Chinese Island Claims Ruled Invalid

The UNCLOS (United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea) Tribunal has rendered its decision on the dispute between Philippines and China over regions of the South China Sea.  To the surprise of, well, no one, the Tribunal ruled that,

• It did have jurisdiction over the case via Article 288 of the Convention

• China’s claim of historical rights with in the Nine Dash line (first island chain, essentially) are unfounded

• The Spratley Islands, singly or as a group, were incapable of generating either 12 mile territorial limits or 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)

• Certain portions of the Sea were within Philippines EEZ

• That China violated Philippines sovereign rights by interfering with Philippines fishing rights, unlawfully constructing artificial islands, and unlawfully allowing Chinese fishing

• China had caused severe damage to reefs and habitats in violation of the UNCLOS agreement

The press release announcing the decision is listed below (1)

China is a signatory to the UNCLOS agreement having signed and ratified both the Convention and Agreement in 1982 and 1994, respectively.  China, by their own agreement, is bound by the Convention.

The decision has been rendered and all that is left is for China to respect and abide by the decision.  This is the moment that China declares, for all the world to see, whether it is a peaceful and law abiding member of the world community or whether it is a rogue nation, flouting international laws and norms and dishonoring its own signed commitments.

I have no doubt which path China will choose and, unless China greatly surprises me, this is also the moment in time when the Chinese apologists lose all credibility.

____________________________

(1)http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/thediplomat_2016-07-12_09-15-37.pdf

Zumwalt Update

I’ve documented the Navy’s increasing use of deferred construction to avoid cost caps and obscure costs.  The concept is that ships are accepted incomplete and the remaining construction is completed during post-delivery availabilities using other funds that are not tracked as construction costs.

The latest example is the Zumwalt, DDG-1000, which, according to the DOT&E 2015 annual report, will be accepted in an incomplete state by the Navy and transferred to the West Coast in 2016.  DOT&E states,

“After the ship arrives on the West Coast, it will begin an 18-month post-delivery availability to complete installation, integration, and shipyard testing of mission systems. The Navy plans to conduct a second Acceptance Trial when that availability has been completed …”

A second Acceptance Trial?  Isn’t a ship supposed to be accepted by the Navy only after construction is complete?  18 Months of additional construction after delivery?  This is obscene.

Now, let me be fair.  I don’t know whether this was part of the original plan of construction and is fully funded by Congress as part of the original costs and schedule or whether this is part of the accounting gimmicks the Navy has become so fond of.  If it’s the former and the costs are all above board then I’m left to wonder, why not simply complete the ship prior to delivery like every other ship?  If it’s the latter then this is despicable.

Moving on, the Navy continues to reject combat related testing - Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST), in this case.  As DOT&E documents,

“The Navy removed funding for the planned Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) on DDG 1000 in September 2014, unilaterally deciding to conduct the event on DDG 1002. In October 2015, the Navy revised their decision and agreed to conduct FSST (specific ship to be determined) prior to the first deployment of any DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer.”

Did you get that?  The Navy unilaterally decided not to conduct shock trials until the last ship of the class!  That not only removes any possibility of finding and correcting problems in other ships of the class but it removes the possibility of anyone questioning the Zumwalt program and threatening funding.  That, of course, is the real reason the Navy is resisting shock trials on all its ships.  The Navy would rather risk ships and sailors in combat than risk funding due to bad PR from testing. 

The Navy reversed their decision only after it became clear that DOT&E has SecDef’s ear and the Navy decided they didn’t want yet another public spanking.

Is FSST important?  As DOT&E summarizes it,

“Conducting FSST on DDG 1000 is critical to finding and correcting failures in mission-critical capabilities prior to the classes first deployment and prior to placing this class of ships in harm’s way. FSSTs routinely uncover mission-critical vulnerabilities that were not identified by component testing, analysis, and/or modeling and simulation alone.”

Further, the amount of new technology, to say nothing of the unique hull form, demand shock testing because they have not been tested in previous ships.

“All three ships of the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class have in common a significant amount of new designs, including the unique wave-piercing tumblehome hull form, as well as the new Integrated Power System, Total Ship Computing Environment (software, equipment and infrastructure), Integrated Undersea Warfare System, Peripheral Vertical Launching System, the Advanced Gun System, and the associated automated magazines. These systems and equipment have not been subjected to shock on previous ship classes. Moreover, the previously untried automation and small crew for a ship this size, limit the sailors’ ability to conduct repairs to enable recovery from shock-induced damage.” [emphasis added]

It couldn’t be any simpler or clearer than that and yet the Navy continues to fight testing.

