I Believe

I believe!  Say it with me, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that simulators provide all the training I need and that chaos, shrapnel, smoke, power outages, and noise are just stories told to frighten the untrained.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that GPS will be with me always, to comfort and guide me.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that air superiority is my birthright.  Let the Air Force bear witness.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that minefields can be cleared through the Power of Point and True Belief.  Wish with me, that we may pass untouched!  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that although I jam the heathen’s electronic systems, their jamming shall pass me by.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that manufacturer’s claims are true and right.  So sayeth Lockheed.  So sayeth Raytheon.  So say we all.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that stoutness of heart will armor my ship.  The purity of Aluminum will transcend damage.  Steel is the Devil’s Material.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that the Accountants of Optimal Manning will be my strength and my Damage Control.  Praise be the Minimal Crew.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
I believe that “F” is the Holy Letter and “35” is its Number.  Long has my faith been tested as I have awaited its coming and though it be longer still till I shall see it serve, I remain steadfast in my belief.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!
 
Finally, and most importantly, I believe that, though all else be lost, I will still build new ships as shrines to the Gods of Acquisition.  Let me not blaspheme by walking the false paths of Upgrade or Maintenance.  Keep me true to the Way of the New Build.  Say it, brothers.  Say it with faith and fervor.  I believe!  I belieeeeve!
 
________________________

 

OK, fine, I’m mocking the culture of blind faith that all too often substitutes for objective and analytical thinking in the Navy.  Blind faith is only way to explain so many of our obvious shortcomings and capability gaps.  As you ponder various Navy matters, continually ask yourself if they are grounded in logic and reality or, instead, blind faith.

Note:  This is a re-post from July 2014.  There are a lot of new readers since then and, although it's the responsibility - and privilege! - of new readers to be familiar with the archives, I know that some are not.  This post was just too good not to share it with newer readers.  Amazingly, and disappointingly, the post is still completely relevant today.  I guess that shows how little progress the Navy has made over the intervening nine years.

I'm considering making re-posts (possibly slightly updated?) of old posts a regular occurrence.  What do you think?

Bykov Corvette and Warship Design

We’ve extensively discussed the flawed designs of modern ships as regards firepower and survivability.  Here’s a bit of data from actual combat involving the Russian Bykov (Project 22160) class corvette which, on paper, was nearly the dream design of a modern small ship:  small, fast, cruise missile armed, helo equipped, unmanned capabilities, complementary diesels and gas turbines, and flexible modular capabilities to accommodate any imaginable mission.  Truly, the epitome of modern naval design.  The reality of combat, however, revealed the flaws in the design sufficient to curtail further production of the class.  From a Google-translated TASS article,
 

"The series of patrol ships of project 22160 will not be continued and will end with the delivery of the last corvette of the series to the Black Sea Fleet next year," the agency's interlocutor said, noting that the customer intends to abandon an additional six units of project 22160 due to the discrepancy between their tactical and technical qualities and combat operating conditions.

He explained that military sailors are not quite satisfied with the characteristics and equipment of corvettes tested in the course of their combat use - insufficient seaworthiness, light armor and vulnerability of power plants, as well as weak anti-aircraft weapons.[1][emphasis added]

Bykov Class Corvette - the epitome of modern design
and a failure in combat

 
This illustrates ComNavOps’ claim that modern ship designs do not incorporate the reality of combat.  We (meaning the US and the world) are designing to a hypothetical standard that is focused on business cases, extended cruise comforts, and peacetime tasks instead of actual naval combat.  We’ve abandoned firepower, lethality, and survivability.
 
This also illustrates the phenomenon of follow-the-leader in warship design.  One of the common counter arguments to many of ComNavOps’ tenets about warship design is to point out that every other country is doing it (whatever it is that’s under discussion), therefore, it must be right.  The reality is that follow-the-leader doesn’t ensure correctness, it only ensures uniformity of thought.  Everyone wanted battleships immediately prior to WWII but everyone was wrong, as the rise of carriers demonstrated.  Everyone now wants lightly built ships with extensive crew comforts, minimal manning, and maximum flexibility.  As the Russians are now finding out, everyone is wrong about modern WARship design.  We’ve already seen that modern warships are not built to fight and survive (see, “SingleHits”).
 
Follow-the-leader is not the right way to design a warship.  What’s needed is a solid understanding of the realities of naval combat leading to an effective Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  We need to stop playing follow-the-leader about unmanned assets, lightweight naval guns, minimal manning, no armor, modularity, etc.  These are incorrect, dead end failures in the evolution of WARship design.
 
