Air Force Loyal Wingman

Contract competition will begin soon for the US Air Force version of the Loyal Wingman unmanned UAV, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

 

The US Air Force could kick off a competition for a drone counterpart for its sixth-generation fighter as soon as fiscal 2024, the service’s top leader said Wednesday.[1]

 

That makes sense.  After all, we have no Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the drones so why not jump into procurement?  We have no field experimentation to demonstrate the capabilities of an unmanned drone so why not jump into procurement? What could go wrong?

 

Regarding cost,

 

In terms of cost, the Air Force wants drones that are no more than half the cost of an F-35 — which would put the most high-end CCAs at about $40 million — with Kendall [Frank Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force] stating that he would like to spend “a factor less than that” because some will be lost in battle.[1]

 

The number one characteristic of a drone in combat is that it will have a very short lifespan since we don’t have Terminator level Artificial Intelligence, yet.  Drones will be the equivalent of single digit IQ pilots – you know, as if Admirals were flying – with no ability to do anything but execute a very tightly defined set of actions (well, that rules out the Admirals).  They’re going to drop like flies in combat so they’d better be dirt cheap.  Very few will come back from a mission.

 

With that in mind, $40M drones seems insanely expensive for a drone that will need a precision Swiss watch to measure its lifespan.  Kendall seems not to appreciate that reality despite saying,

 

“The expectation is that these aircraft can be designed to be less survivable and less capable …[1]

 

How can Kendall acknowledge that the drones will be less survivable and less capable – that’s the definition of ‘throwaway’ in combat - and then set a price target of $40M?

 

I wish that were all that Kendall and the Air Force were confused about but it’s not.  Kendall, and the military, in general, has developed a serious case of delusion, manifested in the recent trend of believing the enemy will be ‘confused’ by everything we do.  This concept of enemy ‘confusion’ has been cropping up in everything, lately.  The Navy believes that the enemy will be ‘confused’ by individual, weak, distributed lethality ships.  The Marines believe that the enemy will be ‘confused’ by platoon size, missile shooting units hiding on small islands.  Now, the Air Force believes the enemy will be ‘confused’ by drones.

 

“The expectation is that these aircraft can be designed to be less survivable and less capable, but still bring an awful lot to the fight in a mixture that the enemy has a very hard time sorting out and dealing with,” Kendall said. “You can even intentionally sacrifice some of them to draw fire, if you will, to make the enemy expose himself.”[1]

 

Options include adding weapons, sensors, electronic warfare systems or other effects, and there is a benefit to fielding CCAs with differing mission packages.

 

“That’s a way to keep the cost down,” he said. “It raises the uncertainty that the adversary has to deal with, because he doesn’t know which is in any given aircraft, he has to take each of them seriously as a threat. And so whether they all carry weapons or a subset carries weapons, he’s going to treat them all as if they do. He has no choice.”[1]

 

Merely swapping out payloads will plunge the enemy into the throes of debilitating uncertainty.  Kendall seems to believe the enemy will wind up in a corner, balled up in the fetal position, sobbing from the confusion and uncertainty we inflict on him.  When has uncertainty about a ship or plane’s payload ever been a problem for any enemy?  In war, you destroy everything of the enemy’s and you don’t give a rat’s ass what it was carrying.

 

Returning to the CONOPS issue, consider the following gem of damnation:

 

As the Air Force begins developing CCAs [Cooperative Combat Aircraft, the loyal wingman drone], the service also needs to take steps to begin learning how to use combat drones alongside fighter aircraft … [1]

 

As we begin developing drones (we’re already starting the production process!), we need to take steps to begin learning how to use them?  Pardon me, Air Force, but shouldn’t you know how you want to use them before you begin procurement?  That’s called a CONOPS and a CONOPS must precede design or you wind up with a useless product as we’ve seen with so many acquisition programs.

 

The Right Path

So, what should we be doing before committing to production?

