The High Cost of Ground Attack Helicopters

Guest author Mr. Bustamante returns with a fascinating and thought provoking post about attack helicopters.  This one will challenge your conventions.  Enjoy!

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The High Cost of Ground Attack Helicopters

Are they really worth it? Are they survivable?

Just for fun: which aircraft has greater general flight performance characteristics?

Fieseler Fi 167 (circa 1938)

Bell AH-1Z Viper (circa 2000)

                              Source: Wikipedia

Point in fact: the Fieseler Fi 167 dominates the AH-1; with a maximum speed of 176 knots it was 20 knots faster, with a range of 703 nm it flew over twice as far, its service ceiling was 8,200 m - almost 2.5 times higher, and the Fi 167 could carry a 1,000 kg bomb or large torpedo, while the AH-1 is rated for 1,134 kg, the weight and configuration of weapon mounting points limits it to about a 500 kg ordnance loadout.  Purist will be aghast at this comparison, after all, the biplane lacks the modern sensors, weapon controls, and communications of the AH-1, but the performance characteristics of attack helicopters deserve closer scrutiny, particularly given the high cost of procurement and operations (the acquisition cost of the AH-64D Apache longbow at one point was almost $70 million - as much as an F/A-18).  

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Few weapon systems are as enshrined in American military thought as the attack helicopter, but this reputation has never been proven in high intensity war.  In fact, considering the origins of the attack helicopter, its performance relative to alternative aircraft, its astronomical procurement and total ownership costs, the current and future threat environments, and historical battlefield performance; we should be very concerned about the tradeoffs made in buying attack helicopters.  The attack helicopter is arguably a niche airframe that is both costly, and deficient in performance relative to fixed-wing alternatives.  We must also consider that field artillery, now can deliver both precision and massed fires at ranges exceeding those of the attack helicopter. Justification of a weapon system is not governed simply by whether the system can do the job, but whether it does the job better than competing alternatives.  We have to remind ourselves that the mass purchase of attack helicopters was driven largely by United States Army.  The Army is motivated to view Close Air Support (CAS) as "aerial artillery" and it seeks to retain operational control of air power, in the same way as it controls artillery.  The USAF won the “control debate” in WW2, while still a branch of the Army, and then it won independence as a separate service.  The inter-service politics were nasty, but the Army was effectively pushed out of the business of fixed wing tactical aviation to any great degree, and saw the helicopter as a means for replacing assets lost to the Air Force.[1]  The wisdom or stupidity of this decision is debatable, but the driving argument in favor of the attack helicopter was not performance, but rather a bureaucratic response to the creation of the United States Air Force!  The few advantages that helicopters have over fixed wing aircraft is the ability to use terrain for cover and concealment, to take off, hover, and land vertically.  I argue that those capabilities are not sufficiently advantageous to overcome the huge performance and cost penalties, which makes it very tough to justify the purchase of attack helicopters for tactical aviation use. 

Army and Marine doctrine puts attack helicopters in competition with fixed-wing TACAIR.  Both services doctrine on attack helicopters is similar and assigns them the role of attack, reconnaissance, and security operations, although the USMC adds “anti-helicopter operations” and “… terminal control for …. CAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.”[2]  More troubling, Joint Publication 3-03 Joint Interdiction, and Army doctrine list attack helicopters as assets capable of conducting interdiction operations; that is operations to prevent adversaries from employing surface-based weaponry and reinforcing units at a time and place of their choosing.  The interdiction mission has traditionally been a fixed –wing TACAIR mission because it has generally been conducted beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) – inside the FSCL, fires from any source must be coordinated with the ground commander; beyond the FSCL, any asset may attack without coordination.  Helicopters intrinsically have large acoustic and radar signatures, which makes them excellent targets.  This doctrine exposes attack helicopters to the full spectrum of enemy anti-aircraft systems without the raw airframe performance capabilities of fixed wing TACAIR (altitude, speed, and range), the ability to carry effective standoff weapons to minimize exposure to air defense systems, nor the sophisticated counters to protect TACAIR from these systems (e.g. jamming pods, stealth, etc.).

The issue of attack helicopters should be decided upon the merits, but any review of airframe performance makes it clear that fixed-wing solutions dominate the performance/cost debate; and this at a time when even vertical envelopment supporters are calling for, and funding, platforms with performance characteristics that exceed the performance envelop of any attack helicopter in service or under consideration (e.g. the V-22 and the forth coming Army led joint Future Vertical Lift program). Table 1 below compares U.S. attack helicopters with other tactical fixed wing aircraft:

Table 1. A Comparison of Common Tactical Ground Attack Aircraft¹

                    Source: Federation of American Scientists, Wikipedia, and Global Security.

1.    These figures are for comparison only, actual combat loads, meteorology, and mission profiles dramatically affect performance.  Costs are even more difficult to quantify.

