The Widening Gulf

Some time ago, we had a post about Secretary of Defense Carter’s ill-advised desire to improve recruitment by lowering standards (see, “Drug Users Welcome”).  In the comments, mention was made of the widening gulf between society at large and the military (we’re also seeing a divide between society and the police but that’s a topic for some other blog) and that mention has stuck with me.  After much thought and much self-debate about the desirability of posting on the subject, I’ve decided to offer my thoughts.  Be warned, if you don’t want to read a sociological commentary post, leave now and wait for the next post. 

Observers have offered various reasons for the divide between society and the military.  The reasons generally focus on politics, policies, involvement in unpopular conflicts, and so on.  All probably contain a degree of validity.  However, the main reason for the gulf is something different, I believe.

The gulf between the military and society stems not from politics, policies, and actions but from a widening difference in values.  The military has traditionally valued order, discipline, honor, integrity, sacrifice, and identification with something larger than self.  Society has, over the last couple of decades, turned away from those characteristics and moved towards blaming others for one’s own failures, a focus on self, and elimination of accountability and personal responsibility.  Consider these examples.

• Suing the seller because you were dumb enough to spill hot coffee in your lap
• Participation trophies
• Sanctuary cities
• Failure to prosecute Hillary Clinton
• Enforced feminization of boys in elementary schools
• Banning of Christian references to Christmas
• Legalization of drugs
• Programs to forgive IRS and credit card debt
• Welfare, in general

It all comes down to standards and standard’s handmaidens:  accountability and responsibility.  Our society is systematically removing standards.  No one is held to any civil or criminal standard.  No one is accountable for their actions.  No one is expected to demonstrate responsibility.

Is it any wonder that military age young adults who have grown up in this society and have come to see it as normal see little that they can identify with in the military?

Of course, in the last few years the military has also begun to abandon standards, accountability, and responsibility so the gulf may actually be narrowing a bit.  We see this abandonment in the Fat Leonard scandal that has rocked the Navy, the disgraceful, willful failure by 7^th Fleet to follow mandatory training requirements, the lying by the Marine Corps regarding IOC of the F-35, and so on – I won’t bother presenting an endless litany of the moral and ethical failings of Navy leadership.  Read the blog and you’ll see all the examples you need.

Ironically, anecdotal evidence suggests that the military’s recent social engineering policies are turning off those who do identify with the military culture but now see it being eroded.  I’ve heard from endless veterans who tell me they will actively steer their children away from military service because of the erosion of traditional values.  The long, unbroken lines of familial service are being broken.  The widespread failure of veterans to promote military service may be more damaging to recruitment than the general gulf between society and the military.  Veterans are, arguably, the most effective recruiting tool there is and if they have stopped recommending service then recruitment will, indeed, become a challenge.  Recruitment-wise, the military has shot themselves in the foot by abandoning traditional values.

A functional society must have standards and hold its members accountable to those standards or it will fall.  Is our society climbing or falling?  I’ll leave it to you to answer that question for yourself.

The military has traditionally been the caretaker of society’s standards but is now rapidly abandoning its standards.  This is not a good trend and our civilian leadership’s response of further lowering standards could not be more wrong.  Now is the time to strengthen and reinforce military standards.

CNO Richardson Must Be Fired

Since the report came out about the lapsed certifications among the deployed 7^th Fleet ships and crew, I’ve been trying to find out more about the mechanism by which this state of affairs was sanctioned.  The mechanism was the “risk assessment and management plan” (RAMP).  Apparently, RAMP was used to directly and consciously bypass mandatory Navy training and certifications.  Among 7^th Fleet deployed destroyers and cruisers, around 40% of crew certifications in damage control, navigation, flight operations, and basic seamanship had lapsed (1)

Despite my efforts, I’ve been unable to find any mention of RAMP as an official Navy program.  It appears that it may have been a locally (local to the 7^th Fleet) devised and implemented program that lacked official Navy sanction.  Whether it was universally know throughout upper Navy leadership and unofficially sanctioned is unknown.

