Civilians

This is a companion piece to the previous post, What War Is, in which we considered the hypothetical case of inflicting civilian casualties in order to destroy a threat to national security.  Most readers undoubtedly react with horror at the thought of intentionally killing civilians even in the pursuit of legitimate military operations.

When it comes to war, America bends over backwards and then some to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian structures.  Well, of course we do - is your initial reaction - we’re the good guys and that’s what good guys do.  We fight the evil enemy soldiers but we bear no ill will towards the enemy’s civilians who are wonderful, innocent people, just like us, who, through sheer bad luck, find themselves trapped in the physical space occupied by the enemy.  Why, were it not for the presence of the evil enemy soldiers, the enemy’s civilians would be shining beacons of freedom, friendliness, good will, prosperity, and openness just waiting for the sunshine of democracy and the American way of life to shine on their eager, upraised arms as they reach out to embrace us in a hug of brotherhood.

For this obvious reason the American military tends to make avoidance of civilian casualties one of the main objectives, often the overriding objective, of any military action even to the detriment of mission accomplishment and often at the risk of American lives.  For example, how many American soldiers have been killed and wounded conducting house to house clearance operations instead of simply blowing up the suspect house and moving on with no US casualties?  We do it to avoid civilian deaths and collateral damage but we pay a price.

So, we’re all in agreement, then, that civilian lives are sacrosanct and nothing has a higher priority than preserving civilian lives and avoiding collateral damage?  Well, before I wrap this up, let’s take a moment and dig just a little deeper into the concept of “civilian”.

What is a civilian?  We all know the answer to that one, right?  A civilian is, in addition to the description above, anyone who is not in uniform and a member of the military.  So, the mother raising her children is a civilian, right?  The farmer working his field is a civilian, right?  What about the civilian who works in the enemy’s headquarters assisting in the organization of the logistical effort that directly supports the enemy army?  Is he a civilian or just a non-uniformed enemy combatant?  How about the civilian who works in the factory that manufactures fighter jets for the enemy air force?  Is he a civilian or just a non-uniformed enemy combatant?

You can see where this is going, right?

Let’s reconsider that farmer working his field.  If his crop is going to support the enemy army, either directly or indirectly, is he a civilian or just a non-uniformed enemy combatant?

Look at our own history.  Take WWII, for example.  Were the women who took over the factory jobs so that the men could go fight, civilians or just non-uniformed combatants?  Were the millions of people who grew Victory Gardens civilians or just non-uniformed combatants?  I’m not going to belabor this.  It was clear that the entire country, whether uniformed or not, acted together as a single military force.  There were no civilians.  Everyone was involved in the war effort.  Everyone was at war with the Axis nations.  Had the enemy bombed our cities, they would have hit no civilians – there weren’t any!

The enemy’s civilians aren’t really civilians.  They’re non-uniformed combatants.  Of course, one may legitimately question the degree of willingness of those non-uniformed combatants, in some cases, but that doesn’t change the fact that they’re supporting the enemy’s military effort and, therefore, part of that military effort. 

There is certainly historical precedent for the involvement of civilians in the war effort and the subsequent inclusion of civilians in attacks.  Recall the wholesale bombing of German cities or the use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities.  Even the targeted bombing of enemy factories acknowledges that civilians are part of the legitimate target.  Japan disbursed military related manufacturing among small homes and villages.  Terrorists routinely co-locate themselves and their weapons among the civilian population.

Consider the “civilians” in the Middle East.  How many of them are providing food, shelter, information, and various other forms of support for the terrorist groups we’re fighting?  The number of true civilians begins to drop drastically when that kind of support is taken into account.

Even the Geneva Conventions and other international laws recognize the involvement of civilians and acknowledge the lawfulness of attacks on civilians and civilian structures under appropriate circumstances.  For example, the customary protection afforded hospitals can be violated if the hospital is used to execute acts harmful to the opposing force.

Convention (I), Article 21

“The protection to which fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after a due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such warning has remained unheeded.”

This convention merely codifies common sense.  If an enemy is shooting at you, you have the right to return fire regardless of the location of the enemy or the presence of civilians and civilian structures.  The onus is on the enemy not to create situations that put their own civilians at risk.  Failure of the enemy to thus protect and shield its own civilian population is not the fault of the opposing party and not a reason to grant a de facto immunity to the enemy.