2.    No inflation adjustments have been made to this table.

3.    The GSh-30-2 is a dual barreled, recoil operated autocannon.

4.    Other AH-64 models (e.g. the AH-64D) can be equipped with launch rails for four air–to-air missiles.

5.    Ordinance load outs for attack helicopters are challenging.  The primary limitation is not weight but weapons hard points.   The AH-1 and AH-64 both carry an autocannon, and have four hard points for rocket pods (5” Zuni, or 70mm), or for a four AGM-114 Hellfire missile launch rack.  Additionally, some models add launch rails for AIM-9 air-to-air missiles.

It is worth noting that helicopter performance in “high hot” environments degrades substantially faster than fixed wing aircraft.  From the table above it is clear that fixed-wing aircraft dominate rotary wing attack aircraft in all measurable performance categories.  Specifically they are:

1.    More expensive to buy; and are much more expensive to operate and repair.

2.    Have lower performance (slower, less range, lower service ceilings).

3.    Have lower sortie rates.

4.    Carry dramatically lower armament load outs compared to fixed wing aircraft.

5.    Are less flexible than fighters or light attack aircraft (fighters have been pressed into service as attack aircraft, and most light attack aircraft can function as fighters, but attack helicopters cannot perform the fighter role).

So where exactly do attack helicopters excel? All of the aircraft in Table 1 have been successfully operated from makeshift dirt or grass runways, and all have excellent slow speed maneuverability, although only helicopters can hover, take off and land vertically. I contend that that ability is of limited use as the historical record of helicopter shoot downs demonstrates any low and slow moving tactical aircraft will be hugely vulnerable.  It is no surprise that the USAF prefers fixed wing solutions to close air support and never purchased attack helicopters, although it has acquired large numbers of rotary wing aircraft to meet other mission needs.  To summarize, when the costs and other performance metrics are considered; rotary wing aircraft fare very poorly compared to fixed wing tactical aircraft.  The final judgement on any weapon system is combat, so how have attack helicopters fared in combat operations?

The presumption is that attack helicopters are effective combat assets; but historical analysis does not support this.  The first mass employment of attack helicopters was in Vietnam; the Army and Marine Corps lost over 5,000 helicopters as complete write-offs, of which 277 were AH-1s.  This figure does not include aircraft that were shot down, or put out of commission due to ground fire, but later repaired to flying status.  It also does not count the number of UH-1s, AH-47s (they existed!), and OH-58s operating as attack helicopters.  Significantly, most of these losses occurred over South Vietnam or friendly airspace where the enemy could not deploy his most sophisticated air defenses.  Still, the AH-64, and to a lesser extent the upgraded AH-1s have benefited from a number of protective features to improve aircraft survivability.  So how attack helicopters performed in recent combat operations? Consider the 2003 invasion of Iraq:

“During the course of planning for ground operations in Iraq, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and British Army all considered, and actually planned for, air-assault operations in front of the advancing armored columns. … Once operations started, however, no air-assault missions in front of the leading edge of the armored advance were conducted. [Emphasis added]  Interviews with all three ground forces indicated that the risks of these operations were seen as outweighing the possible benefits, so the senior ground commanders elected to cancel the planned missions.” [3]

It is worth recalling that the Iraqi military in 2003 was broken.  Yet the decision of the UK, USA, and USMC commanders to cancel vertical envelopment operations against doctrine is profound.  Commanders curtailed attack helicopter operations, but even with these limitations, attack helicopters still suffered serious losses against an enemy with no effective air force, and no organized air defenses.

“During the course of the roughly 25 days of major combat operations up to the fall of Baghdad, the Army and Marine attack helicopter forces suffered considerable damage. Several aircraft were effectively destroyed, and many others (for example, 46 of 58 USMC Cobras) took battle damage, mostly from infantry-type weapons, such as machine guns, RPGs, and small arms fire.”[4]

How bad was the situation for attack helicopters?  On 23 March 2003, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment was drawn into a fight where one AH-64 Apache was shot down, and all 31 Apaches in the regiment took various amounts of battle damage. Following the incident, PBS interviewed Thomas White, Secretary of the Army and asked him to comment:

“I was disappointed that we didn't do better.  I mean, this was an Apache [AH-64] raid. We have invested an enormous amount of resources in attack helicopter operations in the U.S. Army. [Emphasis added] … We were very fortunate we didn't lose more aircraft.”

We need to be frank about casualties - they are inevitable - the real question is value: combat effect versus the costs of alternative options.  By this metric, attack helicopters were unable to perform their doctrinal role and did not deliver the combat effectiveness that was expected of them during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

It is now an open question how our rotary wing attack helicopter force would fare against a well led, well trained, well-motivated, force with effective weapons like the 2K22 Tunguska, which was designed to deal with threats like the AH-64 (see figure 2).[5]  Nor do we know how attack helicopters will fair when facing sophisticated artillery threats (modern multifunction fused tube or rocket artillery projectiles) employed en masse by our potential enemies.

