Saturday, April 8, 2017

Syrian Tomahawk Strike

By now, you all know that the US launched a cruise missile attack against a Syrian airfield in retaliation for a chemical weapon attack by Syrian forces.  I’m not going to address the quality of the evidence for the chemical weapon usage or the geopolitical aspects of the retaliation.  What I’m going to address is the military lessons that can be gleaned from the open source information about the cruise missile attack itself.

Defense News website has the best writeup that I’ve found so far (1).  USNI News website has some additional information and some bomb damage assessment photos (2).

The Navy's Tomahawk missile strike from two Burke class destroyers, Ross (Flt I) and Porter (Flt II), offers some insights into modern naval strike warfare.

VLS Mix.  The destroyers did not have time to return to a home port and load missiles.  Therefore, the missiles were part of the standard VLS missile mix.  Assuming the missiles were split equally among the two destroyers, that means each had at least 30 missiles in their mix.  Ross has 90 VLS cells while Porter has 96.  Thus, the 30 Tomahawk missiles represent 33% and 31% of the VLS load, respectively.  This gives us some insight as to the “standard” VLS missile mix.  Of course, there is nothing that says the destroyers used all their Tomahawk missiles.  The may have had more and the mix may be greater.  In fact, one extra missile was fired so clearly at least one of the ships did not use all its missiles.

Reliability.  The initial missile launch involved 60 attempted launches.  One launch failed and a replacement missile launched.  Thus, 61 launches were attempted with 60 being successful.  One missile plunged into the sea during flight so only 59 missiles reached the target area.  Thus, of 61 launches, 59 successfully reached the target area which is 96.7%.  It is unknown how many actually hit their intended targets.

SAM Defense.  There were surface-to-air (SAM) missile defenses around the airfield but none, apparently, engaged the Tomahawk missiles.  Reports suggest that the Russians were operating the SAMs, were pre-warned by the US about the attack, and opted not to engage.  Thus, we cannot learn anything about the viability of Tomahawks versus a modern, peer SAM defensive system. 

Airfield Weapon Density.  The US launched 60 Tomahawks at a single, relatively small airfield.  That seems like a lot of missiles especially when the runways were deliberately not targeted and other structures were deliberately avoided that would likely have been targeted in an all out attack.  Still, this gives us some idea of the weapon density the US believes necessary to destroy a single, small base.  Of course, the US may not have known whether the SAM defenses would engage and the seemingly large number of Tomahawks may have been what planners felt was needed in order to overcome a defense.  Either way, it offers some insight into the number of Tomahawks needed to attack an airbase.  It’s a bit more than I would have thought.

BDA.  The bomb damage photos that have been released do not seem to show 59 hits.  Note, however, that I am the farthest thing from a bomb damage assessment (BDA) photo analyst!  It may be that several missiles were targeted on a single hardened hangar and there appear to have been several of those so that may account for a significant chunk of missiles.  If so, that also suggests what planners think of the resilience of a hardened hangar versus the destructive power of a Tomahawk.


Had this been an all out attack to totally destroy the airfield, presumably many more missiles would have been used.  This gives us some insight into the Tomahawk weapon density needed to take out a facility.  It’s higher than I would have thought.  Given that our total Tomahawk inventory is somewhere around 4000 missiles, that should tell us something about our ability to wage an all out war and how long our inventory would last.  This has to be worrisome given that Tomahawks cannot be quickly replaced from the manufacturer.

This should also tell us how useful (or useless, as the case may be) our Virginia class submarines that carry only 12 Tomahawks will be – not very.  It would have required five subs to carry out this attack and this was only a partial attack against a small airfield.  Those who believe that our subs will constitute a significant land strike capability are mistaken.  The subs are more likely to be used as snipers, taking out smaller, undefended targets.  The retirement without replacement of our four SSGNs which each carried 154 Tomahawks may come to be viewed as a mistake.

Setting aside the geopolitics, this incident has proven to be instructive as regards modern naval strike warfare.