The question becomes, at what point does the work of civilians become an act of enemy activity?  Is the farmer growing food to support the enemy army a part of the enemy’s military effort.  All common sense says that the answer is yes and that the farmer forfeits any immunity to attack that he might otherwise have.

Is a hospital that is caring for enemy wounded who will then be returned to the fight a legitimate target?  It’s certainly an active supporter of the enemy’s military effort and is engaged in an activity that will produce a result harmful to the opposing force.

These are not easy questions but the US’ refusal to even consider the involvement of “civilians” suggests that we have forgotten what war is, how an enemy military “army” operates, and how to wage war.

Before we wrap up this discussion, let’s consider the possible effect of failing to kill civilians in the pursuit of legitimate military targets.  The most recent example is the fight against ISIS.  The US has repeatedly and systematically passed up opportunities to inflict significant destruction against ISIS due to the co-mingling of civilians.  For example, the US has refused to attack ISIS oil convoys despite the immense damage that would have done to ISIS’ financial capability out of reluctance to kill the civilian drivers of the convoy trucks.  For starters, and referring to earlier paragraphs, are drivers of enemy convoys really civilians?  Setting that aside, the refusal to attack resulted in the continued operation and, indeed, expansion of ISIS activities which, in turn, resulted in thousands more deaths at the hands of the terrorists.  By sparing a handful of “civilians” and not attacking the convoys, the US condemned thousands to death in the future.  As a point of interest to this example, the US has very recently begun attacking these convoys in a limited way.

In summary, civilians are not quite what we believe them to be.  In a war, it is highly questionable whether true civilians even exist.  Thus, as we consider whether to bomb that grid square to remove the threat of Hezbollah missiles, we need to consider whether there are actually any civilians there or whether the “civilians” are actually just non-uniformed combatants.  It makes a difference and we need to begin remembering the distinction and the implications of that distinction. 

Note:  This should not need saying but, inevitably, there are idiot readers who can’t distinguish what’s actually being said from what they think is being said.  This post does not call for, nor advocate, the indiscriminate killing of civilians.  The post merely notes that our popular conception of the term “civilian” and how it applies to war is faulty and that a true understanding of the term has implications for our military planning and operations.  Again, this is not a blanket call for mass killing of civilians.

What War Is

One of ComNavOps’ recurring themes is that we’ve forgotten what war is.  The corollaries to this are that we’ve forgotten how to wage a true war and we’ve forgotten the cost, in lives and utter destruction, of war.  SNAFU blog brings the issue to the forefront with a simple sentence in a new post about Hezbollah acquiring the Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile (P-800 export version).  Here’s the quote,

“A mission to destroy/recover those missiles (assuming you aren't willing to risk massive civilian casualties by simply bombing the grid square they're located in) is gonna be rough.” [emphasis added]

This sums up and focuses the entire “what war is” issue in one sentence.

We’ve fought low end conflicts for so long and gotten so used to being able to pick and choose exquisitely precise attacks that we’ve forgotten what an indiscriminate affair true war is.  We’ve come to believe that we can conduct a war with no civilian casualties or collateral damage.  Arguably, avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage has been our main objective in many instances, as opposed to achievement of any actual military objective.

What is war?  For the purpose of this discussion, war is combat to eliminate a threat to national security.  If one’s national security is threatened then one should take any and all action necessary to eliminate the threat.  You don’t address national security threats on a limited, collateral damage avoiding basis.  You decisively, thoroughly, and permanently eliminate it.  If you can do so while avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage, all the better but avoidance of casualties and damage cannot be the military objective.  If it is, then your national security isn’t really being threatened.

If a missile such as this (or any military asset, for that matter) constitutes a threat to national security then it must be eliminated.  The only question is how best to go about it.  Even here, the question is fairly easy to answer.  The “how” is the method that achieves the asset’s destruction with the least loss of American lives.  Avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage are secondary objectives that may serve to moderate the method but not dictate it.  For example, avoidance might suggest conventional bombs as opposed to nuclear weapons if conventional bombs would be equally effective and not unduly risk American lives.

