Mk57 VLS

The Navy’s vertical launch system (VLS) has long been the backbone of the Navy’s offensive and defensive missile systems.

The basic VLS module is currently available in two lengths: Strike and Tactical. The smaller Self-Defense module is no longer available since it can’t accommodate the ESSM Block 2.  The Strike module is 25 ft (7.6 m) tall and can house all variants of the Standard missile, Tomahawk, and ESSM.  The Tactical module is 22 ft (6.7 m) tall and can house ESSM and non-BMD Standard missiles.

The Mk57 VLS is 26 ft tall and can accommodate an 18 in longer missile and about 3 in greater diameter. 

Here’s a quick comparison.

	Mk41 Strike	Mk57
Height, ft	25	26
Weight, lb	32,000	33,600
Max Canister Length, ft	21.4	23.6

We can see then, that the Mk57 is slightly bigger than the Mk41-Strike but not by much.

I really don’t understand the benefit of the Mk57.  Consider,

• There is no missile in the naval inventory or in development, that I’m aware of, that can’t fit in the Mk41 but could fit in the Mk57

• The Mk57 is non-standard and creates a new parts, maintenance, and training requirement.

• The Mk57 takes up more deck space and ship’s internal volume – not by a lot but it adds up when we look at a hundred modules or so.  In other words we can’t fit as many Mk57 cells as we can Mk41.

I could understand if the Mk57 were significantly bigger and could house, say, short/intermediate range ballistic missiles but, as I said, there is no such naval missile in inventory or development.

One of the rationales put forth to explain the benefit of the Mk57 is the distributed nature of the cells around the periphery of the ship.  This is claimed to offer survivability benefits.  However, to the best of my knowledge, the Navy has not claimed this benefit and logical analysis does not support the claim.  While a hit on a Mk57 equipped ship would not hit a centralized cluster of cells, as could happen with the Mk41, a missile would have a much higher probability of hitting some cells, as opposed to the less likely chance of hitting a Mk41 cluster.  The Mk57 is claimed to disperse the explosive impact of an exploding cell outward, away from the ship.  Again, this is not a claim the Navy has made, to the best of my knowledge, and seems unlikely to be significantly true.  An incoming missile hit would penetrate the Mk57 peripheral cell and continue inward, creating an opening into the ship’s hull for the exploding contents of the cell (its missile and subsequent blast wave) to follow.  Yes, some amount of the energy would be directed outward, as with any explosion, but large amounts would be directed inward.  The degree of armor protection, if any, between the cell and interior hull is unknown.  I have seen no Navy claim that the cells are individually armored.

The Mk41 cell clusters are, supposedly, encased in an armored “box” within the hull to contain explosive effects.  Again, the degree of armoring and its effectiveness is unknown.

Thus, the claims of enhanced survivability seem like an after-the-fact justification conjured by observers rather than an actual characteristic claimed by the Navy.  Logic suggests that a peripheral VLS system would offer little, if any, survivability benefit.  Further, if every peripheral cell is armored, the total weight of armor would, likely, be much greater than the armor surrounding the Mk41 box.  A ship would pay a penalty for such a system.  Of course, if the armoring were sufficient to greatly mitigate damage, the penalty might well be worth it.

The peripheral nature of the Mk57 is unique to the Zumwalt class due to the tumblehome shape of the hull.  Conventional hulls cannot accommodate peripheral cells.  They would have to be located some distance inboard due to the length of the cells relative to the outward cant of the hull.  So, the peripheral feature is not a general characteristic of the Mk57.

Finally, if the Mk57 offers significant benefits, whatever those may be, why aren’t they being incorporated into the latest Burkes?

I’m at a loss to understand why this VLS module has been put into service.

Inside Our Loop

John Boyd introduced the military to modern air combat theories and resultant aircraft design theories.  His most famous contribution was the OODA loop which can be summed up, very simplistically, as consisting of the following circular steps:

• Observe
• Analyze
• Act

 Note: I present this with abject apologies to Boyd for this gross simplification and, he would undoubtedly claim, misrepresentation of his theory.  He actually had a fourth step and multiple side steps in his presentations.  As I said, this is a gross simplification to illustrate a point.