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(1)Defense News website, “The Pentagon’s Play-By-Play of the Syria Strikes”, Aaron Mehta, 7-Apr-2017,

(2)USNI News website, “How the U.S. Planned and Executed the Tomahawk Strike Against Syria”, Megan Eckstein, 7-Apr-2017,


Wednesday, April 5, 2017

Government Owned Shipbuilding Yards

Discussions of naval shipbuilding have noted the scarcity of active shipbuilding yards in the US.   Up to, and during, WWII, the US operated dozens of shipbuilding yards.  Now, US shipbuilding has shrunk to a very few.  The reasons are many and include increased safety, environmental, and labor laws and regulations that have put US shipbuilders at a disadvantage relative to foreign shipyards.  Naval shipbuilding demand has also steadily decreased over the last few decades which has increased the cost of what new construction there is which, in turn, has further lowered the numbers of new construction – a classic death spiral.

The lack of shipyard competitors has created a semi-monopoly with all the attendant problems such as elevated prices, limited selection, stagnant designs, corruption, etc.  One of the common suggestions is for the government to operate its own shipyards.  If nothing else, the elimination of profit would lower costs, according to proponents.  With that background, let’s take a deeper look at the concept of government operated shipbuilding yards.

Once upon a time, the Navy did own and operate shipbuilding yards.  These yards were required to competitively bid on construction projects just like private yards.

“Since the nation's earliest days, the U.S. Navy has operated its own shipyards.  There were 13 in total, four of which are still active.   In addition, eight naval stations - one in the U.S., seven overseas - had some shipbuilding capability.  At the end of WWII, the Navy terminated or cancelled almost all new ship construction contracts and only a few new ships were built in the Naval Shipyards thereafter.  Then, in 1972, a report was published that demonstrated that ships built in Naval Shipyards cost, on average, about 30% more than ships built by private-sector shipbuilders: as a result, all new ship construction in the Naval Shipyards ceased and five of the nine remaining yards were closed.” (1) [emphasis added]


“In 1972, Booz-Allen compared the costs of comparable ship work, including new construction, conversions, and overhauls In public and private yards for the fiscal years 1966-71. They found that the cost of new construction was, on average, about 35 percent higher in naval shipyards.” (2)


There are now only four shipyards and none engage in shipbuilding.  They are limited to repairs and upgrades.  The surviving yards are listed below.

  • Portsmouth Naval Shipyard - overhauls, repairs, and modernizes Los Angeles-class submarines

  • Norfolk Naval Shipyard - specializes in repairs, overhauls, and modernization of ships and submarines

  • Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard - repairs, maintains and modernizes the U.S. Pacific Fleet

  • Puget Sound Naval Shipyard - Maintains, modernizes, and retires ships

We see, then, that while the supposition that government owned and operated shipbuilding yards would be cheaper seems reasonable on the surface, the historical data indicates otherwise.  This is in line with almost all other large government programs.  For example, the US Post Office is far more expensive than private firms such as FedEx or UPS.  Similarly, Social Security, which is a form of insurance/annuity, is inefficient, costly, and failing compared to private sector insurance and annuity financial firms.  In fact, if the Social Security program were private, it would not be allowed to operate as it fails to meet private sector laws and regulations.  One final example, the Veteran’s Administration hospital service is a complete failure compared to private sector hospitals.  Thus, there is overwhelming current and historical data that indicates that government owned and operated shipbuilding yards would not provide cheaper ships but would, instead, provide more expensive ones.  

Government shipbuilding yards are not the solution to our out of control shipbuilding costs.



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(2)“Overhaul Costs In Public And Private Shipyards: A Case Study”, Marianne Bowes, The Public Research Institute, Oct. 1981, CRC 442

Monday, April 3, 2017

LCS - Can't Give 'Em Away

We’ve beaten the dead horse of an LCS program for years.  It’s almost gotten to the point where it’s not even fun anymore.  That said, people have lately suggested several things we should do with the LCS’s ranging from serious to tongue-in-cheek and from SinkEx’ing them to giving them to the Coast Guard.

I thought I’d take a moment to look at a couple of semi-serious alternative uses.

The “give ‘em to the Coast Guard” is the most popular semi-serious proposal.  Unfortunately, the LCS offers no capabilities that the Coast Guard needs.  The CG’s National Security Cutter is, arguably, a better warship so they gain nothing from that.  The LCS was designed with very limited at-sea endurance which doesn’t help the CG any.  The LCS is way too expensive to operate.  Given the designed-in land-based maintenance requirement, the CG would have to set up multiple dedicated service centers for the LCS with extensive shore-side maintenance facilities and a significant number of dedicated maintenance personnel and that’s just way more infrastructure than the CG can afford.  The Navy is learning that the required shore-side personnel are 2-3x what they had originally, if stupidly, estimated. 

