A Lesson In Complexity

The Soviet Union was often criticized for having less technologically advanced weapons and systems than the US.  There were various reasons for this including less skilled maintenance personnel, poorer quality control in manufacturing, looser tolerances in design specifications, and, perhaps, a conscious desire to make systems more rugged.  In any event, the result was systems that were less finicky and better able to tolerate the dirty conditions of combat.  It was said that the Soviet aircraft engines didn’t care about foreign object (FOD) ingestion whereas US carriers are constantly conducting FOD walkdowns looking for the tiniest piece of debris that could destroy an entire engine in an instant.  Similarly, the iconic AK-47 is said to be impervious to mud, water, snow, or whatever whereas US rifles have, historically, needed to be meticulously cleaned and cared for.

As a general statement, complex systems are harder to construct, cost more to build, need more maintenance, require better trained personnel to maintain and operate, are more prone to breakdowns, are harder to repair, and less likely to be maintainable in combat.  The other side of the coin is that they offer greater capabilities. 

The trick in system design is to balance capability against maintainability.  It does no good to have the most advanced system in the world if it can’t be kept running.  Conversely, it does no good to have an utterly reliable system that is so lacking in capability that it adds nothing to combat capability.

The US has opted for the far, advanced end of the technology spectrum with systems that are mind bogglingly complex and often have poor reliability.  The Navy’s Aegis system is an example of this.  It offers stunning capability but suffers from fleet-wide degradation.  The F-22 is exceedingly complex and has great theoretical capabilities but the availabilities are around 60% and the goal is only around 70% or so.  Further, the aircraft has oxygen supply/contamination problems that have proven unsolvable, as yet.

So much for a general discussion.  Let’s look at a recent specific example.  The LCS uses a very complex propulsion system that utilizes both gas turbines and diesel engines to power water jets.  The selection and routing of the power source is regulated through a complex set of combining gears and accompanying lube oil system that has proven to be quite prone to breakdowns.  The most recent casualty due to this highly complex system is the USS Fort Worth which destroyed its combining gear in an in-port accident while conducting maintenance.  The ship is returning to the US for several months of repairs.

Is the turbine/diesel combination system with a very complex combining gear worth the gain in cost/performance?  The evidence thus far would suggest not.

If a system can’t operate reliably, can’t be easily maintained, and can’t be easily repaired then it’s not really a good choice for a combat system, is it?

Regardless of the rationale, the Soviets had the foundation of a better system that was based on simpler, more rugged designs that could stand up to the stress of combat. 

Do you recall what happened to the USS Port Royal (Aegis cruiser) when it gently nosed aground?  A WWII ship would have gently reversed engines and continued on its way, no worse for the wear.  Port Royal, in contrast, suffered apparently permanent damage to the radar arrays and VLS cells due misalignment from the gentle rocking of the ship while it was grounded.  Remember that the Navy tried to early retire Port Royal despite it being the newest Aegis cruiser and one of the ballistic missile defense-capable (BMD) ones.  That tells you everything you need to know about the severity of the damage the ship suffered.  Imagine what will happen to an Aegis cruiser that suffers an actual missile, bomb, mine, or torpedo hit and the ship is whipsawed violently.  An Aegis cruiser is a one hit mission kill waiting to happen.  The lesson is simple.  Complex systems can’t be maintained or repaired and certainly not during combat.  Would you rather have an old fashioned rotating radar that is rugged and might be repairable during combat or an Aegis system that is degraded going into combat, can’t tolerate any vibration, and can’t be maintained aboard ship?  Tough choice, huh?

We need to stop choosing the most complex, most delicate systems and start trying to balance capability and complexity.  A system that is simpler than the LCS combining gear would prove far better in the long run.  Who cares about a little fuel efficiency?  In combat, we should care about reliability.  A radar system that offers reasonable performance and rugged reliability would prove far better in the long run. 

