, that at the very moment when we’re debating whether the carrier is obsolete, the Chinese are trying desperately to develop their own? They’re telling us something if we’ll only listen.
The other ship type is the submarine which has been a point of emphasis by the Chinese for many years. They’re rapidly increasing both the numbers and quality of their submarine fleet. Interestingly, they have a significant non-nuclear submarine force although that may be more a cost and construction/operational expertise limitation than a long term plan. On the other hand, maybe they see value in a submarine type that we don’t.
What else might the Chinese be telling us? That intermediate range ballistic missiles are a potent threat? That small missile boats that disperse striking power among multiple platforms are a difficult threat to counter? That long range conventional bombers carrying long range anti-ship missiles constitute a significant anti-shipping threat? That mine warfare produces results all out of proportion to their cost and technology? That quantity matters more than quality?
Admittedly, some of the trends in Chinese military development may be due more to their own unique requirements than to a direct fear-based response to our capabilities but, still, if we listen closely and consider what we hear wisely, we can learn a lot about what our best platforms and weapons are, or should be.
Your enemy will tell you what you want to know if you’re willing to listen.
Friday, September 14, 2012
Adm. Harvey's Mea Culpa
Adm. John Harvey is retiring and sent out a retirement letter to the fleet containing a warning for the future of the fleet. The letter is both a scathing indictment of Navy leadership over the last few decades and a recognition of his own culpability. Specifically, he addresses the change in focus by Navy leadership from readiness to cost efficiency and the resulting unintended consequences of sub-optimal manning, maintenance failures, INSURV failures, inability to effect repairs at sea, loss of technical competence throughout the fleet, loss of readiness, etc. I’ll leave it to you to follow the link and read the letter for yourself.
This issue is one of the main reasons I started this blog. I was disgusted by the incompetent leadership of the Navy and the way they were ruining my fleet. Make no mistake, current leadership is every bit as incompetent as previous groups.
While I commend Adm. Harvey for his belated recognition of the problem and applaud his current efforts, I am appalled at his complicity in the creation of this mess and I do not exonerate him one bit as a result of his mea culpa. To be fair, he accepts the personal responsibility in his letter and apologizes for it. Well, too little, too late, Admiral. Where were you for the rest of your career? You were part of the problem.
What really disgusts me is that this problem was not difficult to spot. If I, a civilian with no naval experience, could clearly see the problem, why couldn’t Navy leadership, supposed experts in their chosen profession, see it? That’s just total incompetence and speaks to the badly flawed criteria we use to select our naval leadership.
Sadly, despite Adm. Harvey’s hopeful belief that we’ve turned the corner, I just don’t see it. Instead, I see continued failure to get serious about maintenance and training, on-going parts shortages, a budgetary focus on new construction rather than upgrades and maintenance of existing platforms, acceptance of sub-standard and incomplete ships, attempts to classify LCS, JHSV, and hospital ships as battle force ships so as to maintain the illusion of a growing fleet, and so on. Work, Greenert, and the rest are continuing to lead the Navy down the wrong path and I will continue to point it out. This blog is about naval matters and leadership is the single most important naval matter.
Thursday, September 13, 2012
BVR - Is It Useful?
Before we go any further, let’s set aside the question of the wisdom or value of the ROEs and VID requirements. There are good arguments for and against these requirements and they go beyond mere military aspects to include public relations, ethics, politics, etc. The requirements are what they are so we’ll simply accept them for the sake of this discussion.
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| AIM-54 Phoenix - Unusable? |
The VID requirement is why Phoenix has never achieved a kill and, to the best of my knowledge, only been launched in anger on one occasion. It’s why Iraqi planes were largely able to make a successful mass exodus during Desert Storm. And so on …
Failure to follow VID has led to a few infamous incidents, notably the Vincennes and the recent firing on an apparent fishing boat by a Navy replenishment ship.
Given that VID is a near-requirement, one can’t help but wonder about the value of BVR weapons. If you can’t use them as intended, what’s the point of having them? Now, I’m not suggesting that we stop development of BVR weapons. Of course, we need them for the all out war situations where BVR will(?) be allowed. The VID requirements do, however, greatly diminish the value of BVR and, in practice during peacetime or limited conflicts, almost totally negate the use of BVR.
For example, if we had our own version of an intermediate range anti-ship ballistic missile (the Chinese “carrier-killer”) would we even use it knowing that there would be a risk, however small, of inadvertently targeting civilian or neutral shipping?
What is my point? Well, to an extent, I don’t have one. I simply note the difficulty in applying BVR combat and the resulting diminishment of overall combat capability when VID is required. Beyond that, I’d suggest that future enhancement of combat capability would benefit more from BVR target identification capabilities than continued development of ever longer range weapons that we won’t allow ourselves to use. Just something to think about as we read and assess future weapon systems.
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