Even if the CG wanted to scrap the minimal manning and give the LCS a full crew, the LCS doesn’t have the capacity for more crew.  It lacks food storage, cold storage, water storage, berthing, showers, heads, galley space, etc. to accommodate more crew.  While it might be possible to add berthing in the previous modular spaces, there is just no realistic way to increase galley space, food storage, cold storage, etc.  The LCS was designed around the two week deployment model and any increase in personnel further reduces that deployed time. 

Related to the short deployment model, the LCS range is only around a few thousand miles.  Compare that to the CG’s National Security Cutter which Wiki credits with a range of 12,000 nm (speed unspecified).  The LCS range does not meet CG needs.

In short, the LCS offers nothing to the CG in terms of capability and is far too expensive to operate.

Sell ‘em to other countries, is another popular refrain.  Unfortunately, the LCS has been proposed to numerous countries as a sale item and no one has yet bought one.  Even at vastly reduced prices just to unload them, the same problems as outlined for the CG apply to other countries.  The limited combat capability and extremely limited endurance combined with the need for an extensive land-based maintenance infrastructure make the LCS undesirable even at giveaway prices.

LCS?  Can’t even give ‘em away!

LRASM Update

The more I hear about the LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile), the more I like it.  Obviously, the Navy desperately needs a replacement for the obsolete and expired Harpoon and the LRASM is one of the options being seriously considered.  In fact, evidence to date suggests that LRASM is the only replacement option being seriously considered, at the moment, although the Kongsberg JSM and Tomahawk are also possibilities.

Scout Warrior website has a nice review and description of the LRASM program (1).

To briefly review, plans call for the LRASM to initially be launched from aircraft, the B-1 (in 2018) and F-18 (in 2019), specifically.  This will be followed by launch capability from standard VLS cells.  The missile will have a range of 200+ nm, is stealthy, and has a speed in the high subsonic range.  On board targeting sensors include radar, infrared, and optical imaging.  The missile requires initial target location and can accept mid-course guidance before falling back on its on-board sensors and autonomy for terminal guidance.  The warhead is a 1000 lb penetrator with blast fragmentation.

The missile depends heavily on autonomous target identification specifically to avoid a vulnerable dependence on networking, GPS, and other electronic communications that could be subject to countermeasures.  This is an outstanding design philosophy in that it recognizes a potential vulnerability and works around it.  Of course, the challenge is to develop software capable of that degree of autonomy while still providing the requisite degree of safety.  No one wants a weapon that will sink commercial shipping due to mistaken identity.  The challenge is compounded due to the electronic countermeasures that the missile will face.  The radar signatures that the missile will search for will be distorted and yet the missile will still have to reliably identify target from non-target.  Still, this is the only viable way to attack a target that we can’t keep continuous “sight” on during the final approach and terminal attack phases.

Apparently, the LRASM can also be launched from a deck mounted launcher in addition to VLS.  This has obvious advantages in some situations.  Deck launchers would be appropriate for smaller ships that don’t have VLS cells or have small clusters of them and don’t want to sacrifice any of their few AAW cells for anti-ship missiles.  The LCS comes to mind as an example of a ship that could benefit from a deck mounted LRASM launcher.

“We developed a new topside or deck-mounted launcher which can go on multiple platforms or multiple ships such as an LCS or Frigates,” Callaway [Scott Callaway, Surface-Launched LRASM program manager, Lockheed Martin] said.

The adaptation of the surface-launcher weapon, which could be operational by the mid-2020s …“

  
Of course, the inherent weakness in the weapon is still the requirement to provide the missile with initial target detection at long range, prior to launch, unless we’re going to blind fire a million dollar missile on the hope that it will find a target.  Long range targeting remains a key shortcoming of all Navy attack systems and one that is not being given adequate attention.  As we’ve noted repeatedly, a 200+ mile missile is useless if the initial sensor range is 30 miles, as would be the scenario for the LCS or Burke when operating independently.

As I said, I’m pleased with this program, overall.  It may not be the ultimate, best choice for an anti-ship weapon (I’d prefer a supersonic missile, for starters) but it represents a vast improvement over the venerable Harpoon and is a solid step in the right direction for a Navy that continually seems to find the wrong direction.  This is also a reasonably significant addition to the firepower side of the Navy which has been badly neglected in recent years with the likes of the non-combat capable LCS and  the Zumwalt which has no munition to fire.

