USNS Wally Schirra Maintenance

Here’s an interesting piece of potential good news.  According to a press release, the Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship, USNS Wally Schirra, T-AKE-8, completed a several month maintenance overhaul in Korea at the Hanwha Ocean Co. (previously Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering) facility.[1]  If this turns out to be a viable option, the flexibility to obtain maintenance at a foreign yard increases our maintenance capacity and improves fleet availability.
 
What wasn’t spelled out in the press release was the actual cost compared to budget or the adherence to the planned schedule.  The work was originally supposed to be completed in Dec 2024 but ran into March 2025 when the scope of the work was increased due to additional maintenance requirements discovered during the course of the project.  Thus, it appears that the schedule overrun was an add-on approved by the Navy rather than an inability to meet the original schedule.  It was also not revealed whether all of the maintenance items were addressed within the allotted time frame – typically, US ships in US yards leave their maintenance periods with significant work unaddressed due to time pressures – a practice that simply kicks the maintenance can down the road and causes worse problems in the future.  For example, the USS Port Royal grounding was, in part, directly attributable to the failure to complete work on a faulty navigation system.
 

USNS Wally Schirra Entering Hanwha - that is
one beat up looking ship!

 
A Navy press release gives a hint of the scope of the work: 

ROH [Regular OverHaul] conducted aboard Wally Schirra in the Republic of Korea included dry docking, and more than 300 work items that addressed hull corrosion and a full rudder replacement.
 
“Hanwha addressed extensive deterioration and damage to the hull, propeller, rudder, and rudder post/steering gear,” said Cmdr. Patrick J. Moore, commanding officer, MSC [Military Sealift Command] Office-Korea. “Notably, Hanwha engineers reverse-engineered the damaged rudder, completely replacing the unit when blueprint were not available.[2]

A concerning item is the replacement of the rudder and the lack of a blueprint to do so.  How is it possible for the Navy to not have a blueprint for the ship’s rudder?  That’s mind-boggling.
 
That aside, if the work was completed on time and on budget, that’s a tremendous accomplishment both for the Korean company and for the general Navy maintenance effort.
 

USNS Wally Schirra Leaving Hanwha - that's what
a ship should look like!

 

Hanwha Ocean is currently executing an overhaul on USNS Yukon.
 
If obtaining maintenance from a foreign company turns out to be a viable and effective option, the beneficial impact on Navy readiness cannot be overstated.  This would increase our maintenance capacity, increase ship availability, increase readiness, and improve overall ship quality. 
 
Of course, there is always the issue of sensitive/secret equipment and how to ensure the security of that equipment while in a foreign yard.  It’s probably not that significant an issue for logistics ships but warships are crammed with sensitive/secret equipment.  Still, even being able to obtain additional maintenance on the logistics fleet would be a tremendous help.  I love to be able to say this:  well done, Navy!
 
If nothing else, maybe we can pull into a foreign dock and get the rust removed from our rotting ships!
 
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Hanwha Ocean completed its first MRO on US Navy ship”, staff, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/hanwha-ocean-completed-its-first-mro-on-us-navy-ship/
 
[2]Navy website, “USNS Wally Schirra Completes Major Maintenance at South Korean Shipyard”, Grady Fontana, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/4118860/usns-wally-schirra-completes-major-maintenance-at-south-korean-shipyard/
 

Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

USS Stark Lessons

We have often examined battles to glean lessons learned.  Along a slightly different line, let’s take a look, now, at a single incident, as opposed to a full battle.  The incident is the attack on the USS Stark which saw an Iraqi aircraft launch two Exocet missiles, both of which hit the Stark, one exploding and the other may not have exploded but did spew hundreds of gallons of flaming fuel.
 
The information that follows is taken mainly from the excellent book, Missile Inbound [1].
 
Here are some points of interest to keep in mind as you review the timeline presented further down the page:
 

• The electronic warfare (EW) SLQ-32 unit on the Stark was a passive-only signal detection device.  It could detect signals and identify them by comparing to a signals library.  The ultimate output of the SLQ-32 to the operator was a signal source/type and bearing.[1, p.67]  It did not provide range.
• The CIWS on the Stark was capable of detecting, tracking, and notifying the operator that it was tracking a target.[1, p.68]  The Stark’s CIWS was in ‘Standby’ mode at the time of the attack.
• Stark had both the SPS-55 and SPS-49 operating.  The SPS-49 operator was inexperienced and did not have the proper range setting on the radar and failed to see the attacking aircraft.  In fact, the Stark’s radar never detected the aircraft but were aware of the aircraft’s movements via data link from an AWACS.
• Ship was in Battle Condition III (BC III) which required a third of the crew to be on duty and all weapon stations manned.[1, p.69]

 
As a brief review, here is the timeline of the event.  I’ve used generic descriptions of a person’s position, listed in block parentheses [xxx], instead of names to avoid confusion.
 
