The Marines and Concentration of Force

One does not need to have the overall superior force in order to win.  If one can achieve localized mass and superior firepower, one can win enough individual battles to eventually win the war.  On land, this localized massing of firepower is achieved through maneuver warfare, according to modern theory.  The wisdom of localized massing of force/firepower is generally undisputed.  The challenge lies in creating the circumstances that allow for it.

 

The Marines, until just recently, appeared to subscribe to this theory with their published doctrine of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) (1), Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) (2), and, less formally, ‘land where the enemy isn’t’ philosophy.  Now, of course, the Marines have switched to the exact opposite approach and want to deploy small, dispersed units that will be individually overmatched in every scenario.

 

Before we go any further, let’s remind ourselves that the term ‘massing’ actually refers to the massing of firepower rather than troops and weapons.  For example, massing light infantry against heavy armor may produce superior numbers but not superior firepower.  With that firmly in mind, let us also recall that massing can be achieved two ways (on a related note, see, “LCS– Mass or Disperse” for a general discussion of massing as applied to the LCS):

 

• Concentration of forces which is the traditional method. 
• Concentration of firepower which requires only simultaneous time-on-target.  In this approach, the forces may be physically dispersed and only their weapon effects need to mass.  Of course, that requires perfect networking and data sharing which seems like an unlikely event in a peer contested electromagnetic and cyber spectrum.

 

So, to return to the Marines, we see, now, that instead of maneuvering and creating localized, superior firepower and mass, the Marines want to operate on small islands from fixed points where maneuver is not even possible and the amount of firepower that they can bring to bear is extremely limited.  Yes, I’ve heard the Commandant describe the ability to relocate from island to island, in a form of maneuver, but does anyone really think that’s possible – to casually sail in, pick up Marine units, sail to another island, and unload without being detected and destroyed?  That’s just pure fantasy.

 

Unless we want to believe that the Marines have discovered a war-winning alternative to massing which no one else in history has managed to do, we have to conclude that the Marine’s concept is badly flawed and runs counter to one of the most fundamental precepts of warfare.

 

If concentration of mass/firepower is the key to success, why aren’t we practicing it?  Train like you fight, fight like you train.

 

 

 

 

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(1)https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCCP%201%20Operational%20Maneuver%20from%20the%20Sea.pdf

 

(2)https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Documents/Concepts/STOM%20May%202011.pdf

War Games Built The LCS

Commandant Berger is completely remaking the Marine Corps.  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The Navy is going to be replacing Burkes with medium and large unmanned surface vessels (MUSV, LUSV).  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The US military is investing heavily in UAVs.  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The Navy established the Ford class aircraft carrier specifications because of the results of a series of war games.

 

ComNavOps has expressed doubt about all of the above but they were all established by war games so they should be solid, logical requirements, right?  None of us are privy to the details of the games so we should just relax and accept the results and conclusions of war games run by our professional warriors, right?  Right?

 

Well, before we buy in on blind faith, let’s consider what we do know about previous war game results and conclusions.

 

Millenium Challenge 2002 – This is the classic example of a staged, utterly unrealistic game that had a pre-determined outcome and, as a result, absolutely no value, whatsoever, as a combat simulation.  From the Wiki article about the event,

 

After the reset, both sides were ordered to follow predetermined plans of action.  After the war game was restarted, its participants were forced to follow a script drafted to ensure a Blue Force victory. (1)

 

 

Ford – USS Ford was designed based on the results of a war game modeled after Desert Storm rather than a peer war. (2)

 

LCS – The LCS program was initiated and executed based on the results of a series of war games. (3)

 

Zumwalt – The Zumwalt design was derived from war games that determined that a long range naval fire support capability was needed.  It was also derived from simulations that determined that a family of future warships was necessary.  Of course, the Zumwalt went from the mandatory future of naval combat to unwanted by the Navy in a matter of weeks based on classified naval studies and simulations that, apparently, completely contradicted those that came shortly before.

 

Dogfights – After the Korean war, the US Air Force determined from combat simulations and studies that dogfighting was a thing of the past and began building aircraft without guns.  The folly of this was demonstrated in Vietnam.