The Navy’s policies and decisions are becoming increasingly bizarre and the Zumwalt class is just the latest recipient of the effects of those decisions.

A Ship's A Fool To Fight A Fort

A Ship’s A Fool To Fight A Fort

Well, there’s an old adage that’s stood the test of time … or has it?  ComNavOps is a student of history and a believer in the lessons it has to teach.  On the other hand, ComNavOps is also a questioner of history and an analyst.  Is this adage still true?  Let’s take a closer look.

[note: this post is inspired by comments in a recent post and I thank the various commenters who contributed to the discussion]

The adage is credited to the Royal Navy’s Admiral Nelson and dates back to the age of sail.  In that time, the adage was literal.  It referred to a ship and a fort fighting a cannon duel.  Today, the meaning has evolved to encompass a much broader scope but we’ll come back to that.  In the age of sail, the advantage was completely with the fort.  The fort was almost invariably at a higher elevation and could fire down on the ship.  The fort was generally constructed of massive stone and earthen works which were extremely resistant to cannonballs.  By comparison to a ship, the fort generally had larger magazines, a larger “crew”, and often larger guns.  The ship had limited and predictable maneuverability due to its dependence on the winds.  The fort was a fixed target but the ship was not much more mobile!

In short, the fort held a massive advantage over a ship.  It’s no wonder the adage was born – it was true!

Is it still?  If it’s not, what has changed to invalidate it?

The ship has changed.  Ships are now much faster, more maneuverable, somewhat stealthy, and can appear and disappear at whim.  If one considers submarines as ships, they have become extremely stealthy.  However, for purposes of this discussion, we’re going to exclude submarines as a special case that the adage was never meant to apply to.  Ships can also launch aircraft and from great distances.  Ships can now engage a “fort” without ever being detected.

The fort has changed.  The term “fort” has come to mean all of the surrounding and supporting land rather than a single fixed fortification.  Thus, land based aircraft, long range, land based, anti-ship missiles, long range artillery, and the supplies in the surrounding area have all become part of the “fort” and none need to be in the same physical building or even in the same local area.  An airbase can be hundreds of miles from the “fort”, and still be part of the “fort’s” defenses.

So, both the ship and the fort have changed but have the changes altered the traditional huge advantage that the fort enjoyed?  Well, it’s obvious that the original adage is no longer relevant and meaningful.  It applied to a very specific and localized scenario that no longer exists.  Thus, there’s no point discussing it.

So, moving on, what is the modern version of the adage?  The meaning of the adage has changed to mean that a ship can’t survive within range of land based weapons so I guess the adage, now, is,

A ship’s a fool to approach land.

Now, the question is, is that true?

Well, by way of partial answer, here’s another adage,

The seat of purpose is on the land.

Recognizing the timeless applicability of that, ships have no choice but to approach land.  The only question is how to do it and do we have ships that are designed to operate and survive near land (recognizing that “near” can mean within a thousand miles, today)?

Let’s look at history, briefly, for some guidance.  WWII was a continual demonstration of the viability, effectiveness, and survivability of ships near land (within a hundred miles, back then, instead of a thousand miles).  The US Navy routinely conducted near-land operations in the face of determined resistance.  Yes, some ships were sunk but only a relative handful.

Consider the example of Okinawa and the kamikaze attacks.  This is an excellent example of ships fighting a fort – the fort, in this case being the island and all the land based kamikaze aircraft supporting it.  The fort/kamikaze had the advantage of huge supplies of weapons (the kamikaze aircraft) and an unending supply of pilots – typical fort/land advantages.  The ships, however, succeeded, and quite handily if not without damage and death.  If memory serves, none of the carriers, battleships, cruisers, or transports were sunk.  The picket line destroyers and escort vessels paid a price but that was their function and they performed it quite well.  The ships fought a fort and won completely.

A more recent example is the Falklands War.  The British fleet fought a fort/land and won, though not without losses.  In fact, the conflict served to illustrate the inherent difficulties in locating a naval force at sea, even one tied, operationally, to predictable areas.  It also demonstrated the difficulty in assembling and conducting an effective, co-ordinated attack against mobile naval forces.

