The Navy and the Arctic

A recent comment to a post prompted me to contemplate the Arctic.  Russia is reportedly developing Arctic capabilities and the US has lamented an icebreaker gap.  Here’s a quote reporting on President Obama’s call for more icebreakers.

“The US needs to build heavy icebreakers if it is to catch up with Russia in the Arctic, the White House said. President Barack Obama called for funding the construction of the specialized ships on the second day of his visit to Alaska.” (1)

What’s missing is a rationale for the icebreakers other than the fact that Russia has more than we do – a worthless rationale by itself.

What strategic benefit do we gain by being able to operate in the Arctic?  I genuinely pose the question.  I do not immediately see any benefit but I have not studied the issue enough to have a well formed opinion.

Arctic Region

Our submarines are already under-ice capable so there’s nothing to be gained there.  There are no strategic mineral resources in the Arctic that we cannot get easier and cheaper from somewhere else.  Russian Arctic military bases would not threaten us any more than they are already capable of doing. 

In short, I see no compelling reason to want to operate in the Arctic.  Maybe a reader can offer a strategic interest in the Arctic?

(1)https://www.rt.com/usa/314040-arctic-icebreaker-gap-obama/

Ship Warranties - What's That?

ComNavOps has frequently documented the all too common occurrence of incomplete ships being delivered to, and accepted by, the Navy.  In addition, we’ve seen far too many examples of simply horrific levels of quality defects in the delivered ships.  The LPD-17 class was, probably, the poster child for manufacturing defects.

All of this is bad but even worse is that the Navy is paying to complete the ships and correct the defects.  If you buy a car you get a five year bumper to bumper warranty.  Shouldn’t we expect at least a minimal warranty on a ship?

The GAO looked at the cost of “warranty” work on Navy ships and had this to say (1),

“For five of the six Navy and Coast Guard ships GAO reviewed, guarantees did not help improve cost or quality outcomes. While the type and terms of each contract determine financial responsibility for correcting defects, the government, in most of the cases GAO examined, paid shipbuilders to repair defects. For the four ships with fixed-price incentive type contracts and guarantee clauses, the government paid the shipbuilder 89 percent of the cost—including profit—to correct these problems. This means the Navy and Coast Guard paid the shipbuilder to build the ship as part of the construction contract, and then paid the same shipbuilder again to repair the ship when defects were discovered after delivery—essentially rewarding the shipbuilder for delivering a ship that needed additional work.” [emphasis added]

We’re paying the shipbuilder twice!!!

Did you catch this part?  “…essentially rewarding the shipbuilder for delivering a ship that needed additional work …”  The shipbuilder has absolutely no incentive to deliver a complete and functioning ship – just the opposite, in fact.  Every defect or incompletion is an opportunity to get paid again!  This is beyond insane!

Aren’t warranties a standard part of shipbuilding contracts?  No, apparently not.

“Department of Defense guidance instruct[s] programs to, respectively, consider and document the use of a warranty, the use of warranties is not mandatory, and the Navy does not consider using them for ship contracts.”

You’re buying a multi-billion dollar product and you don’t want a warranty?  That seems insane especially given the recent slipshod performance history of shipbuilders.

The issue is even more basic than warranties.  The Navy is accepting incomplete and defective ships.  The shipbuilding contracts call for delivery of a complete ship and the various acceptance trials are supposed to ensure that happens.  But it’s not.  As GAO states,

“We found that some ship classes are routinely delivered with thousands of outstanding defects with the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems …”

A large part of the warranty issue can be bypassed by simply refusing to accept a ship until it’s actually completely built and trials prove that all the components work.  That has nothing to do with warranty – it’s just refusal to accept an incomplete product.  Failure to do so is gross negligence, incompetence, and a violation of the trust of the taxpayer. 

You might wonder what the magnitude of the warranty type issues is?  Obviously, the larger the ship, the more numerous and costly the warranty issues might be.  GAO offers this data point on the LCS warranty costs.

“For LCS 3 and LCS 4, the Navy spent $46 million and $77 million, respectively, under these post-delivery agreements to correct defects, complete ship construction, and assist with tests and trials, among other tasks.”