  

 

The US military has a long history of conducting war games, combat simulations, and studies and then basing future platforms and force structure off the results.  Unfortunately, the US military also has a long history of drawing exactly the wrong conclusions from the war games, combat simulations, and studies.  So, what does this suggest about the likelihood of the Marine’s restructuring being correct?  It suggests, with near 100% certainty, that the Marines and Commandant Berger are acting upon incorrect conclusions drawn from faulty war games.

 

More generally, the military has wholeheartedly embraced unmanned assets in combination with extensive networks and data flow as the key to future success in war.  Given the preceding discussion and examples, why would we trust the war games that are telling the military to drop firepower in favor of networks and data?  The military has gotten nearly every war game conclusion wrong so should we now believe that their emphasis on networks and data instead of firepower is correct?

 

Do you know what would make me a believer in networks and data?  If the military would run realistic exercises where our own anti-network, anti-data, anti-sensor, anti-communications – meaning electronic and cyber warfare – were applied against our networks, sensors, and comms and prove that we could effectively operate our networks, collect our data, and communicate.  Do that and I might begin to buy into the concept.  Lacking that kind of actual proof of concept and remaining fully cognizant of our badly flawed history of incorrect war game conclusions, I’ll remain highly skeptical about our plans to emphasize networks instead of firepower.

War games built the LCS and now war games are building a new Marine Corps.  Not exactly confidence inspiring, is it?

 

 

 

 

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(1)Wikipedia, “Millenium Challenge 2002”, retrieved 7-Sep-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002

 

(2)Navy Matters, “Ford Design Considerations”, 23-Mar-2020,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/03/ford-design-considerations.html

 

(3)Navy Matters, “LCS – Conceptual Origin”, 10-Sep-2012,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2012/09/lcs-conceptual-origin.html

Right In Front Of You But You Can't See It

The US Army is working to figure out how to fight the next war which is more than can be generally said for the Navy or Air Force.  Unfortunately, they’re blind (as is the rest of the military) to what’s in front of them.  Consider this statement from Army Futures Command Commander Gen. Mike Murray who was discussing the German Blitzkrieg:

 

“It was a combination of those three technologies [German military’s airplanes, radios and tanks] and how the Germans put it together to execute what we call Blitzkrieg" that was “fundamentally different” than any of the capabilities the Allied forces … (1)

 

Okay, General, you recognize that Germany achieved a breakthrough in warfare and you want to achieve something similar in terms of significance.  Good for you!  What are your thoughts, Gen. Murray, on how to achieve this?

 

In 2020, there are three key technologies that when paired together in novel ways can provide a strong advantage against possible conflict with near-peer adversaries, according to Murray: artificial intelligence, autonomy and robotics in the air and on the ground. (1)

 

Uh …

 

Do you see a problem, General?

 

No?

 

Okay, let me lay it out for you.

 

Here’s what you identified as the three keys to the German breakthrough:

 

Airplanes

Radios

Tanks

 

Now, here’s the three keys you’ve identified for your desired, modern breakthrough:

 

Artificial intelligence

Autonomy

Robotics

 

General, do you see a fundamental difference between those two groups of factors?  It’s okay.  Take your time.  I’m asking you to think and that’s a new experience so I’ll wait.  

 

… …

 

Really … nothing?

 

All right, I’ll spell it out for you.

 

Two of the three German factors were things that make explosions (airplanes and tanks) and one was an enabler (radio).  None of the three current US factors make explosions and it’s highly debatable that any are even enablers.

 

It’s all about firepower, General.  If you can enhance your firepower, as the Germans did … all the better, but you have to have firepower.  Without it, you’ll just be a well-informed loser when the enemy’s firepower overwhelms you.

 

You’re not going to revolutionize warfare without things that go boom (I’m trying to keep this on a level that a General or Admiral can understand).  All the data in the world is useless if you haven’t got firepower.

 

Blitzkreig

For those who are a little smarter than a General or Admiral – like all the readers of this blog! – let’s consider the General’s three factors a bit closer.

