4th of July

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, …”  - from the Declaration of Independence

Do you think the Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or NKorean governments live by these words and concepts?  Not even close.

Some readers wonder why we should care whether China, for example, takes over the South and East China Seas or whether Russia takes over Crimea and Ukraine.  We can come up with reasons such as ensuring the safe passage of international shipping or some such but, ultimately, it comes down to our fundamental beliefs.  Unlike any other country in the world, we believe that our fundamental rights are granted by God, not governments, and that everyone, not just Americans, are entitled to these same unalienable rights.  We should care that most of the world lives in a reality far different from the concepts of our Declaration and in governments that do not govern with the consent of the governed.  If we truly believe these words then it is our responsibility, ultimately, to secure these rights for all people, in whatever country.  That is why we should care.

Sometimes we need a reminder about certain fundamentals in our lives.  Sometimes we also need a reminder that God is the source of our fundamental rights and our strength.

A happy and reflective Independence Day to all of you.

Surrender Was Unnecessary

ComNavOps has faulted the boat crews for surrendering without resistance.  Some readers have suggested that this was the only prudent thing to do and that the boat crews would have been killed to no purpose had they resisted.  Here is the proof that surrender was not necessary.

From the full Navy investigative report we learn the following.

• Various crew First observed two small boats at 1-2 nm.
• Observed weapons on the boats at 800-1000 yds.
• Both boats manned their weapon stations as the Iranian boats approached.  Some guns were loaded, some were not.
• As the boats approached to within 100-300 yds, several crew members observed that each Iranian boat had a single COVERED crew served weapon.
• The Iranians uncovered their weapons at 100-300 yds.  In addition, each Iranian was seen to be armed with an AK-47.
• One of the Iranian boats had two crew and the other boat had a single crew member.  Here are the relevant quotes from the full report.

IV.H.31. (U) According to most accounts, one of the boats had two Iranians on board, while the other boat had only one Iranian onboard.

IV.H.32. (U) Concerning the boat with one Iranian, crewmembers observed the Iranian ?frantically? shifting between driving the boat, manning a weapon, and talking on a radio.

So what was the situation when the US boats were initially approached?  A grand total of three Iranians, two on one boat and one on another, threatened two US boats armed with four 0.50 cal machine guns and 10 crewmen each of whom were also armed with personal weapons of various types.  One of the Iranian boats was, essentially a non-factor, being crewed by a single person and incapable of simultaneously maneuvering and fighting.

The engine was repaired and both boats began to accelerate away.  The Iranians were seen pointing their weapons at the 802 boat.  It was at this moment that the boat 802 coxswain refused to continue accelerating and stopped the boat.  At this point, the 802 Boat Captain initiated the surrender.

So, two fully functioning US boats armed with four 0.50 cal machine guns and 10 crew with personal arms surrendered to two Iranian boats with two crew-served machine guns and a total of three crew members without a shot being fired.  At the moment of surrender, the US boats had twice the firepower and more than three times the crew numbers and surrendered without a shot being fired.

It bears repeating.  At the moment of surrender, the US boats had twice the firepower and more than three times the crew numbers and surrendered without a shot being fired.

Shortly after this decision, a third Iranian vessel showed up followed, eventually, by a fourth.

According to the report, at the moment of mutiny and surrender, the two Iranian guns were pointed at the 802 boat.  Thus, the 805 boat had the opportunity to fire, unhindered and unopposed, on the Iranians which would have prevented the surrender and seizure of the boats but did not do so.

The more we dig into this incident, the worse it gets.

The surrender is an example of cowardice, a violation of the Code of Conduct, and mutiny.  There is no other way to view this incident.

___________________________

Side Note:

Some readers will, undoubtedly, suggest that it was “right” for the US boats to surrender because they were in Iranian waters.  From a legal perspective, that’s totally false.  All countries have the right to conduct a procedure called Innocent Passage through another country’s territorial waters.  Setting that aside, however, at the moment of surrender the boat crews were totally lost and believed they were in international waters.  Thus, they believed they were being attacked and seized in international waters.  By definition, that’s an act of war and should have been resisted with force – see, again, the Code of Conduct.  All of the rationales for surrendering based on being in Iranian waters were promulgated after the fact when the crews eventually learned where they actually were.  The crews believed they were in international waters and, as such, were obligated to resist and defend their boats and themselves.