For a supposed $400M LCS shipbuilding contract (that figure is absolute garbage but we’ll use it for sake of this discussion) the warranty costs represent around 10%-20% of the original contract – that’s money being paid to do what was contracted to be done originally. 

None of us would do this in our personal lives.  We would consider it recklessly irresponsible and just plain stupid.  We’d find another supplier. 

The Navy doesn’t own the Navy, I the taxpayer do and I expect basic business principles, to say nothing of common sense, to be used in ship acquisition.  Every single Navy Admiral should be fired along with the entire NavSea leadership (NavSea is the organization responsible for the acceptance of incomplete and non-functional ships).

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(1)Government Accounting Office, “Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding”, March 2016, GAO-16-71

Myth Of The Unopposed Landing

We have a treat today in the form of a guest post from a long time reader with a career's worth of experience.  Please check out his bio at the end of the post.

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The Myth of the Unopposed Amphibious Landing

Implications of Anti-access/Area-denial Weapons

G. Bustamante

In 1943 Major General Alexander A. Vandergrift, United States Marine Corps stated: “… that landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed within striking distance of the objective.”

- Joint Publication 3-18 Joint Forcible Entry Operations

Current military thinking and doctrine assumes that opposed forcible entry operations (amphibious landings and vertical envelopment) can be avoided; yet the laudable intent to minimize casualties flies in the face of historical record, and the inability to conduct forcible entry operations not only simplifies enemy’s planning, it may lead to a protracted campaign with even greater friendly force casualties. Historians will confirm that with the exception of the landings at Inchon, commanders have done precisely as General Vandergrift suggested: major amphibious operations since Gallipoli were directed against the weakest sections of enemy defenses, although even “weak sectors” could prove to be very challenging. Note that allied losses in the WWII landings at the five Normandy invasion beaches were insignificant compared to the casualties incurred in subsequent combat operations (1).

Perfection of Anti-access/Area-denial technologies (submarines, mines, long range strike aircraft, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles) are the principal threat to forcible entry operations; but what is seldom appreciated is that these defenses can be applied not only to the enemy’s territory, but projected across border to the harbors and airports in neighboring nations, calling into question the idea that these defenses can be bypassed.

Consider a friendly defensive scenario from the point of view of India. Using its Agni I ballistic missiles (2), India can strike potential invaders not only along its coastline, but also any forces attempting to use airfields or harbors in neighboring Pakistan or Bangladesh. India also has the ability to deliver sea or land mines by aircraft or rocket, as well as a submarine force. Any potential invader must consider the implications of Anti-access/Area-denial, as demonstrated in the following graphic.

Map of India: Defensive Implications of the Medium Range Agni I Missile

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA): http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IND, annotations by author

This should serve as a reminder that a competent enemy will not oblige us by fighting according to our theorems, timetables, and wishes, but will seek to prevent us to build up substantial forces ashore. It is naïve to assume that there will always be a neighboring friendly ally willing to allow the use of their ports, and airports. Even if sympathetic, an ally may be unwilling to risk the political, economic, and military consequences of allowing the use of its harbors and airspace. The “so what” implication of this is that mines, long range strike aircraft, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles and supporting ISR networks will have to be destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed prior to the introduction, or reinforcement of forces into theater.

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(1) The Normandy landings cost the allies an estimated 10,000 casualties; the Normandy campaign, 5 June 1944 through 1 September 1944, cost the allies approximately 225,000 casualties. German casualty estimates range from 400,000 to 530,000 men, most lost in the breakout and encirclement of the German Army Group B in the Falaise Pocket leading the collapse of German defenses in France.

(2) The Agni-I is capable of delivering a conventional payload of one (1) metric ton to a distance of approximately 600 nautical miles. India has further developed its ballistic missile forces.

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"Mr. Bustamante is a retired naval officer who served the majority of his career as a Naval Special Warfare Officer and also is held Surface Warfare Officer and Foreign Area Officer designators.  He is a graduate of the  U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering.  He also holds a Master of Science degree in Defense Analysis (Operations Research) from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and numerous service schools. After retiring from the Navy, Mr. Bustamante worked for the legislative branch, as a civil servant with the United States Depart of State, and in the private sector as an analyst in information technology project management."