The first combat design goal should be ruggedness and ease of maintenance.  Actual performance, oddly, is a secondary, though important, goal.  We need to find the proper balance point and, right now, it’s not where we’re currently designing!

The Past Is Prologue

The science fiction classic, Dune, set in a far distant future with weapons of unimaginable power, hypothesized a personal force field so effective that it forced a return to primitive knives and swords for combat (yeah, I’m glossing over a lot of stuff in the book but it serves to make the point).  ComNavOps has previously suggested that future naval combat with all its vast networks, omni-present sensors, data sharing, long range missiles, etc., will all too often devolve into WWII style gun battles.  Battles for which neither we nor our enemies are well prepared given that modern ships lack large caliber guns and armor.  To say that readers have been skeptical of this belief is to put it mildly.  That’s okay.  My purpose is to offer data and conclusions that are logical regardless of whether readers agree with them.  I’ll let my record of predictions stand for itself.

So, is ComNavOps alone in the belief that future warfare will devolve into more basic, primitive modes despite all our wonder-tech?  Well, the Army, at least, seems to be coming around to my way of thinking.

The Army desperately wants to regain relevance in the face of the Pacific Pivot’s seeming lack of use for ground forces (Russia, however, is making the Army relevant at a furious pace!).  One way to do that is to be able to provide long range, land based strike and anti-air weaponry.  Breaking Defense website offers an article on this Army vision (1).

“The crucial element of this vision isn’t any specific missile, McMaster said, but the joint network that connects the different services so they can assist each other.”

“The goal is a network so flexible and all-encompassing that, for example, a US or allied aircraft can spot an enemy ship, then pass the targeting information to a land-based missile battery to sink it.”

However, as we’ve often pointed out, belief that our networks, distributed sensors, and data sharing will function flawlessly and seamlessly in an electromagnetically contested environment is foolish, at best.  As Breaking Defense says,

“In such a conflict, of course, the invisible war of electrons to deceive sensors, jam transmissions and to hack computers is at least as important as the physical battle. You can’t count on your network always working against a sophisticated adversary …”

Even upper levels of the civilian military leadership seem to be grasping at least a little of this.

“So our networks must be designed to degrade gracefully, Work [Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Work] said, and our minds must be able to cope with losing them. Local commanders must be ready to fight in the dark on their own initiative, guided by a common understanding of the mission and a deep trust in their comrades. “You can configure your network in different ways,” he said, “but you have to be ready for the network to kind of disassemble, and then people to operate on a local level.”

So, DepSecDef Work recognizes that our networks are vulnerable and we must be prepared to revert to basic, close up combat.  Of course, that leads one to question why we’re basing our entire Third Offset Strategy on exactly that belief in flawlessly functioning networks, data sharing, unmanned vehicles, and autonomous weapons but, I digress ...  The point is that the Army and senior military leadership can see the possibility (I call it a certainty) that combat will devolve to local levels, divorced from the grand, all-seeing, all-controlling network of co-ordinated, precision fires that we like to believe we will have.

Are we ready for such devolved combat?

“Right now, we’re not ready for such scenarios, McMaster [Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster] made clear. ‘We’ve developed systems that are exquisite and could be prone to catastrophic failures’ instead of degrading gracefully, he said. The fragility and complexity of existing networks is such, he added to rueful laughter, that some of them don’t need an enemy to break them. They just go down in day-to-day operations without facing hostile action of any kind.”

And yet we’re basing out entire Third Offset Strategy on these networks???  But, I digress …

Is that the limit of the devolution of combat?  No …

“ ‘Many existing systems also broadcast continually in all directions at high power, he [McMaster] said. Against a sophisticated enemy, that’s basically putting up big flashing neon arrows labeled “WE ARE HERE.” We need to relearn techniques for concealment, camouflage, and deception — in the visual, infra-red, and radio frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum — that our adversaries have been refining for years.

McMaster warned that, ‘our enemies have become more and more elusive, and we’ve become almost transparent.’ “

So, we need to relearn the age old basic techniques of warfare like concealment, camouflage, and deception. 