It’s nice to be able to discuss a positive aspect of the Navy even if it’s not perfect.  I’m a big believer in the adage, “perfect is the enemy of good”, and this is a good program.



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(1)Scout Warrior website, “Navy Weighs New Ship-Deck-Launched Attack Methods for LRASM Weapon”, Kris Osborn, 7-Jan-2017,


Thursday, March 30, 2017

What Do The Marines Bring To The Table?

The Marine Corps has been renowned for being a tough fighting force with certain skill sets that make it unique.  Individual Marines have traditionally been considered tougher, more formidable fighters than Army soldiers – at least, if you ask a Marine.  The Corps has mastered (and now forgotten) skills such as amphibious assaults that the Army can’t perform.  However, times have changed.  The effects of social experimentation (women in service), technological emphasis (digital and electronic capabilities over close combat), and doctrinal changes (aviation combat emphasis and tactical mobility have trumped brute force combat) have significantly altered the characteristics of the “ideal” individual Marine or, at least, the perceived requirements.  Similarly, the Corps as a whole has changed.

For example, in WWII, women could not have passed the Marine Corps training program and, even if they could, would have been an absolute detriment in the field being unable to perform the basic activities such as climbing over the side of an attack transport in full gear, humping a battlefield load of equipment, carrying injured comrades to safety, etc.  Now, though, with the “gentling” of the Marine training program, gender norming, and the previously mentioned trends, women are deemed capable of serving, including front line combat.  This is not a post about women in service/combat.  I’m merely illustrating one of the ways in which the Corps has changed over time.  The Marines are no longer the Few, the Proud, the Marines.  They are now an equal opportunity, social organization that is the farthest thing from exclusive or unique.

As a whole, the Corps has moved away from the concept of frontal beach assaults in favor of inland, airborne assaults.  That’s fine (well, no it isn’t – a word or two on that, below) except for the fact that we have another group that does that and, at the moment, does it better – the Army.  In fact, the Army is aggressively moving to conduct operations from Navy ships and is aligning their future platform acquisitions with naval requirements.

The Corps is also moving away from the heavy end of the combat spectrum with recent announcements that tanks and artillery will be cut along with personnel. 

The Corps lacks a modern, effective amphibious battle vehicle and has spent many years dithering over the AAV replacement.  They’re no closer to an answer now than they were when they began the ill-fated EFV program.

We’re left with a Marine Corps that is currently only capable of short duration, small, light infantry operations.  The entire aviation assault concept that the Corps seems to be moving towards has some potentially serious weak points such as the survivability of the MV-22 and helos in an inland, opposed scenario and the questionable ability to adequately resupply an inland assault.

Further, the Corps’ apparent movement towards an expeditionary air force role is logistically and tactically suspect, at best.  They seem to want to take part in the high end, aerial combat, distributed lethality type of war that so many of our professional warriors seem to believe, incorrectly, will be the future of combat.  The problem with this, aside from the incorrect nature of the very concept, is that that is not the Corps’ fight.  That is not their job.  That is not their war.  We have a very high tech Air Force whose job it is to do that.  We have a Navy whose job, partially, is to do that.  The Marines have another job, though they seem to have forgotten what it is.

Finally, the Marine’s main unique attribute, their ability to execute an amphibious assault is highly suspect, now, from both a doctrinal and strategic point of view.

Doctrinally, the Marines cannot execute an amphibious assault.  They lack the landing craft to transport troops from 25-50 miles offshore to the beach in fighting condition.   They lack the ability to put heavy firepower ashore with the initial wave, when it is most needed.  In short, the Marines have no ability to execute an opposed landing against a peer.  They have no ability to execute their own doctrine.

Strategically, the need for amphibious assaults against foreseeable enemies over the foreseeable future is highly suspect.  Consider the likely cases:

China – We are not going to invade mainland China (at least, I hope we’re not that stupid).  The first island chain islands and bases are too small to justify an assault.  They are pinpoint, concentrated targets that will be destroyed by cruise missiles.  So, there is no reasonable need for amphibious assaults.

Russia – War with Russia will be a land and air war with minor naval contributions.  The war will be supplied and conducted through Europe and fought around the periphery of Russia.  There will be no need for amphibious assaults.

North Korea – War with NKorea will, as with Russia, be supplied and fought from South Korea in a south to north movement.  This will be the closest thing to a WWII type conflict.  There could be a use for a small, diversionary amphibious assault along the coast of NKorea although, given the threat of mines and the Navy’s almost complete lack of mine countermeasure capability, the likelihood of an amphibious assault is very small.