The conclusion from this is obvious.  The program has led to disasters, deaths, and horribly damaged ships.  Someone must be held responsible and pay the price and, indeed, VAdm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7^th Fleet, has been relieved.  Of course, the firing may have been largely symbolic since he was due to retire in a few weeks, anyway.

There is another person who must pay the price and that is current CNO Richardson.  

If he did not know about an unsanctioned program intended to bypass mandatory Navy readiness certifications for an entire major fleet then he should be fired for incompetence and obliviousness.  

If he knew about the program then he should be fired for violating the trust of the country, the Navy, and the sailors serving under him and hazarding the military preparedness and security of the country.  

Either way, he has to go.

Get used to it.  You’re going to hear me continue to harp on this.  CNO Richardson is the Captain of the Navy and the Captain is accountable for everything that happens on his ship – his ship being the entire Navy.  I have lost confidence in his ability to command.

Richardson has allowed, and may have actively aided and abetted, the readiness and basic seamanship of the Navy to fall to dangerously low levels.  If our Navy is no longer capable of basic navigation, anchoring, and other acts of basic seamanship, how are we going to fight a war?  If we no longer have a grasp of basic seamanship, what are the odds that we’re tactically trained and proficient?  Through actions and inactions he has endangered the security of the country.  That’s tantamount to treason.  Further, he is directly responsible for the deaths of sailors and hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to US military assets.  He should be court-martialed and punished severely.

Let’s be fair.  This didn’t all happen on Richardson’s watch.  His predecessor, Adm. Greenert is at least equally culpable.  He should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed. 

A Chinese or Russian mole agent could not do more damage to the Navy and our nation’s security than our own Navy leadership is doing.

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(1)Defense News website, “US Navy worked around its own standards to keep ships underway: sources”, David B. Larter, 7-Sep-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/09/07/us-navy-worked-around-its-own-standards-to-keep-ships-underway-sources/

Shoot The Messenger

Shoot the messenger!

That’s a time honored method used by incompetent leaders to deal with bad news.  Now, we see the Navy’s version of that related to the aircraft oxygen deprivation problems being experienced by pilots.  Apparently, there is no problem.  It’s all in the pilot’s heads.  Yep, here’s the Navy’s explanation for the oxygen problems.

“First, the cockpit warning light for the On-Board Oxygen Generation System (OBOGS) goes off too often, making pilots think they had a problem with their air supply when there really wasn’t one, Winter [VAdm. Mat Winter, F-35 program director] said at the DefenseNews conference here yesterday. Since the warning signs of hypoxia are the same as the signs of getting anxious about hypoxia – you have trouble breathing and concentrating – a false alarm can easily send a pilot into psychosomatic symptoms. The program has tweaked the warning light to reduce false positives, Winter said.” [emphasis added] (1)

You’re not passing out, you just think you are!  I love it!  Only the Navy could come up with this response to a physiological and physical problem.  It’s all in your head!

“Second, in this summer’s incidents at Luke in particular, the problem was a combination of brutal temperatures and inexperienced pilots. While pilots who know an aircraft well can jump in the cockpit, run through their checklists, and get in the air ASAP, the F-35 is a new plane and most of its pilots are still mastering it. The result was pilots spending half an hour on the runway in the baking Arizona sun and 100-plus degree heat, all the while sitting in the carbon monoxide from their own jet exhaust. That’s enough to make anyone woozy.” [emphasis added] (1)

So, it’s the pilots fault!  Of course, Winter’s explanations ignore the fact that experienced pilots and instructor pilots were reporting symptoms across a variety of aircraft under a variety of conditions. 

The Navy’s version of shoot the messenger is to throw the complaining pilots under the bus!  This is not going to sit well with pilots who already feel their complaints were being ignored.  This should increase the pilot job satisfaction and reenlistment rate.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “JPO Fixing F-35 Oxygen, Carrier Landing, Software Glitches: VADM Winter”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 7-Sep-2017,

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/09/jpo-fixing-f-35-oxygen-carrier-landing-software-glitches-vadm-winter/

Criminal Negligence

Read this bit related to the recent spate of groundings and collisions in the 7^th Fleet.