To return to the specific example of a missile located amongst the general population, the option to eliminate it via bombing a grid square is likely the option that would provide the most effective accomplishment of the task while providing the least risk to US lives.  When faced with a national security threat, avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage must take a back seat to mission accomplishment.  We’ve forgotten that.

In WWII, when faced with snipers hiding in civilian buildings, we called in artillery, mortars, or bazookas, leveled the building, and moved on.  That was war.

The only “good” in war is ending it quickly, decisively, and victoriously.  Any other approach just prolongs the fighting and results in more casualties on both sides, both civilian and military.  Consider the US’ reluctance to engage ISIS when co-located with civilians.  By passing on engagement opportunities, the US repeatedly allows ISIS fighters to continue to slaughter more civilians.  On the one hand, tens of civilians may die in the engagement.  On the other hand, hundreds or thousands may die, and many more suffer deprivations, over the succeeding months and years at the hands of the ISIS terrorists that are allowed to live out of a desire to avoid civilian deaths or collateral damage.  Which is worse?  The answer is clear, if ugly, but that’s what war is and we’ve forgotten that and forgotten how to make the hard decisions.

This post runs the risk of putting words in the mouth of the SNAFU author that the author did not intend.  Thus, note that SNAFU did not suggest that the Yakhont missile constituted a national security threat requiring immediate action nor did SNAFU state how, exactly, the threat should be dealt with.  ComNavOps has simply taken one of SNAFU’s typically informative and thought provoking posts and extrapolated on one aspect of it.  If you have problems with the conclusions in this post, blame ComNavOps not SNAFU.

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(1)SNAFU website, “Hezbollah Terror Group now has P-800 Oniks Anti-Ship Missiles (Brahmos)????”, 23-Feb-2017,

http://www.snafu-solomon.com/2017/02/hezbollah-terror-group-now-has-p-800.html

Threat Surrogates

The Navy thinks nothing of spending billions for new ships, aircraft, and weapons – even ones with questionable performance – and yet what does the Navy spend on testing of these systems?  Only a tiny fraction, by comparison.  Worse, what does the Navy spend on threat surrogates to ensure that the testing they do engage in is meaningful?  Almost nothing.  In fact, in many cases, there are no realistic threat surrogates which means there is no realistic testing possible. 

Let’s take a wander through the DOT&E 2016 Annual Report and see how widespread this problem is.

Submarines – The Navy lacks a realistic diesel submarine or surrogate which is necessary for testing the BQQ-10 submarine sonar system.

“Perform an ASW event against a high-end, diesel-electric, hunter-killer submarine …”

Torpedoes – The Navy lacks realistic, threat-representative torpedo surrogates.

“In September 2015, the Navy completed a formal study that identified capability gaps in currently available torpedo surrogates and presented an analysis of alternatives for specific investments to improve threat emulation ability. The Navy has since taken the following actions to address the identified capability gaps:

- The Navy received funding through an FY16 Resource Enhancement Project (REP) proposal and is currently in development of a threat-representative high-speed quiet propulsion system.

- The Navy submitted an FY17 REP proposal to develop a General Threat Torpedo (GTT) that is intended to expand upon the propulsion system under development and provide representation of threat torpedoes in both acoustic performance and tactical logic.”

Lack of a suitable surrogate hinders Zumwalt testing.

“The threat torpedo surrogates currently available for operational assessment of the Zumwalt-class destroyer have significant limitations in their representation of threat torpedoes.”

Cruise Missiles – The Navy lacks representative cruise missile surrogates.

“…although SeaRAM has demonstrated some capability against ASCM threats, the lack of ASCM surrogate targets to adequately represent advanced ASCM threats combined with the paucity of test data does not support a meaningful and quantitative assessment of SeaRAM’s ability to provide the DDG 51 class with an adequate self-defense against threat ASCMs.”

DOT&E’s recommendation: 

“Develop threat surrogate aerial targets that adequately represent advanced ASCM threats.”