How Did We Get Here?

After one of my posts, critical of the Navy’s performance and leadership, a reader asked me if I really believed that the Navy was that incompetent.  The question was asked in a mocking way, implying that the Navy couldn’t possibly be as incompetent as I portrayed it (despite the fact that I factually document and reference all my main points) and that, therefore, I was an idiot who had no idea what was going on with the Navy.  Well, the previous post regarding the Navy’s own investigative report showed just how systemically incompetent the Navy has become.  The question, now, is how did this reprehensible state of affairs come to be and why is it not only continuing but steadily worsening?  I’ll now answer that question.

There are two main reasons.

1. Priorities
2. Peace

Priorities – The Navy exists to fight wars.  You can dress that answer up with all kinds of qualifiers and descriptors like maintaining the flow of international shipping, fostering international maritime relations, etc. but when you boil it down, the Navy exists to fight wars.  That is its ultimate, end function.  Everything the Navy does, buys, or decides, should run through that filter.  Does whatever it is support or enhance the Navy’s ability to fight wars?  If not, we shouldn’t do it.  It really is that simple.

With that in mind, ask yourself what the Navy’s current priorities are.  They’re gender norming, transgender equality, gender integration, unisex uniforms, sexual assault, tattoos, green energy, diversity quotas, removing “man” from job titles, sensitivity training, etc.  Look at the number of departments, people, paperwork, and training sessions that are devoted to these priorities.

The Navy has completely lost its focus on warfighting and that leads us to the next reason.

Peace.  The worst condition for any military force is peace.  Peace is when you no longer are forced to run everything through the unforgiving and uncaring crucible of survival of the fittest.  In peacetime, the crude, rough, vulgar, impolite, warriors – the killers who excel in combat – are systematically weeded out.  The very people who should be the backbone of a warfighting organization become the new enemy.  They’re uncouth and an embarrassment and the peacetime hierarchy ruthlessly terminates their service.

In peacetime, new weapon systems are no longer subjected the impartial test of combat.  Instead, systems get adopted not because they are efficient killing systems but because they are efficient jobs programs, or they enjoy support from some influential Congressman, or they’re a pet project of some highly ranked admiral.

In peacetime, all the hard learned and blood-earned lessons and procedures are abandoned or ignored because there is no penalty for failing to follow them.  No one is going to shoot at you if you didn’t have time to service your weapon.

Peace is the enemy of the Navy.  Peace is the driving force for incompetence.

There you have it.  The Navy has arrived at this sorry state of affairs due to misplaced priorities and the extended peace that the Navy has lived with.

The Navy needs to find those few individuals, like ComNavOps, who have not forgotten why the Navy exists and have the courage to insist that the Navy behave like a warfighting machine and then promote them and follow them.  Will that happen?  No, of course not.  It will take another war to wake the Navy from its long peaceful slumber.  Unfortunately, a lot of sailors will pay for that slumber with their lives.

Iranian Seizure of US Boats - Navy Report

This blog has been resolute in examining and laying bare the faults of Navy leadership.  This blog has also documented the significantly degraded state of the Navy as regards readiness, maintenance, training, warrior mindset, and tactics.  All of these were made manifestly clear in the recent Farsi Island incident in which the Iranians seized two US Navy boats and their crews that had incompetently transited into Iranian waters.  All of the faults and shortcomings that have been discussed in this blog came together to produce one of the most humiliating incidents in Navy history.  Here are just a few of the individual factors that led to this incident as detailed in the just released, heavily redacted, Navy investigative report (1).