 

1. We should be conducting actual exercises using some low level aircraft as a simulation for a drone and install whatever autonomy or control software we’re planning on using to see how it performs.  Oh wait … we don’t have any actual software yet, do we?  We’re going to procure the drone and then develop the software concurrently.  What could go wrong?  Hasn’t concurrency worked every time it’s been tried?

 

Can you imagine a ‘less survivable and less capable’ drone simulator, say, a T-6B Texan II Turboprop trainer or a T-45 Goshawk trainer, thrown into combat against Chinese equivalents to the F-15, F-35, and F-22?  What would the lifespan of those be?  What could they productively accomplish in combat?

 

2. Via demonstration exercises, we need to determine a realistic attrition rate of drones and balance that against cost to determine an affordable price point.  I guarantee you it isn’t anywhere near $40M.  By the way, when has any acquisition program come anywhere near its initial, hoped for price target?  Never!  The actual cost of whatever debacle we produce will be closer to $80M than $40M;  history guarantees that.

 

3. Based on the demonstration exercises, we should then – and only then – develop the CONOPS.  The CONOPS will then tell us exactly what performance requirements we need for the drone.  Without the CONOPS, we’re just randomly guessing.  That’s how you wind up with a Zumwalt with no mission, and LCS that has no use, and Afloat Forward Staging Base whose captain has orders to sail around and look for a mission (see, “AFSB– Looking For Something To Do”), a Ford that costs twice as much and offers no improvement, etc.

 

 

This Loyal Wingman / Collaborative Combat Aircraft is another in a long series of fads (see, “Fleeting Trends”) that the military jumps on with no supporting evidence or experience.  So far, none of those have ever turned out well but, hey, this one will be the exception, right Air Force?

 

No CONOPS, no demonstrations, no performance specs, no cost/attrition analysis, guaranteed runaway costs  …  what could go wrong?

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Coming soon: A US competition for sixth-gen drone wingman could begin in FY24”, Valerie Insinna, 7-Sep-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/coming-soon-a-us-competition-for-sixth-gen-drone-wingman-could-begin-in-fy24/

LCS - Worse Than We Could Possibly Have Imagined

The LCS has been beat up by naval observers just about every possible way.  It’s not even fun anymore.  What’s left to criticize?  And yet … it seems as if the problems are even worse than we already knew.

 

USNI News website reports on the content of media remarks by Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener, the commander of Naval Surface Forces, regarding the LCS ships in general and the Independence class, in particular.[1]

 

Bear in mind that the first Freedom LCS was launched in 2006 and the first Independence LCS was launched in 2008.  That’s 16 and 14 years ago, respectively.  One would think that a decade and a half ought to have been enough time to work out the bugs, right?  Well, consider these comments from the article:

 

While the Independence-class ships, based at Naval Station San Diego, have been deploying to the Indo-Pacific, the Navy in recent years has sent the Freedom-class LCS to U.S. Southern Command for counter-drug operations.[1]

 

That deployment pattern illustrates just how bad the Freedom variant’s propulsion problems are.  The Navy is forced to keep the ships within easy sailing (meaning recovery via tug/tow) distance of US ports.  It is also a tacit acknowledgement that they have no combat value.

 

As you recall, the entire LCS concept was predicted on a civilian-provided, forward (meaning foreign) based maintenance model.  Kitchener had this to say,

 

Again, still some things to look at and to work on as far as expeditionary maintenance … [1]

 

So, after 14-16 years, the Navy is still trying to figure out the maintenance model?  That’s bad.  That’s really bad.  It’s damning.

 

After 14-16 years, reliability is still an issue, according to Kitchener who had this to say about the Independence variant reliability:

 

The Navy has made progress on fixing the reliability issues on the Independence-class ships based in San Diego with the help of its Task Force LCS effort, Kitchener said.