“Adm. Scott Swift has taken on direct supervision of the “risk assessment management plan” program, a system otherwise known as RAMP that allowed the local destroyer squadron, fleet trainers and stateside commanders to keep their ships on patrol even if their qualifications in critical areas such as damage control, navigation and flight deck operations had lapsed.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office is set to testify Thursday that nearly 40 percent of the Japan-based cruisers and destroyers were operating without valid warfare certifications.” [emphasis added] (1)

ComNavOps has been preaching the hollowness of the Navy and the criminally negligent behavior of Navy leadership for the last few years.  Now the ironclad proof is beginning to come out.

Is there really anything further I need to say?

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(1)Defense News website, “US Navy worked around its own standards to keep ships underway: sources”, David B. Larter, 7-Sep-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/09/07/us-navy-worked-around-its-own-standards-to-keep-ships-underway-sources/

Combat Radius

So many discussions about aircraft include mention and claims about range.  Unfortunately, range is a very imprecise concept and range numbers are highly variable.  There’s an old saying in statistics that you can make the numbers say anything you want.  The same is true in discussions of range - you can get any range number you want by playing with the conditions. 

Let’s look a bit closer at the concept of range by looking at the specific example of an F-18E/F Super Hornet (SH).  In a recent post, a SH range figure was quoted and I expressed doubt and stated that it was a very optimistic number.  Let’s see why.

As a general prelude to this discussion, we need to agree on some terms. 

Range is, technically, the distance from one point to another – in other words, a straight line, one-way travel.  Carrier aircraft don’t generally do that.  Instead, they fly out, execute a mission task, and return to the carrier.  So, their “range” is actually a radius.  Thus, their maximum radius is half their maximum range. 

Unfortunately, many people use “range” and “radius” interchangeably.  For the rest of this discussion, we’ll attempt to use “range” as meaning a one-way, straight line travel and radius to mean an out and back trip. 

Now, let’s plunge right in and check the range and radius for the F-18E/F.  From the F-18E/F NATOPS Performance Data Manual, Specific Range Chart Fig. 5-37, Alt = 15,000 ft, Wt = 50,000 lbs, we get the following data.

Using the Optimum Cruise line at the median Drag Index gives

Speed = 456 mph

Fuel Flow = 6500 pph

Specific Range = 0.058 nm per pound of fuel

So, for a SH with a full internal fuel load of 14,400 lbs, that gives a range of (14,400 lbs x 0.058 nm per lb = 835 nm), radius = 417 nm

Calculated alternatively,

Flight time = (14,400 lbs / 6500 lbs/hr = 2.2 hrs)

Flight range = (2.2 hrs x 456 mph = 1003 miles or 872 nm), radius = 501 miles or 436 nm

We see, then, that the combat radius of the SH is about 420 nm at a cruise altitude of 15,000 ft and a weight of 50,000 lbs and using optimum cruise speed.  As a reminder, the recent post quoted the SH range figure as 450 nm.  Well, that’s almost exactly the figure we just calculated so that seems like a reasonable and valid range number, right?  Why did ComNavOps express doubt and claim it was extremely optimistic?

Well, here’s where the discussion breaks down.  The calculated range is for straight line cruising at the specified altitude, speed, and weight but how did the aircraft get to that altitude?  It didn’t just appear there.  It launched from a carrier using maximum thrust which consumes huge amounts of fuel.  It had to climb to altitude which consumes additional fuel over and above that needed to simply cruise.  So, in the real (operational) world, the fuel required to launch and climb to altitude has to be subtracted from the available fuel in our calculations.  How much fuel is that?  I have no idea – 20%, maybe?  A pilot would have to tell us or I would have to dig even deeper into the NATOPS manual.  The point is that the calculation assumes the aircraft starts at altitude and with a full load of fuel which is impossible.  So, the calculated range/radius must be significantly reduced.  That 420 nm radius now becomes 350 nm, maybe?