• Failed to conduct mission planning, produce a concept of operations, or review the route and navigational plan
• Did not review the Plan of Intended Movement (PIM)
• Upon departure, which was several hours late, deviated immediately from the PIM in an attempt to make up time
• Failed to report the engine casualty to the Tactical Operations Center
• Failed to report an unanticipated land sighting (Farsi Island) to the Tactical Operations Center
• Tactical Operations Center failed to act when scheduled check-in was missed
• Tactical Operations Center failed to note or act when tracking equipment showed the boats heading into Iranian waters
• Lacked a communications plan
• Lacked surface or air overwatch
• Leadership tasked the boats and crew beyond the limits of their capability
• Commander, Task Force 56 promulgated a “can do/will do” culture that frequently compromised risk management and procedural adherence
• Crews had been up most of the night before conducting maintenance on one of the boats that had broken down.
• Had to "cannibalize" parts from a third boat in order to have two working vessels.
• Experienced problems with their satellite communications gear.
• Crews were unfamiliar with the region, weather, geography, or threats
• Had insufficient crew to both maneuver and man weapons at the same time
• Failed to post lookouts or man weapons stations when the boats suffered the engine breakdown

The report makes a point of documenting command’s vision of how to handle Iranian interactions.  VAdm. Donegan, Commander Fifth Fleet, communicated his intent for handling interactions with Iranian forces in this message from Dec 2015.

“When we are approaching an interaction, fundamental to your plans should be the utilization of maneuver and knowledge of the battle space to open distance and/or time so that you have more options for de-escalation and to provide additional opportunity to determine intent of the Iranian units.”

This directive embodies what’s wrong with our policy of appeasement.  Why does only the US have a responsibility to deescalate?  Unilateral deescalation is another way of saying appeasement.  What did this accomplish?  It led to crews that were totally unprepared to fight and, worse, had no idea that a fight was coming or even possible.  The policy led directly to the state of unpreparedness for combat by the boat crews and, arguably, led directly to their seizure.

Here is another key point.  The report states that someone (the name is redacted) on boat 802, apparently the Boat Captain, disobeyed a direct order from the Patrol Officer on boat 805 to evade.  His refusal of orders caused boat 805 to return to try to assist and resulted, directly, in both boats being captured.  Thus, one man’s refusal of an order resulted in the direct seizure of two boats and their crews.  He jeopardized both crews given that there was every reason to believe that surrendering would not turn out well.  Iran’s history of handling prisoners is not one that lead to a reasonable expectation of safe return.  This was mutiny, pure and simple, and I fully expect this person to be harshly punished.

Section Update

The full report states that the boat 802 coxswain refused an order to accelerate away from the Iranian craft.

Update Ends

Another lesson to be had from this incident is that despite all our vaunted automation, sensors, networking, satellites, radars, data links, and sophisticated communications, we failed completely and utterly to monitor and control the boats as they inexorably violated Saudi Arabian and then Iranian territorial waters, became stranded, and were seized.  And yet we want to increase our reliance on these systems.  Well you know what?  No system can compensate for utter incompetence and total confusion.  All the data in the world is useless if you don’t know what to do with it.

Regarding the actual surrender by the boat crews, the report goes to the trouble of quoting the US Armed Forces Code of Conduct.  This is incredibly significant, I think.  Consider the first two items of the Code which, again, were quoted in the report.

1. I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

2. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

           [Emphasis added]

Those who argue that the crews were right to surrender without resistance would do well to read and consider the Code requirements.  Military life does not come with a guarantee of safety – in fact, almost the opposite.

The report goes on to make innumerable recommendations which contain nothing that isn’t already supposed to be part of standard operations – a typical waste of a report, in that regard.

Every person in the chain of command from the boat crews on up to CNO Richardson and SecNav Mabus should be fired or court-martialed.

This is why I do this blog and why I’ve been so critical of Navy leadership.  Leadership’s failure is putting sailor’s lives at risk.

As an aside, many people have speculated about conspiracies related to this incident but reading the report makes it clear that there is nothing more nefarious, here, than simple, gross incompetence on a scale that defies belief.

I am unilaterally relieving CNO Richardson for loss of confidence in his ability to command.