 

Figure 2. The 2K22 Tunguska Anti-Aircraft System

                            Source: www.ausairpower.net

To re-state the situation, not only have attack helicopters proven to be costly, and less capable than fixed-wing tactical aircraft, they have proven ineffective and vulnerable.  In fact, if the justification for buying attack helicopters is for use as a middle-weight force (which I take to mean COIN and ground attack in permissive environments), then the USMC has not only purchased the most expensive, and least capable aircraft for the mission; it bought into a weapons platform that it was unwilling to employ per doctrine due to survivability concerns.

So what conclusion can we draw?  The U.S. Army is constrained by long-standing policies on fixed-wing tactical aircraft, but the Department of the Navy is unconstrained and is free to pursue better alternatives.  From a price performance ratio, an amphibious task force would be far better served with two, or three squadrons of fixed-wing aircraft like a 21^st century A-4, operating from an austere aircraft carrier (e.g. Midway class), than the current LHD/LHA with attack helicopters, and VSTOL jets.  Any shortfalls in cargo space could be addressed by other sealift (new AKA/LKA).  Someone will scream about the loss of vertical take-off and landing capability.  My response is: 1) a small carrier could conduct ground support flight operations to the limits of OMFTS – effectively the combat radius of the V-22; 2) the logistics/maintenance penalties of operating from FARPs will reduce sortie production to the extent that it is more effective to operate aircraft from ships; 3) if the ground force is operating so far inshore as to make carrier operations unfeasible, then fixed wing aircraft are capable of operating from improvised runways ashore (including dirt runways!); and 4) no rotary wing aircraft in production, or on the drawing boards, can keep up with the V-22.  

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Mr. Bustamante is a retired naval officer who served the majority of his career as a Naval Special Warfare Officer; he also served as a Surface Warfare Officer and Foreign Area Officer.  He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering.  He also holds a Master of Science degree in Defense Analysis (Operations Research) from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. After retiring from the Navy, Mr. Bustamante worked for the legislative branch as an auditor and analyst, as a civil servant with the United States Department of State, and also in the private sector as an analyst in information technology project management.

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[1] The key point for this discussion is that the Army argued successfully that the attack helicopter fulfilled its requirements for close air support, but the origin of the attack helicopter is entangled in the larger inter-service debate over air power, particularly as argued between the United States Army and Air Force.  The most extraordinary claims are made by proponents on both sides of the issue; the two best summaries avoiding the partisanship are: The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate, by Douglas N. Campbell, May 1, 2003; and Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support Issue, Rand R-906-PR, 1971.

[2] MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations articulates USMC doctrine on aviation to include attack helicopters; Field Manual No. 1-112 articulates Army doctrine on attack helicopters.  Significantly, the two services organize attack helicopters very differently.  The Army organizes, and emphasizes the employment of attack helicopters in battalions consisting of 24x AH-64 helicopters.  Typically two attack helicopter battalions are assigned to division and corps in aviation brigades.  The Army also emphasizes that its attack helicopter battalions, even when conducting independent battalion sized operations, are always employed to complement other maneuver forces.  Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLA) mix utility and attack helicopters in a squadron of 9x UH-1 and

12x AH-1 helicopters.

[3] Rand briefing DB472, “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” page 87. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf

[4] Rand briefing DB472, “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” page 87.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf

[5] In addition to RAND studies, readers desiring more information on helicopter survivability may wish to read the article: “Are Helicopters Vulnerable?” by Dr. Carlo Kopp, published in the March 2005 edition of Australian Aviation.

Comments

This blog exists to raise the level of discourse available on the Internet regarding naval matters.  Of late, the commentary associated with posts has often failed to do that.  Comments have become factually challenged and argumentative.  That is my fault for allowing it.

A typical example is if the statement is made that southern US cities have warmer climates than northern cities, someone will, inevitably, respond with a comment citing some southern city that, on some given day, was colder than some city in the north – as if that disproves the general statement.  This kind of comment is simply argumentative and does nothing to further the main premise.

Trying to find one example, somewhere in history, that appears to contradict a main premise is simply argumentative.  Now, if you want to take that example and build a logical case for an alternative view, that’s fine – unlikely but fine.  Just as the main premise is never built on a single example (single examples of anything mean nothing) so too, an alternative view can not be built on a single example.

There’s a famous saying that there are no dumb questions.  As far as this blog is concerned, there certainly are dumb questions and, more to the point, dumb comments.  In order to contribute to raising the level of discourse, you, the commenter, have to do your homework.  I expect a basic level of knowledge about naval matters which includes a familiarity with naval history and an understanding of the basics of naval operations and tactics.  You don’t have to be an expert but, I’ll be honest here, this is not the blog for amateurs who have no grasp of naval fundamentals.  There are plenty of books and websites where you can go to learn the basics. 