Thus, he suggested, the pilot that could more quickly (and correctly!) execute this repetitive loop would “get inside” the opponent’s loop and be able to anticipate better and act faster and, ultimately, win.  For example, in air to air combat if I can see that my opponent is beginning a maneuver (observe), analyze his maneuver so as to predict the outcome (analyze), and place myself in a position to take advantage of his final position (act), I’ll be in position to defeat him as a result of having operated inside his OODA loop.

Unfortunately, ISIS, and terrorists in general, are inside our OODA loop.  Consider this, from a Navy Times website article,

“The Navy is moving to place armed watch-standers at recruiting stations nationwide, a move that comes a year after shootings at a recruiting station and a reserve center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, claimed the lives of four Marines and a sailor.”

It’s taken us a year to decide to have armed personnel at recruiting stations.  A year!!!  How’s that for a snail-slow OODA loop?  No wonder we’re not making more progress in the war on terror.

“We are in the final stages of preparations for implementation” of the policy, said Cmdr. Dave Aliberti, policy branch head for Fleet Forces Command’s anti-terrorism, force protection directorate. 

A year, and we’re still not actually implementing it.  We’re just in the “final stages”.  That means we’ve got a ways to go, yet.

Now, what would you or I - logical, reasonable people - decide in about the first 2 minutes after the original incident?  We’d say, “Arm the recruiters.  After all, they’re highly trained in weapons handling and they could always be given additional training for using weapons in civilian settings, if need be.”  Of course, the military sees it differently.

“Some lawmakers called for service members, especially recruiters, to be allowed to carry their personal firearms to work so they could respond to an attack in progress. Aliberti said that was looked at in detail but it is not being considered.

“Because of the nature of their mission it’s something less than ideal to have every recruiter armed when their mission is engagement with the public,” he said. “While that would be one extreme, it’s not something that is being considered seriously at this time.”

Seriously????  We won’t consider allowing recruiters to be armed?  What does engagement with the public have to do with whether professional military personnel are armed.  Actually, isn’t that their job – to be armed and defend citizens against terrorists?  Is the military afraid that the public will find out that war involves guns?

Here’s a further extension of the stupidity.

“Navy leaders have also been less than enthusiastic about allowing sailors to bring their guns on bases. In an April interview with Navy Times and Defense News, the Navy’s top officer said the idea was on the table but that he was concerned about a situation where more guns are present during a shooting creating confusion for law enforcement.”

Think this one through …  If sailors were armed on base, there would be nothing for law enforcement to do after an incident except bag the terrorist’s body for removal.  More guns aren’t going to create confusion, they’re going to end the incident before it becomes a base-wide massacre. 

So, what’s the military’s approach, since they don’t seem to want to use simple, common sense?

“Militarywide, the Army Corps of Engineers is upgrading recruiting stations' security with visual identification features, as well as better access control mechanisms and ballistic shields, he said. The Army Corps is also making alterations to buildings that make them more secure, he said.”

There it is – the pervasive and misguided belief that technology is the preferred solution to any problem.  Armed sailors are the simple answer but the military would prefer to spend enormous sums of money on some idiotic technological solution that keeps budget money flowing.

Well, I’ve wandered off track, here.  The point of the post is that terrorists are inside our OODA loop.  If it takes us this long to implement simple, common sense solutions, how can we possibly fight a war and hope to win?  We have completely forgotten the lessons that Boyd taught us.  We need to be mentally nimble, quick and decisive in our decision making, and bold and timely in our actions.  We need to operate inside the terrorist’s loop instead of the other way around.

____________________________

(1)Navy Times website, “Navy to put armed sailors at recruiting stations”, David Larter, July 14, 2016,

http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/07/14/navy-put-armed-sailors-recruiting-stations/87099232/

New and Improved?

Why do we build new classes of ships or aircraft?  The answer is to incorporate new capabilities that can’t be achieved simply by adding upgrades to existing classes.  Further, the presumption is that the new class will have several new capabilities that render the previous class hopelessly obsolete.