____________________________

(1)Memorandum For The Record, Executive Assistant, Chief of Naval Operations, 29-Jun-2016

Mutiny?

Wow!  Read these excerpts from a Fox News website article about the recent Iranian seizure of two US boats and crews (1).

“…when the order was given to evade the Iranian forces, the helmsman refused the order.”

The helmsman "refused the order" ?????

Are you kidding me?!  That’s mutiny.

“ ‘The story here is these guys had gotten so used to Iranians doing stupid s---, having weapons pointed at them all the time, they didn’t know they were being captured until the Iranians boarded their boats,’ one defense official said describing the lack of situational awareness by the Navy crew. ‘They messed up pretty bad.’ “

Are you kidding me?!  We’ve gotten so used to being threatened that we didn’t even know we were being boarded?  This is what happens when your default force posture is appeasement.  Sure, they’re pointing presumably live weapons at you but, hey, don’t respond.  That’s idiotic.  If someone points a weapon at you, shoot them!  Even in the civilian world, that’s legal.

At the moment, these are unsubstantiated snippets so I’ll withhold final judgment pending the release of the official report in a couple days but this doesn’t look good.

A Congressman (I can’t recall who it was) who had been briefed on this incident, stated in an interview a week or so ago that we weren’t going to believe what would be in the report on this.  If these snippets are any example, he was more than right.

If these incidents are proven to be true in the official report, CNO Richardson should resign for having allowed the Navy’s readiness and discipline to fall to such a low level.  Of course, to be fair, the bulk of the blame lies with his predecessor, Adm. Greenert, but he's now untouchable.  Still, the blame always lies with the Captain and the Captain of the Navy is CNO Richardson.  He's got to go.

I can’t wait for this report to come out.

__________________________

(1)foxnews.com, “Navy commodore to be relieved of command over Iran's capture of his sailors”, Lucas Tomlinson, June 24, 2016,

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/06/24/navy-commodore-to-be-relieved-command-over-irans-capture-his-sailors.html

Island Showdown

Here's a change of pace.  I'd like to describe some non-lethal ways that the Navy can counter Chinese land reclamation efforts.  Rather than dryly list various methods and equipment I've opted to describe them in the form of a short story.  So, settle back and enjoy.

Remember, this is intended to illustrate various systems and tactics.  It is not intended to be a balanced or "fair" simulation of an encounter so don't read it as such.

________________________________

Island Showdown© (2016)

ComNavOps

As far as the Captain could tell, it was just another reef with occasional bits of coral and rock protruding above the water.  Of course, it was exactly these kinds of navigational hazards that the Chinese had turned into several air and naval bases already, here in the South China Sea, he reminded himself.  Until the recent election and change in administration, the US had been content to acquiesce to the Chinese in a policy of unofficial appeasement.  As a result, artificial island bases had begun springing up all over the South China Sea.  Now, however, a new President was demanding an end to this kind of illegal construction and territorial grab and the USS Steadfast had been sent to stop this latest island building effort before it could really get going.

Nice to have a new ship, the Captain mused as he observed the rocks.  Steadfast was the first of her class – a new kind of patrol ship developed for a new kind of patrol philosophy.  Appeasement was over.  The Captain’s orders had been clear.  Confrontational patrol was to be the new norm and Steadfast was eminently equipped for that role – in theory.  That theory was about to be put to the test.

Turning away from his observation, the Captain decided that now was as good a time as any to begin.  A Chinese ship, probably a dredging vessel was standing about 200 m off the principle rock while a small boat occasionally shuttled back and forth unloading and setting up gear.  The land reclamation project had just recently begun so there wasn’t much set up yet but the Chinese had already demonstrated an amazing ability to build an artificial island in a very brief period.

“All right,” the Captain said, “let’s facewash that rock. Give me a powersquat pass at 50 m.”

Steadfast was built for power rather than speed and specially modified to create enormous wakes.  The ship’s stern contained ballast tanks and those now flooded to drop the stern deeper into the water as the ship’s engines and three propellers came up to full power.  As the ship began to build up speed, the wake grew larger and larger.  At 25 kts, the ship passed by the target rock at a distance of 50 m. 