2050 hr – One of the two required fire controlmen was allowed to leave CIC, in violation of BC III, for a bathroom break and never returned before the missiles hit.
 
2055 hr – Stark establishes its first radar contact when an officer changes the radar range mode to the correct setting.
 
2102 hr – SLQ-32 operator detects the aircraft’s search radar emissions.
 
2104 hr – Aircraft is 39 nm from Stark.
 
2105 hr – At 32.5 nm, Mirage turns directly towards Stark but no one in CIC notices.
 
2107 hr – At 22.5 nm, F-1 Mirage launches first missile.
 
2108 hr – Stark CIC notices Mirage has changed course directly towards them and decides to issue standard radio warning to aircraft.  At 15.5 nm, Mirage launches second missile.  SLQ-32 detects a momentary radar fire control lock from what the CIC crew believes is the Mirage.  The signal reverts to routine search mode in a couple of seconds.
 
2109 hr – Crew is dispatched to arm the port and starboard chaff launchers and launchers are switched from ‘safe’ to ‘on’.  Lookout spots first missile but verbal warning is not relayed to CIC in time.  SLQ-32 operator reports second radar lock signal.  CIC officer orders the Mk92 STIR (fire control radar) to track the Mirage but is told that the Mirage is in the STIR blind zone.
 
2110 hr – First missile impacts.
 
2111 hr – Second missile impacts.
 
 
Discussion
 
The Stark incident has been reported and analyzed many times so I won’t belabor the more obvious points.  There are, however, a few points that are particularly pertinent.
 
1. Officers later testified that they never detected a ‘terminal homing’ signal from the Mirage.  This indicates a glaring lack of knowledge about the Mirage which had a track-while-scan radar and did not generate anything approximating a ‘terminal homing’ signal.  What the SLQ-32 operator momentarily noticed was likely the first missile’s seeker signal.  Had CIC recognized what the SLQ-32 actually detected, they would have had time to switch the CIWS into automatic mode.
 
This reveals that the crew was poorly trained.  They should have been well versed in both the capabilities of the SLQ-32 and the characteristics of all the aircraft in the region.  This is just elementary logic.  The failure to learn about the aircraft and weapons in the region would suggest that either the captain and crew were negligent in the extreme (fatally so) or were too busy with ancillary work to make time for the study of regional aircraft and weapons.  Indeed, the book points out that the crew's top priority leading up to the moment of attack was an upcoming high speed engineering test (OPPE).  Crews in a war zone should never have a higher priority than combat.  This is a failure of leadership at higher levels than the ship and crew.
 
2. The CIWS was never placed in automatic mode which would have allowed it to fire at the incoming missiles.  The officers testified that they left the CIWS in manual mode because they didn’t want to risk an accidental shoot down of the aircraft, believing it not to be a threat.  How they thought a CIWS with a range of some 1500 yds would shoot down an aircraft 15-20+ nm away was never explained.  Again, this demonstrates the officer's lack of familiarity with their own equipment.
 
The default mindset in a war zone should have been the opposite:  CIWS should always be in automatic mode in a war zone and switched to manual only when a verified friendly aircraft receives permission to approach.  If the price of saving a billion dollar ship is the occasional loss of a friendly pilot and aircraft due to the pilot’s stupidity, so be it.  I think such an approach would see a very rapid increase in pilot awareness and discipline – which is a good thing!
 
3. Allowing crew to leave their stations during BC III reveals the lackadaisical approach of the ship’s leadership and the absence of a combat mentality.  The ship’s captain, Capt. Glenn Brindel, testified that the absence of the fire controlman was a major contributing factor.  Regarding the inability of the STIR to track the Mirage due to the blind zone, Brindel said, 

[The CIC officer] did not know of the blind zone, Brindel said it was because [the fire controlman] had left the CIC for a head call without [the CIC officer’s] knowledge.  That fact, Brindel said, was key to the CIC’s inability to defend the ship.[1, p.80]

Brindel claimed not to know that leaving CIC without qualified replacement was a common practice by his crew.  If true, that speaks poorly about Brindel’s awareness of his crew’s behavior and his own failure to properly train his crew.
 