We mastered the principles of WARship design in WWII and we need to return to them.  For the stupid among you, I’m not calling for a return to actual WWII equipment (though in many cases that might be superior to what we have now!).  I’m calling for a return to the principles of WARship design that we mastered in WWII.  The principles are timeless and proven successful.  We foolishly abandoned those principles and now desperately need to return to them.
 
The Bykov failed in combat and yet it represented the epitome of modern naval design.  Does anyone think the Burke or Constellation will fare better?
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]TASS website, “The Russian Navy will refuse an additional series of six patrol ships of project 22160”, 14-Jun-2022,
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14908939

Characteristics of an Effective Military

A recent reader (‘Lutefisk’) comment inspired this post.  My thanks!
 
If I were building my own military, what organizational characteristics would I pursue and how would I prioritize them?  Here they are, in order:
 

1. Motivation
2. Combat Mentality
3. Firepower
4. Training
5. Logistics
6. Simplicity
7. Industrial Support
8. Technology
9. Command and Control

 
Note where technology falls on the list.  Technology just isn’t that important and certainly doesn’t guarantee that one will win a war.  Consider the overwhelming technological advantage the US enjoyed in Vietnam and Afghanistan and look how those turned out.
 
Now, for the eye-opening part of the post, here’s the same list of characteristics in order of their priority as practiced by our military:
 

1. Technology
2. Command and Control
3. Training
4. Logistics
5. Industrial Support
6. Firepower
7. Simplicity
8. Motivation
9. Combat Mentality

 
Note that technology is the military’s top priority despite the fact that technology does not win wars.  To be honest, most of the characteristics on this list aren’t even on the military’s real list of priorities.  Here’s a list of the US military’s actual priorities:
 

1. Budget Size
2. Technology
3. Command and Control
4. Diversity
5. Environment (Climate Change)
6. Politics
7. Training
8. Logistics

 
The mental aspects such as combat mentality aren’t even a consideration in today’s military and, in fact, are frowned on and discouraged by our military.  

Also, note the complete absence of firepower from the list.  The modern military just doesn't care about firepower, treating it as an afterthought, at best.  This is baffling.

Finally, note the conspicuous lack of simplicity as a characteristic.  To the contrary, the military emphasizes complexity which is why so many of our weapon systems fail.  In combat, simplicity rules and complexity (weapons, planning, whatever) invariably fails and yet this is what we're pursuing.  Yes, we're pursuing failure!

Examining the military's actual list of priorities reveals exactly why our military is hollow and failing.  It's not a mystery.  We're prioritizing the wrong characteristics.
 

Now you know how I’d build my military.  How would you build yours?  What’s your ordered list of priorities?

Constellation Land Based Engineering Test Facility

The Constellation frigate program is building a land based engineering test facility in Philadephia which will duplicate the ship’s power plant.  What a great idea!  The Navy deserves credit for this after the Freedom variant powertrain combining gear debacle, right?.  However, we can’t give the Navy any credit because they didn’t want the test facility.  It was mandated by Congress in the 2021 defense budget.[1, 3]
 
Well, regardless of who the credit goes to, it’s still a great idea.  The program can put the ship’s power plant through its paces and work out any problems before the ship is built.  Only … in true Navy fashion, the test facility will not be ready before the first ship is delivered and subsequent ships have been started.
 

The site should be ready around the time the first frigate is delivered and will continue to operate until the ship is ready for deployment.[1]

Uh … isn’t this backwards?  Shouldn’t the test facility be up and running long before the ship construction begins?
 

… the LBTS [land based test site] focuses on hardware, as a laboratory of different configurations to settle on a final propulsion system.[2]

Again, shouldn’t that testing to determine a final propulsion system be completed before the ship construction begins, not after the ship is delivered – at which point it is too late to matter?
 
Well, what’s the big deal?  The Constellation is, basically, the existing FREMM frigate so the propulsion system is already well proven.  Honestly, the land facility is a Congressionally mandated formality that isn’t really needed for an existing, proven propulsion system, right?
 
Unfortunately, the Navy did a bit of fraud bait and switch.  The Constellation is based only loosely and to a minor extent on the existing FREMM.
 

The propulsion system for the Constellation is a new configuration for the U.S. Navy, with a combined diesel-electric and gas turbine system. The CODLAG propulsion system takes a General Electric LM-2500+G4 and combines it with two MTU diesel engines to power the ship via an electric drive system.[2]

This is not what Congress intended.
 