 

We’ve had a lot of success with reliability fixes and maintaining those ships on station, operationally longer. We still have some challenges as far as some of them systems and part of that is an effort of making sure we have the right parts at the point of need.[1]

 

So, 14 years operating Independence variants and we’ve ‘made progress’ but we ‘still have some challenges’?  And you know he’s lying applying the maximum positive spin.  The reality is, without a doubt, much, much worse.

 

Regarding maintenance and parts issues, Kitchener said,

 

I’ve been pretty happy with that, but there’s a lot more work to do … [1]

 

Read that statement without the spin and he’s actually describing a still badly broken system … after 14 years!

 

Here’s a damning statement that Kitchener appears to be taking pride in,

 

The Naval Sea Systems Command LCS Strike team, led by Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton, helped the service make fixes to USS Oakland (LCS-24) ahead of its deployment.

 

The work that the strike team did – the NAVSEA engineers – on reliability fixes, we pushed Oakland out, who’s our latest deployer, recently with about 20 to 25 of those fixes.[1]

 

This is telling us that LCS vessels are unfit to deploy unless they receive a focused set of reliability fixes … and lots of them!  This is worse than I thought.

 

More on maintenance:

 

While the Navy has sent the Freedom-class ships to U.S. 4th Fleet for counter-drug operations over the last few years, Kitchener said the service has only recently figured out how to perform maintenance on the ships during deployments.[1] [emphasis added]

 

Seriously?  The Freedom variant has been operating for 16 years and the Navy ‘has only recently figured out how to perform maintenance on the ships during deployments’.  This was the core concept of the ship.  What have you been doing for the last 16 years, admiral?

 

One of the problems the Navy faces, fleet wide, is the issue of data rights.  Kitchener addressed this for the LCS:

 

As we transition to more of the sailor-focused maintenance, we spent a lot of time on getting our sailors some specialized training, buying some of the – getting the rights to some of the gear – we continue to do that.[1]

 

This is demonstrating that we bought equipment without the corresponding data rights – thinking the manufacturer would perform the maintenance - and now that we’ve opted to have sailors perform the maintenance, we find that we lack the specifications, data, and manuals to successfully do so.

 

Kitchener also discusses problems with some seemingly mundane equipment.

 

He pointed to the crane at the back of the LCS that is used to deploy the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) and the rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) as an example of where the Navy had to train its sailors as part of the maintenance model shift.

 

Traditionally that’s been very problematic for us. There are some mechanical issues with it and there are also some training issues with it and some depth of knowledge issues, quite frankly.[1]

 

Kitchener is acknowledging that we’ve lost the ability, as a Navy, to operate and maintain a simple crane mechanism … and yet we believe we’ll be able to operate incredibly advanced radar  and combat systems?  But, I digress …

 

Kitchener’s general assessment:

 

While the Navy has made headway on LCS reliability and maintenance, Kitchener said the service needs to make more progress to ensure the ships are operating at full capacity.

 

I still get concerned over some of the system readiness. I think we’ve improved our ability to stay underway, though sometimes I think from a system perspective we have more work to do in making sure that not only are they underway, but they’re 100 percent fully redundant on some of their combat readiness.[1]

 

Read between the lines.  Kitchener is saying that the LCS still has massive problems.  If this is what he’s acknowledging, you can be sure there’s plenty more he’s keeping quiet about and the problems are worse than we could possibly have imagined.

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “SWO Boss Wants 6 Littoral Combat Ships in Western Pacific”, Mallory Shelbourne, 22-Aug-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/08/22/swo-boss-wants-6-littoral-combat-ships-in-western-pacific

Freedom PSA Contract

The Freedom class USS (PCU) Cooperstown, LCS-23, was laid down in Aug 2018 and launched in Jan 2020.  The ship is not yet commissioned. 

 

The Navy has awarded a $25M contract to BAE Systems Jacksonville Ship Repair LLC, Jacksonville, Florida to perform a post-shakedown availability (PSA).  PSA’s are performed to fix all the things that should have been working prior to delivery but weren’t or that broke during trials.