Let’s look at a less successful example that borders on the classical scenario.  The British/French Dardanelles campaign in WWI involved an attack by several battleships and cruisers (albeit old/obsolete ones) against the straits held by the Ottoman Empire.  While the direct ship versus land gun duels appeared to have favored the British/French ships, the ships were routed due to the presence of mines.  Several ships were sunk and damaged and the operation failed.  Without the mines, the ships would have succeeded.  With the realilty of the mines the ships failed.  Whether one views this operation as validating the adage or not depends on whether one views mines as part of the fort/land defenses or part of a navy versus navy conflict.  The net result is that the mines were there as part of the fort/land defenses and the attacking force was unprepared to deal with them.  This simply demonstrates that the attacking force must be properly equipped to approach land and deal with the fort/land defenses.  Ill-prepared forces are going to lose in any scenario!

History, then, suggests that there is no particular problem with approaching land as long as the attacking force is prepared for the defenses that are present.

So, where does the balance of favor lie today?  I believe it lies with the ships. 

While the fort/land side of things retains the traditional advantages of large magazines in the form of “unlimited” aircraft, missiles, artillery, and manpower, the mobility and stealth advantages of the ship side of things more than negates the fort/land advantages.  The ultimate truth is that you can’t shoot what you can’t see.  All the aircraft and missiles in the world are useless if you can’t give them targets and a naval force that can remain hundreds of miles out to sea is a difficult target to find.  Conversely, the fort/land defenses are largely fixed and known and very susceptible to cruise and ballistic missile attack.

The biggest advantage the fort/land enjoys is the ability to “flood” the skies with surveillance aircraft.  If it can do that successfully and locate the attacking naval force then it can prevail.  If not, it loses.  However, those same aircraft are vulnerable to destruction from cruise/ballistic missile attacks on their airbases either directly by destroying the aircraft on the ground or indirectly by destroying the airbases ability to operate aircraft in general.

So, I see no prohibitive reason why ships can’t operate near land as long as they are prepared and equipped for it.  Modern history (WWII and on) bears this out.  Thus, the traditional adage is no longer meaningful and the modern version of the adage is untrue.

Today’s overly timid naval strategists seem to feel that the risk of losing even a single ship somehow proves that a ship can’t operate near land.  Partly, this comes from a lack of operational wisdom and experience (given that we never practice these kinds of operations, it’s kind of understandable) and partly from a risk aversion due to the staggeringly expensive cost of modern ships.  Losing even one would, indeed be a disaster because we only build a very few ships due to the cost.  Ships have become too expensive to risk doing the jobs they were built for!

The remaining issue that stands out from this discussion is mines.  Setting aside the almost semantic debate about whether they constitute a fort/land’s defenses or a naval on naval battle, the fact is that mines are, and will be, a major factor in operating near land.  Any attacking naval force had better be prepared to deal with them and prepared to do so while under fire.  The US Navy is woefully unprepared to do so.  Again, though, mines do not invalidate the ability to operate successfully near land as long as the attacking force is prepared for them.

So, the prevalent belief that

A ship’s a fool to approach land.

is false.

USS Long Beach

It’s fun to occasionally look back at previous ship classes and reminisce.  It can also be instructive.  Let’s take a look at the one-of-a-kind USS Long Beach, CGN-9.  Much of the following information comes from Friedman’s book on the illustrated design history of cruisers.

Long Beach dates back to the 1950’s when the Navy was looking at building new, pure missile cruisers and, led by CNO Arleigh Burke, developing an interest in nuclear powered surface ships.  Interestingly, most of these early design plans included provision for Polaris missiles (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile – SLBM).  The Navy viewed cruisers as hard-hitting, offensive platforms.  Initial design cost estimates were in the $90M range but that quickly proved to be far too optimistic.

Further demonstrating the Navy’s view of cruisers as offensive weapons was the desire to include a powerful and comprehensive ASW suite meant to support independent operations as opposed to being limited to part of a carrier escort group. 

Initial efforts were focused on nuclear frigates or destroyers rather than cruisers but it soon became apparent that the nuclear power plants of the time would require much larger ships – hence the eventual move to cruiser size ships.