So, our networks are vulnerable?  I’d like further proof, please.  OK …

“Inspired in large part by Russian successes against Ukraine, McMaster said, ‘we’re doing a vulnerability assessment on our force. What are we vulnerable to? — (and) topping that list is cyber and electronic warfare.’

That vulnerability means you can never be sure your sensors won’t be blinded or your intelligence deceived — which means, in turn, that your long-range precision-guided weapons will sometimes go to precisely the wrong place. Then you need to send in the ground troops to ‘develop situational awareness in close contact with the enemy [and] the population,’ McMaster said. Even with the most advanced long-range technology, he said, at some point, ‘you’ll probably have a close fight.’ “

So, the Army sees a vulnerability in our dependence on networks, intricate sensors, data sharing, and so forth?  Isn’t that what ComNavOps has been preaching for years?

You caught the part about, “… at some point, ‘you’ll probably have a close fight’”?  For all our standoff, precision fires, Gen. McMaster believes we’ll wind up having close up battles?  Shades of WWII !!!

Having established that the Army believes it likely that we’ll lose our grand networks when combat starts – so why are we basing our Third Offset Strategy on networks? – we can pretty reasonably extrapolate that the Navy will also lose their networks, data sharing, co-operative engagement, distributed sensors, etc. which means that the Navy will find itself fighting much like our WWII fathers did:  mostly blind with only short range sensing and awareness.  Opposing naval forces will literally stumble upon each other at shockingly close range (remember to factor in IFF issues when your situational awareness only extends to the horizon).  Missiles will be spoofed by ECM.  Missile guidance signals will be disrupted.  In short order, the opposing forces will be within gun range and the result will be a WWII-style naval gun battle.  That’s a battle that the US Navy is ill-equipped to wage.

The Future Of Naval Warfare?

There’s nothing wrong with having missiles and networks and data sharing and co-operative engagement.  Hey, it may work some of the time!  However, we should be prepared for the inevitable high tech failure and have a basic, low end combat capability to back it up.  We need to re-equip our ships with larger caliber guns, heavy torpedoes, and armor.  We need to be able to wage a gun battle and win.

The Army agrees with me.  Now, I just need to get the Navy on board.

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(1) Breaking Defense website, “What Lessons Do China’s Island Bases Offer The US Army?, Sydney Freedberg Jr., 5-May-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/05/chinese-island-bases-show-the-way-for-us-army/

The Next War

You all know the old adage that Generals are always preparing to fight the last war.  Like most adages, it’s largely true.

As a side note, possibly the best exception to the rule is the military’s preparation to fight Desert Storm.  We had pretty much the right equipment, tactics, and mindset for that conflict before the conflict started.  We were prepared.  Of course, one could make a legitimate argument that the preparations for Desert Storm were the result of having prepared for the old Soviet Union conflict rather than correctly anticipating the future Desert Storm and that the resulting match between forces and warfare needs was more fortuitous than predicted.  Moving on …

If the adage is generally correct, what is today’s military and Navy preparing to fight – the last “war” of neverending low end conflict or the next war, whatever that might be?

Let’s start with the easier question – what are we preparing for.  Our preparations are fairly clear and straightforward.  We’re downsizing our explosive power and armor in favor of lightness, mobility, and information (networks and data/sensor sharing).  The Marines are shedding tanks and artillery, ignoring amphibious assault, and focusing on expeditionary aviation and aviation based light infantry operations.  That’s clearly a terrorist, low end, third world focus which is exactly the “war” we’ve been fighting for the last two decades. 

On the Navy side, we’re focused on increasing the numbers of low end, light vessels like the LCS, JHSV, and LPD-17 while shedding Aegis cruisers, frigates, and large amphibious ships.  Air wings are shrinking, the fleet is steadily shrinking, and explosive combat power is vanishing.  The Navy is clearly moving from a combat force to a presence force which is what we’ve been doing for the last two decades.