 

Artificial intelligence – Our AI efforts are at the level of the Wright bother’s airplane.  We’re just barely beginning to develop it.  There won’t be any breakthroughs from this for the foreseeable future.  Consider our recent attempt:  the F-35’s ALIS was a colossal failure and it wasn’t even AI, really, just a predictive maintenance database.

 

Autonomy – The Navy just proved that an unmanned ship couldn’t navigate from San Diego to Hawaii without an attending ship and boarding crew.  We’re decades away from any significant breakthrough, here.  Significantly, our military appears committed to NOT allowing autonomous systems to control lethal weapons.  One can debate the wisdom of this position but it surely diminishes the breakthrough potential of autonomy, doesn’t it?  You’re trying to achieve a breakthrough while simultaneously limiting the scope and usefulness of the technology!

 

Robotics – Our current state of the art combat robots can’t tell the difference between a puddle and a lake, as a recent Internet article pointed out.  Our UAVs have been deemed non-survivable over a battlefield by the military.  UAVs around the world are routinely shot down.  Robots can offer some ancillary assistance but to expect a breakthrough from them is pure fantasy.

 

 

Here’s some more from Gen. Murray,

 

“I firmly believe on a future battlefield, the commander that can see first, understand first, decide first and the act first will have a distinct advantage and will ultimately win any future battle,” Murray said. (1)

 

Not without firepower, they won’t!  This is the blindness that the US military exhibits.  It’s all about firepower and they simply can’t see it.  There’s an adage that’s applicable, here.  Paraphrasing,

 

Get there firstest (first) with the mostest (most).

 

The saying is attributed (debatably) to Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest and it means that victory goes to he who first achieves the proper position with the necessary firepower.  The key is the ‘mostest’:  the firepower.  It does no good to know everything about your enemy and to maneuver to an advantageous position if you lack the firepower to do anything decisive when you get there and yet that’s exactly the path the US military is heading down:  perfect knowledge and insufficient firepower.

 

Consider the example of Midway, in WWII.  We had the intel (code breaking) which allowed us to mass forces and reach a position of advantage but what allowed victory (aside from some large doses of good fortune!) was that we had sufficient firepower when we got there.  Had we arrived at Midway with our intel but lacked firepower, we would have been defeated.  Today’s leaders fail to recognize that you need the mostest to go along with the firstest.

 

It’s sad, isn’t it?  General Murray obviously read some history about the German army, which is great – ComNavOps constantly pushes for our military leaders to study history – but he completely fails to see the lessons from that history. 

Stuka Dive Bomber

 The more we head down the misguided path of data over firepower, the more I’m going to push back and keep pounding on the need for firepower.

 

Consider this for some perspective …  We’re coming out with new networks and data schemes on a seemingly daily basis but what was the last significant advance the US made in firepower?

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Standard Disclaimer:  I'm all in favor of intel - as an enabler of firepower, not instead of firepower.

 

 

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(1)Defense News website, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army is preparing for war in the next decade”, Jen Judson, 10-Sep-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/

Weapon Procurement Status

We often discuss weapons and weapon inventories.  Understandably, the US military’s weapon inventories are not generally public record.  Even so, reasonable estimates can be made from procurement quantities, which are public record, and usage patterns which are somewhat publicized.

 

 

Here’s some Navy weapon procurement quantities from the FY20 budget.(1)  The quantities shown are eyeball annual averages of the six year period FY19 – FY24, inclusive.

 

 

Weapon		Qty	Comment
Tactical Tomahawk		200	Includes new missiles and modernization upgrades
Standard SM-6	140
RAM		120
ESSM		190	Trending up to 300/yr projected for FY23 and FY24
Mk48 Torpedo		70
LCS Naval Strike Missile		20	Trending up to 26/yr in FY23 and FY24
LCS Hellfire		109
LRASM		48	Constant purchase quantity across the FY19-FY24 period

 

 

 

It is interesting that the LCS Naval Strike Missile (NSM) is programmed for very low purchase quantities through FY24.  At the end of FY24, the fleet inventory will be only 101 (less, actually, depending on the number used for training launches, if any).  This limited procurement may be due to manufacturer shortages or may be recognition by the Navy of the limited usefulness of the LCS in combat and the LCS' impending replacement by the new frigate.