The Captain leaned out over the bridge wing, looking back to observe the effect of their passage.  It was everything he could have hoped for.  The immense wake broke over the rock, obscuring everything on it.  When the wall of water passed, there was nothing left but the rock and a few pieces of equipment that had been anchored into the rock.  Everything else was gone – washed away in a mini-tidal wave. 

Turning back to look at the Chinese ship, now also rocking violently, the Captain could only imagine the angry reactions Steadfast’s passage had caused.

“Transmit the message,” the Captain ordered.  A pre-recorded message was transmitted to the Chinese ship telling them that they were to leave the area immediately and that they had 10 minutes to acknowledge and begin complying.  The Captain harbored no illusions that the Chinese would obey.

“While they waste 10 minutes, let’s get set up for smoke herding”, he said.

Steadfast turned and began to maneuver to a position upwind of the Chinese vessel.  As they did, the Chinese ship began transmitting furious protests and threats which the Captain ignored other than to smile slightly.  This wasn’t combat, he thought, but, still, it did have an element of adrenaline-pumped excitement. 

More ominously, the Chinese vessel also began transmitting what the Captain assumed was calls for help.  There was a Chinese “Coast Guard” vessel in the area, about 20 nm away.  Help was undoubtedly already on the way.  We’ll deal with that shortly, the Captain thought.  For the moment, though, there was an uncooperative Chinese vessel to move out of the area.

By this time, 10 minutes had passed and Steadfast was in position, upwind of the Chinese vessel, and with her bow pointed in the same direction as the Chinese ship.  At the Captain’s order, the Steadfast moved in on the Chinese ship which was now beginning to move to evade.  Smoke began to pour from exhaust vents situated along the side of the US ship.  The smoke was a tear gas derivative designed to be thick and cloying.  Steadfast began to herd the Chinese ship, matching its maneuvers while maintaining a 20 m offset and staying upwind.  It wasn’t too difficult as the Chinese ship wasn’t built for speed or maneuverability.  This had the effect of keeping the Chinese ship continuously covered in a blanket of tear gas smoke.

The Chinese ship continued to broadcast angry messages and dire threats but to no avail.  After several minutes, the Chinese ship turned directly away from the rocks, bent on their best speed, and began to retire from the area.  Steadfast broke off from the herding exercise and began to circle away.  As the Chinese ship pulled away, the crew could be seen leaning over the rails, vomiting into the ocean.

That had gone well enough, the Captain reflected, but he knew that the main event would come when the Chinese Coast Guard vessel arrived.  About 45 minutes later, the Chinese vessel appeared on the horizon and began broadcasting demands for the American ship to leave the area. 

Steadfast’s Captain immediately replied with another prepared message instructing the Chinese ship to leave the area immediately and stating that there would be no follow up message.  This would be the first and only warning.

Knowing that the warning would be ignored, the Captain put Steadfast on an intercept course.  As the two ships neared each other, the Chinese vessel suddenly veered sharply into the path of the oncoming American, forcing it to abruptly turn away.  That was predictable, the Captain thought and, indeed, he had anticipated it and been prepared to sheer away.

Steadfast, after turning away, used its exceptional maneuverability to come around to a course parallel with the Chinese ship and offset by about 100 m.  Both ships held a steady course for several minutes but, after continued threats from the Chinese which the Captain ignored, the Chinese ship began edging closer – unsafely closer.

“He’s going to bump us,” the Captain announced.  “Sound the collision alarm.”

As the Chinese ship edged even closer and its bow began to swing towards Steadfast, the Captain smiled and muttered to himself, “He’s got a surprise coming.”

The Chinese ship angled towards the US ship, committed now to a bump maneuver. 