On a more general level, we’re increasing the number of women in combat, increasing our diversity efforts, focusing on sexual assault prevention, changing titles to eliminate “man” from them, requiring sensitivity training, and debating women’s uniforms.  Honestly, I’m not sure what war this is preparing us for!

So, our actions make it clear that we’re preparing to fight the last war, meaning a continued focus on low end, anti-terrorist, anti-insurgency, peacekeeping, and democracy building with a dash of social engineering thrown in.  We are living proof of the “preparing to fight the last war” adage. 

Recognizing the trap we’ve fallen into, what war should we be preparing to fight?  Well, that’s the challenge, isn’t it?  It’s easy to see the last war but it’s harder to predict the next war, right?  Wrong!  It’s easy to see the next war(s) coming.  All we have to do is ask ourselves,

1. Who’s mad at us?
2. Of those that are mad at us, who has, or is building, a credible military force?
3. Of those that are mad at us and have a credible military force, who has a demonstrated set of actions and goals that conflict with our interests?

The countries remaining at the end of that simple set of questions will be the ones that constitute the next-war possibilities.

Who’s mad at us?  Perhaps an easier question is to ask who isn’t?  The list of countries and entities that are mad at us is long.  Aside from the obvious answers of Iran, NKorea, Russia, and China, we have to add several Central and South American countries, several African countries, every Middle East country to varying degrees, Pakistan, India (from time to time), Philippines, Japan (wherever our military comes in contact with their civilians), every terrorist organization (by definition!), the entire Islamic faith, and others.

Well that didn’t narrow things down much!

Of those countries and entities that are mad at us, which ones have, or are building, a credible military force?  This is where the list begins to narrow rapidly.  Only Iran, NKorea, Russia, Japan, China, and India have credible forces.

Finally, of those countries who are mad at us and have credible military forces, which ones have demonstrated actions and goals that conflict with our interests?  That leaves Iran, NKorea, Russia, and China.  This is our set of potential next-war possibilities.

Iran barely qualifies as having a credible military threat.  Further, they seem content with tweaking America when they can and funding terrorism.  They are probably the least likely to initiate an actual war.  Of course, when they obtain nuclear weapons this assessment will change given the fanatical and zealot nature of their leaders.  The most likely future with regards to Iran is an endless series of small scale confrontations though we could be dragged into a war on behalf of Israel.

NKorea has a credible, though low end, military and possesses nuclear weapons though without a reliable delivery system.  NKorea’s actions are generally contained and limited although that assessment has to be tempered by the realization that their leader is mentally unstable.  As with Iran, war is relatively unlikely although smaller scale confrontations will continue.

China has a peer level military that is on track to surpass us in the relatively near future.  Disturbingly, their near term goals of seizing the entire South and East China Seas and every disputed territory, combined with their longer term goals of recapturing Taiwan and their poorly concealed interest in the second island chain and, eventually the entire Pacific, put them on a collision course with the US.  Add to that their demonstrated willingness to physically confront the US and eventual war seems inevitable.

Russia has a near-peer military but is a bit of an unknown in that their long term goals are yet unclear.  Unfortunately, it looks as though Russia will not be content with the few territories already seized.  Russia appears to be preparing to seize the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, operating bases in Syria to support further Middle East expansion, and is solidifying their hold on the far eastern territories and the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.  The unanswered question is whether Russia will continue to seize territories and expand west and south into Europe.  At the moment this appears somewhere between possible and likely.  Further, like China, Russia has clearly demonstrated a willingness, almost enthusiasm, to engage in confrontation with the US.  They clearly are not deterred by US military, political, or economic power.  While eventual war with Russia seems less inevitable than is the case with China, war is certainly possible.

We see, then, that there are two likely war scenarios.  War with China is almost  inevitable and war with Russia is possible.  These, then are the future wars we should be preparing for.  Other wars, such as with NKorea, Iran, South American or African countries, are subsets.  If we’re prepared to handle war with Russia and China then we can handle war with other, lesser militaries.