 

… post-shakedown availability will include correction of trial card deficiencies, new work identified between custody transfer and the time of the availability and incorporation incorporation of approved engineering changes not addressed under the building yard's construction contract.[1]

 

Why is the Navy accepting ships with known deficiencies (trial cards)?  Would you?

 

Given that an LCS costs around $500M, depending on what you want to include or exclude, the $25M PSA represents an additional 5% of the ship’s total cost, added to the procurement cost for things that should have been corrected before delivery and at the manufacturer’s expense.

 

Cooperstown’s PSA work is expected to be completed by Mar 2024.  Does it really take two years to do a PSA?  How incomplete and broken was this ship when it was delivered?  And why did the Navy accept it if it requires two years of additional work to finish/repair?

 

On a related note, despite having been laid down in 2018 and completed acceptance trials (with known deficiencies !) in 2020, there is no commissioning date set, yet.  We’re looking at six-plus years or so to build and commission a corvette size ship.  WWII Flower class corvettes were commissioned around 9 months from being laid down.  Yes, I know COVID issues impacted things but still … six-plus years to commission a modern corvette versus nine months?

 

I wish I could tell you that this was some kind of one-off fluke but it isn’t.  This is routine.  Would you buy a car with documented deficiencies (trial cards), take delivery, and then give it right back to the garage to finish/fix it for two years … all at your expense?  Of course not!  The Navy really needs to learn how to procure ships because they clearly haven’t got a clue.

 

 

 

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[1]https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2020/02/14/BAE-Systems-awarded-246M-for-post-shakedown-availability-for-Freedom-class-ship/1081581727313/#:~:text=A%20post-shakedown%20availability%20takes%20place%20in%20a%20period,as%20well%20as%20short-range%20missiles%20and%20anti-submarine%20torpedoes.

Iran Seizes Two More USVs

The US Navy has confirmed that Iran just seized two additional Saildrone small, unmanned surface vessels, held them for a period of time, and then dumped them back into the sea.[1]  As we noted just recently, it is open season on unmanned craft (see, “Open Season”) thanks to the US policy of non-interference with the acts of piracy.

 

One supposes the Iranians removed electronics and/or incapacitated the drones prior to dumping them back into the sea.

 

Open season continues!  No limits.  No license needed.  Bag your drones now, courtesy of the US Navy.  Happy hunting.

 

This is embarrassing and humiliating.

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Iranian navy nabs 2 American sailing drones, dumps them overboard: Iranian media”, Justin Katz, 2-Sep-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/iranian-navy-nabs-2-american-sailing-drones-dumps-them-overboard-iranian-media/

High Tech Approach to Low Tech Problems

The Navy/Air Force are completing a five year test program of what appears to be the successor to the Counter-electronics High-Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) microwave based Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapon.

 

The High-Powered Joint Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Strike Weapon, known as HiJENKS, uses microwave technology to disable an adversary’s electronic systems.[1]

 

HiJENKS is the successor to the AFRL’s [Air Force Research Laboratory] Counter-electronics High-Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project [CHAMP], which completed testing a decade ago. Jeffry Heggemeier, chief of AFRL’s high-power electromagnetics division, told reporters during a June 24 visit to the lab’s Directed Energy Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico the program builds on CHAMP, taking advantage of new technology that allows for a smaller system equipped for a more rugged environment.

 

There is no designated platform for the weapon, as yet.

 

“We’ll start looking at more service-specific applications once we’ve done this test that demonstrates the technology,” he said.[1]

 

So, they developed a weapon with no delivery platform.  Okay … um …

 

The Air Force is also looking at a High Power Microwave (HPM) directed energy weapon (see, Ref [2] for a nice discussion of the technology).  I’m way out of my area of expertise here but it appears that the difference between CHAMP/HIJENKS and the HPM is that the CHAMP/HIJENKS is a releasable EMP ‘bomb’ that spreads its effect in an omni-directional, one-time burst whereas the HPM is a narrow, directed energy ‘beam’ that is transmitted via an antenna.  Please, someone correct me if I’ve got this wrong.