“Deploy the starboard spikes!”, the Captain ordered.  Along Steadfast’s side, six giant, solid metal rods, 2 m long and 15 cm thick, and capped with a pointed end, snapped out from their inboard resting cylinders to present a line of sharpened spikes.  Already committed to the bump, the Chinese ship was unable to avoid them.  As the ship’s hulls came together, the spikes, in rapid succession, punctured the Chinese ship’s hull and, because the two ship’s speeds were not identical, the spikes began tearing a horizontal line along the hull as the Chinese ship slipped slightly astern. 

The Chinese ship veered off, pulling free of the spikes and sporting several deep gouges in its side.  They wouldn’t be fatal, by any means, but they weren’t intended to be.

Furious threats came across the airwaves at Steadfast but the Captain simply laughed.  The encounter was developing nicely and he was quite satisfied.

“He’s mad now,” the Captain called.  “Let’s be alert.  He’s going to take his best shot at us, now.”

The Chinese ship, now well clear, began to accelerate to move out in front of Steadfast. 

“Let’s let him take the lead, if that’s what he wants, and see what he’s got in mind,” the Captain said.

The Chinese ship passed Steadfast, pulled about 60 m directly ahead and then, with no warning, went from full ahead to full astern.  Steadfast would have to react very quickly to avoid a collision.

“All engines ahead full,” the Captain calmly ordered.  “Hold course.”

Instead of veering off, Steadfast accelerated straight for the Chinese ship’s stern.  In moments, Steadfast’s specially armored and reinforced bow sliced into the stern of the Chinese ship, cutting a deep “V” into it and riding up on the vessel’s fantail. 

As Steadfast came to a halt several meters into the Chinese ship’s stern, the Captain ordered full astern and the two ships grindingly and grudgingly separated to the sound of screeching metal.

Steadfast backed away and began to circle around the stricken Chinese vessel, while the Captain ordered the next message which was a very insincere apology for not being able to stop in time in response to the unsafe ship handling of the Chinese.  The message also politely asked if the Chinese needed assistance.

The airwaves rapidly filled with threats from the Chinese which Steadfast’s Captain took to mean that they did not require assistance.

“I think we’ve accomplished our mission, here, for the moment,” the Captain said.  “Let’s head back to our patrol area.”

As Steadfast began to pull away from the Chinese ship, the Chinese bow gun pivoted towards the American ship and a shot fired, missing Steadfast’s bow by no more than 20 m.  Steadfast’s Captain held his breath, waiting to see if the Chinese were going to initiate combat, which he was fully prepared for, or whether the shot was just a petulant parting shot across the bow.  After several seconds without a second shot, the Captain had his answer.  Apparently, the Chinese were simply trying to establish dominance and were not concerned with safety margins in their warning shot across the bow. 

“I guess we’re not quite done,” said the Captain.  “Give me a full volley of Bats.”

A small, 20 cell box launcher erupted with 20 flashes of fire, each two seconds apart.  The projectiles, called Bats, cleared the launcher and small wings deployed converting the objects into miniature UAVs.  The UAV swarm quickly formed and then, as a coordinated group sped towards the Chinese ship at their maximum speed of about 50 kts.  As the UAVs neared the ship, they dove sharply down and, just before impacting the ship, a small warhead burst open, releasing a fist sized glob of thick, extremely sticky gel that, along with the now inert UAVs, impacted across the Chinese ship.  Aside from multiple dented equipment and one unlucky sailor who happened to be in the path of one of the UAVs and suffered a broken arm as he tried to fend off the mini-aircraft, the only other damage was the deposition of 20 globs of gel that were not going to come off without some extraordinary effort.

That, apparently, was enough for the Chinese vessel as it began to limp away at a few knots.

Satisfied, now, that they really had accomplished their mission, the Captain knew that there would be many more encounters to come.  The US had been passive far too long for the Chinese to be thwarted by a single encounter.  Still, it was a start.

DOT&E

There is a persistent misunderstanding about what DOT&E (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation), the Pentagon’s weapon and system test group, is and does.  As incredulous and unbelievable as it seems, there are actually some who view DOT&E as an obstacle or impediment to fielding weapon systems.  This can only stem from a complete failure to understand what DOT&E is and does.  I’ll now make clear what they do.