Credibility - Not All Reports Are Created Equal

ComNavOps happened to read a comment posted on another blog in which the reader accused critics of the F-35 of only giving credence to other critics and ignoring positive reports even from presumably knowledgeable sources like pilots who had actually flown the aircraft.  It made me reflect that, yes, there is a natural human tendency to do that.  We form an opinion and then tend to cherry pick the data and reports that support that opinion.

The thought made me reflect on my own tendencies and, to be honest, I do that the same as anyone else, to a degree, although I try very hard to stay objective and give equal weight to the good and bad reports about any particular subject.  Anyway, that would have been the end of the matter – a mental reminder to myself to stay objective – except that I then happened to read two articles in the most recent issue of Proceedings which illustrated and reminded me why I don’t always give equal weight to both good and bad reports.  It’s because not all reports are created equal.  Not all reports are objective.  Not all reports are fact and logic based.  All reports have an agenda.  Recognizing that, I weight the reports according to the degree of objectivity evidenced in the report, the degree of bias revealed, the agenda of the author, etc.  Based on that assessment, I may accept the report at face value, I may reject the report utterly, or, more likely, I may weight the various points and factor them into my own opinion accordingly.

Here’s a simple example.  Early on, when criticism of the LCS was mounting and the Navy was desperate for some good PR to rebut the critics, they ran the ship’s Captains out and had them do interviews, articles, and reports.  Unsurprisingly, those interviews and reports were over-the-top positive, providing the impression that the LCS was exactly the miracle war machine the Navy claimed it was.  Well, by that point it was obvious to all that the LCS had serious problems and lots of them.  Thus, the Captain’s interviews and reports were clearly not objective – there was no hint of even the slightest negative - , they were clearly heavily biased, and the Captains and the Navy had an obvious agenda which precluded objectivity.  Therefore, I read the reports but largely dismissed them – not because I refused to listen to opinions that ran counter to my own but because the reports were not credible even though the source, the ship’s Captain, should have been nearly the ultimate authority on the subject.

Here’s another example near and dear to us.  The current Proceedings has an article by Col. Matthew Kelly, USMC, who claims to have flown “hundreds of hours” in the F-35.  There should be no more authoritative expert on the subject, right?  Well, the article spends several pages extolling the virtures (almost magical, according to his descriptions) of the aircraft and offers a single, vague sentence about unspecified hardware and software updates that are coming.  That’s the extent of the negatives in the article.  Given the litany of problems with this aircraft, that alone suggests a severe lack of objectivity by the author.  The author’s affiliation, the USMC, suggests an agenda and bias – the USMC declared IOC in what was clearly a public relations stunt after a hugely unsuccessful trial.  Thus, the author’s credibility and objectivity are seriously questionable.

The author describes how the F-35 will operate in teams of four to sweep the skies clear of enemy planes.  No credit is given to enemy capabilities, whatsoever.  The F-35 has stealth, data linking, off-boresight targeting, etc. which will utterly overwhelm the enemy.  Absolutely no attempt is made to explain how the enemy’s stealth, data links, and (superior?) off-boresight targeting will factor into this. 

In short, the article reads like a sales brochure. 

So, what did I take away from this article?  Not a thing.  The Marines trotted out a pilot to do a PR sales piece.  I rejected the article not because it differed from my own opinion but because it wasn’t credible. 

The second Proceedings article was about the Zumwalt and was written by the ship’s current Captain, James Kirk.  Again, the article reads like a sales brochure.  The ship apparently has no flaws except for an almost insignificant restriction in the heavy seas operating envelope.  Other than that, it’s clear from the article that a single Zumwalt can win any war by itself (so why did we build three, I wonder?).  The only question is whether the ship will need to leave dock to do it or if it can win the war from its home port.

While the article offers a few interesting factoids, it is clearly a PR piece and, again, I reject it as a basis for influencing my opinion.