It was also, belatedly, realized that the hull size necessitated by nuclear propulsion requirements would also dictate a much larger and more powerful weapons fit in order to justify the size of the ship, as compared to the starting design point of a destroyer/frigate weapons fit.  Design cost estimates were beginning to approach $150M by the late 1950’s.

At that time, the Navy also recognized that nuclear power was needed in the short-legged escorts more than in the carrier itself.

Here’s an interesting passage addressing the issue of escort versus independent operations.

“… the CNO [Adm. Arleigh Burke] saw dispersion as increasingly important in a nuclear environment.  A nuclear cruiser in particular should be able to operate alone against submarines, aircraft, and enemy missiles, although her primary role in non-nuclear war might well be within the task force screen. … The ship would not be able to handle a mass raid, but she would have to be able to shoot down several aircraft in quick succession …

This was a reversion to classical cruiser concepts.  However, from the beginning the SCB (Ship Characteristics Board) and the bureaus had been thinking in terms of a fast task force escort.”

Thus, there was significant disagreement between CNO Burke and his design groups about the role of a cruiser.

Regarding the design concepts, Friedman notes,

“… the ship radars had been optimized for task force command and control, not for the much more limited needs of an individual unit armed with weapons of limited range.”

Friedman also notes that the main design goal of what became the Long Beach was not warfare but, rather, the introduction of nuclear power to surface combatants.  That the weapons fit was not completely commensurate with the ship’s size was, therefore, considered acceptable.  Further, the ship’s hull was lengthened to reduce resistance and maintain the ability to meet a speed requirement of 30 kts.

Eventually, all of the designs coalesced into SCB 169 which became the Long Beach and the ship was included in the FY57 shipbuilding budget.  The ship would be 720 ft long and have a displacement of 16,000 tons.  Long Beach was commissioned in 1961.

The ship was designed with space amidships for Regulus II cruise missiles and structural provision for 8 Polaris missile launch tubes.

The SPS-32/33 radars were mounted on the now-iconic block superstructure which she shared with Enterprise.  The radar system was tied into the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS), a forerunner of the modern, computerized combat control systems.  Long Beach initially entered service without the SPS-33.  The combination of Talos missile system and NTDS allowed the ship to shoot down two MiGs at ranges of around 60 miles during the Vietnam war.

A 1968 refit installed a conventional SPS-12 air search radar due, in part, to the poor reliability of the new radars and the need for IFF functionality.

The poor performance and reliability of the new radar arrays was due to the shortage of qualified technicians.  Having only two such radar systems in the fleet, the Navy never established a technical school and was never able to properly service the radars.

Initial combat fit consisted of,

• 2x Terrier launchers (40 missiles for one and 80 missiles for the other)
• 1x Talos launcher (52 missiles)
• 1x ASROC (20 missiles)
• 2x 12.75” triple torpedo mounts
• SQS-23 sonar

In 1963 two 5”/38 guns were added amidships.  The story is that President Kennedy insisted on the guns being installed after touring the ship and noting a lack of any guns.  I don’t know whether this is true or not. 

The Regulus and Polaris weapons were never installed in their intended locations.

By the end of her life, Long Beach lost the Talos and Terrier launchers and had the radar arrays removed.  The final combat systems fit consisted of

• 2x Tomahawk launchers (8 BGM-109)
• 2x dual-arm Standard SM-2ER SAM launchers (120 RIM-67)
• 2x Phalanx CIWS
• 2x 12.75” triple torpedo mounts
• SPS-48C, SPS-49, SPS-67, 2x Mk 90 radars
• SQQ-23B sonar
• SLQ-32, SLQ-34 ECM suites
• 4x Mk 36 SRBOC decoy launchers

Long Beach was decommissioned in 1995.

Long Beach 1961

Long Beach 1991

So, what can we learn from the Long Beach?

The most interesting lesson is the role of a cruiser which was in dispute during Long Beach’s design years and has been ever since.  Escort versus independent operations is not only an operational consideration but a major design factor.  The equipment fits are radically different for each role.  Long Beach’s design tried to straddle the line and failed.  Her offensive weaponry was never installed and only late in her career did she acquire even a modicum of offensive power in the form of a few Tomahawk launchers and Harpoons.  Interestingly and, I feel, incorrectly, subsequent cruiser designs have come down solidly on the escort side of the question.  The current Ticonderoga class cruisers are clearly intended as task force escorts only.