There, now that wasn’t so hard, was it?  We can see who we’ll have to fight.  The next question is how we’ll have to fight.  Will we have to invade mainland China?  Will we have to drive Russia back to previous boundaries?  Will we have to assault a seized Taiwan?  These are geopolitical strategic questions that must be answered in order for the military to come up with comprehensive operational plans.  Still, there are certain absolutes that transcend specific strategies.

For any kind of conflict with China we will need very long range aircraft and lots of them.  We will need a Navy that can support long range Air Force strikes and conduct their own strikes while suppressing China’s Navy and Air Force.  A war with China will be one fought over vast distances from the air and sea.  Ground combat will be quite limited.  Long range, high explosive missiles will be the predominant weapon.

A war with Russia will be a ground and air war with limited direct naval involvement.  Such a war will be up close and incredibly violent – European WWII combat on steroids.  Heavy armor and artillery will rule the battlefield.  Operational strategy will be subservient to attrition.  Last man standing will decide the victor. 

In both cases, electronic warfare will play a major role.

With all of the above in mind, and knowing, clearly, what the future war will be, why are we still preparing to fight the last war?  It’s clear that the future war requires a vastly different preparation path than we are currently on.  We need heavy tanks, more and heavier artillery, supersonic high explosive missiles (cruise and ballistic), long range air superiority fighters, high end naval forces, etc.  Instead, we’re building LCSs, JHSVs, Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, short range, small payload F-35s, and short range, subsonic anti-ship missiles.

There’s no excuse.  We know what war we should be preparing for.  Let’s start doing it.

I would be remiss to close out this discussion without briefly touching on the Third Offset Strategy.  Let’s be perfectly fair.  Very recently the military has taken the first steps towards planning for the next war.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work has imposed his personal vision of future warfare which he calls the Third Offset Strategy.  The cornerstone of this vision is networked sensors and weapons and a heavy focus on unmanned vehicles.  The premise is that superior information will compensate for the lack of numbers and explosiveness that we’ve created for ourselves. 

I give the military leadership some tiny bit of credit for beginning to plan ahead.  Unfortunately, the chosen path of the Third Offset Strategy completely misses the mark as to what wars we will fight and what we will need to fight them.  Work’s personal vision for the next war is as flawed as his championing of the LCS.  Continued pursuit of the Third Offset Strategy is going leave us woefully unprepared for the next war.

I’ve laid out the future for the military.  Now, they need to take heed and begin preparing for it.

Marine Electronic Warfare

ComNavOps has long discussed the need for the military to start training in an electromagnetically challenged environment since that is clearly what we’ll fight in.  Stubbornly, the military has refused to conduct serious electromagnetically disrupted training.  On the one hand, we have absolute faith in our ability to attack enemy communications, radars, sensors, data links, and networks while, on the other hand, crediting our enemies with no ability to do the same to us.  Evidence is mounting, however, that Russian and Chinese forces will routinely employ widespread and powerful electronic countermeasures (ECM).  Russian forces in Ukraine are reported to have electronic warfare (EW) units attached even to small units and have operated them quite effectively.

On a related note, the Marines are looking to expand the offensive use of EW by distributing jamming pods on all aircraft and even ground vehicles or, ultimately, individual soldiers (1).  The EW pod of choice is the Intrepid Tiger II which first appeared in 2012 and, in its airborne guise, is the size and shape of typical Hellfire missiles or simulator pods used in training.  Foxtrot Alpha website has a nice description of the pod and its origins (2).

Intrepid Tiger II Pod - Good Start But Only Half The Story

The desire by the Marines to include EW pods on many units and at many levels is commendable and, hopefully, signals a budding recognition that we may someday fight a peer opponent rather than the endless series of low end threats we’ve dealt with in recent decades – threats that have allowed us to become stagnant and complacent due to the lack of challenge.  Distributing EW widely and at low organizational levels will put a much needed capability at the front lines. 