The WWII Essex class carriers were a vast improvement over the Yorktown class.

The F-86 Sabre was a vast improvement over any previous propeller driven aircraft.

The Forrestal was an immense improvement over the Midway class.

You get the idea.  Each major new class (for you nitpickers, I’m not talking about tweaks that produce sub-classes like the Sumner/Gearing) was an inarguably vast improvement over the preceding class.  Unfortunately, that trend may be coming to an end.  Let’s look at some recent new classes.

LCS.  OK, this is everyone’s poster boy for a messed up program but, seriously, even if the modules ever pan out, they’ll not represent a vast improvement over existing ships and technology.  The Avenger MCM vessels are arguably more capable than the LCS.  The Perrys were better ASW vessels than the LCS will be – not surprising given that the LCS ASW module will consist purely of existing technology and the seaframe is not optimized for ASW (meaning quieting).  Almost by definition it won’t be an improvement.  The Perrys, before the Navy neutered them, were worlds better at ASuW than the LCS.

Could we not have kept building the Perrys and simply slanted the superstructure to add a bit of stealth?  Add to that some new build Avengers and you’ve got the LCS (actually, a far more capable “LCS”) without all the added developmental costs.

Ford.  Where is the huge leap in capability?  The claimed increase in sortie rate has been debunked.  The EMALS catapult is of dubious value.  It’s claimed to be easier on aircraft but there has never been any data supporting that.  Aircraft were built to take the steam catapult stresses so that claim is highly suspect.  Same for the Advanced Arresting Gear which the Navy has just recently hinted may be a complete failure and have to be replaced by a conventional arresting system.  The ship has some increased automation which is nice (until damage control is required and we find out the price we’ll pay for reduced crew size) but that’s something that could have been easily incorporated into the next Nimitz.  The vaunted dual band radar has already been downsized and replaced for subsequent ships of the class.  There is simply no need for a massively capable radar on a ship that carries only short range AAW missiles and is always accompanied for Aegis ships and Hawkeyes.

Could we not have added the EMALS to the next Nimitz and achieved the same capability as the Ford without the billions of dollars of developmental costs?

F-35.  The F-35 is nowhere near as capable as the F-22.  It’s aerodynamically on par with the F-16/18.  It’s steadily losing any capability gains it might have as each year of development continues, decade after decade.  The only real improvement might be the 360 degree sensor fusion if it ever works and sensor fusion is already being incorporated into upgrades of other aircraft.  The F-35’s sensors are already technologically behind those of many other aircraft.  Advances in IRST and anti-stealth detection technology are quickly negating the aircraft’s stealth advantage.

Could we not have added some stealth to the Hornet (oh, wait, we already have – the Advanced Super Hornet) and incorporated the 360 degree sensor technology if it ever matures?  Or, could we not have simply continued building the F-22 with whatever bits of technology we wanted to add from the F-35?  After all, we’ve already looked at the possibility of restarting the F-22 production line and found it to be feasible and cheap relative to continuing the F-35 debacle.

America.  This one is the most baffling.  This is just a rebuild of the Wasp class with a few minor tweaks and the loss of the well deck.  Did we really need to spend billions designing a new class?

Could we not have simply continued the Wasp class with whatever tweaks were incorporated into the America?  Heck, we didn’t even improve the flight deck to the point that it could handle the F-35B.  We’re having to go back and rebuild the flight deck and the compartments immediately under it.  Surely, we could have done that with new Wasps?

Virginia.  Is this sub significantly better than the Los Angeles class?  No one, including the Navy knows because of the extreme security measures surrounding the sub.  The Navy won’t even let the Virginias take part in ASW exercises.  My suspicion is that the Virginia is better but not significantly so.  The technologies that are in the Virginia could have been incorporated into new 688s.

Could we not have continued building 688s with some of the new sonar arrays?  We certainly could have added the proposed missile modules to the 688.