Closely related to realistic threat surrogates is the need for realistic test bed platforms for Aegis.  As DOT&E suggested,

“Provide the necessary funding to support the procurement of an advanced air and missile defense radar [AMDR/SPY-6] and Aegis-equipped SDTS [Self Defense Test Ship] that are needed to support Aegis Modernization, advanced AMDR DDG 51 Flight III, and ESSM Block 2 operational testing.”

The lack of a realistic test bed – meaning a representative SDTS – jeopardizes Aegis modernization, AMDR/SPY-6 development and fielding, the Burke Flt III, and ESSM.  What is the Navy spending on those programs?  Billions.  What is the Navy spending on obtaining a realistic SDTS?  Zero.  The Navy is willing to risk ships and crew to save an infinitesimally small amount of money.  Here’s a thought …  The Navy is desperately trying to early retire the Aegis cruisers.   Why not convert one of them into an Aegis/AMDR SDTS?  The ship is there – already paid for.  The equipment is already mounted.  It only needs to have some simple automation added.

As a point of interest, the current SDTS is the former USS Foster, DD-964, a Spruance class destroyer.  Given that the bulk of our surface fleet consists of Aegis vessels – and soon to be AMDR/SPY-6 – the need for a representative SDTS is overwhelming.

The Navy thinks nothing of spending billions on highly questionable platforms like the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, and LPD-17 but balks at spending the money necessary to actually test new weapons and platforms.  That’s utterly illogical.  That’s the Navy.

Right All Along

The Navy has finally and officially acknowledged that ComNavOps was right all along.  Of course, ComNavOps is right about everything, so what, specifically, is the Navy acknowledging that ComNavOps was right about?  - The need for in-house naval engineering to design and oversee ship acquisition programs.

ComNavOps has long preached that the Navy abdicated its responsibilities by abolishing BuShips and turning over design and construction responsibility to the manufacturers.  This began with the Spruance class, which actually turned out quite well, and has culminated the LCS, LPD-17, Ford, and Zumwalt fiascos.

Now, the Navy has recognized that the lack of in-house engineering expertise is at the root of these acquisition disasters (1).  How bad had the engineering loss gotten?

“Vice Adm. Tom Moore, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, said NAVSEA’s engineering directorate (SEA 05) had dropped to a fifth of its size from 1990 to 2005.”

“…in SEA 05, where there had been 1,292 engineers in 1990 and only 251 in 2005 …”

The Navy is now looking to hire engineers with a goal of 750 by 2025.  Of course, that’s still only around half of what they had in 1990 and none of those new hires will have naval warship design and construction experience so there won’t be any quick turnaround in design and construction expertise.  Still, it’s a step in the right direction.

Unfortunately, the Navy is only looking to go half way to solving the problem.  The full solution requires reconstituting BuShips and the General Board.  The Navy, however, is only going to add engineers without the BuShips organization that made the warship design process so effective and without the General Board that made warship conceptual designs so linked to operational needs.

Why did the Navy go down the ill fated path that they did?

““In one of our many eras of acquisition reform – and at that time, the vogue in acquisition reform back in the mid-90s was, hey, industry knows best, just throw it over the fence to them and let them build the ships and we’ll be fine …”

I know, it sounds idiotic, doesn’t it?  Unfortunately, the concept went even further off the rails when the Navy not only threw the responsibility over the fence to the manufacturer but they threw it to companies that had never built a warship before.  Neither Lockheed Martin nor Austal had built a warship before they started building the LCS.  What did the Navy think was going to happen?

I’ve never built a nuclear reactor before.  What do you think will happen if you hire me to build one?

You know, there’s some failings that are obvious in hindsight but may not have been obvious at the time and then there’s ideas that are so blindingly stupid that hindsight is not required:  non-warship companies building warships, minimal manning, deferred maintenance, and so on.  It was obvious from the start that abdicating design responsibility would not turn out well. 

While it’s good that the Navy is finally recognizing the error of their ways, that error has cost the Navy an entire generation of flawed ships.  The LCS will never be useful.  The LPD-17 was a quality control disaster whose effects are still being felt (and we’re using it as the basis for future ship classes!!!!).  The Ford is an unaffordable budget disaster that is sounding the death knell of carriers.  The Zumwalt is the poster child for “I don’t really know what I want” and cost the Navy an entire generation of cruisers.