But wait, there’s more confusion.

The 420 nm radius assumes a straight line, unwavering, constant speed flight.  On a combat mission, aircraft don’t generally fly straight, level, and constant speed.  Typically, a combat mission will involve changes in direction to weave around known dangers (radar sites, enemy bases, etc.) and/or to approach from a direction other than straight on.  So, even if you could fly 420 nm in a straight line, if you throw in several course changes that take you off that straight line, you’ll consume additional fuel which has the effect of shortening the apparent radius. 

Further, on a combat mission the aircraft don’t fly at a constant speed or altitude.  They increase speed, especially near the target when they use fuel gulping maximum power.  They fly at different altitudes.  For example, a mission might consist of a high altitude cruise to the target, a low altitude approach, and a high altitude return cruise.  The altitude changes not only consume additional fuel but change the flight efficiency – lower altitudes are generally less fuel efficient.

So, the actual combat mission flight profile is going to consume additional fuel.  That 350 nm radius now becomes 260 nm, maybe?

Of course, if the aircraft expends ordnance at the target, the aircraft’s weight decreases which improves the fuel efficiency on the return leg.  Also, as fuel is burned, the aircraft becomes lighter, further improving fuel efficiency and that 260 nm radius becomes 290 nm, maybe?

So, we see that combat radius is totally dependent on the specific conditions of the combat mission.  The point is that the published range/radius is generally significantly unrealistic.  Nowhere is this more evident than in discussing the much-hyped and much-lied about F-35.  You know those ranges are works of fiction!

So, is that the end of the discussion?  No, not by a long shot!

The problem is further compounded by actual carrier aircraft operating procedures.  Aircraft don’t actually launch with a full load of fuel, go out, execute their mission, and return, all on one load of fuel.  Instead, the aircraft usually launch with a partial fuel load and top off over the carrier, after launch.  Additionally, they are often partially refueled during the return leg and/or at the carrier for recovery.  Making the issue more complicated is that fact that aircraft don’t usually take off and immediately begin flying straight to the target – they take off and marshal at some point waiting for the rest of the strike package to launch and assemble.  This waiting burns more fuel.  The assembly point may also include a partial refueling. 

So, what does combat radius refer to?  Is it the radius after having launched and refueled and factoring in a return refueling or two?  If so, then the combat radius can be any distance you want just by adding in more refuelings!  When the Navy cites a combat radius of xxx nm, do they mean the radius with the benefit of multiple refuelings because that’s what a typical mission consists of?

Carrier aircraft rarely fly “unrefueled” missions so citing an unrefueled radius is a combination of unrealistic, pointless, meaningless, and confusing.  Yikes!

So how do we usefully compare the combat radius of one aircraft to another?  We intuitively know that aircraft differ in their inherent “range” but how do we compare the differences?  Well, for practical purposes, we can’t.  About the best we can do is get our hands on flight manuals and extract specific range numbers (nm miles per pound of fuel) under a specific set of conditions.  This will give us directly comparable fuel efficiency numbers which will reveal which aircraft is more fuel efficient and from that we can infer, and calculate, actual combat radii.  But, even that isn’t the end of the story.

Different aircraft fly different types of missions.  An air superiority fighter flies a different mission and flight profile than a strike aircraft so trying to compare combat radius at a single, arbitrary set of conditions is pointless and unrealistic. 

Further, different aircraft have different fuel efficiencies under different conditions.  Some aircraft are optimized for lower level flight while others are optimized for higher level flight.  How do we compare those?  Again, we really can’t.  The best we can do is try to compare apples and apples.  We can’t meaningfully compare the combat radius of an A-10 low level close air support plane to the combat radius of a high altitude F-22 air superiority fighter.  We can, however, compare the F-35C to the F-18E if we specify the mission, weapons load, and flight profile – assuming we can get our hands on NATOPS flight data.