In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy must finish the LBES site for the frigate before the lead ship in the class delivers in 2026. The site must include shipboard equipment for systems ranging from the main reduction gear and the main propulsion system, to the power control modules.[2]

Cognizant of the LCS debacle, Congress intended for the land site to be up and running before the ship was built, not after.  Congress wanted to eliminate the problems before the ship was built.
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy Says Constellation Hull Change Won’t Affect Internal Design”, Justin Katz, 4-Aug-2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/navy-says-constellation-hull-change-wont-affect-internal-design/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Frigate Land-Based Engineering Site Taking Shape in the Philadelphia Navy Yard”, Mallory Shelbourne, 20-Jun-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/06/20/frigate-land-based-engineering-site-taking-shape-in-the-philadelphia-navy-yard
 
[3]From Congressional Research Service, “Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate
Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 27-Mar-2023, p.8 : 
Section 125 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of
January 1, 2021) requires the Navy to commence, prior to the delivery of the first FFG-62, a landbased test program for the FFG-62 engineering plant (i.e., its propulsion system and related machinery). The provision specifies how the test program is to be conducted and requires the Navy to complete the test program not later than the date on which the first FFG-62 is scheduled to be available for tasking by operational military commanders.

Contractor-Led Maintenance

Some things just burn my behind because of their sheer stupidity.  Once such example is the LCS, specifically, the entire concept of shore-based, contractor supplied maintenance.  That was stupid on a plate with a side helping of idiotic fantasy spread with a delicious icing of combat impracticality.  From day one, in the entire universe, only the Navy didn’t instantly recognize that maintenance model as a failure waiting to happen.  Only someone as stupid as a Navy admiral could fail to see the flaws in that maintenance model.
 
Now, from a USNI News website article,
 

Industry experiments with direct contractors have been met with mixed success. In particular, the Navy is moving away from the contractor-led maintenance model that prevents sailors from servicing equipment on ships. In particular, Lockheed Martin’s Freedom-class littoral combat ship design relied on contractor maintenance.[1]

So, having thrown away a generation of naval ship development, an entire class of ship, and flushed billions of dollars down the drain, the Navy is finally recognizing that contractor-led maintenance might not be the best approach?  Well, welcome, Navy.  Welcome to what the rest of the universe has known for decades.  In fact, we’re throwing a massive ‘told you so’ party in your honor.
 
How many admirals does it take to screw in a light bulb?  No one knows because they’ve never yet done it successfully.
  
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Lockheed CEO Pitches Pentagon on Subscription Software”, John Grady, 4-Oct-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/10/04/lockheed-ceo-pitches-pentagon-on-subscription-software

Book Review – Electronic Greyhounds

The Spruance class destroyer (DD-963) was, arguably, the best ASW vessel ever produced but it had another, more impactful claim to fame.  It was the first ship designed by industry instead of the Navy/BuShips.  This practice of abdicating design capability and responsibility to industry has plagued become the standard Navy practice ever since.
 
The Spruance construction contract was awarded in 1970, prior to the advent of the digital age and widespread Internet use.  Thus, documentation on the class is sparse and limited largely to brief, repetitive entries in a handful of books.  This changed, however, in 1995 when Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, authored Electronic Greyhounds, the definitive book on the Spruance class design, construction, capabilities, and operations.[1]
 

The hardcover (roughly 8.5" x 11") book is a 270 page masterpiece of documentation with hundreds of references and citations from all manner of sources.  In fact, the note citation sources are nearly as fascinating and informative as the chapters themselves!
 
The book’s content can be best summarized by the chapter headings:
 
1.   Destroyers during the Cold War, 1948-1962
2.   Destroyers on Trial:  McNamara, Rickover, and Vietnam
3.   The Navy Adopts Total Package Procurement
4.   The DX/DXG Project
5.   The DD963 Design Competition
6.   Design Selection and Completion
7.   Construction and Controversy
8.   Fleet Introduction, Engineering, and Supply
9.   Gunnery, Electronics, and Antimissile Weapons
10. Strike Weapons
11. Antisubmarine Warfare
12. The Kidd (DDG993) Class
13. The Shield of the Fleet:  The Aegis Cruisers
14. Operations
 
Even the Appendices are fascinating:
 
Appendix A. Documents on the Origin of DX/DXG
Appendix B. A Tour of a Spruance-Class Destroyer
Appendix C. Name Histories
Appendix D. Specifications
 
Dozens of photographs and drawings support each chapter and illustrate key points.  The ship’s internal layout schematic is particularly interesting as is the profile photo with every electronic sensor/comm device labeled.  Understand, though, that this is not a coffee table ‘picture book’ by any means.
 