Iran – This offers the greatest possibility of an amphibious assault although the bulk of supply and fighting would still pass through Iran’s land borders.  An amphibious assault, if it happened, would only be lightly opposed.  Iran simply does not have the capability to offer serious resistance.

The overall strategic likelihood of amphibious assaults is very low for the foreseeable future.  Combined with the inability to actually conduct an assault, I see very little need for such a capability.

So, given the preceding, what is it that the Marines bring to the table that the Army and Air Force don’t already have?  The unfortunate answer is less and less, bordering on nothing.

Having posed the question and acknowledged the disappointing answer, let’s turn our attention to what the answer ought to be.

The Marines have two primary missions: 

  • Conduct short duration, high intensity, inland actions (raids, rescues, diversions, disruptions, first response, etc.).

  • Seize entry points into enemy territory for follow on forces.  This includes port seizure and landing points (beach or near-shore airfields).

It’s that simple.  It’s that simple and yet the Marine’s have lost their focus.  It’s that simple and yet the Marines are floundering.

Everything the Marines do and buy should be run through the filter of “will it support or enhance the primary missions”?  If so, do it.  If not, don’t.  It’s that simple.

Now let’s look a bit closer at the primary missions and what’s needed to accomplish them.

First response, almost by definition, will be a crisis that was unanticipated to some extent and likely be a situation where we are overmatched locally.  Responding to such a situation will require the Marines to fight above their weight.  They’ll have to hit hard and be able to survive on a battlefield that is not ideal and probably under unfriendly skies.  What will a Marine force need to accomplish this?  They’ll need as much transportable heavy firepower as possible (an M! Abrams provides firepower and survivability but currently presents a transport challenge).  A medium weight, heavy gun vehicle may be needed.  Possibly something along the lines of the M551 Sheridan or M50 Ontos.  Of course, the preferred solution would be to figure out how to transport M1 Abrams tanks!  In addition to tanks of whatever sort, they’ll need artillery and as much of it as they can get along with mortars of all sizes, including, ideally, vehicle mounted, heavy mortars (there’s that transport issue again).

Hand in hand with firepower is survivability.  It does no good to show up on the battlefield and be wiped out in short order.  Survivability requires armor and self-defense weapons.  The current fascination with, and trend towards, light “jeeps” for mobility is a surefire recipe for defeat especially if one has to fight under unfriendly skies.   

Fighting under unfriendly skies requires a robust anti-air (AAW) capability which the Marines (and Army, to be fair) have all but abandoned under the decades long belief that the US would always rule the skies.  We desperately need mobile AAW platforms, both missile and gun (along the lines of the ubiquitous Soviet ZSU).

Entry point seizure is the other key Marine mission.  The Marines have one unique feature that mobile Army units lack and that is ships – large, amphibious ships loaded with many tons of heavy equipment, munitions, and general supplies.  The amphibious ships represent the kind of equipment supply and reserves that Army airborne units just can’t match.  The ships are also mobile and are capable of bringing those supplies to the point of action.  The ships allow the Marines to operate aviation assets in close proximity to the point of battle unlike Air Force assets that must return to distant bases between missions thus drastically reducing sortie rates.

Thus, the distinguishing feature of the Marines is the ability to bring large amounts of heavy equipment to bear on far distant battlefields via ship based transport. 

The ability to bring large amounts of tanks, combat engineer vehicles, artillery, and other heavy equipment to a battle from nearby ships gives the Marines a decisive, hard-hitting capability that the Army-Air Force combination can’t match.  Unfortunately, that advantage is being squandered by ill-advised changes in direction and doctrine (expeditionary air force, for example, or divestiture of tanks and artillery) and failure to develop and procure the requisite supporting equipment (armored, heavy transport connectors, for example, or LSTs, or armored combat/amphibious vehicles).

Port seizure is a special skill set that will be urgently required and has been utterly neglected.  It is quite likely impossible to sustain an invasion without access to a port facility for unloading, especially given our lack of large connectors and the elimination of LSTs.  Port seizure will be critical.  However, the doctrine, operations, and tactics required for port seizure and defense are radically different from a beach assault.  Port seizure will require heavy C-RAM defenses, in-port AAW defenses, new means to actually get ashore (an AAV can't climb a pier, for example), new tactics for port defense since most ports are integrated with large urban cities (urban warfare raises its ugly head), among other unique challenges and needs.  Only the Marines can do this.