That said, I have no problem with someone asking a sincere question and trying to learn.  I’m happy to respond to that.  What I don’t want to do is embark on a long term educational foray spanning many posts/weeks.

I never delete a comment because it disagrees with me.  I do, however, delete comments, whether they agree or disagree, when they’re based on stupidity. 

What kind of comments am I looking for?  I’m looking for comments that further the discussion.  I’m looking for comments that address the main premise rather than try to pick apart some minor side detail.  I’m looking for comments that build on the main premise.  I’d love comments that have an opposing view and are supported with data and logic.  “You’re wrong”, is not a productive comment.

Data and logic – those are mandatory in any comment.  Given the short length of a blog post, I still try to cite data for my main points and I expect comments to make use of data and logic.  “The LCS sucks”, is not a worthwhile comment.  Offer some data to support the statement.

All of this should not discourage readers from commenting.  Instead, it should encourage readers to put a bit of effort into their comments and try to become part of a conversation rather than part of an argument.  I recognize that there is a fine line between discussing a point of disagreement and arguing.  The difference is that the former is done with an open mind and a willingness to learn and further the discussion while the latter is a simple attempt to “win” and serves no purpose.

Of course, there is always the requirement for politeness and respect.  Argue the points, not the person.

I’m sometimes asked why I don’t respond to a given comment.  The answer is that I respond to comments that meet the above criteria – comments that further the discussion, raise new and valid points, and offer insights.

I expect my readership to be a cut above the typical blog readership.  I’d rather have one good comment than ten pointless ones.  With that goal in mind, I’ve started, and will continue, to delete comments that fail to meet the criteria.

I encourage you to be part of something challenging and worthwhile.  Recognize, though, that means you may have to put a bit of effort into it.

Respond or Leave

Everyone has heard by now of the apparent cruise missile (C-802 is the most likely) attacks on two US Navy ships.  If you haven’t, you can check out the USNI article (1).  The USS Mason, a Burke destroyer, launched two SM-2 missiles and one ESSM in response to the cruise missiles.  Both cruise missiles landed in the water short of the ships and there is no indication that either was shot down by the destroyers missiles.  It appears that either the cruise missiles never had a target lock or the destroyer’s electronic countermeasures prevented a lock.

I’m not going to waste time speculating about the performance of the weapon systems since we don’t have enough information.  Instead, let’s see what other lessons we can learn.

First, the fog of war is eternal.  Despite all our sensors, electronics, radar, IR, optics, and computer software, we don’t know whether the missiles we fired in defense hit anything.  How is that possible?  No one was trying to deny us sensor data as would happen in a peer war.  We had a completely unhindered view of a small battlespace and yet we couldn’t even see whether any of our three missiles hit anything?  This should serve as a lesson to all those who want to commit us to the vaunted Third Offset strategy based on networks, unmanned vehicles, and a wholly unfounded belief that we will have an omniscient view of the battlefield thereby enabling and enhancing our forces.  What a bunch of cow droppings!  We can’t see an uncontested battlefield clearly and it’s only going to be much, much more confused when a peer enemy contests the battlefield with electronic warfare.  We won’t know jack about what’s going on.  That’s the reality of war.  That’s the fog of war.  We should be training for that confusion rather than blindly believing we’ll see everything.  The fog of war is eternal and all-encompassing.  We need to embrace it and train for it, not ignore it.

Second, we need to respond with massive and deadly force – or leave the area.  Any other course is just going to get US sailors killed and ships sunk.  Failure to respond will simply embolden our enemies and ensure further attacks.  The various actors in the area need to understand that threatening US ships is a fatal mistake.  If it’s not a mistake and they can launch missiles at us with impunity as we demonstrate our restraint and passivity then we need to leave the area because we clearly aren’t doing any good.  I think the odds of us responding are negligible so I think we should leave the area.

Third, this illustrates the need for a counterbattery (countermissile, in this case) capability.  The moment the incoming cruise missiles were detected, Tomahawk missiles should have been heading towards the cruise missile launch point.   Further, a UAV should have been directed to the launch point to look for follow up attack possibilities.  The two cruise missile attacks were apparently launched an hour or so apart.  It’s not clear whether they were launched from the same point (there’s that fog of war, again!) but a UAV should have been overhead, watching, for the second launch.  A UAV might also have allowed us to preemptively attack the second missile launch site.  If we’re going to operate on the modern battlefield, split seconds will be all we have and a countermissilebattery fire capability is badly needed.

What response will the Navy and the country make?  If history is any indicator, none. 

What lessons will the Navy learn?  If history is any indicator, none. 