LX(R).  The replacement for the LSD-41 class has only half the well deck which makes it a poor substitute let alone a successor.  Even more baffling is that we’re retiring the LSDs before we need to.  Could we not simply keep the LSDs and toss in a few modest upgrades?  What leap in technology or capability does the LX(R) offer? 

There’s nothing wrong with new ships.  There is something wrong with spending billions of dollars designing new classes when we could simply add capabilities to existing classes.  Yes, there would be some money spent to figure out how to incorporate new technologies but nothing even remotely approaching the cost of a new class. 

Where are the leaps in capabilities that are typically associated with new classes?  The problem is that the Navy has opted to forego conventional leaps in favor of generational leaps – none of which have panned out.

Conventional leaps would include the latest sensors, missiles, and systems that actually exist.  The leap in capability would come from incorporating the cutting edge, but existent, technology with new, better platform designs.  Instead, the Navy seems stubbornly fixed on repeating existing designs under the misguided notion that this will save money.  ComNavOps is all for upgrades but there comes a point where upgrades simply won’t get you where you need to be.  At that point, a new design incorporating the latest, existent, technology is the preferred approach.

Consider all the development programs that are just expensive repeats that don’t really offer the needed improvements.

The Burke-AMDR may be the poster boy for failed repeats.  The AMDR requires a bigger, or at least differently designed, ship than the Burke.  Because the Navy has opted to repeat the Burke design, the ship will have only a fraction of the desired performance.

There are two ways to approach “new” ships.  We need to either do simple upgrades to existing ships or design new classes that offer significantly improved capabilities.  The former option saves the bulk of the design money and the latter, while costing more, gives us new capabilities.  The Navy is combining the worst of the two options by pouring lots of money into redesigns of existing ships that offer little improvement in performance – the worst of both options!

Chinese Island Claims Ruled Invalid

The UNCLOS (United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea) Tribunal has rendered its decision on the dispute between Philippines and China over regions of the South China Sea.  To the surprise of, well, no one, the Tribunal ruled that,

• It did have jurisdiction over the case via Article 288 of the Convention

• China’s claim of historical rights with in the Nine Dash line (first island chain, essentially) are unfounded

• The Spratley Islands, singly or as a group, were incapable of generating either 12 mile territorial limits or 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)

• Certain portions of the Sea were within Philippines EEZ

• That China violated Philippines sovereign rights by interfering with Philippines fishing rights, unlawfully constructing artificial islands, and unlawfully allowing Chinese fishing

• China had caused severe damage to reefs and habitats in violation of the UNCLOS agreement

The press release announcing the decision is listed below (1)

China is a signatory to the UNCLOS agreement having signed and ratified both the Convention and Agreement in 1982 and 1994, respectively.  China, by their own agreement, is bound by the Convention.

The decision has been rendered and all that is left is for China to respect and abide by the decision.  This is the moment that China declares, for all the world to see, whether it is a peaceful and law abiding member of the world community or whether it is a rogue nation, flouting international laws and norms and dishonoring its own signed commitments.

I have no doubt which path China will choose and, unless China greatly surprises me, this is also the moment in time when the Chinese apologists lose all credibility.

____________________________

(1)http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/thediplomat_2016-07-12_09-15-37.pdf

Zumwalt Update

I’ve documented the Navy’s increasing use of deferred construction to avoid cost caps and obscure costs.  The concept is that ships are accepted incomplete and the remaining construction is completed during post-delivery availabilities using other funds that are not tracked as construction costs.

The latest example is the Zumwalt, DDG-1000, which, according to the DOT&E 2015 annual report, will be accepted in an incomplete state by the Navy and transferred to the West Coast in 2016.  DOT&E states,

“After the ship arrives on the West Coast, it will begin an 18-month post-delivery availability to complete installation, integration, and shipyard testing of mission systems. The Navy plans to conduct a second Acceptance Trial when that availability has been completed …”

A second Acceptance Trial?  Isn’t a ship supposed to be accepted by the Navy only after construction is complete?  18 Months of additional construction after delivery?  This is obscene.