The Corps needs to take a step back, refocus on its core missions, re-acknowledge its strengths, and redirect its development, training, doctrine, and procurement efforts towards those strengths. 

Unfortunately, the Marines have all but officially abandoned one of their core missons, entry point seizure, and have seriously jeopardized their other core mission, first response, by downgrading their hitting power from their traditional middle weight status to light weight.  This is not just my opinion.   Here’s what Lt. Gen. Gary Thomas, deputy commandant for programs and resources, had to say to a Congressional panel.

“We are a light general purpose force. One of the things that gives the Marine Corps an advantage on the battlefield is its mobility and its fires. Much of that comes from aviation.” 

Well, there it is.  I’ve been saying for years that the Marines have abandoned their core and now top Marine leadership is confirming that, on the record, to Congress.

A light general purpose force is fine for peacekeeping and low end skirmishes but utterly useless for executing the Marine’s core missions.  A light general purpose force, by definition, is not specialized for anything and, therefore, not highly capable at any given task.  This is utterly wrong.  They are supposed to be medium weight, striving to be as heavy as they can be given transport constraints, specialists in first response and entry point seizure.  They should not be flitting around the battlefield in ultra lightweight jeeps (what is an airburst munition going to do to the troops packed on an open jeep?) or soaring over the battlefield in $150M aircraft that have a 50% readiness rate on a good day and require exquisite maintenance and care from highly trained factory technicians dressed in surgical garb.

In summary, what do the Marines bring to the table that we don’t already have?  Little or nothing.

I know the Corps has a strong Congressional lobby but if they don’t wake up soon, the Army is going to push them right out of a job.

The Marines need to get back to being the toughest, nastiest fighting force on the planet (yes, that means completely dumping women from the Corps and getting rid of the guys who don’t even outweigh their packs).  A Marine carries his rifle in one hand and fires a mortar in the other without bothering to set it on the ground like some Army puke. 

The Marines need to focus on their two core missions.  The days of Hollywood practice landings for the sake of public relations photo ops need to disappear.  The Marines need to focus on brutal raids, desperate defenses, and entry point seizure.  If Marines aren’t getting hurt during exercises then they aren’t training the right way.

The Marines need to bring something unique and valuable to the table or fold up and go away.  There is no middle ground.  Hey, Marine Corps, that sound you hear behind you is the Army sniffing at your butt.  Time to wake up!



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(1)USNI News website, “Lawmaker Worries Marine Corps Investing Too Heavily In Aviation Over Ground Vehicles”, Megan Eckstein, 10-Mar-2017,



Monday, March 27, 2017

Counter Assault

We talk at great length about amphibious assaults.  We discuss doctrine, our inability to execute our own doctrine, the lack of naval gunfire support, the very limited range of our ship-to-shore connectors, the complete absence of heavy weapons in the initial waves, and many other issues.  We occasionally discuss new and “new” (old but relearned) Marine Corps assault concepts.   We never discuss amphibious assault defense concepts – counter assault (CA).

The Marines are getting ready to conduct some exercises intended to test out several dozen new assault technologies.  As a side note, you see the traditional US emphasis on technology over tactics and training?  Why aren’t we testing out over a hundred new tactics?  But, I digress …    These technologies will include drones, mini-drones, unmanned amtracs and unmanned vehicles of all types, communications gear, networking, cyber, electronic warfare, etc. (1)(2)

Setting aside the myopic focus on technology over tactics, all of this is good.  Explore technology.  Find out what works and what doesn’t.  But – and this is the big but – do it under realistic conditions.  There’s no point “testing” technologies that have a pre-determined successful outcome because the exercise is designed to ensure success.  That’s just going to generate a false confidence that China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea will quickly shatter when war comes.

There’s another, even bigger “but” here.  Why not try out counter assault (CA) technologies and tactics, as well?  Let’s try to imagine what the enemy will do and see if they can stop us.  Maybe that technology that succeeds against a non-existent enemy in set piece testing will fail utterly due to the enemy’s CA?  Let’s find out.

Why don’t we turn this around and try to think like a peer enemy faced with the prospect of future US amphibious assaults.  How would we stop them?  What can we do to counter their assault?