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(1)USNI News website, “USS Mason Fired 3 Missiles to Defend From Yemen Cruise Missiles Attack”, Sam LaGrone, 11-Oct-2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-missiles-to-defend-from-yemen-cruise-missiles-attack

The Strikefighter Myth

We have to build multi-role aircraft today.  Our budgets are too limited to allow the luxury of dedicated fighters and separate, dedicated strike aircraft.  Plus, the flexibility of multi-role aircraft gives us a huge advantage in that we can switch seamlessly between roles and “mass” aircraft for any given task.  A carrier air wing of 40 Hornets can be 40 strike aircraft or 40 fighters or any combination thereof.

In fact, the next generation of aircraft is even more multi-role than just strike and fighter.  The F-35 can be a strike, fighter, electronic warfare, surveillance, intel, UAV controller, and many other roles.  Yes, the future of naval aviation is in good hands and clearly headed down the right path.

Okay, then, let’s all give ourselves a pat on the back and call it a day.  This is just a short, feel-good post, I guess.

Well, come on, now, you’ve been following ComNavOps long enough to know that this isn’t the end of the post.

Let’s look closer at the multi-role aircraft issue.

Let’s start with the easiest aspect which is budget.  We have more than enough money for whatever we want as long as we spend it wisely – which we aren’t doing.  So, budget is not a real justification for multi-role aircraft.  We could build dedicated fighters and dedicated strike aircraft (we’ve done it in the past and we can do it again) if we wanted to and if we would follow the common sense approach that we’ve laid out in previous posts.  We covered this before so I won’t go over it again.  If you’re unsure of how we do this, go back through the archives.

Now, let’s look at the self-escorting myth.  When multi-role strikefighters began appearing, the scenario was put forth that the aircraft would be self-escorting, able to switch from air-to-ground (A2G) to air-to-air (A2A), efficiently dispatch enemy fighters, switch back to A2G, strike their targets, switch back to A2A, and return home triumphantly, probably having bagged a few more enemy fighters on the way home.  Unfortunately, unless we’re fighting an enemy whose air force is barely flight worthy, let alone combat capable, this is simply not true. 

To illustrate the exception clause, a Navy flight of Hornets did exactly this during Desert Storm.  Two F/A-18Cs from VFA-81 on the Saratoga were on a strike mission when they were intercepted by two MiG-21s.  The Hornets shot down the two MiGs and continued on their strike mission.  So, why were they able to accomplish this?  Because the Iraqi aircraft and pilots were hugely overmatched.  The MiG-21 is a 1950’s era aircraft and the Iraqi pilots were found to be exceptionally poor with no understanding of modern jet combat tactics.  The American pilots and aircraft had every conceivable advantage. 

That’s the exception.  Now, let’s look at the peer combat case.  What if the MiG-21s had been, say, MiG-29s flown by pilots as good as ours?  In that case, the Hornets would have been badly outgunned, overloaded with bombs, unable to maneuver, and, basically, sitting ducks.  Of course, they could and would have jettisoned the bombs to regain their air to air maneuverability.  However, jettisoning the bombs means a mission kill for the strike mission and a failure as a self-escorting strikefighter.  Even then, they would be at a disadvantage because they would have only a minimal A2A loadout since most of their hardpoints would have been bombs and fuel tanks.  So, the Hornets would not only be a mission kill but, likely, an actual kill.

Self-escort is a myth.  If you load up on strike weapons you can’t carry A2A weapons.  If you’re up against a competent enemy you’ll have to jettison your bomb load to maneuver – a mission kill at the very least.  Self-escort sounds good on paper but is a myth.

Let’s move on and look at the multi-role myth.  In previous posts, we’ve noted that a multi-role platform can’t be as good as a corresponding single role platform because the multi-role platform isn’t optimized for any single role.  In a head to head match, a multi-role strike fighter will lose to a single role aircraft every time.  Multi-role strikefighters are jacks of all trades and masters of none.  Look at the F-35’s anemic A2A performance – at best, it’s as good as an F-16.  How will an F-35 fare against Russian or Chinese stealth fighters?  Not well.  Or, let’s keep it in house for illustrative purposes.  How would an F-35 fare against an F-22?  No one knows but, presumably, not well.

Okay, so the F-35 is a second rate fighter but what about as a strike aircraft?  Again, it’s a poor fit as a pure strike aircraft, having a very small internal weapons capacity and limited range.

How about the multi-role F/A-18 Hornet?  In A2A mode, it compares poorly to the Su-27, MiG-29, or any of the more modern Russian and Chinese stealth fighters.  The Hornet is a nice peacetime aircraft but would perform poorly in peer combat against even its own generation of aircraft.

As we’ve previously discussed, multi-role is fine for non-combat applications but is a disaster waiting to happen in combat.

Let’s look at other roles within the multi-role spectrum. 

Surveillance is supposed to be one of the F-35’s strong suits.  However, the F-35 radar is miniscule compared to, say, the E-2 Hawkeye or P-8 Poseidon.  It just can’t see very far with any usable resolution.  It even fares poorly in surveillance when compared to a MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft just due to the Triton’s vastly superior endurance and, hence, area coverage even though the Triton would not have a superior radar.