Make no mistake.  This decades long disaster lies squarely with Navy flag leadership.  The extent of their incompetence is/was staggering and will continue to be felt for decades to come.

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(1)USNI website, “Navy to Impose More Rigorous Oversight in New Ship Classes; Will Hire More Engineers”, Megan Eckstein, February 20, 2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/02/20/navy-oversight-in-new-ship-engineering-classes

Russian Spy Ship

The media is abuzz with reports of a Russian spy ship off the northeast coast of the US.  Congressmen are demanding action and expressing outrage.  You’d think we were being invaded.  Good grief, this is exactly what we do to countries around the world.  The Russians have every right to be there and I have no problem with that.

Having said that, if I were the Navy/Military I’d give some thought to scheduling our pilots for some low level flying training in that area.  If some pilot happened to make a closer than “safe” pass, well, that happens during training, doesn’t it?

I’d also consider having some Navy ships conduct close quarter maneuvering drills in the area.  If they happened to inadvertently cross paths with the Russian ship and violate some rules of the road, well, again, those things happen during training. 

Finally, I’d send some ships and electronic warfare aircraft to conduct training in the area.  If that training happened to interfere with the Russian ship’s communications and whatnot, well, that happens during training, right?

Seriously, this is a golden opportunity for the US to send a message to Russia in response to all the Russian actions that are aimed at sending messages to us.

Modern Battleship - v.2

Let’s have a little fun today and consider what a modern battleship would be.  In particular, let’s look at how a modern battleship would be different from the iconic Iowa class.

Note: This is a significantly different slant on a modern battleship from a previous version that I offered for consideration (see, "Modern Battleship").  You might want to check that one out as a comparison.

Since WWII, missiles have replaced guns as the main naval weapon.  Long range, almost world wide surveillance has obviated the need for speed to a large degree, weapon ranges have increased from 20 miles to hundreds or a thousand miles, armor has been all but abandoned.  How do these trends impact a modern battleship design, if at all?  Let’s look at the modern battleship’s main characteristics, point by point, and see where they take us.

Main Armament.  Battleship discussions rightly start and end with the main armament.  The BB’s 16” guns set the standard for gun based destructive power – both anti-surface and land attack.  To build a modern BB without powerful guns is to build a ship that is not a BB – it might be an arsenal ship or missile barge but it won’t be a BB.  Thus, the modern BB will be armed with three triple 16” gun mounts – any less and what’s the point?

Secondary Armament.  The battleship’s secondary armament had a few functions: anti-aircraft, shore bombardment, and anti-destroyer.  Guns can no longer perform anti-aircraft, 5” guns for shore bombardment are still useful but the likelihood of a major assault requiring massive bombardment is very small, and no destroyer is likely to reach 5” gun range against a battleship.  Thus, the secondary gun requirement is much reduced.  The secondary armament would be the Navy’s standard 5”/62 gun.  I would suggest that two per side, for a total of four, would be adequate.

Strike.  A battleship’s purpose is to hit hard with overwhelming firepower.  Part of that firepower will consist of Tomahawk cruise missiles.  A pair of 32 cell VLS units, for a total of 64 missiles, would provide a significant long range strike capability.  This would be in addition to the AAW VLS requirements discussed below.

AAW.  The battleship of WWII was the Aegis cruiser of today – a mammothly powerful AAW platform bristling with 20 mm, 40 mm, and 5” guns.  Today, however, AAW is conducted with missiles, primarily.  We already have dedicated Aegis AAW ships so duplicating this capability on a battleship would be a waste.  The battleship would always operate with Aegis escorts.  Thus, the BB would be armed only with medium range ESSM and RAM missiles.  Specifically, I’d give the BB two 8-cell Mk41 VLS which could hold 64 quad-packed ESSM.  Additionally, I’d give it 6 SeaRAM launchers, each of which holds 11 RAM missiles for a total of 66 close in AAW missiles.  Finally, I’d give it 4 Phalanx CIWS mounts, two per side, for that last ditch defense.

Armor.  If armament is the first item of battleship discussion, armor is the second.  A modern battleship would have the modern day equivalent of the Iowa plus whatever modern armor improvements could be adapted such as Kevlar, composite armor, reactive armor, spaced armor, and so on.  There’s simply no point to having a powerful, expensive ship that can be easily sunk.