What’s the overall conclusion from this discussion aside from the realization that published range/radius values are virtually meaningless?  The conclusion is to assume the published range/radius numbers are maximum and unrealistic values that would only be obtained under unrealistic, non-operational conditions.  If you want an “actual” operational combat radius, take 60% of the published figure and you’ll be somewhere in the realm of an actual combat mission radius.

So, did that clear things up?  Yeah, I didn’t think so but it’s the best we can do.  Hopefully, it will at least allow you to more intelligently discuss combat “range” in the future and more realistically assess published values.

On a related note, this discussion makes the published range/radius values for the SH and F-35 all the more disappointing when compared to the actual Pacific theater requirements.  It also emphasizes the need for an operationally effective tanker.  Above all, though, it clearly points out the need to build aircraft that are inherently longer ranged.  When we're talking about thousand mile A2/AD zones, it quickly becomes obvious that the F-18 and F-35 are both woefully short on their useful combat radii.

Navy Aerial Tanker Update

Details on the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker have been hard to come by, especially the most relevant ones like fuel loads and range.  Now, however, we see some details in a USNI News article (1).

“Air Boss Vice Adm. Mike Shoemaker said the service’s goal was for the Navy’s first operational carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle to be able to deliver about 15,000 pounds of fuel at 500 nautical miles from the carrier to the air wing’s strike fighters, which would almost double their operational range.”

So, that’s interesting … 15,000 lbs of fuel at 500 nm from the carrier.  Let’s examine that a bit closer.

An F-18 Super Hornet has an internal fuel capacity of around 14,000 lbs.  So, the unmanned tanker could completely refuel one aircraft.  Of course, that’s not exactly how refueling works.  Each aircraft would receive a lesser amount of fuel, say 5,000 lbs.  Thus, the tanker could refuel three aircraft.  I think you can see where this is going.  If there are 30 aircraft in a strike package, and each needed 5,000 lbs of fuel, it would require 10 tankers.  That’s a LOT of tankers.  Of course, more tankers would be required for the carrier overhead/recovery tanking.  We’re looking at around 16 tankers in our strike/recovery scenario.  Yikes!

Now let’s refer back to that quote and the phrase, “double their operational range”.  Here’s the relevant range figure according to the article.

“The strike range of a carrier air wing is now only about 450 nautical miles – the effective unrefueled radius of a Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.”

That range figure is exceedingly optimistic but, hey, let’s work with it for the sake of discussion.

So, if it took 15,000 lbs of fuel to achieve an operational range of 450 nm, adding 5,000 lbs of extra fuel (36% of the aircraft’s full fuel capacity) isn’t going to double the aircraft’s range, it’s going to increase the range by 36% which is an extra 160 nm.  Yes, I know the range calculations aren’t a simple linear function.  I’m just illustrating the concept.  No matter how you look at it, we aren’t going to double an aircraft’s range by adding a small fraction of additional fuel.  The only way we can double the range is to do a complete refueling which takes us back to a 1:1 tanker:aircraft ratio.  In that case, our example strike of 30 aircraft would require 30 tankers!

Does no one in the Navy run these simple calculations?  Apparently not.

Let’s refer back to the excellent post by guest author George Bustamante, “Why The Navy Needs A Really Large Tanker” (2).  In that article, he lists fuel capacities of various tankers and demonstrates why a capacity of 15,000 lbs of fuel is insufficient for a mission tanker.  For example, the old KA-3 Skywarrior tanker carried 29,000 lbs of fuel  - almost double that of the proposed unmanned tanker.  At the high (and useful) end, the KC-135 carries 150,000 lbs!

The MQ-25 Stingray, with a 15,000 lb fuel capacity barely duplicates the current F-18 Super Hornet tanker capacity of ~16,000 lbs.  The F-18 isn’t considered a mission tanker so how will the MQ-25 which barely duplicates the F-18 tanker’s load suddenly and magically become an effective mission tanker?  Unless we’re going to build lots and lots of these unmanned tankers, I just don’t see this as an effective solution for mission tanking – for overhead/recovery tanking, yes, but mission tanking, no.