Let’s consider electronic signal intercepts and analysis (ELINT/ESM).  The F-35 is supposed to provide ELINT data back to other platforms.  However, the F-35 would be hard pressed to even match the long since retired ES-3A Shadows of the early 1990’s.  There’s simply a limit on how much equipment you can pack into a single airframe.

Even the most cursory evaluation makes it readily apparent that multi-role combat aircraft are a waste of resources in war.  So many people want to compare the F-35 to legacy MiG-29s or Su-27s when they should really be comparing the F-35 to the Sukhoi PAK-FA and Chinese J-20/31.  These are the opponents against whom the F-35 will be matched and will justify its price tag, if it can, and it is these opponents against whom the mediocrity of a multi-role aircraft will become apparent.  Let’s also be honest about enemy aircraft.  I don’t know the performance characteristics of the PAK-FA, J-20, or J-31 nor am I even sure what their intended roles are.  Perhaps they are being designed as compromised, multi-role aircraft, too.  In that case, it will be an even match.  However, from what I’ve read, my sense is that these enemy aircraft are much more focused on aerial superiority as opposed to our do-everything designs.

One closing note …  My denigration of multi-role combat aircraft and preference for single function aircraft does not mean that a single function aircraft cannot have a secondary function.  The F-14 Tomcat was built as a pure fleet interceptor but was able to be converted into a decent attack plane.  The P-47 was built as a pure fighter but was able to adapt to the low level attack role.  The F-22 was built as a pure air superiority fighter but may be adapted to an attack role as time goes on.  The point is that an aircraft should designed, built, and optimized for one role and one only.  Other roles, if they can occur, are a fortuitous benefit but should, in no way, drive the design.

Strikefighters are a failed myth.

Damaged LCS Damaged Again

This could only happen to the poor LCS program.  The USS Montgomery (LCS-8), already in port in Mayport for repairs after suffering two engineering casualties in 24 hours in mid-September, took a “knock” from a tug as it was putting to sea ahead of an expected hurricane and suffered a 1 ft x 1/4 inch crack along a weld seam as well as some bent stringers (horizontal hull structural beams) (1)

My issue with this incident is the physical weakness demonstrated by the ship as a result of what appears to have been a fairly mild contact with a tug.  What does this say about the LCS’ ability to absorb actual battle damage?  The Navy has stated that the LCS was only designed to stay afloat long enough after a hit to allow the crew to escape.  Of course, I’m ignoring the fact that the Navy has also claimed that the LCS was built to Level 1+ (Level 2 except for one or two minor requirements) standards which means that the ship should be able to take a hit and keep fighting so there’s an inherent contradiction but, I digress …

This lightness of construction is not limited to the LCS.  We’ve seen that the Aegis cruiser, Port Royal, was severely or permanently damaged by nosing gently aground.

The Burkes were found to have been too lightly built and have had to have reinforcing plates added to the hull.

I’ve commented on the Navy’s tendency over the last few decades to build ships far too weak, physically.  I won’t belabor the point.  This is just more evidence that the Navy has forgotten how to build warships.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Tug Collides With LCS Montgomery, Cracks The Hull”, David B. Larter, 6-Oct-2016,

https://www.navytimes.com/articles/tug-collides-with-lcs-montgomery-cracks-the-hull

CNO Richardson Disappoints

Long time readers know that ComNavOps was not a fan of recently retired CNO Greenert.  In fact, it’s fair to say that ComNavOps viewed him as the worst CNO in a long, long time.  Thus, it was with cautious optimism that ComNavOps greeted incoming CNO Richardson.  The optimism had less to do with any knowledge of Richardson’s accomplishments or abilities and more to do with the belief that a tree stump would do a better job leading the Navy and Richardson could only be an improvement, no matter how bad he might be.

Alas, those giddy, hopeful days have slowly given way to disbelief – disbelief that anyone else could rival Greenert’s incompetence and yet we seem to have a contender in the making. 

Consider all the problems facing the Navy and all the issues that the CNO could have chosen to take on and fix.  I won’t even list the problems.  You know the litany as well as I do.  So, what has CNO Richardson chosen to focus on?

His latest focus and apparent best use of his time is to ban the acronym “A2/AD” (anti-access/area denial). 

“We’re going to scale down the mention of A2AD,” Adm. John Richardson said Monday, referring to the acronym for anti-access area denial, a warfighting approach with, he said, a variety of definitions. 

“It’s a term bandied about pretty freely and lacks the precise definition it probably would benefit from, and that ambiguity sends a variety of signals,” Richardson said. “Specifics matter.” (1)

The term does not have a variety of definitions.  In fact, as military acronyms go, it’s one of the most specific and well understood ones!  Richardson may not understand it but the rest of us do.  Recognize, though, that my complaint and derision stem not from the fact that he’s banned the acronym but that he considers that to be a priority issue over all the other challenges the Navy faces.  Is this the best use of his time?