 

Similarly, the LRASM, which is currently only for aerial launch, is being procured in very small quantities.

 

Hellfire, which is supposed to be the LCS main weapon against small boat swarms, is also being procured in very small quantities.

 

It’s fairly obvious that any significant usage – you know … like a war – will require hugely increased annual production rates of weapons.  We’re talking about factors of 10X – 100X.  For example, we’ve seen that a single, partial attack on a small, undefended airbase requires nearly 100 Tomahawks.  A strike against a peer defended base would likely require 300+ missiles.  That’s for one target!  We’ll need 10,000-20,000 Tomahawks per year to wage a peer war.  That’s a hundred-fold increase in production.  Do we have that kind of industrial production capacity?  I seriously doubt it.  We need to be planning for wartime production increases, now.  It does no good to build a fleet with 10,000 VLS cells if we can only produce 200 Tomahawks per year to fill those cells during a war.

 

 

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(1)”Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2020 Budget”, 12-Mar-2019, p.4-8

AI Beats Fighter Pilot - Not Really

You’ve all heard about the recent test which pitted an artificial intelligence (AI) against a human fighter pilot in a simulator and the AI won 5 of 5 dogfights.  I can’t tell you how many people I’ve heard use that event as ‘proof’ that AI is more capable than humans and that we should be moving immediately to pure unmanned air combat aircraft.  Well, the results are not what they appeared to be.  The link below is to a review of the event by a former pilot and includes the actual simulator footage of the fights, analysis of the fights, explanations of the conditions of the fights, and discussion by the AI programmer representative.

I was stunned by the overwhelming advantage that the test conditions gave the AI.  For example, the AI was given perfect 360 degree situational awareness and perfect knowledge of not only its own performance but that of the human pilot’s aircraft which is utterly unrealistic.  Another example is that the AI merely had to have the target in a conical field of view to count as a gun hit – not actually place the piper on the target.  And so on. 

The results proved absolutely nothing.  I’m not going to go any further with this because the linked video does a much better and more complete job of analysis than I can.  All I’ll say is that you owe it to yourself to watch the video.  It will completely change whatever impression you had about the results.

I went into it thinking that I’d see some pretty impressive AI and I came away from it thinking the event was almost a waste of time for all parties and was tantamount to the usual staged war games and exercises that the military is so famous for.

For those who can see the imbedded video, below, check it out for yourself.  If you can't see the video, follow the link and see for yourself.


Link:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziCQqmEllZo

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) may not mean to the military what it means to casual observers.  Most of us think of the Terminator when we think of AI.  We recognize that’s a far off fantasy but that’s our vision.  The military, on the other hand, thinks of AI as a way to assist in more comprehensive micro-management.  They don’t state it in those terms but even a cursory examination of the military’s goals shows this to be the case.

“We believe that the current crop of AI systems today are going to be cognitive assistance,” he [Nand Mulchandani, acting director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center] said. “Those types of information overload cleanup are the types of products that we’re actually going to be investing in.” (1)

So, the military seems to view AI as a data ‘clean up’ or streamlining service which will, of course, be used by remote commanders to more closely micro-manage their subordinates who are the local commanders.

The military is also intensely interested in micro-managing the assets in the field by connecting sensors and weapons and exerting control over them (see, “Command and Control”).

… DoD’s focus on developing JADC2 [ed., Joint All-Domain Command and Control], a system of systems approach that will connect sensors to shooters in near-real time. (1)

AI is also viewed as a common connector between disparate platforms – whatever ‘platforms’ means in this context – so as to, again, enable more effective micro-managing.