Now, let me be fair.  I don’t know whether this was part of the original plan of construction and is fully funded by Congress as part of the original costs and schedule or whether this is part of the accounting gimmicks the Navy has become so fond of.  If it’s the former and the costs are all above board then I’m left to wonder, why not simply complete the ship prior to delivery like every other ship?  If it’s the latter then this is despicable.

Moving on, the Navy continues to reject combat related testing - Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST), in this case.  As DOT&E documents,

“The Navy removed funding for the planned Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) on DDG 1000 in September 2014, unilaterally deciding to conduct the event on DDG 1002. In October 2015, the Navy revised their decision and agreed to conduct FSST (specific ship to be determined) prior to the first deployment of any DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer.”

Did you get that?  The Navy unilaterally decided not to conduct shock trials until the last ship of the class!  That not only removes any possibility of finding and correcting problems in other ships of the class but it removes the possibility of anyone questioning the Zumwalt program and threatening funding.  That, of course, is the real reason the Navy is resisting shock trials on all its ships.  The Navy would rather risk ships and sailors in combat than risk funding due to bad PR from testing. 

The Navy reversed their decision only after it became clear that DOT&E has SecDef’s ear and the Navy decided they didn’t want yet another public spanking.

Is FSST important?  As DOT&E summarizes it,

“Conducting FSST on DDG 1000 is critical to finding and correcting failures in mission-critical capabilities prior to the classes first deployment and prior to placing this class of ships in harm’s way. FSSTs routinely uncover mission-critical vulnerabilities that were not identified by component testing, analysis, and/or modeling and simulation alone.”

Further, the amount of new technology, to say nothing of the unique hull form, demand shock testing because they have not been tested in previous ships.

“All three ships of the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class have in common a significant amount of new designs, including the unique wave-piercing tumblehome hull form, as well as the new Integrated Power System, Total Ship Computing Environment (software, equipment and infrastructure), Integrated Undersea Warfare System, Peripheral Vertical Launching System, the Advanced Gun System, and the associated automated magazines. These systems and equipment have not been subjected to shock on previous ship classes. Moreover, the previously untried automation and small crew for a ship this size, limit the sailors’ ability to conduct repairs to enable recovery from shock-induced damage.” [emphasis added]

It couldn’t be any simpler or clearer than that and yet the Navy continues to fight testing.

The Navy’s policies and decisions are becoming increasingly bizarre and the Zumwalt class is just the latest recipient of the effects of those decisions.

A Ship's A Fool To Fight A Fort

A Ship’s A Fool To Fight A Fort

Well, there’s an old adage that’s stood the test of time … or has it?  ComNavOps is a student of history and a believer in the lessons it has to teach.  On the other hand, ComNavOps is also a questioner of history and an analyst.  Is this adage still true?  Let’s take a closer look.

[note: this post is inspired by comments in a recent post and I thank the various commenters who contributed to the discussion]

The adage is credited to the Royal Navy’s Admiral Nelson and dates back to the age of sail.  In that time, the adage was literal.  It referred to a ship and a fort fighting a cannon duel.  Today, the meaning has evolved to encompass a much broader scope but we’ll come back to that.  In the age of sail, the advantage was completely with the fort.  The fort was almost invariably at a higher elevation and could fire down on the ship.  The fort was generally constructed of massive stone and earthen works which were extremely resistant to cannonballs.  By comparison to a ship, the fort generally had larger magazines, a larger “crew”, and often larger guns.  The ship had limited and predictable maneuverability due to its dependence on the winds.  The fort was a fixed target but the ship was not much more mobile!

In short, the fort held a massive advantage over a ship.  It’s no wonder the adage was born – it was true!

Is it still?  If it’s not, what has changed to invalidate it?

The ship has changed.  Ships are now much faster, more maneuverable, somewhat stealthy, and can appear and disappear at whim.  If one considers submarines as ships, they have become extremely stealthy.  However, for purposes of this discussion, we’re going to exclude submarines as a special case that the adage was never meant to apply to.  Ships can also launch aircraft and from great distances.  Ships can now engage a “fort” without ever being detected.