Now, recognize that this works both ways.  I’ve read reports on the F-35 and LCS that were nothing but criticism and those are no more credible than the reverse.  A report that would have me believe that those platforms have not a single positive, redeeming characteristic is just as clearly biased and unbelievable as the reverse.

So, to respond to the original complaint by that far removed, unknown commenter, the reason why positive reports are often summarily dismissed is because they lack credibility.  I would also remind the commenter that supporters cherry pick their data as much or more than critics!

5 Years or You Didn't Know What You Wanted

ComNavOps so often hears comments to the effect that we can’t consider new weapons because it would take many years to produce a product and we’ve already spent too much time on the current version, however flawed, to start over.

Nothing could be further from the truth.  This kind of thinking is the result of having witnessed so many horribly mismanaged programs that we’ve come to believe that it’s normal.

The F-35 is the poster child for mismanaged programs.  Consider these time frames.

F-35 Lightning

RFP (Request for Proposal)            1996

Contract Award                                 2001

First Flight                                         2006

IOC                                                    pending

Squadron Service                             pending

That’s 10 years from RFP to first flight and 5 years from contract to first flight.  We’re still waiting, 20 years later for IOC (neglecting the Marines publicity stunt declaration of IOC) and it’s going to be a few more years before the Navy achieves IOC, yet.

By comparison, the F-14 Tomcat went from RFP to first flight in 2 years and IOC in 5 years, as shown below.

F-14 Tomcat

RFP (Request for Proposal)            1968

Contract Award                                 1969

First Flight                                         1970

IOC                                                    1973

Squadron Service                             1974

We can build a first rate aircraft in 5 years if we follow basic, common sense rules:

• No use of non-existent technology
• No change orders
• No initiation of production without full design documents
• No concurrency

If we do that, there’s no reason we can’t build a very good aircraft in 5 years, from start to full rate production.  If we can’t do that and we feel we have to change things as we go then we clearly didn’t know what we wanted in the first place.

Hand in hand with being able to build an aircraft in 5 years has to go penalties for failing to do so.  Here’s what needs to happen.

• Program managers must be assigned for the full 5 years to ensure accountability.

• Programs must be terminated after exactly 5 years if they have not reached full production.  No exceptions.  No extensions.  On the day after the 5 year anniversary, the program is automatically terminated regardless of how close the program managers claim it is (programs are always on the verge of completion – just ask the LCS or F-35).

• Production can only start with DOT&E’s approval.  This will prevent stunts like the Marine’s IOC for the F-35 even though the aircraft is in no way combat ready.

• If a program is terminated, the program managers must all be terminated from service and employment.  The only exception is if the program managers themselves recommend early program termination prior to the start of the 4^th year.  If you don’t know within 3 years whether the program is viable then you shouldn’t be a program manager.

• Successful program managers should receive major financial rewards.

The preceding must be Congressionally mandated – it must be law.

There you have it.  That’s how to prevent LCS/Ford/F-35 program failures and ensure timely introductions of new platforms.  If we can’t produce a new platform in 5 years then we didn’t really know what we wanted in the first place.

It’s a simple system.  Most great ideas are.

CUSV for LCS MCM

Well, here’s one that somehow slipped by me.  Textron’s Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) has been selected to tow the unmanned influence sweep system (minesweeping) for the LCS MCM module.  The CUSV is an 11 meter unmanned surface craft.  It has self-righting capability, a draft of a little over 2 ft, data links, remote operator control station, max speed of 28 kts, 24 hr endurance, 1200 nm cruising range, can operate up to sea state 4, and can tow 5000 lb at 10 kts.  The payload bay is 14 ft x 6 ft x 3.5 ft.

Textron has a $34M contract to provide a CUSV for the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS).

This sounds like a nice little craft for the minesweeping task other than the potentially slow speed and questionable towing capacity.  As a point of reference, the standard helo-towed Mk105 minesweeping sled weighs around 9000 lbs fueled and operational.  Given the manufacturer’s claim of being able to tow 5000 lb at 10 kts, the 9000 lb Mk105 would most likely be beyond the ability of the CUSV to tow.  I’ve been unable to find a detailed description or specs on the UISS so I don’t know the weight of the equipment.