 
Lessons
 
Mindset.  The preceding points offer an overall lesson for us, today, about combat and combat mindsets.  Ultimately, the Stark tragedy can be traced back to the lack of a combat mindset by both the captain/crew and higher level fleet leadership.  No one in the entire chain of command was mentally prepared for combat.  They were lulled into complacency by the multitude of previous attacks that were directed against Iranian shipping.  In today’s world, where terrorism can strike anywhere and anytime, combat must be the default mindset.
 
Technology versus Knowledge.  Technology is not the answer to combat;  knowledge is.  Highly advanced equipment that is not fully understood (looking at you, Aegis) is worse than useless as it leads to incorrect assumptions (recall the training drone strike on the Tico cruiser), misinterpretations, and failure to grasp the reality of a situation.  Better to have simpler equipment that is completely understood.
 
__________________________
 
History keeps telling us exactly what we should be doing and we keep ignoring it.
 

__________________________

 
(1) Missile Inbound, Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 1-55750-517-9
 

2023 DOT&E Quick Hits

Following are some quick hits from the 2023 (released 2024) DOT&E annual report.  Again, I cannot stress the near-uselessness of the DOT&E reports since Dr. Gilmore left.  Nevertheless, consider these items:
 
 
CH-53K
 
The DOT&E report assess the CH-53K as not operationally suitable.
 

In the December 2022 IOT&E report, DOT&E determined that the CH-53K is not operationally suitable. The aircraft demonstrated acceptable results for all reliability and maintainability metrics.
 
However, the demonstrated low aircraft availability does not support sustained operations.  Additionally, the low probability of success of the automatic blade fold system will result in mission aborts and extended deck cycles that could hamper amphibious operations. The aircraft demonstrated its sortie generation rate requirement.  Unexpected main and tail rotor blade erosion damage was observed on aircraft operating in the desert environment during IOT&E. Extended time was needed to repair blade erosion damage because of the lack of a structural repair manual. Battle damage assessment and repair also requires a structural repair manual that has yet to be delivered.[1, p.161]

CMV-22B COD
 

As reported in the combined FOT&E and LFT&E report of June 2022, DOT&E found that CMV-22B was not operationally suitable due to failures of many subsystems … [1, p.164]

The miraculous V-22 is less than miraculous?
 
 
F-18 Software
 

The Navy stopped SCS [Software Configuration Set] H16 operational testing during 4QFY22 due to severe software deficiencies, but still fielded the system to the operational fleet in FY23 without completing the DOT&E-approved FOT&E test plan.[1, p.195]

So, severe deficiencies identified in testing but the Navy fielded the system anyway?  I don’t see any way that can go wrong.
 
 
Constellation
 
From the DOT&E operational effectiveness assessment, 

Unclassified risks to operational effectiveness include that the FFG 62 design does not have a tracker illuminator system, which is typically installed on other Aegis platforms, and that the design crew size will be highly reliant on currently unproven system automation and human system interfaces. The Navy acknowledges the risk of the current crewing strategy for FFG 62 … [1, p.201]

Independence LCS-MCM
 
Here’s the operational suitability assessment of the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) that is the actual sweep portion of the MCM module as opposed to the one-at-a-time hunting systems.  Doesn’t look good. 

UISS is not operationally suitable, as documented in the UISS IOT&E report dated June 2022. UISS’s reliability and availability do not support sustained mine sweeping operations.[1, p.207]

MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Tanker
 
How’s that tanker coming along? 

DOT&E has not approved any operational test plans for MQ-25.[1, p.217]

Not even testing, yet???

SEWIP 

…preliminary data indicate SEWIP Block 2 fails to meet its reliability and operational availability requirements.[1, p.242]

John Lewis Class Replenishment Oiler 

USNS John Lewis could not support scheduled test events on five occasions due to equipment failures.[1, p.245]

Discussion
 
A few common themes jump out from the DOT&E report.
 
While it is perfectly normal for every new project to encounter problems, many of the systems being reported on are far from being new and the degree of problems encountered is not acceptable.
 