While the advent of VLS has allowed modern surface combatants to have a Tomahawk cruise missile land attack capability, that has not led to the development of offensive ships or independent operations doctrine and tactics.  Only recently has there been any movement to give surface combatants a credible anti-surface capability.  Our current DDGs and CGs are clearly task force escorts, primarily.  Offensive operations are a distant secondary mission, at best.

I agree with CNO Burke and today’s Adm. Thomas Copeman both of whom have seen a need for independent operations.  It seems almost certain that our ships will one day have to fight under skies that we do not dominate and without attachment to carriers – if for no other reason than our carrier and air wing numbers are steadily shrinking.  We are eventually going to be forced into conducting independent surface ship operations and we desperately need a cruiser designed for offensive warfare.

The key point about a ship designed for offensive, independent operations is that the design involves much more than simply tacking on additional VLS or Harpoon launch canisters.  For a ship to have any hope of conducting independent operations it must be designed for that role.  Design elements include stealth, greatly increased armor protection, maximum redundancy and separation, a heavy medium and short range AAW fit, large numbers of UAVs for scouting, and, of course, a heavy anti-ship and land strike capability.  Anything less is not survivable.

Anyway, big boxy superstructure aside, the ship is long, sleek, and just plain attractive.  It looks like a warship!  I’ve always had a soft spot for this vessel and it was fun to take a look back at it.

4th of July

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, …”  - from the Declaration of Independence

Do you think the Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or NKorean governments live by these words and concepts?  Not even close.

Some readers wonder why we should care whether China, for example, takes over the South and East China Seas or whether Russia takes over Crimea and Ukraine.  We can come up with reasons such as ensuring the safe passage of international shipping or some such but, ultimately, it comes down to our fundamental beliefs.  Unlike any other country in the world, we believe that our fundamental rights are granted by God, not governments, and that everyone, not just Americans, are entitled to these same unalienable rights.  We should care that most of the world lives in a reality far different from the concepts of our Declaration and in governments that do not govern with the consent of the governed.  If we truly believe these words then it is our responsibility, ultimately, to secure these rights for all people, in whatever country.  That is why we should care.

Sometimes we need a reminder about certain fundamentals in our lives.  Sometimes we also need a reminder that God is the source of our fundamental rights and our strength.

A happy and reflective Independence Day to all of you.

Surrender Was Unnecessary

ComNavOps has faulted the boat crews for surrendering without resistance.  Some readers have suggested that this was the only prudent thing to do and that the boat crews would have been killed to no purpose had they resisted.  Here is the proof that surrender was not necessary.

From the full Navy investigative report we learn the following.

• Various crew First observed two small boats at 1-2 nm.
• Observed weapons on the boats at 800-1000 yds.
• Both boats manned their weapon stations as the Iranian boats approached.  Some guns were loaded, some were not.
• As the boats approached to within 100-300 yds, several crew members observed that each Iranian boat had a single COVERED crew served weapon.
• The Iranians uncovered their weapons at 100-300 yds.  In addition, each Iranian was seen to be armed with an AK-47.
• One of the Iranian boats had two crew and the other boat had a single crew member.  Here are the relevant quotes from the full report.

IV.H.31. (U) According to most accounts, one of the boats had two Iranians on board, while the other boat had only one Iranian onboard.

IV.H.32. (U) Concerning the boat with one Iranian, crewmembers observed the Iranian ?frantically? shifting between driving the boat, manning a weapon, and talking on a radio.

So what was the situation when the US boats were initially approached?  A grand total of three Iranians, two on one boat and one on another, threatened two US boats armed with four 0.50 cal machine guns and 10 crewmen each of whom were also armed with personal weapons of various types.  One of the Iranian boats was, essentially a non-factor, being crewed by a single person and incapable of simultaneously maneuvering and fighting.

The engine was repaired and both boats began to accelerate away.  The Iranians were seen pointing their weapons at the 802 boat.  It was at this moment that the boat 802 coxswain refused to continue accelerating and stopped the boat.  At this point, the 802 Boat Captain initiated the surrender.

So, two fully functioning US boats armed with four 0.50 cal machine guns and 10 crew with personal arms surrendered to two Iranian boats with two crew-served machine guns and a total of three crew members without a shot being fired.  At the moment of surrender, the US boats had twice the firepower and more than three times the crew numbers and surrendered without a shot being fired.