CUSV - Enough Power To Tow?

I would desperately like to believe that someone in the Navy looked at the CUSV towing capacity before committing to this but we all recall the fiasco of the original Seahawk type helo being found unable to safely tow its intended MCM equipment.  Is this another example of that?  Until someone tells me that this craft can actually tow the UISS, I’m going to remain nervous about this.

So, this is a nice little craft that may or may not be suitable for the task.  Of course, there’s also the issue of whether it can actually meet its specs.  We’ve seen that the MCM module has nice specs but the equipment can’t meet the specs despite years of development.

I’ll keep an eye on this.

Operational Maneuver From The Sea

One of the serious problems with current military thought is that far too many concepts are being accepted with little rigorous examination to validate the ideas.  For example, "littoral" was accepted with no discussion - instead, discussion leaped straight to implementation.  Most recently, the third offset strategy has been christened with no rigorous analysis, simply a statement of faith that it will work.

With that in mind, let's take a look at Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and attempt to analyze it.

Whatever the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) means to proponents today, it seems that it differs from the intent of the original concept both in theory and practice.  Let’s take a closer look at OMFTS.

The original document, authored by Gen. Krulak in 1996, is focused on a better method of conducting littoral warfare (1).  It is vital to understand that the document defines “littoral” as meaning both the water and the land as opposed to our use of littoral today which has come to mean the shallow waters near land.  OMFTS sees the land and water as one and the same – areas that are interchangeably used to conduct maneuvers aimed at a single operational objective.  This is a point of semantics, in a sense, but a key one to keep in mind when evaluating OMFTS.

The next key point to understand is that OMFTS is conceived as a means of forcible entry.  It is a method to conduct opposed landings and it is assumed that the landings will be opposed.  Too many people today believe that OMFTS is a magical means of conducting unopposed landings by going ashore where there is no enemy and the enemy has no reach.  OMFTS makes clear that nothing could be further from the truth.

“The heart of Operational Maneuver from the Sea is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bid for victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemy weakness in order to deal a decisive blow. Mere movement, which may lead to indecisive results or even be counterproductive, does not qualify as operational maneuver.  That is to say, operational maneuver should be directed against an enemy center of gravity—something that is essential to the enemy's ability to effectively continue the struggle.”

Thus, we see that OMFTS is directed at a significant enemy strength, a center of gravity.  By definition, that point will be heavily defended.  As the document states, merely landing forces at some far distant point just because it was safe to do so does not constitute OMFTS.  OMFTS must strike a significant target.  Of course, if forces can be landed away from enemy response and then move to the desired objective, that would be perfectly acceptable.  The problem with that is that by landing so far away the logistics tail will become enormous and vulnerable.  Further, the force will still have to fight its way to the significant objective in the face of steadily increasing enemy resistance and having given away any element of surprise by landing so far away.

Having set the stage for a description of OMFTS, the document then describes the single biggest assumption which provides the foundation for the entire concept:  OMFTS will succeed because the need for the traditional build up of a supply dump ashore will be bypassed.  This is not only the key to the concept but also its biggest weakness.

“For most of the 20th century, the usefulness of sea-based logistics was limited by the voracious appetite of modern landing forces for such items as fuel, large caliber ammunition, and aviation ordnance. As a result, the options available to landing forces were greatly reduced by the need to establish, protect, and make use of supply dumps.  Concerted efforts were delayed and opportunities for decisive action missed while the necessary supplies accumulated on shore.

In the near future, improvements in the precision of long-range weapons, greater reliance on sea-based fire support, and, quite possibly, a decrease in the fuel requirements of military land vehicles promise to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the need to establish supply facilities ashore. As a result, the logistics tail of landing forces will be smaller, ship-to-shore movement will take less time, and what were previously known as "subsequent operations ashore" will be able to start without the traditional "build up phase." In other words, landing forces will move directly from their ships to their objectives, whether those objectives are located on the shoreline or far inland.