The number of scheduled test events that were cancelled due to equipment failure – often not of the test item, itself! – is disappointing especially when one considers that the tests were scheduled and the equipment presumably underwent meticulous tweaking prior to the test period.  The failures paint a picture of a Navy that is physically failing and is incapable of performing rapid, on-site repairs.  This speaks worlds – and poorly - to the specter of battle damage and our ability to ‘stay in the fight’ when damaged.
 
As noted many times in the past, the Navy lacks suitable, enemy-representative, target drones for realistic testing.  To paraphrase, ‘millions for new construction, not a penny for testing!’  The Navy’s priorities are beyond badly screwed up.

Stop Talking, Start Doing

 
This from SecDef Pete Hegseth during an interview with Shannon Bream,
 

“We won World War II with seven four star generals, Shannon. We have 44 today … Has it created better outcomes or not? We’re challenging a lot of assumptions at the Pentagon to streamline what we do so that we get as many resources as possible to the warfighter.”[1]

So, stop talking, Pete, and start firing people.  Arithmetic says, 44-7 = 37.  I’m waiting to see 37 generals fired.  Otherwise, it’s all just talk and you’re no different from your predecessors. 
 
Stop talking and start doing.  What are you waiting for?  Don’t disappoint me.
 
 
 
… and then do the Navy.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Daily Caller website, “‘The Status Quo Hasn’t Worked’: Hegseth Breaks Down Why Pentagon Needs Major Shake Up”, Hailey Gomez, 23-Feb-2025,
https://dailycaller.com/2025/02/23/pete-hegseth-pentagon-trump-administration/
 

CNO Franchetti Fired

In a not entirely unexpected, and very welcome move, SecDef Hegseth has fired CNO Franchetti.  During her tenure, she accomplished nothing, perpetuated the problems she inherited, and solved no existing problems (see, "CNO Franchetti - Another Failed CNO in the Making").  She had a notably undistinguished resume for the position and, I suspect, was a DEI hire.
 

Good riddance.
 
Of course, it remains to be seen who the replacement will be and whether they’ll be any better.  Still, this is a possible first step towards fixing the Navy.  Well done, SecDef.

Asymmetric Warfare Against the Chinese

A reader recently offered his opinion that the US has no hope of achieving victory in a war with China due to China’s overwhelming superiority in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  I’m not going to cite the reader’s comment as I have no wish to embarrass him.  Besides, his view is shared, to varying degrees, by many people so he’s hardly unique.  Is he correct?  Is America doomed?  Let’s examine this view.
 
For starters, the reader’s assumption of China’s overwhelming superiority is incorrect, in many ways, but for the sake of this discussion, let’s stipulate that he’s exactly right – that China does, indeed, have overwhelming superiority of technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  It would seem, then, that the US, indeed, has no hope of victory.  After all, those are the main determinants of victory in any war, right?
 
Or are they?
 
Let’s start where we always do … history.  Let’s look at some recent examples.
 
Vietnam – The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (US) - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (Soviet Union) - The Soviet Union enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Korea - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers (at least until the Chinese entered the war), and industrial capacity and yet could only achieve a stalemate.
 
Without a doubt, technology, numbers and industrial capacity are important, especially in a conventional war, but, clearly, history proves that there are other, more important, factors that can overcome technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  What are those factors? 
 
 

• Will – First and foremost is will.  Determination.  The absolute unwavering desire for victory and nothing less.
• Victory Conditions – One sure way to lose a war is to enter into it without a clear idea of the end state (total victory, one assumes).  The US has violated this requirement repeatedly since WWII.  Indeed, a very strong case can be made that the US has not had a clear idea of victory conditions in any conflict it’s entered since WWII.
• Commitment – Hand in hand with will is the willingness to do whatever is required to win.  This means not allowing the enemy sanctuary across some border, not holding back out of fear of collateral damage or casualties, not scrubbing target lists to see which ones will play well on the public relations stage, and not giving a damn what the rest of the world thinks.  If you’re serious enough to enter a war, the only ‘good’ outcome is total victory as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary.
• Training - Training can overcome a lot of other disadvantages.  A properly trained man with a knife can beat a man with a machine gun.  We have hollow forces, currently; China's level of training is unknown.  We need to be trained to the peak of effectiveness. 
  