So, we have fraudulent claims about doubling the air wing’s range combined with an utterly ineffective mission tanker specification.  I don’t see a good outcome, here.  Yes, it can free up the Hornet from overhead/recovery tanking, which is good, but it leaves the Navy with short ranged aircraft and still no effective mission tanker.  The Navy had an opportunity to do something that could significantly enhance the air wing’s combat effectiveness and apparently have declined to do so.  Baffling.

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(1)USNI News website, “MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Aerial Tanker Could Almost Double Strike Range of U.S. Carrier Air Wing”, Sam LaGrone, 31-Aug-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/08/31/mq-25-stingray-unmanned-aerial-tanker-almost-double-strike-range-u-s-carrier-air-wing

(2)Navy Matters blog, “Why The Navy Needs A Really Large Tanker”, George Bustamante, 22-Aug-2016,

http://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/08/why-navy-needs-really-large-tanker.html

MH-60R Radar and Distributed Lethality

The Navy’s MH-60R Seahawk family helicopter operates from various ships, including the LCS, and performs various roles such as search and targeting, ASW, ASuW, search and rescue, etc.

One of the keys to the usefulness of the MH-60R is the on-board radar.  The APS-147 and its successor, the APS-153(V), are multi-mode radars with long/short range search capability, Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging, and periscope detection modes, among others (1).

The MH-60R radar is derived from the APS-143(V) which is claimed to have a maximum range of 200 nm (3).  Of course, maximum range is for a large target on a clear day with calm seas.  A more realistic range for smaller targets, such as naval vessels with a degree of stealth, in typical seas with wave clutter will be much, much less.

The APS-147 radar’s design features include wide bandwidth, high average power, fast scan rate (108/minute), frequency agility, scan-to-scan integration over nine scans, and a track-before-detect capability (4).

APS-147 Modes (2)

• Small Target/Periscope Detection
• Long Range Surveillance
• Weather Detection and Avoidance
• All Weather Navigation
• Short Range Search-and-Rescue
• Enhanced Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Search
• Target Designation
• Inverse Synthetic Aperture Target Imaging

The APS-153(V) adds Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination (ARPDD) capability to the list of modes.

Note that long range search and LPI are two separate and distinct modes.  LPI uses less power and produces much shorter detection ranges while long range search is more powerful but increases the probability of intercept to a certainty.

Radar is not the only means of finding targets.  The ALQ-210 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system for provides passive detection, location and identification of emitters  and threat warning (1).  The system emphasis seems to be on threat warning.  I don’t know how effective the system is for targeting or whether it can even generate targeting quality data.

At least among public observers and commentators, if not naval professionals, the helo is seen as the key to distributed lethality and is accorded near-magical capabilities.  As we’ve often noted, long range anti-ship missiles are useless without equally long range target detection and identification.  The helo is seen by non-professionals as being able to provide that long range search, detection, and targeting capability.

When I distinguish between public observers and naval professionals, the distinction I’m making is that I know what observers believe but I have no idea what naval professionals think about this subject.  I have no idea whether the Navy believes that helos are an integral and major component of distributed lethality or not.  It may be that the Navy sees no more than an incidental role in the long range search that is necessary to support distributed lethality.  Of course, if this is true then I have no idea how the Navy thinks they’ll find targets.

The maximum range of the APS-147/153 is unknown but, for sake of discussion, let’s assume it’s around 200 miles.  Again, that’s the maximum range for detection of a large, non-stealthy, non-ECM active target under ideal conditions and using maximum output power – say, a large tanker sailing in good weather.  For a smaller, semi-stealthy, active-ECM target such as a modern frigate or destroyer, the detection range is considerably less than the maximum – let’s call it a third to half the max range.  That puts our useful detection range at 66-100 miles and against a modern, semi-stealthy, ECM cloaked naval vessel even that may be optimistic.