The fort has changed.  The term “fort” has come to mean all of the surrounding and supporting land rather than a single fixed fortification.  Thus, land based aircraft, long range, land based, anti-ship missiles, long range artillery, and the supplies in the surrounding area have all become part of the “fort” and none need to be in the same physical building or even in the same local area.  An airbase can be hundreds of miles from the “fort”, and still be part of the “fort’s” defenses.

So, both the ship and the fort have changed but have the changes altered the traditional huge advantage that the fort enjoyed?  Well, it’s obvious that the original adage is no longer relevant and meaningful.  It applied to a very specific and localized scenario that no longer exists.  Thus, there’s no point discussing it.

So, moving on, what is the modern version of the adage?  The meaning of the adage has changed to mean that a ship can’t survive within range of land based weapons so I guess the adage, now, is,

A ship’s a fool to approach land.

Now, the question is, is that true?

Well, by way of partial answer, here’s another adage,

The seat of purpose is on the land.

Recognizing the timeless applicability of that, ships have no choice but to approach land.  The only question is how to do it and do we have ships that are designed to operate and survive near land (recognizing that “near” can mean within a thousand miles, today)?

Let’s look at history, briefly, for some guidance.  WWII was a continual demonstration of the viability, effectiveness, and survivability of ships near land (within a hundred miles, back then, instead of a thousand miles).  The US Navy routinely conducted near-land operations in the face of determined resistance.  Yes, some ships were sunk but only a relative handful.

Consider the example of Okinawa and the kamikaze attacks.  This is an excellent example of ships fighting a fort – the fort, in this case being the island and all the land based kamikaze aircraft supporting it.  The fort/kamikaze had the advantage of huge supplies of weapons (the kamikaze aircraft) and an unending supply of pilots – typical fort/land advantages.  The ships, however, succeeded, and quite handily if not without damage and death.  If memory serves, none of the carriers, battleships, cruisers, or transports were sunk.  The picket line destroyers and escort vessels paid a price but that was their function and they performed it quite well.  The ships fought a fort and won completely.

A more recent example is the Falklands War.  The British fleet fought a fort/land and won, though not without losses.  In fact, the conflict served to illustrate the inherent difficulties in locating a naval force at sea, even one tied, operationally, to predictable areas.  It also demonstrated the difficulty in assembling and conducting an effective, co-ordinated attack against mobile naval forces.

Let’s look at a less successful example that borders on the classical scenario.  The British/French Dardanelles campaign in WWI involved an attack by several battleships and cruisers (albeit old/obsolete ones) against the straits held by the Ottoman Empire.  While the direct ship versus land gun duels appeared to have favored the British/French ships, the ships were routed due to the presence of mines.  Several ships were sunk and damaged and the operation failed.  Without the mines, the ships would have succeeded.  With the realilty of the mines the ships failed.  Whether one views this operation as validating the adage or not depends on whether one views mines as part of the fort/land defenses or part of a navy versus navy conflict.  The net result is that the mines were there as part of the fort/land defenses and the attacking force was unprepared to deal with them.  This simply demonstrates that the attacking force must be properly equipped to approach land and deal with the fort/land defenses.  Ill-prepared forces are going to lose in any scenario!

History, then, suggests that there is no particular problem with approaching land as long as the attacking force is prepared for the defenses that are present.

So, where does the balance of favor lie today?  I believe it lies with the ships. 

While the fort/land side of things retains the traditional advantages of large magazines in the form of “unlimited” aircraft, missiles, artillery, and manpower, the mobility and stealth advantages of the ship side of things more than negates the fort/land advantages.  The ultimate truth is that you can’t shoot what you can’t see.  All the aircraft and missiles in the world are useless if you can’t give them targets and a naval force that can remain hundreds of miles out to sea is a difficult target to find.  Conversely, the fort/land defenses are largely fixed and known and very susceptible to cruise and ballistic missile attack.

The biggest advantage the fort/land enjoys is the ability to “flood” the skies with surveillance aircraft.  If it can do that successfully and locate the attacking naval force then it can prevail.  If not, it loses.  However, those same aircraft are vulnerable to destruction from cruise/ballistic missile attacks on their airbases either directly by destroying the aircraft on the ground or indirectly by destroying the airbases ability to operate aircraft in general.