 

AFRL is also making progress on a more advanced version of its Tactical High Power Operational Responder (THOR), which uses HPM [High Power Microwave] technology to disable drone swarms that pose a threat to military bases. The next-generation platform is named Mjölnir as an homage to the mythical god Thor’s hammer. AFRL awarded Leidos a $26 million contract in February to develop the Mjölnir prototype and deliver it in early 2024.

 

Adrian Lucero, THOR and Mjölnir program manager, told reporters during the same June 24 briefing that counter-drone systems are becoming increasingly relevant as unmanned aerial vehicle technology advances.

 

“There are other effectors out there that are intended to go against drone systems like guns, nets and laser systems,” he said. “But what Thor brings to the table is it has a larger range to affect and it has a decreased engagement time.”[1]

 

The fascinating part of this is that the prototype has, apparently, been deployed for operational testing.

 

The THOR prototype returned last month from a year of operational testing overseas. While the system was in use, the program team was hard at work developing the Mjolnir upgrades to extend THOR’s range, increase its power by about 50% and improve its usability — recommendations from the Air Force Security Forces who were using it during the deployment.[1]

 

“We learned a lot of lessons from it being overseas, just working in that operational environment, having Air Force Security Forces airmen pulling the trigger and breaking it,” Heggemeier said.

 

I think it’s noteworthy that Security Forces are mentioned as having been the operational test unit.  This strongly suggests that the weapon is intended to counter small drones and drone swarms that would threaten bases or facilities in the field.

 

 

Low Tech Alternatives

 

I have no problem with developing EMP technology, whether as a single pulse ‘bomb’ or as a continuous, directed energy ‘beam’.  In particular, the use of the technology against drones and swarms seems a reasonable application.  The disturbing aspect of this is that it is yet another in an endless series of attempts to apply high tech solutions to low tech problems.

 

Drones, of the size and type used in swarm attacks, are a decidedly low tech problem.  They’re essentially hobby drones adapted for military annoyance uses.  They’re small, cheap, slow, physically weak, and have vulnerable communications.  That’s a low tech problem.

 

You’ll recall the flurry of ultra-advanced, high tech solutions to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Iraq?  We spent untold hundreds of millions of dollars (billions?) attempting to develop futuristic detectors and neutralizers for IEDs while ignoring low or zero cost options that would have proven instantly and completely effective.  As far as I know, none of our high tech solutions ever worked reliably, all were hideously expensive, and none were ready when needed.

 

As an illustrative example, here’s some low tech solutions that could have effectively dealt with IEDs:

 

• IEDs were always planted on known US military transportation routes so STOP DRIVING ON THE SAME ROUTES ALL THE TIME.
• IEDs were always planted on roads so STOP DRIVING ON THE ROADS.  EVERY VEHICLE WE HAD WAS OFF-ROAD CAPABLE SO GET OFF THE ROADS.
• IEDs were generally planted at night so monitor the roads and KILL ANYONE APPROACHING A ROAD AT NIGHT

 

I can go on but you get the idea.  Effective solutions with no cost. 

 

We appear to be doing the same thing with the problem of very low tech drones.  We’re developing the most advanced, most expensive, least ready solution we can instead of applying low tech solutions.  What are some low tech solutions to drones?

 

• 0.22 cal machine guns with very high capacity, very high rate of fire, very small cost, easily transportable, and ready now
• ZSU-23-4 23 mm, 4-barrel, Self Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) type weapon
• Jamming – the type of drones we’re concerned about have low tech communications and control that are susceptible to simple signal jamming
• Foot patrols with shotguns

 

 

Conclusion

 

We’ve got to break our habit of automatically seeking the highest tech solution to problems instead of the lowest tech.  This is not some sort of anti-tech statement.  This is a rejection of high tech as the default response to problems.  The default response should be the lowest technology that solves the problem.