We seem to be slowly recognizing that we need to expand our offensive EW capability.  That’s good but what about the flip side?  What about defensive EW capabilities?  What about our ability to operate in an electromagnetically challenged environment?  Can our troops communicate in the face of enemy jamming?  Can we navigate without GPS?  Will our data links function in the face of ECM?  Will our weapon guidance signals get through?

Hand in hand with distributing EW pods to all and sundry aircraft, vehicles, and troops, our forces need to learn how to operate when those EW capabilities are turned on them.  I have yet to see much indication that the Marines are making any effort to train in a realistic electromagnetically challenged arena.  The Army, at least, has begun to take steps in that direction and the Marines need to follow suit.

All of the above applies equally to the Navy. The Navy has only recently begun to upgrade its venerable (obsolete) SLQ-32 EW equipment and has made no effort to train in an electromagnetically challenged environment.  The complacent attitude is that our EW will baffle the enemy and theirs will have no effect on us.  Nothing could be further from the truth. 

We need to start training like we’ll fight which will be in an electromagnetically degraded condition.  A good starting point would be to turn our own EW/ECM capabilities on ourselves in exercises and to do so in an uninhibited manner.  Let the EW/ECM people inject themselves into exercises with no constraints and no limitations.  If they can totally disrupt a training exercise, so be it.  Better to find out now than in actual combat.  The argument in the past has been that if we disrupted our own training, we wouldn’t be able to accomplish the goals of the training exercise.  That is just complete and utter nonsense.  If we can’t accomplish our training goals in the face of EW/ECM then we aren’t prepared, equipped, and trained properly and the reduced training is worse than useless because it leads us to believe that we’re ready.  Every athletic coach will tell you that the only thing worse than not practicing is to practice incorrectly and develop bad habits.  That’s what we’re doing when we hold back in training.  Russia and China aren’t going to hold back on EW/ECM so that we can accomplish our goals.

_____________________

(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Aim For Jammers On ‘Every Airplane’”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., April 01, 2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/marines-ramp-up-cyber-electronic-warfare-jammers-on-every-airplane/

(2)Foxtrot Alpha website, “How The Marines Cheaply And Quickly Built Precision Comm-Jamming Tech”, Tyler Rogoway, 18-May-2014,

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-the-marines-cheaply-and-quickly-built-precision-com-1577979656

Beach or Port?

ComNavOps has opined that high level amphibious assaults are very unlikely and, therefore, the amphibious fleet could be drastically reduced in size.  However, “very unlikely” does not mean impossible.  ComNavOps is nothing if not open minded (Hey!  I hear those snide chuckles in the back.  You people behave yourself.) and is always eager to consider alternate ideas.  With that in mind, a highly respected source has suggested to ComNavOps that the US military no longer has the capability to sustain a major assault and subsequent invasion force via movement of supplies over an unimproved beach.  The suggested premise is that such a large scale effort would require seizure and utilization of an existing port.  Let’s look at that premise a bit closer.

As we begin, let me state clearly that I don’t have anywhere near a sufficient understanding of the detailed capabilities the Navy could bring to bear on this.  I may be wrong about portions (or all !) of this.  That said …

I don’t think there is much question that we don’t have the resources to move sufficient amounts of fuel from ship to shore over a beach.  We’re talking about a major assault followed by major combat operations – division level efforts or more.  The amount of fuel division level ops consume is staggering.  Moving drums/bladders of fuel at a time just won’t suffice!

Similarly, history assures us that the amount of munitions a combat unit will go through will far exceed any pre-war planning allocations. 

Likewise, the amount food, spare parts, water, and all the other things that a combat unit needs to sustain itself will dwarf our nice, neat pre-war planning.  Factor in inevitable combat losses of supplies as they cross the beach and move inland and it becomes obvious that we just don’t have the number of transport vessels to move the supplies across the beach or the number of transport vehicles to move the supplies from the beach to the inland combat element.  Helos will help to a minor extent but are severely limited in individual capacity and will certainly be employed moving troops and providing direct fire support.