Speed.  The WWII Iowa was operated with the fast carriers and so it had to be fast, itself.  That would not be true with a modern BB.  A modern BB is not a carrier escort – it is a land and sea strike platform.  It would operate as the anchor of a Surface Action Group (SAG).  In that role, speed is nice but not a necessity and very high end speed serves no purpose.  No ship, no matter how fast is going to outrun a missile or aircraft.  A reasonable degree of speed is useful for rapid repositioning but 25 kts is just as effective as 30+ kts. 

Speed in WWII was also used to outpace the enemy’s surveillance cycle.  The only long range surveillance in WWII was the aircraft and they were only effective during daylight hours.  Thus, speed was used to dash in from a couple hundred miles away, during the night, to achieve an attack position before the enemy’s next surveillance cycle could begin.  Today, with radar, satellites, etc,, there is no surveillance cycle.  Surveillance is 24 hours a day and the ability to “dash in” probably no longer exists.

Therefore, the modern BB will have a speed of 25 kts and, thus, a correspondingly smaller engineering plant, smaller uptakes, and smaller exhausts, thereby consuming less internal ship’s volume.  If you want to see the effect that very high end speed has on ship’s volume, look at the LCS and note the size of the intakes and exhausts and imagine the internal volume dedicated to those ducts!

Sensors.  Not being an Aegis/Standard Missile vessel, and operating with Aegis vessels, the modern battleship has no need for Aegis/AMDR or any other high end radar suite.  Something like the TRS-4D radar in flat panel array configuration should be adequate along with EO/IR sensors.

ASW.  This is not a destroyer.  We are not going to have our BB playing tag with submarines.  That is what escorts are for.  The modern BB will have no ASW capability, at all.  The most we’ll concede is a mine-detecting sonar.

Helos.  The modern battleship will always be escorted by Aegis destroyers with helos, hangars, and flight decks.  The battleship needs only a flight deck for resupply and personnel transport purposes.  No hangar and no dedicated helos.

Stealth.  The battleship is going to be big and will be detected.  It is not worth driving up costs in an attempt to provide an unachievable degree of stealth.  The ship should have whatever degree of stealth can be achieved via simple shaping (slanting) of the superstructure.  Exotic coatings should be avoided.

There you have our modern version of a battleship – a powerful, well protected vessel that provides dominant offensive firepower on the modern battlefield.  Its mission would be to anchor surface attack groups (I say “attack” to, again, emphasize the offensive nature of the modern battleship) tasked with shore bombardment support for ground forces, anti-surface sweeps, and strikes against enemy bases, ports, airfields, etc.  A group would consist of a battleship and 5 Burke class destroyers. 

What do you think?  What does your concept of a modern battleship look like and what would its mission be?

Side note:  The one item that I’d be willing to trade off is the third 16” turret.  If an analysis of size, weight, cost, and weapons placement suggested that deletion of the third turret would result in a more affordable, better packaged ship, I’d be willing to consider that.  Specifically, I’m considering the placement of the required VLS cells.  It might be that the third gun would have to be replaced by a VLS cluster.  Hopefully, though, that would not be the case.

F-18 IRST Status

Infrared Search and Track (IRST) is one of the hot topics in aviation.  Supporters claim it greatly enhances the stealth of a fighter since it allows search and tracking via passive modes as opposed to active radar use.  It also allows detection of enemy aircraft that are radar stealth’ed and, thus, negates an enemy’s stealth advantage. 

The Navy has an IRST development program underway to equip the F-18E/F Hornet fleet with IRST as an effort to keep the non-stealthy F-18s relevant and combat effective in an age of stealth.

Following is a discussion of the F-18 IRST program as reported in the DOT&E 2016 Annual Report.

The F-18 IRST sensor will be mounted on the nose of a centerline fuel tank under the fuselage of the Hornet.  The current IRST21 unit is being developed by Boeing and Lockheed Martin and is descended from the F-14 IRST.  The Navy plans to procure 170 IRST units.  The current Block I will be fielded as test units and eventually upgraded to the future production Block II. 