“JADC2 is not a single product. It is a collection of platforms that get stitched together — woven together ― into effectively a platform. And JAIC is spending a lot of time and resources focused on building the AI component on top of JADC2,” said the acting director. (1)

We see, then, that the military views AI not as an autonomous, near-sentient, battlefield killing machine but as a tool to aid in the exercise of even closer and tighter micro-managing.  They don’t say it in exactly those words but that’s what they want.  The Admirals and Generals grew up in a zero-defect environment where you didn’t trust your subordinates to operate without your moment-by-moment direction.  Ship command, for example, was an excruciating period of time where you, as Captain, prayed every minute that none of your crew would make a mistake that would result in the dreaded ‘loss of confidence’ pronouncement from your superiors and the loss of your command and career.  You achieved this by micro-managing every action aboard your ship.  Not surprisingly, then, today’s Admirals want to apply the same model of command – meaning micro-management – to large scale Command and Control and they see artificial intelligence as the way to do it.  The more you can see what your subordinates see, the more closely you can micro-manage them and AI is just the thing to allow that – so the Admirals believe.

I’ve repeatedly posted and commented about the ills of micro-managing.  There’s no need to repeat myself.  What I’d like to address is not the self-evident evils of micro-management but, instead, the proper use of AI in the conduct of a war.  What our Admirals (and civilian leadership!) should be using AI for is not assisting in micro-managing but, instead, assisting in the formulation of strategy.  We should be using AI to identify enemy patterns of resource use that might indicate strategic vulnerabilities, identify overall enemy force movements that might presage future operations, assess enemy leadership performance and patterns that might allow us to predict actions and decisions, track enemy munitions expenditures to identify weapons usage patterns and inventories, and so on.  None of this is directed toward telling the individual soldier or sailor which way to turn and when to pull the trigger.  None of this is directed toward telling the individual ship’s Captain what course to steer.  Admirals and Generals should have much bigger problems to worry about than setting a course or monitoring individual soldiers.

Strategy - Not Micro-Managing

Properly used, AI has the potential to be a strategic-level aid for upper command.  One of the difficulties, I’m sure, is that our current – and future – leadership has been ‘raised’ in an environment totally lacking in strategic and operational thought.  Thus, it’s undoubtedly difficult, if not downright impossible, for them to even conceive of using AI for strategic purposes.  They’re simply not wired to think about strategy.  They never had to before so why would they now?  Somehow, we need to break out of that limited thinking and start thinking strategically instead of micro-managing.  AI can offer valuable assistance but only if properly applied.

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(1)C4ISRNet website, “Pentagon AI center shifts focus to joint war-fighting operations”, Nathan Stout, 8-Jul-2020,

https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/07/08/pentagon-ai-center-shifts-focus-to-joint-warfighting-operations/

Naval Stealth Helicopter

ComNavOps has long criticized the Navy’s plan to use helicopters as off-board sensor platforms in combat.  Helos also appear to be the Navy’s main distributed lethality sensor asset.  As we’ve discussed, the problem with helos is that they are extremely slow and decidedly non-stealthy.  Add to that the need to operate an active radar and the helo has zero chance of remaining undetected and zero chance of surviving the resultant enemy attack.  Unfortunately, the use of active radar ensures that the enemy will see the helo long before it sees the enemy.

Making the situation worse is the fact that each warship will only carry one or two helos which ensures that coverage will be sporadic and sparse and that combat attrition will quickly reduce the host ship to its own organic sensors.  In other words, in combat, helos will be prove to be only a very tiny step above useless and then, only for a very brief period before they are destroyed.

So, what’s the solution?

The ideal solution is to use lots of small, cheap, limited range UAVs and accept the inevitable attrition while depending on numbers to provide the necessary sensor coverage (see, “TheNext Cruiser and Mini-Hawks” and “UAVs – Numbers Matter” and “SensorAttrition”).

While the concept of small, cheap, numerous UAVs makes eminent sense, the Navy almost always prefers much more expensive and complex solutions.  So, …

Alternatively, a stealth helo might enable the helo to carry out the Navy’s desired off board sensor function.  Is there such a thing as a stealth helo considering those large, radar reflecting rotary blades?  Well, the Army seems to think so and pursued the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche as a stealth reconnaissance helicopter in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s before the project was cancelled due to cost overruns and technical issues.  Other examples include the HAL Light Combat Helicopter and Eurocopter Tiger.  Let’s briefly review these examples.