So, I see no prohibitive reason why ships can’t operate near land as long as they are prepared and equipped for it.  Modern history (WWII and on) bears this out.  Thus, the traditional adage is no longer meaningful and the modern version of the adage is untrue.

Today’s overly timid naval strategists seem to feel that the risk of losing even a single ship somehow proves that a ship can’t operate near land.  Partly, this comes from a lack of operational wisdom and experience (given that we never practice these kinds of operations, it’s kind of understandable) and partly from a risk aversion due to the staggeringly expensive cost of modern ships.  Losing even one would, indeed be a disaster because we only build a very few ships due to the cost.  Ships have become too expensive to risk doing the jobs they were built for!

The remaining issue that stands out from this discussion is mines.  Setting aside the almost semantic debate about whether they constitute a fort/land’s defenses or a naval on naval battle, the fact is that mines are, and will be, a major factor in operating near land.  Any attacking naval force had better be prepared to deal with them and prepared to do so while under fire.  The US Navy is woefully unprepared to do so.  Again, though, mines do not invalidate the ability to operate successfully near land as long as the attacking force is prepared for them.

So, the prevalent belief that

A ship’s a fool to approach land.

is false.

USS Long Beach

It’s fun to occasionally look back at previous ship classes and reminisce.  It can also be instructive.  Let’s take a look at the one-of-a-kind USS Long Beach, CGN-9.  Much of the following information comes from Friedman’s book on the illustrated design history of cruisers.

Long Beach dates back to the 1950’s when the Navy was looking at building new, pure missile cruisers and, led by CNO Arleigh Burke, developing an interest in nuclear powered surface ships.  Interestingly, most of these early design plans included provision for Polaris missiles (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile – SLBM).  The Navy viewed cruisers as hard-hitting, offensive platforms.  Initial design cost estimates were in the $90M range but that quickly proved to be far too optimistic.

Further demonstrating the Navy’s view of cruisers as offensive weapons was the desire to include a powerful and comprehensive ASW suite meant to support independent operations as opposed to being limited to part of a carrier escort group. 

Initial efforts were focused on nuclear frigates or destroyers rather than cruisers but it soon became apparent that the nuclear power plants of the time would require much larger ships – hence the eventual move to cruiser size ships.

It was also, belatedly, realized that the hull size necessitated by nuclear propulsion requirements would also dictate a much larger and more powerful weapons fit in order to justify the size of the ship, as compared to the starting design point of a destroyer/frigate weapons fit.  Design cost estimates were beginning to approach $150M by the late 1950’s.

At that time, the Navy also recognized that nuclear power was needed in the short-legged escorts more than in the carrier itself.

Here’s an interesting passage addressing the issue of escort versus independent operations.

“… the CNO [Adm. Arleigh Burke] saw dispersion as increasingly important in a nuclear environment.  A nuclear cruiser in particular should be able to operate alone against submarines, aircraft, and enemy missiles, although her primary role in non-nuclear war might well be within the task force screen. … The ship would not be able to handle a mass raid, but she would have to be able to shoot down several aircraft in quick succession …

This was a reversion to classical cruiser concepts.  However, from the beginning the SCB (Ship Characteristics Board) and the bureaus had been thinking in terms of a fast task force escort.”

Thus, there was significant disagreement between CNO Burke and his design groups about the role of a cruiser.

Regarding the design concepts, Friedman notes,

“… the ship radars had been optimized for task force command and control, not for the much more limited needs of an individual unit armed with weapons of limited range.”

Friedman also notes that the main design goal of what became the Long Beach was not warfare but, rather, the introduction of nuclear power to surface combatants.  That the weapons fit was not completely commensurate with the ship’s size was, therefore, considered acceptable.  Further, the ship’s hull was lengthened to reduce resistance and maintain the ability to meet a speed requirement of 30 kts.

Eventually, all of the designs coalesced into SCB 169 which became the Long Beach and the ship was included in the FY57 shipbuilding budget.  The ship would be 720 ft long and have a displacement of 16,000 tons.  Long Beach was commissioned in 1961.