Block I was originally scheduled to enter full rate production but the Navy decided to forego production in favor of the Block II version after a program review of the Block I test results.  This suggests that the Block I was deemed insufficiently successful to warrant production and, in typical Navy thinking, the unsuccessful Block I is bypassed in the hope that the non-existent Block II will somehow attain the success that the Block I did not.  There is nothing inherent wrong with this approach as long as we don’t commit to the Block II production before its capabilities are proven.  Too often, the Navy, faced with a failure, opts to incorporate undemonstrated “improvements” that exist only on paper and then immediately commit to production without waiting for demonstrated success.

The key development in the program thus far, Operational Assessment 2 (OA 2), took place in November 2015 when the IRST was tested under realistic combat conditions.  Unfortunately, the results were less than successful.

“The system … could not reliably detect and track targets well enough to support weapons employment in an environment that reflects realistic fighter employment and tactics.”

Immediately subsequent to this assessment, a program review was held.

“Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) held an IRST program review on January 27, 2016, and in a September 8, 2016, Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), ASN (RDA) approved a restructured program that foregoes full-rate production of Block I sensors and proceeds directly to development of the Block II system. The Block I system will not be fielded and IOT&E did not begin in 2016 as planned.

The Navy plans to hold the Block II Preliminary Design Review in May 2017 and begin IOT&E in 2020.”

As discussed, it is clear that the results of the assessment test and subsequent review indicated that the Block I IRST was not successful.  Unfortunately, instead of pausing until development could overcome whatever problems were seen, the Navy has opted to leap into Block II and has already scheduled production.

It is noteworthy that the Hornet-IRST-fuel tank combination has been approved for the full flight envelope as long as the fuel tank is empty.  Some restrictions have been placed on both launch and flight conditions with varying loads of fuel in the tank.

With the tank empty, the IRST becomes, in essence, a giant sensor the size, weight, and drag of a fuel tank!  If the tank can’t be used for fuel or only in partial load conditions, one has to wonder at the wisdom of placing the unit in a centerline fuel tank to begin with as opposed to a wing or nose mounted location.  On the other hand, DOT&E points out that the flight restrictions may not be significant.

“Given the rate at which fuel is consumed from the centerline fuel tank, these restrictions are effective for only a short period at the beginning of the mission profile and should not have an operational impact.”

The under-the-fuselage location also restricts the field of view of the sensor.  Obviously, it can’t see anything above the aircraft.  Thus, it’s only 50% effective to begin with, even if it worked perfectly for the lower field of view.

Reliability is also an issue.

“Demonstrated reliability is below what was expected at this point in the flight test program. As of the time of DOT&E’s OA 2 report, the cumulative Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF) was 4.1 hours; the reliability after incorporating known fixes was 19.5 hours. The MTBOMF requirement is 40 hours and the system was expected to have a projected reliability of 38 hours when entering IOT&E.”

DOT&E’s report concludes with this criticism of the Navy and admonishment to learn a lesson.

“Many of the Block I system’s difficulties with detection and tracking seen in OA 1 and OA 2 did not require flight testing to uncover them, but could have been discovered earlier via analysis and modeling and simulation. The Navy expects that the Block II configuration (which includes sensor and aircraft hardware and software), will provide improved capability. This assumption should be tested as early as possible, prior to major decisions …,”

Unfortunately, the Navy seems determined to ignore this lesson, having already scheduled Block II production.

Please don’t read this post as being against fielding an IRST.  ComNavOps believes that a fully functional IRST would be a relatively cheap and highly effective combat aid and is well worth pursuing.  Successful and functional IRST units apparently exist around the world and there is no reason to believe that the Navy and its manufacturing partners cannot produce a functional unit.  However, we need to go about this intelligently.

I would recommend that the Navy reconsider the under-the-fuselage location.  Perhaps there is a good reason why the unit can’t be wing or nose mounted but it would be worth some extraordinary effort to do so.  The actual sensor is small and should be able to be mounted in a more advantageous position.

I also recommend that the Navy stop making production plans for an unproven and, thus far, unsuccessful unit.  By all means, continue development but set production plans aside and remove that artificial deadline from consideration.  Take the time needed to field a fully functioning unit.