 

If someone can develop a high tech solution that costs next to nothing and can be made fully functional in a month … do it !   But, almost by definition, that can’t and won’t happen.  High tech takes time to develop and costs enormous amounts of money;  that’s why it’s called high tech !

 

 

 

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[1]Defense News website, “US Navy, Air Force running ‘capstone test’ of new high-power microwave missile”, Courtney Albon, 1-Jul-2022,

https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/01/us-navy-air-force-running-capstone-test-of-new-high-power-microwave-missile/

 

[2]https://www.electronicsforu.com/market-verticals/directed-energy-weapons-high-power-microwaves#:~:text=An%20HPM%20weapon%20essentially%20comprises%20a%20pulse%20power,weapons%20also%20include%20tracking%2C%20aiming%20and%20control%20systems.

Open Season

As predicted, it is open season on unmanned vehicles.  The US has set the precedent that unmanned assets are not worth fighting over and that we’ll sit back and allow them to be seized if a strongly worded protest won’t stop the act of piracy/war.  That precedent guarantees open season on unmanned assets.  To whit,

 

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy attempted to capture a U.S. Navy unmanned surface vessel that was operating in the Arabian Gulf on Monday and Tuesday, U.S. 5th Fleet said in a statement.

 

U.S. 5th Fleet spotted IRGCN support ship Shahid Baziar towing the USV around … [1]

 

A warship is a piece of sovereign US territory and to seize one is to commit an act of war.  I would assume that an unmanned warship also constitutes a piece of sovereign US territory although that is a question I leave to legal experts on international law (here’s an excellent examination of sovereign status of ships).

Iran committed an act of war or, at the very least, an act of piracy.  I fail to understand why we don’t simply sink the Iranian ship.  Doing that every time would put a quick end to such attempts.  Our default position of abject appeasement is how you become a second rate nation.

 

Iranian Vessel Towing US Unmanned Craft (circled in red)

Apologists and pacifists may claim that it’s not worth going to war over a small unmanned boat (as if Iran is going to declare war on us over a failed act of piracy on their part) but what happens when the Navy starts deploying medium and large unmanned vessels that carry classified sensors and weapons?  Are we going to stand idly by while foreign countries seize them?  Precedent would suggest that’s exactly what we’ll do.  Heck, we did nothing when Iran seized two manned riverine boats and their crews so why would anyone think we’ll do anything about an unmanned vessel, no matter how large it is?

 

It is embarrassing to witness the level of timidity we’ve sunk to.

 

 

 

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[1]USNI News website, “VIDEO: Navy Blocks Iranian Attempt to Steal U.S. Surface Drone in Persian Gulf”, Heather Mongilio, 30-Aug-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/08/30/video-navy-blocks-iranian-attempt-to-steal-u-s-surface-drone-in-persian-gulf

Solomon Islands Issues Moratorium on US Naval Vessels

The recent denial of a scheduled port call by a US Coast Guard vessel (see, "US Denied Solomons Port Call") has now expanded to a blanket moratorium on visits and port calls by US naval vessels.

 

The US government was notified by the Solomons on Monday of a “moratorium on all naval visits, pending updates in protocol procedures,” … [1]

 

China signs a security pact with Solomons and suddenly the US is banned from port calls in the Solomons.  It doesn’t take a genius to see the connection. 

 

Chinese vessels, of course, are permitted by the recently signed security pact between Solomon Islands and China.

 

China has masterfully achieved a takeover of the Solomons and now calls the shots there.  The Solomon Islands are now a vassal state of China.  China will begin militarizing the islands in short order, no doubt.

 

China is conquering the Pacific without firing a shot while the US watches.  If the US doesn't start engaging diplomatically, the Marines are going to have to set up their small missile-shooting units along the coast of California!

 

 

 

[1]https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-30/us-disappointed-after-solomons-ignores-coast-guard-request