Let’s start with what DOT&E does not do.

• They do not approve or disapprove projects, weapons, or systems.  If they did, the F-35 and LCS would have been cancelled long ago! 

• They do not set criteria or specifications for weapon systems. 

• They do not decide when a system can be fielded.  The Navy routinely fields systems that have not been completely or successfully evaluated by DOT&E.

Now, what do they do?

At its simplest, DOT&E takes specifications that are established and provided by the Navy and implements test programs to verify that the system under consideration meets those specifications.

This is important enough to say again.  DOT&E takes specifications that are established and provided by the Navy and simply verifies that the system meets those specifications.

Some people believe that DOT&E mandates unnecessary tests and becomes an obstacle to progress.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

How does DOT&E determine what tests are needed and how many?  DOT&E testing, as in industry in general, is based on statistics and experimental design.  There is an entire field of mathematics devoted to figuring out how to set up experiments to obtain the maximum amount of data from the minimum amount of test runs.  I won’t even attempt to describe how this is done.  Suffice it to say that this is pure mathematics.  There is no personal opinion involved.  The experimental design does not care what the designer thinks of the system being tested.  In other words, DOT&E’s opinon, if they even had one about a given system, does not enter into the design of the experiment and has no influence on the type or number of tests required.  See reference (1) for a brief discussion of statistical experimental design.

The biggest obstacle to rapid assessments is the Navy.  The Navy routinely declines to make ships, aircraft, and systems available for timely testing.  Consider the Navy’s habit of putting off shock testing.  If the Navy would simply perform the shock testing with the first of class at the earliest opportunity, the testing would be over and the ship could get on with its service life and deployments.  Instead, for reasons unfathomable to me, the Navy spends more time fighting with DOT&E and trying to delay testing than the time it would take to simply do the testing.  The only explanation I can come up with for the Navy’s reluctance to perform shock testing is that recent ship designs are so structurally weak and poorly designed that the testing will reveal significant weaknesses and problems which will, rightly, make the Navy look bad, so they try to avoid the testing.

Further, the Navy routinely fails to fund the necessary threat surrogates that would conclusively verify weapon and system performance.  The Navy will spend several billion dollars on buying a ship but refuses to spend a hundred thousand dollars or a million dollars on simple, realistic threat surrogates to determine whether that ship can actually perform its duties effectively.  I think, by now, you can reason out the why of the Navy's reluctance to perform realistic testing.

If the Navy had their way, no testing would have been done on the LCS or its modules and we’ve seen how that turned out.  DOT&E is the only thing standing between badly flawed weapons and sailor’s lives.

The Navy’s adversarial relationship with DOT&E is inexplicable.  The Navy should be the strongest supporter of DOT&E since DOT&E is the group that ensures that the Navy will get what it wants in the way of weapon and system performance.  Indeed, the Navy’s history of being cheated and shorted by fraudulent manufacturer’s claims should be all the evidence needed for the Navy to be DOT&E’s most enthusiastic supporter.  Sadly, this is not the case.  The Navy’s reluctance to fund proper testing and perform said testing borders on criminal negligence and incompetence.  The next time we enter high end combat we’re going to look fondly back on the faulty torpedo episode of WWII compared to the failings we’ll find in today’s systems due to the Navy’s unwillingness to embrace proper testing.  Many sailors will pay with their lives for the Navy’s gross negligence.

__________________________

Brief Background:  DOT&E was established by an act of Congress in 1983.  The organization reports directly to the Secretary of Defense which keeps it out of the chain of command of the services, thus ensuring its independence.  The current Director, Dr. J. Michael Gilmore has served since 2009.  Dr. Gilmore and his group have been nothing short of spectacular in their performance and are the saving grace of a badly flawed military acquisition process.  Countless service members undoubtedly owe their lives to DOT&E.

__________________________

(1)http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/policies/2013/7-23-13BestPracticesAssessingStatAdequacyExperimentalDesignsUsedOTE(6866).pdf