For example, similar to the maxim that it’s easier to kill archers than arrows, it’s also easier to kill troops when they’re in the water, bunched up in slow moving, easily detected, almost defenseless Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV).  Why not employ a swarm of small, cheap, suicide UAVs that would spread out over the incoming assault wave and throw themselves at the lumbering AAVs in the water.  If simple explosives are insufficient to achieve kills, then shaped charge warheads similar to RPG’s can be employed.  Would any AAVs even make it ashore?

Do you think this concept is unrealistic?  Well, the Marines are banking on exactly this technology in reverse.  Doug King, director of the Ellis Group, a Marine Corps think tank, describes friendly UAV swarms opening gaps in the enemy defenses.

““Think about it this way: I’m maneuvering ashore, potentially in a boat,” he said. “What’s flying overhead is an unmanned swarm, that as soon as somebody radiates, gives off a signature, that swarm is just going right after them.” (1)

If we can imagine using UAV swarms, so can the enemy.  Let’s test the UAV CA concept and see if we can defend against it.

Let’s think up other CA measures and test them, too.  The US military has a decided tendency to only examine our own technology (under unrealistically contrived conditions) and fail to credit the enemy with any technology or tactics.  This is a perfect example – we’re going to possibly test UAV swarms and congratulate ourselves on developing yet another way to beat our enemies without ever considering that they may use the same technology to beat us.

Here’s a few other thoughts about new technology, counter assault measures that we might want to investigate.


  • Mine laying artillery – long range and no need for precision targeting makes this an appealing technology.  An entire assault fleet can be paralyzed by the mere threat of mines and the US has no viable volume MCM capability.

  • SSK’s - directed against the very few Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) that the Navy/Marines possess would bring an assault to a rapid halt.  Amphibious assault ships would be another attractive target.  The US lacks any effective littoral ASW capability and has little experience against SSKs since it does not operate any and only rarely exercises against allied SSKs.

  • Lingering FOD bursts – similar to chaff and delivered by artillery, cluster bombs, sub-munitions, or any other convenient means, these long lasting, drifting foreign objects (FOD) would foul LCAC turbine engines and fans.

  • Bunkered, unmanned gun mounts – would provide a hard-to-kill, devastating, anti-personnel fire that would be particularly effective against the unarmored, light infantry that the initial assault wave comprises.

  • Surf zone unmanned mobile mines – would utterly negate the standard tactic of attempting to clear a path immediately in front of the landing craft.  The mobility of a swarm of smart, subsurface (undetectable), unmanned, mobile mines that intelligently move to intersect the path of an approaching landing craft would thwart any existing tactics or equipment for clearing a path to the beach.  Slow moving AAVs would be wiped out.


I could probably think of ideas all night but you get the idea.  It’s not enough just to think up our own ideas and then pat ourselves on the back.  We need to think up the enemy’s ideas and figure out how to counter his counters.  We’re just barely and simplistically testing our own stuff.  To the best of my knowledge, we aren’t even pretending to imagine and test out possible enemy technologies.



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(1)Marine Times, “New Amphibious Landing Tactics And Technology”, Jeff Schogol, 23-Mar-2017,

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Rush 50 Technologies To Field Test In 9 Months”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 23-Mar-2017,



Saturday, March 25, 2017

Russian Shipyard Fires

One of the biggest challenges facing Russian shipyards seems to be keeping the ships from burning.  I was reminded of the fire that effectively destroyed the USS Miami in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in May 2012 and decided to see what the Russian experience had been with shipyard fires.  An Internet search turned up the following catastrophic fires over the last several years.  I’m sure there were many additional, smaller fires that are not reported and this does not include fires at sea – this is only shipyard fires.

30-Dec-2011  K-84 Yekaterinburg (Delta IV SSBN)
16-Sep-2013  K-150 Tomsk (Oscar II SSGN)
17-Mar-2014  K-148 Krasnodar (Oscar II SSGN – decommissioning)
4-Nov-2014    Kerch (Kara class missile cruiser)
7-Apr-2015    K-266 Orel (Oscar II SSGN)
7-Dec-2015   RaisKorfou (Koni II frigate for Algerian Navy)
7-Jun-2016    Project 12700 Georgiy Kurbatov (Alexandrit-class minsweeper)
17-Jan-2017  Ossora (Trawler)

Yikes!  That’s a lot of lost or seriously damaged shipping, there.


Orel, Oscar II SSGN Burning



No point to this post, just a bit of interesting information.