Of course, even if the helo’s detection range is relatively short, the helo itself can fly out from the host vessel thereby extending the effective detection range.  Thus, the effective detection range is the helo’s flight range plus the radar range.  The flip side of this is that if the helo is radiating, it’s going to be seen and tracked at longer ranges than it can detect a target at and will be targeted and shot down before it can detect the shooting platform.  In other words, if the helo is close enough to detect an enemy vessel, the helo is probably already dead.

This is the key concept and it invalidates the use of a helo as the means of providing long range targeting for the distributed lethality concept.  A radiating target (the helo) can be detected at a much greater distance than its own radar can detect the targets it’s looking for.  This is not a prescription for survival and it is not a prescription for successful long range targeting.  Couple this with the helo’s demonstrated non-survivability in a surface-to-air missile environment and it’s patently obvious that the helo cannot survive long enough to find a target.  Could it find a small patrol craft that has no significant SAM capability?  Sure, but that’s not really the kind of target distributed lethality is intended to find and destroy, is it?  Even then, in enemy waters and airspace, an enemy aircraft will likely be called in to dispose of the helo before it can do much good.

As with so many modern naval assumptions, the concept of distributed lethality depends on the enemy allowing us to freely roam the skies conducting our targeting searches.  In a peer war, this is a ridiculous assumption and distributed lethality simply will not work because we have no long range survivable sensor.

I’ve told you why distributed lethality won’t work and why the helo, specifically, can’t be used as the long range sensor.  Now, I’ll tell you how the concept could work.  The key is a survivable long range sensor.  We do have such a sensor available – it’s the small UAV. 

MH-60R

If a ship can put out a constant stream of small, cheap UAVs with a combined flight range and sensor range of 200 nm, then we have a chance, at least, of finding a target.  Of course, many UAVs, being non-stealthy, will be spotted and destroyed.  This is where “cheap” factors in.  If the UAVs can be made cheaply enough then they can be considered expendable, almost one-way, assets.  So what if some, or many, don’t return?  If we have to expend a bunch of UAVs that cost tens (or even hundreds) of thousands of dollars in order to sink an enemy ship that costs hundreds of millions (or billions) of dollars, that’s a great trade.

The key to this cheap, expendable UAV is the sensor’s field of view.  It doesn’t matter how many UAVs we throw out if each one’s field of view is so limited that we can’t cover a significant swath of ocean.  If the field of view is too limited, the search devolves into dumb luck and that’s no way to win a war.  Do we have UAV sized sensors that have a sufficient field of view?  I don’t know.  Manufacturer’s claims are always ridiculously exaggerated so those are useless in assessing this.  This is one of those areas that only the Navy knows for sure.  The fact that I’ve seen no attempt to outfit the distributed lethality ships with a multitude of UAVs suggests that the sensor packages are not up to the task but I just don’t know for sure.

So, we now know what won’t work.  The helo is not the magic answer.  We also know what could work if appropriate sensors were available.

As a parting reminder, distributed lethality is a flawed concept for more reasons that just the long range sensing issue.  Simply solving the sensor issue offers a chance of making the concept work but it is still flawed.  For example, the enemy is going to be searching for us at the same time we’re searching for them.  What happens when a small, lightly armed distributed lethality vessel is found by the enemy before we can find the enemy?  The answer is a foregone conclusion: our distributed lethality ship will be sunk.  When the Navy idiotically starts talking about using amphibious ships, logistic ships, etc. as distributed lethality vessels, we’re talking about risking high value, but nearly defenseless, assets against the remote possibility of surviving long enough to find a suitable enemy target.  It’s not a risk that’s worth taking.

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(1)Lockheed Martin MH-60R informational brochure,

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/MH-60R-trifold.pdf

(2)Telephonics data sheet

http://quickstrike.com.au/imaging/APS-147.pdf

(3)Data sheet,

https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=76

(4)U.S. Navy Journal of Underwater Acoustics, “A History of U.S. Navy Airborne and Shipboard Periscope Detection Radar Design and Development”, January 2014, John G. Shannon,

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1003753.pdf