What else has he accomplished in his short tenure?  Well, he appears to have prioritized the long standing system of Navy ratings as more important than warfighting, training, maintenance, etc.   His solution to the non-existent problem is to eliminate the time honored and specific rating system in favor of a generic rank label (2).  I’m not going to debate the merits of this but, rather, point out that if this is the best use of the CNO’s time and the most pressing issue he believes he faces then we truly have a contender for Greenert’s position of worst CNO in recent history.

Richardson also seems to have inherited his predecessor’s naïve views regarding China.  He has met with his Chinese counterpart five times already and, apparently, sees a rosy future in our relations with China.

“Despite rising tensions in the South China Sea, the US Navy’s top admiral says his Chinese counterparts “by and large” behave professionally, not provocatively, when the two nations meet at sea. And precisely because of those ensions, Adm. John Richardson said, it’s all the more important to emphasize cooperating with China, not confronting it.”

How’s that cooperation working out, there, Adm. Richardson?  We’ve ceded the entire South China Sea, gotten nothing in return, and are now watching the Chinese preparing to expand their territory still further, including annexing the disputed Scarborough Shoal which is also claimed by the Philippines.

“In March, U.S. Navy chief Admiral John Richardson said the United States had observed “survey type activity” around Scarborough that could be a precursor to reclamation. A month later, South China Morning Post added fuel to the fire by citing an anonymous source “close to the PLA Navy” as saying that China would carry out reclamation work at Scarborough “within this year.” (3)

Again, the point is not whether China ultimately will or will not seize the reef (they will) but, instead, the complete absence of a grasp on reality being demonstrated by Richardson.  China has already proven that they will use any means, including illegal acts, to further their expansionist agenda.  Richardson’s attempts at appeasement paint a picture of a man with no grasp of geopolitical or strategic reality or, indeed, any remembrance of very recent Chinese actions.

In addition to what Richardson has done (and disappointed in the doing) consider what he hasn't done.  He hasn't killed the LCS, he hasn't killed the Ford class, he hasn't laid out a solid F-35 CONOPS and acquisition strategy, he hasn't developed a viable amphibious assault doctrine in conjunction with the Marines, he hasn't prioritized warfighting, maintenance, training, and tactics.

Whether you look at what he's done or what he hasn't done, it's all the same: disappointing.

My cautious, feeble hopes for Richardson are gone.  The only hope I have left is that he proves to be only the second worst CNO I’ve seen rather than supplanting Greenert as the absolute worst.

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(1)Defense News website, “CNO Bans ‘A2/AD’ As Jargon”, Christopher P. Cavas, 3-Oct-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/cno-bans-a2ad-as-jargon

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Eliminating 241-Year-Old Rating System in New Enlisted Rank Overhaul”, Sam LaGrone, 29-Sep-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/09/29/navy-eliminating-241-year-old-rating-system-new-enlisted-rank-overhaul

(3)The Diplomat website, “China Building on Scarborough Shoal? Don't Hold Your Breath.”, Shannon Tiezzi, 9-Sep-2016,

http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-building-on-scarborough-shoal-dont-hold-your-breath/

Forgotten LCS Capabilities - The LCS Air Group

The LCS program garners much criticism which makes it easy to forget that that the class possesses potentially useful inherent capabilities.  We are honored today to have guest author Steven Wills (aka Lazarus) to remind us of one of those capabilities and offer some much needed balance to the LCS discussion.  Please enjoy this post and give it your serious consideration.  Check out Mr. Will's bio at the end of the post.

Regarding comments, LCS discussions too often degenerate into positive and negative platitudes and this will not be allowed.  Comments must be specific and supported with facts and logic.  As always, politeness and respect are mandatory.

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Forgotten LCS Capabilities

The LCS Air Group

One of the significant capabilities of the littoral combat ship (LCS) that is often overlooked in discussion is the ship’s extensive aviation facilities. Both LCS variants have large flight decks and helicopter hangars. Their modular spaces also support the storage of ordnance and aviation maintenance gear in support of extended rotary wing operations. The three ship deployed LCS squadron can theoretically support six MH 60R helicopters and Firescout unmanned rotary-wing vehicles (1), or a combination of those assets. The LCS air group can perform a number of warfare and surveillance roles in support of a naval component commander’s campaign effort.