It bears repeating.  At the moment of surrender, the US boats had twice the firepower and more than three times the crew numbers and surrendered without a shot being fired.

Shortly after this decision, a third Iranian vessel showed up followed, eventually, by a fourth.

According to the report, at the moment of mutiny and surrender, the two Iranian guns were pointed at the 802 boat.  Thus, the 805 boat had the opportunity to fire, unhindered and unopposed, on the Iranians which would have prevented the surrender and seizure of the boats but did not do so.

The more we dig into this incident, the worse it gets.

The surrender is an example of cowardice, a violation of the Code of Conduct, and mutiny.  There is no other way to view this incident.

___________________________

Side Note:

Some readers will, undoubtedly, suggest that it was “right” for the US boats to surrender because they were in Iranian waters.  From a legal perspective, that’s totally false.  All countries have the right to conduct a procedure called Innocent Passage through another country’s territorial waters.  Setting that aside, however, at the moment of surrender the boat crews were totally lost and believed they were in international waters.  Thus, they believed they were being attacked and seized in international waters.  By definition, that’s an act of war and should have been resisted with force – see, again, the Code of Conduct.  All of the rationales for surrendering based on being in Iranian waters were promulgated after the fact when the crews eventually learned where they actually were.  The crews believed they were in international waters and, as such, were obligated to resist and defend their boats and themselves.

How Did We Get Here?

After one of my posts, critical of the Navy’s performance and leadership, a reader asked me if I really believed that the Navy was that incompetent.  The question was asked in a mocking way, implying that the Navy couldn’t possibly be as incompetent as I portrayed it (despite the fact that I factually document and reference all my main points) and that, therefore, I was an idiot who had no idea what was going on with the Navy.  Well, the previous post regarding the Navy’s own investigative report showed just how systemically incompetent the Navy has become.  The question, now, is how did this reprehensible state of affairs come to be and why is it not only continuing but steadily worsening?  I’ll now answer that question.

There are two main reasons.

1. Priorities
2. Peace

Priorities – The Navy exists to fight wars.  You can dress that answer up with all kinds of qualifiers and descriptors like maintaining the flow of international shipping, fostering international maritime relations, etc. but when you boil it down, the Navy exists to fight wars.  That is its ultimate, end function.  Everything the Navy does, buys, or decides, should run through that filter.  Does whatever it is support or enhance the Navy’s ability to fight wars?  If not, we shouldn’t do it.  It really is that simple.

With that in mind, ask yourself what the Navy’s current priorities are.  They’re gender norming, transgender equality, gender integration, unisex uniforms, sexual assault, tattoos, green energy, diversity quotas, removing “man” from job titles, sensitivity training, etc.  Look at the number of departments, people, paperwork, and training sessions that are devoted to these priorities.

The Navy has completely lost its focus on warfighting and that leads us to the next reason.

Peace.  The worst condition for any military force is peace.  Peace is when you no longer are forced to run everything through the unforgiving and uncaring crucible of survival of the fittest.  In peacetime, the crude, rough, vulgar, impolite, warriors – the killers who excel in combat – are systematically weeded out.  The very people who should be the backbone of a warfighting organization become the new enemy.  They’re uncouth and an embarrassment and the peacetime hierarchy ruthlessly terminates their service.

In peacetime, new weapon systems are no longer subjected the impartial test of combat.  Instead, systems get adopted not because they are efficient killing systems but because they are efficient jobs programs, or they enjoy support from some influential Congressman, or they’re a pet project of some highly ranked admiral.

In peacetime, all the hard learned and blood-earned lessons and procedures are abandoned or ignored because there is no penalty for failing to follow them.  No one is going to shoot at you if you didn’t have time to service your weapon.

Peace is the enemy of the Navy.  Peace is the driving force for incompetence.

There you have it.  The Navy has arrived at this sorry state of affairs due to misplaced priorities and the extended peace that the Navy has lived with.

The Navy needs to find those few individuals, like ComNavOps, who have not forgotten why the Navy exists and have the courage to insist that the Navy behave like a warfighting machine and then promote them and follow them.  Will that happen?  No, of course not.  It will take another war to wake the Navy from its long peaceful slumber.  Unfortunately, a lot of sailors will pay for that slumber with their lives.