The ship was designed with space amidships for Regulus II cruise missiles and structural provision for 8 Polaris missile launch tubes.

The SPS-32/33 radars were mounted on the now-iconic block superstructure which she shared with Enterprise.  The radar system was tied into the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS), a forerunner of the modern, computerized combat control systems.  Long Beach initially entered service without the SPS-33.  The combination of Talos missile system and NTDS allowed the ship to shoot down two MiGs at ranges of around 60 miles during the Vietnam war.

A 1968 refit installed a conventional SPS-12 air search radar due, in part, to the poor reliability of the new radars and the need for IFF functionality.

The poor performance and reliability of the new radar arrays was due to the shortage of qualified technicians.  Having only two such radar systems in the fleet, the Navy never established a technical school and was never able to properly service the radars.

Initial combat fit consisted of,

• 2x Terrier launchers (40 missiles for one and 80 missiles for the other)
• 1x Talos launcher (52 missiles)
• 1x ASROC (20 missiles)
• 2x 12.75” triple torpedo mounts
• SQS-23 sonar

In 1963 two 5”/38 guns were added amidships.  The story is that President Kennedy insisted on the guns being installed after touring the ship and noting a lack of any guns.  I don’t know whether this is true or not. 

The Regulus and Polaris weapons were never installed in their intended locations.

By the end of her life, Long Beach lost the Talos and Terrier launchers and had the radar arrays removed.  The final combat systems fit consisted of

• 2x Tomahawk launchers (8 BGM-109)
• 2x dual-arm Standard SM-2ER SAM launchers (120 RIM-67)
• 2x Phalanx CIWS
• 2x 12.75” triple torpedo mounts
• SPS-48C, SPS-49, SPS-67, 2x Mk 90 radars
• SQQ-23B sonar
• SLQ-32, SLQ-34 ECM suites
• 4x Mk 36 SRBOC decoy launchers

Long Beach was decommissioned in 1995.

Long Beach 1961

Long Beach 1991

So, what can we learn from the Long Beach?

The most interesting lesson is the role of a cruiser which was in dispute during Long Beach’s design years and has been ever since.  Escort versus independent operations is not only an operational consideration but a major design factor.  The equipment fits are radically different for each role.  Long Beach’s design tried to straddle the line and failed.  Her offensive weaponry was never installed and only late in her career did she acquire even a modicum of offensive power in the form of a few Tomahawk launchers and Harpoons.  Interestingly and, I feel, incorrectly, subsequent cruiser designs have come down solidly on the escort side of the question.  The current Ticonderoga class cruisers are clearly intended as task force escorts only.

While the advent of VLS has allowed modern surface combatants to have a Tomahawk cruise missile land attack capability, that has not led to the development of offensive ships or independent operations doctrine and tactics.  Only recently has there been any movement to give surface combatants a credible anti-surface capability.  Our current DDGs and CGs are clearly task force escorts, primarily.  Offensive operations are a distant secondary mission, at best.

I agree with CNO Burke and today’s Adm. Thomas Copeman both of whom have seen a need for independent operations.  It seems almost certain that our ships will one day have to fight under skies that we do not dominate and without attachment to carriers – if for no other reason than our carrier and air wing numbers are steadily shrinking.  We are eventually going to be forced into conducting independent surface ship operations and we desperately need a cruiser designed for offensive warfare.

The key point about a ship designed for offensive, independent operations is that the design involves much more than simply tacking on additional VLS or Harpoon launch canisters.  For a ship to have any hope of conducting independent operations it must be designed for that role.  Design elements include stealth, greatly increased armor protection, maximum redundancy and separation, a heavy medium and short range AAW fit, large numbers of UAVs for scouting, and, of course, a heavy anti-ship and land strike capability.  Anything less is not survivable.

Anyway, big boxy superstructure aside, the ship is long, sleek, and just plain attractive.  It looks like a warship!  I’ve always had a soft spot for this vessel and it was fun to take a look back at it.