The Navy’s solution to amphibious sustainment support is the seabasing concept.  Unfortunately, this concept is based largely on wishful thinking. 

• Wishfully thinking that the weather will cooperate since the seabase components are mostly limited to lesser sea states.
• Wishfully thinking that the enemy will not attack the seabase since we only have or are planning to have two MLPs (and three AFSBs that may or may not be able to function as MLPs), the major component of the seabase concept and a limiting factor in supply throughput.
• Wishfully thinking that an enemy SSK won’t make the seabase a top priority target.
• Wishfully thinking that we can move the requisite tonnage of supplies across the seabase.
• Wishfully thinking that the fixed nature of the seabase won’t make it a very attractive target for ballistic and cruise missiles.

Of course, we have yet to address the delivery of the supplies to the operating units once the supplies make it to the beach.  Again, we do not have the trucks or helos necessary to move the requisite tonnage of supplies  after they make it ashore.

That said, a pretty good argument can be made that the only viable option to conduct and sustain a major amphibious assault is to seize an existing port.

Unfortunately, port seizure brings its own set of problems.

• How do we repair damaged ports while under fire?  We lack the heavy equipment to do the job while under fire.
• How do we protect ports from cruise and ballistic missiles?  The Navy wants to stand its Aegis ships 25-50 miles offshore so they won’t be able to do it effectively. 
• How do we provide rocket, mortar, and artillery defense?  Note: operating C-RAMs (land based Phalanx) in a built up, urban port city will cause massive collateral damage or have so many holes in its coverage as to prove useless, assuming we could even get C-RAMs ashore and set up under fire.
• How do we move supplies from the port, out of the city given that the few major roads will undoubtedly be mined, mortared, and “snipered”?
• How do we provide ongoing minesweeping in the harbor given the ease with which mines can be laid?
• How do we unload cargo ships in the port assuming that the enemy destroys the port’s cranes and other cargo handling equipment?  To the best of my knowledge we lack mobile, heavy duty cranes and heavy lift equipment.

Seizing a port can probably be done but repairing the port and cargo handling equipment while under fire will be a challenge.  Equally challenging will be defending the port from the multitude of missiles, rockets, mortars and artillery that a known, fixed location will invite.  We have neither the equipment nor doctrine to defend a port. 

Given our fixation with minimizing collateral damage, port defense will be very difficult.  Consider the simple case of snipers in adjoining multi-story buildings.  If we’re not willing to inflict significant collateral damage (destroy an entire floor or building to kill one sniper, for example) how will we neutralize snipers?  Room by room through a skyscraper?  We don’t have remotely enough troops to do that.

Consider the related challenge of mortars firing through holes in rooftops or, simply, from narrow, crowded streets.  They would be essentially invisible and invulnerable unless we were willing to apply counterfire and accept destruction of entire buildings and the countless civilian deaths that would result to get a single mortar.

Beach or port?  This is one of those questions that has no easy answer.  Nonetheless, the military needs to pick an option and begin equipping and training for the desired option.  For instance, can anyone even remember the military ever conducting a full scale port seizure exercise?

From Bad To Worse

How do programs go from recognizably bad to worse?  It happens when bad decisions are compounded by more bad decisions in the face of all evidence, common sense, and logic.  This is what’s happening right now with the Ford carrier program.

As reported by USNI News website, the man who ran the LCS program is now taking over the Navy’s troubled carrier program.  RAdm. Brian Antonio who has served as PEO for the LCS program since 2013 is taking over as PEO for carriers.

According to the Navy, Antonio,

“… previously served as program manager for Future Aircraft Carriers from 2007 to 2011.  Antonio also held various ship maintenance, modernization and acquisition roles throughout the Navy in his 33 years in the service. 

After having overseen the start of production of the future carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) as program manager, Antonio will now guide the ship through delivery, commissioning and fleet introduction as PEO. “

Is that an impressive resume of poor performance, or what?!