If there’s something you want to know about the Spruance class and it’s not in this book, it’s probably classified.  That said, be aware that this is not a lively, entertaining, near-fictional storytelling.  It is a deep-dive, scholarly tome with an emphasis on documented facts.  As such, it is not for the casual reader looking for adventure stories about ships although the chapter on ‘Operations’ is fascinating.  This book is a comprehensive reference for the reader looking for facts and details about the Spruance class and, as such, is very highly recommended.
 
 
Author:  Among Capt. Potter’s impressive and varied naval assignments, he served on a Spruance destroyer and as a defense contracting officer.  He also worked in industry as a systems analyst and project manager.  His background makes an ideal basis for researching and writing the history of the Spruance class.
 
 
Disclaimer:  I had a brief correspondence with the author suggesting that he write a similar book about the LCS.  Beyond that, I have no connection with the author, the book, or the publisher.
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, Electronic Greyhounds, The Spruance-Class Destroyers, Naval Institute Press, 1995, ISBN 1-55750-682-5

The Heartbreak of Software

It has become painfully clear in recent decades that, more and more, the major stumbling block in weapon acquisition programs is software, rather than hardware. 
 
The F-35, for example, has failed on the software side of things rather than the hardware.  The all-encompassing, mission planning, parts inventory controlling, maintenance regulating, aircraft health assessing ALIS software has been a colossal, and to date, unrecoverable, failure.  Further, the F-35 was planned to be fully combat capable only with the advent of the Block 4 software upgrade which is now hopelessly behind schedule and has had many of its planned features deleted or deferred to some undetermined future time.
 

The F-35 program, now 4 years into its Block 4 modernization efforts, continues to experience cost increases and schedule expansion. Costs continued to rise during 2021 due to crucial hardware development and testing upgrades, among other things. In 2021, the program office added 3 years to its Block 4 schedule and now expects to extend Block 4 development and delivery into fiscal year 2029 …[2]

As of 2021, the program office now plans to complete Block 4 capability deliveries 3 years later than the original schedule due to software quality issues, funding challenges, and the addition of new capabilities, among others.[2]

If/when it ever happens, Block 4 will introduce over 75 major upgrades into the fighter.
 

So, the Block 4 upgrades enabled by TR-3 are quite imposing, increasing the range and diversity of weapons that can be carried, plus the sensitivity of sensors used to detect, track and engage targets. Most of the new weapons, 17 in all, are “kinetic” weapons such as missiles, but they also include non-kinetic systems that use clever software and waveforms to jam or confuse enemy warfighting systems.
 
Block 4 also enhances networking capability with other tactical systems to enable what the military calls integrated, long-range “kill webs.”[1]

However, before these changes can be implemented, the fighter’s core processor and memory unit must be improved. This is accomplished via an upgrade called Technology Refresh 3, or TR-3. The fighter’s previous computing system, TR-2, is not adequate to support the capability upgrades included in Block 4.
 

TR-3 is being installed in all new production aircraft including the Lot 15 aircraft being delivered today, and will be retrofitted onto fighters already in the fleet back to Lot 10.[1]

This would seem to imply that all aircraft delivered prior to Lot 10 will become ‘orphans’ and relegated to non-combat duties.  Thus, we see that software issues, not hardware, are going to relegate hundreds of aircraft to non-combat status.
 
Software issues not only impose schedule or ‘orphan’ penalties but actual cost penalties, as well.
 

A recent report by the Government Accountability Office noted that the cost of Block 4 upgrades to the F-35 fleet had risen to an estimated $15 billion across over a dozen years.[1]

That’s staggering and that’s just a minor software upgrade cost;  just one block of a planned four.
 
 
Discussion
 
Much of the software delays and problems associated with weapon system acquisitions are self-inflicted in the sense that we create needlessly complex requirements.  For example, the entire faddish trend of wanting to be able to control any weapon from any platform is idiotic in the extreme.  In what real world scenario would this capability be required?  The answer is … none.  This is just the pursuit of technology for its own sake.  If there was no penalty for this it would be fine;  useless but harmless.  However, the reality is that every line of code that is added to a program takes time, costs money, increases the likelihood of unintentional interferences with other bits of code, and requires time to test and debug.  When we’re already struggling – and failing – to produce useable combat aircraft in less than two decades, needlessly complex software is the last thing we should be pursuing.

 
 
 
_______________________________

[1]Forbes website, “Inside Block 4—The Mostly Secret Plan For Making The F-35 Fighter Even More Lethal”, Loren Thompson, 14-Nov-2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2022/11/14/inside-block-4-the-mostly-secret-plan-for-making-the-f-35-fighter-even-more-lethal/?sh=5172e58f4423
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
Continue”, Apr 2022, GAO-22-105128