• Brutality – Part of the commitment to war is the commitment to the brutality of war.  The US has been far too squeamish about war since WWII and, thus, unable to wage war efficiently, meaning brutally effective.  I recall a small uproar of protest amongst the population during Desert Storm when it was revealed that the US bulldozed trenches and buried Iraqi soldiers alive.  Killing is killing.  It’s not our job to gently cradle enemy soldiers while we wait for them to die of old age.  Our job is to kill as efficiently as possible.
• Simplicity - Simplicity trumps complexity in battle.  Complex equipment that won’t function in the stress of combat, can’t be maintained, and can’t be repaired is of no use.
• Decentralization – A decentralized command and control structure can only help during war.  It reduces confusion and eliminates a vulnerable center of gravity.

 
 
In every example conflict cited above, the loser violated one or more (generally all!) of the factors just described.
 
So, can the US win a war with China even with the stipulation that China possesses superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity?  Of course we can!  However, it requires unwavering determination, crystal clear victory conditions, and total commitment. 
 
There is yet another factor that can offset superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and that is unconventional strategy and tactics.  Ukraine has amply demonstrated this with their unmanned assets, among other developments.  The Chinese used human wave attacks.  The North Vietnamese / Viet Cong used all manner of unconventional tactics.  The Taliban used IEDs and hid amongst the civilian population.  And so on.
 
Some people refer to this as asymmetric warfare and often use it as an excuse as to why a seemingly superior country lost to an inferior one.  Is asymmetric warfare some kind of magic solution?  Let’s consider it.
 
Let's start by dispensing with the silly notion that asymmetric war is somehow a different kind of war. It's not. War is war. Asymmetric simply means the enemy used different tactics than you did and, more often than not, asymmetric is used to try to explain away how you managed to lose to an inferior force.
 
So, recognizing that war is war, we now note that technology is not only NOT a guarantee of victory, it is often a detriment. For example, Germany's focus on ever more exquisite tanks to the detriment of just plain good tanks produced in large quantities cost them valuable time and resources. Thus, Vietnam and Afghanistan are not some kind of special war for whom the constants of war do not apply. They are war and the enemy conducted their war better than we did.
 
As an aside, readers, you might benefit from reviewing Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and more and try to identify which factors were truly deciding in the outcomes. You'll be surprised.  Ours is not the only way to wage war and, arguably, might be the least effective, depending on circumstances! Figure out why.
 
During a discussion of asymmetric war, and in response to the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and others, an anonymous reader made the comment,
 
"Afghanistan and Vietnam were asymmetrical, counterinsurgency operations, so are not analogies to what we would face with China."
 
Again, sticking with our stipulation of China possessing superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity, and keeping in mind the other factors that impact victory, what does that suggest for a US strategy? A student of warfare, might look to history and postulate that the US could and should fight exactly the kind of asymmetric war that the reader dismissed as not being applicable! Perhaps the US should identify asymmetric operations and tactics that would enable it to succeed despite being hopelessly outclassed by the Chinese in every conceivable way?
 
How could the US do this? What kinds of asymmetric tactics could the US use that might succeed? Well, for example, instead of attempting a toe-to-toe slugfest of army against army, perhaps the US should emphasize the use of small, special forces units to destroy Chinese oil and gas pipelines in Russia (*gasp* we can't put troops inside Russia! that would violate international law! ... well, that's why they call it asymmetric; you'll recall that the NVietnamese used Laos and the Taliban didn’t hesitate to cross into Pakistan?) thereby imposing a total sea AND LAND blockade of a critical resource.
 
Another example might be that instead of going toe-to-toe with the magnificent, all-powerful, Chinese navy, perhaps we could emphasize our still formidable advantage in submarines to destroy their fleet and systematically launch cruise missile attacks on every Chinese port, airfield, and base on the Chinese mainland - basically, guerilla warfare using sub-launched cruise missiles! Done correctly, this kind of attack would be almost undetectable and unstoppable.
 
And so on.
 
Asymmetric is not a special category of war that transcends the constants of war.  It is merely a set of tactics and operations that your/our military doesn’t normally use.  If we think China truly has superiority of technology, numbers, and industry then perhaps we should be looking at implementing asymmetric tactics ourselves.  If we took this approach, it would, of course, require a different force structure, doctrine, and tactics and would require intense training to become proficient … none of which we’re doing.
 
China is beatable.  What we need to do is decide how we want to go about it and start getting serious about equipping and training for it.