Both LCS variants boast the most expansive helicopter operating limits in terms of wind speeds due to their expansive flight decks. At 7300 square feet in size (2), the LCS-2 (Independence) variant has the largest flight deck of any surface combatant in the fleet. The LCS-1 (Freedom) variant has a smaller flight deck at 5200 square feet, but can land a helicopter in the face of 45 knot relative winds (3). The LCS sea frames also carry more aviation fuel (JP-5) (75-80 metric tons (4)) than the preceding Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (64 metric tons (5)). While neither LCS variant has the traditional RAST (Recovery, Assist, Secure, Traverse (6)) system to aid in landing and deck movement, helicopter operations are supported by the British-made MacTaggart Scott Trigon (7) cable recovery and traversing system. The Trigon system has not been used in past U.S. ship classes, but has been a staple of Commonwealth navies (8) for the last 40 years. It was pioneered by the British Royal Navy for use with small flight decks and smaller deck crews than larger ships. It uses a system of deck-mounted cables to secure a helicopter to a ship’s flight deck and move it to/from the vessel’s helicopter hangar (9).

USS Freedom and FireScout UAV

The MH-60R helicopter (10) is capable of a wide range of missions to include reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare. It can mount up to 3 MK54 lightweight antisubmarine (ASW) torpedoes or 4 AGM 114 Hellfire air to surface missiles. The MQ-8B Firescout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (11) also carries the Hellfire missile as well as the small (1 kg) GBU 144 Viper Strike laser guided bomb (LGB). The MK54 is the standard U.S. ASW torpedo while the Hellfire has an air to surface range of 4.5 nautical miles. The AGM 119 Penguin antiship missile with a range of 18 nautical miles might also be carried on LCS-based MH-60R’s.

Trigon Helo Handling System

An LCS air wing of multiple assets operating in conjunction with other weapons and capabilities based on the LCS sea frames such as the Harpoon and Naval Strike missiles constitutes a significant surface warfare capability. Operating in a distributive configuration but linked using air and surface equipment, an LCS squadron might launch coordinated strikes from air and surface assets. The high speed of the LCS sea frames allows them to rapidly re-position away from aircraft launch and recovery sites (12), thus increasing an opponent’s area of uncertainty in planning a counter-strike. The distributive employment of LCS at maximum distance forces an opponent to contemplate a much wider battle space in locating and striking at LCS sea frames. Unlike one or two conventional frigates that might support 12-16 antiship cruise missiles, the loss of one LCS only degrades the formation’s strike capacity rather than halving or entirely losing it.

The LCS’ sea frame capabilities are available today and do not need an associative mission module to contribute to the surface and subsurface battle. Potential LCS aviation assets provide the maritime component commander with a medium surface strike capability. Utilization of the emerging distributive lethality concept allows for an integrated strike capability from both sea frames and aircraft while maximizing their survivability through dispersion. The LCS air group is not waiting on a certification from the Department of Defense Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), or funding stalled in Congress, but is ready whenever and wherever the sea frames can be assembled.

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(1)Defense Industry Daily website, “LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships”,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

(2)National Defense website, “Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All The Stops”, Grace V. Jean, March 2010,

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/LittoralCombatShip.aspx

(3)Navy.mil website,  COMLCSRON ONE Newsletter, “USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Commissioned In Galveston”,  MC2 (SW/AW) Garcia, SURFPAC Public Affairs,  October 2012, Volume 2, Issue 4,

http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcsron1/Documents/LCS_Newsletter_Vol_2_Issue4-Oct_2012.pdf

(4)GAO, “Littoral Combat Ship - Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, July 2014, GAO-14-749,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665114.pdf

(5)“The Continuation of a Damage Control Stability Module for the FFG-7”, Charles Arthur Bush, B.S.N.A., United States Naval Academy, Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1984

(6)Curtiss-Wright website, products/naval systems/helicopter securing & traversing/RAST, 30-Sep-2016,

https://www.curtisswrightds.com/products/naval-systems/helicopter-securing-traversing/rast.html

(7)DocSlide, 30-Sep-2016,

http://docslide.us/documents/why-trigon-has-no-rails-rev6.html

(8)MacTaggart Scott website, defense products/surface ship systems/helicopter handling, 30-Sep-2016,

http://www.mactag.com/94_HelicopterHandling.html

(9)YouTube, “MacTaggart Trigon helicopter recovery and handling system”, jimbarc, published 15-Sep-2014,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xh01qPp7ia4

(10)Lockheed Martin website, products/naval systems/mh 60 seahawk helicopters,

http://lockheedmartin.com/us/products/mh60r.html

(11)Naval Air Systems Command website, aircraft and weapons/uas/firescout,

http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=8250AFBA-DF2B-4999-9EF3-0B0E46144D03

(12)Aviation Week website, “Seahawk Helicopters Provide Punch For LCS Operations”, Michael Babey, 23-Sep-2013,

http://aviationweek.com/awin/seahawk-helicopters-provide-punch-lcs-operations

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Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer who spent most of his sea going career in small combatants including two frigates, a mine countermeasures ship (MCM) and a patrol coastal (PC). He is currently a PhD Candidate in Military History at Ohio University. His areas of expertise are Cold War naval history and the history of British sea power from 1889-1941. He posts on a number of sites under the pen name of "Lazarus."