The significant reduction of logistics infrastructure ashore will also facilitate the rapid re-embarkation of the landing force”

This is clearly the key to OMFTS – the ability to operate without shore based supply dumps.  The needed supplies are envisioned as flowing directly from the supply ships to the troops.

Of course, this is tantamount to stating that in the future we’ll eliminate the traffic congestion in cities by moving the commuters directly from their homes to their destinations without needing to use cars and roads.  The concept is good, the technology is non-existent.

How do we get the supplies directly from the ships to the troops?  The document offers no solution other than foreseeing an, apparently, hugely reduced requirement for supplies due to precision weapons, sea based fire support, and a decrease in fuel requirements of land vehicles.  This is both optimistic, bordering on fantasy, and ignorant.

The optimistic aspect is clear.  Not only have today’s land vehicles not reduced their need for fuel, the need has increased as vehicles have become larger and heavier.

The ignorant (I use the word in its clinical, not emotional, sense) aspect is that munitions make up only a small portion of the needed supplies.  Any reduction in the number of munitions due to precision guidance is swamped by the need for food, water, fuel, parts, etc.  The “dump” requirements aren’t going to be eliminated or even significantly reduced just because we need a few less munitions.  Also, the vast bulk of munitions is probably unguided bullets, bombs, and rockets.  The number of precision guided weapons employed by troops on the ground is limited.  While an argument can be made that aircraft have reduced their munitions requirement due to guided weapons, the same does not hold for ground troops.

Sea based fire support is another aspect that has proven problematic.  The Navy’s doctrine is to stand 50+ miles offshore – well beyond the range of any naval gun.  Further, the explosive effects of 5” guns are minimal even if the Navy were willing to stand inshore.  Finally, the number of 5” guns in the fleet is woefully inadequate for the task of fire support.  Consider the number of naval guns used in a WWII amphibious assault.  A single Fletcher class destroyer had almost as many guns as an entire modern amphibious assault force would have!

The net result of this ambitious concept is that the enemy will be stunned into inactivity.

“When combined with a command and control system oriented towards rapid decision-making at all levels of command, the additional speed and flexibility offered by these new techniques translates into a high tempo of operations. Vulnerabilities can be exploited before they are reduced, opportunities seized before  they vanish, and traps sprung before they are discovered. In short, we will be able to act so quickly that the enemy will not be able to react effectively until it is too late.”

Again, this is an example of the type of one-sided thinking that pervades military thought today.  Everything we do will work flawlessly and nothing the enemy does will have any effect on us.  With that assumption, every concept sounds good!

One final shortcoming in this concept is that it ignores the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities of the enemy.  The assumption in the concept is that we will have complete freedom of maneuver throughout the littoral waters.  Admittedly, this is a document geared towards land combat and the author can be forgiven, to a slight degree, for leaving the naval and A2/AD issues to the Navy.  However, the author recognizes that the land and sea issues are linked as a fundamental pillar of OMFTS and yet fails to address it.

Today, OMFTS has morphed into some kind of aviation assault concept accepted as utterly valid by its proponents without any critical examination – examination which reveals foundational flaws!

OMFTS has some aspects that are worth further contemplation but the foundations of the concept are flawed.  The reduction in logistical supply necessary to realize the concept is unattainable, bordering on fantasy.  The ability to instantaneously transport those supplies that are needed directly into the laps of the ground troops is glossed over.  The shortcomings created by assuming away ground based fire support are hand wavingly reduced to a Navy issue that is not recognized for the problem it is.  The lack of acknowledgement of the enemy’s capabilities is stunning.

As a preliminary concept, all of these flaws are acceptable.  The concept can be exercised and shortcomings solved – or the concept can be found to be unrealistic and dropped.  The problem is that OMFTS has been seized by proponents as proven gospel despite the lack of any rigorous examination. 

The real danger from this is that implementation of the concept leads to an assault force that is woefully inadequate for the task if the concept proves flawed in practice.  Implementation will hamstring our proven (though currently badly lacking) assault capability for the promise of a fantasy operation.

(1)“Operational Maneuver From The Sea”, General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCCP%201%20Operational%20Maneuver%20from%20the%20Sea.pdf