The man was responsible, in large measure, for getting the Ford off to a disastrous start.

He held various maintenance, modernization, and acquisition roles.  How’s the Navy’s maintenance?  How’s the Navy’s modernization programs?  How’s the Navy’s acquisition programs?  Could one man have a poorer resume?

The LCS is, arguably, the biggest shipbuilding disaster in Navy history and the man responsible for a large chunk of that is now going to be put in charge of carriers – for which he is already partially responsible for the Fords problems.

I’m not going to bother reciting a litany of the LCS’ problems.  They’re well documented.  Likewise, the Ford’s problems are also well documented.  This man had a major hand in both.     

  … And now he’s in charge of the Navy’s carriers.

This is how a program goes from bad to worse.

____________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Rear Adm. Brian Antonio, Former PEO LCS, Takes Over As PEO Aircraft Carriers”, Megan Eckstein, June 1, 2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/06/01/antonio_peo_aircraft_carriers

I Want More Money

As reported by USNI News website, a group called the Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition is asking Congress to authorize a two-ship block buy contract for Ford class aircraft carriers (CVN-80, CVN-81) (1).  In addition, they are asking for money to research ways of saving money on carrier construction.  Let’s look at bit closer at this.

Block Buy Contracts are similar to Multi-Year Procurement contracts and are supposed to be limited to purchases of well established, mature designs.  Such contracts can only be authorized by Congress.  There is also a formal difference between “block buys” and “block buy contracts” and it’s not clear from the article which terminology is being referenced.  Regardless, given that the first Ford class carrier is not yet complete and that several major pieces of equipment are still highly suspect regarding their long term viability, it’s hard to see how a block buy contract makes sense or would even be permissible.  This is clearly an attempt by a defense industry “lobby” to lock in construction business and profits.

Such an acquisition move is not necessarily a bad thing.  Theoretically, there are savings to be had from such a contract structure although, as CRS points out, such savings are small and often difficult to demonstrate in the face of the many other sources of cost increases which can obscure any savings (2).

Curiously, the article references the desire of the Coalition to initiate block buys of common equipment at a very early point in construction.  However, as the CRS report points out, this may not be legal.

“Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature.” (2)

This appears, then, to be a questionable contracting procedure intended to solidify the defense industry’s work load more so than to produce savings for the Navy.  Again, it’s not necessarily bad as long as the Navy enters into the agreement carefully and with a well thought out contract – something the Navy has not been noted for in the past!

Moving on to the more interesting point, the Coalition is asking for money to research ways to save money building carriers.  Well, here’s one way to save money:  don’t spend money to research ways to save money! 

The group is requesting $20M for research.  Hey, here’s an interesting procurement tidbit - figuring out how to make construction less expensive is supposed to be what the shipbuilder does all the time.  In fact, under a fixed price contract, there is enormous incentive for the shipbuilder to find ways to reduce construction costs because the savings go completely to the shipbuilder.  If savings can be demonstrated, the next ship can be built to a cheaper contract price and the cycle continues.  This is what economy of scale is.  The Navy doesn’t need to finance the shipbuilder’s cost savings efforts;  the fixed price contract already does that!

This effort is just industry trying to get the Navy to pay for what industry should be doing, and has every incentive to do.  I hope the Navy isn’t dumb enough to do this.  It all goes back to our discussions about running procurement contracts like a business instead of like an industry welfare program.

That industry would even ask for (demand) these financial concessions illustrates how ingrained poor contracting practices have become and how desensitized the Navy has become to being financially abused (willingly) on a regular basis.  This must end.

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(1)USNI News, “Industry Pushing Congress for CVN-80 and 81 Block Buy, Research for Shipbuilding Efficiency”, Megan Eckstein, March 18, 2016,

http://news.usni.org/2016/03/18/industry-pushing-congress-for-cvn-80-and-81-block-buy-research-for-shipbuilding-efficiency

(2)Congressional Research Service, “Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke & Moshe Schwartz, November 6, 2015