RAH-66 Comanche – This was intended to be a reconnaissance and light attack helo.  Regarding its stealth, Wiki states,

As intended, it would have functioned as a stealth helicopter, incorporating a number of different techniques and technologies in order to reduce its radar cross-section (RCS) along with other areas of visibility and detectability. The exterior surfaces of the RAH-66 were faceted and covered with both radar-absorbent material (RAM) coatings and infrared-suppressant paint; as a result of these combined measures, the Comanche's RCS was stated to be 360 times smaller than that of the AH-64 Apache. The acoustic signature of the helicopter was also reported to be noticeably lower than comparative helicopters; this reduction had been partially achieved through the adoption of an all-composite five-blade main rotor and pioneering canted tail rotor assembly. (3)

RAH-66 Comanche

HAL Light Combat Helicopter – This is an Indian produced, attack helo featuring very light weight and very high altitude.  According to a Wikipedia article, it is claimed to have stealth profiling, armor protection, a digital camouflage system, infrared (IR) suppression, and an exterior covered by canted flat panels to minimize its radar cross-section.(1) 

HAL Light Combat Helicopter

Eurocopter Tiger – This is a stealthy multi-role attack helo that uses advanced composites which reduce its radar cross section and features reduced visual, IR, and acoustic signatures.

Eurocopter Tiger

Russia - Wikipedia reports the existence of a stealthy Kamov helicopter with a reduced radar cross section (RCS), IR suppression, and an internal weapons bays.(2)

Ka-58 Stealth Helicopter?

A naval stealth helo combining the state of the art stealth features from the preceding examples might allow the Navy to achieve the manned, off-board helo surveillance asset that they’ve been chasing for many years and which is the pre-requisite foundation for a viable distributed lethality concept.  Of course, the question is how stealthy can a helo be?  The only hint we have is the Comanche claim of an RCS 360 times smaller than an Apache but without knowing what kind of radar signature an Apache has, that’s not really helpful.  However, it does suggest that a sufficiently stealthy naval helo might be possible.  At the very least, it would be worth some developmental effort along the lines of calculations and small scale testing.

Hand in hand with any physical stealth design is a stealthy Concept of Operations.  How would a stealth helo operate?  Would it radiate, thereby pinpointing its own location?  Can it radiate, obtain a useful picture of the area, and move sufficiently far away to survive the resultant aircraft or surface-to-air missile attack?  Can passive sensors be used to obtain a useful situational awareness or to supplement active radar to a useful degree?  How many helos are needed to provide sufficient coverage?  And so on …

One of the problems the Navy has is its insistence on using only the SH-60 Seahawk family.  These are large, ungainly, helos – decidedly non-stealthy.  If the Navy were to consider the use of smaller, specialized reconnaissance helos, they might be able to operate more of them and attain better coverage and be better able to deal with mechanical and combat attrition.  The RAH-66 Comanche, for example, was 47 ft long, 11 ft high, and a bit over 6 ft wide as compared to the Seahawk which is 64 ft long and 17 ft high.  An LCS, for example, might be able to operate 3-4 small, stealth helos instead of the single Seahawk family helo they can now.  A smaller, lighter, stealth helo would also be more compatible with the structural strength constraints of the LCS flight decks which are the limiting factor in their helo ops.  A Burke might be able to operate 3-4 stealth helos as opposed to 1-2 Seahawk types.

All of this is conjecture, of course, but it offers a possible path for the Navy’s desired distributed lethality concept.  Of course, there’s still the fact that distributed lethality is just plain stupid but the Navy’s going to do stupid anyway so this, at least, offers a possibility of doing it slightly less stupidly.

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(1)Wikipedia, “HAL Light Combat Helicopter”, Retrieved 21-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Light_Combat_Helicopter#Design

(2)Wikipedia, “Stealth Helicopter”, Retrieved 18-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stealth_helicopter

(3)Wikipedia, “Boeing–Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche”, Retrieved 24-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing–Sikorsky_RAH-66_Comanche#Design