Helo Assault

We often discuss amphibious assault problems and one of the common rationalizations for those shortcomings is the notion that we’ll use helos to conduct all or portions of the assault landings.  This kind of vertical assault is deemed by its supporters to be fast, stealthy, powerful, and “safe”.  I say “safe” because no one who discusses helo assaults ever includes a factual and logical assessment of helo survivability on the modern battlefield.  Well, with that lead in, you know we’re going to look at it.  

Far and away, the best historical record is the Viet Nam war.  The US had undisputed control of the air, at least in areas where helo operations took place, and faced an enemy with no practical radar or electronic detection capabilities that applied to helos.  US helos could roam the skies unhindered.  Indeed, helo insertions were a common tactic.  So, what were the helo losses in Viet Nam?  1%?  5%?  Surely not much more than that.

From the Viet Nam Helicopter Pilot’s Association website comes this statement (1).

“Total helicopters destroyed in the Vietnam War was 5,086 out of 11,827.”

That’s a 43% loss rate.

From that same site come the following statistics for the UH-1 family of helos.

          Served    Destroyed

UH-1         80         80

UH-1A         8          1

UH-1B       729         376

UH-1C       696         415

UH-1D     1,926       1,028

UH-1E       156         100

UH-1F        31         18

UH-1H     3,375       1,285

UH-1L         2          0

UH-1M         5          0

UH-1N         2          2  

UH-1P         3          0

Total     7,013       3,305

That’s a 47% loss rate for UH-1’s.

Now, let’s bear in mind that those loss rates are not for one-time missions.  Helos flew repeated missions.  The loss rate for a single mission might be acceptably low but it adds up over time.  Note, though, that that’s exactly what we’re talking about in an aviation assault.  A helo or MV-22 will conduct multiple flights over the course of an operation.  That acceptable 5% loss rate for a single sortie becomes 23% for five sorties and 40% for ten.

The next best historical example might be the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan.  I’m unaware of any data for that conflict but, anecdotally, the helo losses were staggering.

So, how do these examples and data inform our discussion of helo-borne assaults?

The obvious conclusion is that helos have a significant loss rate over the battlefield.  They are not inherently a highly survivable platform.  Low tech forces have enjoyed great success against helos.  The combination of shoulder launched SAMs and simple guns are a lethal and nearly undetectable counter to helos.  As we discuss helo assaults, we need to factor significant losses into the discussion – more so against a high tech, capable, disciplined peer.

We also need to bear in mind that the loss rate has a double effect.  The effect of losses during the assault (initial landing), itself, are obvious.  We need to remember, however, that every helo lost impacts the subsequent sustainment portion of the assault for the entire duration of the operation.  Those troops that were inserted need continuous resupply and support and every helo loss has a cascading effect on sustainment.

OK, that much is straightforward, if sobering.  Is there more to this?

Yes.  What is never discussed are the helo numbers that are available for vertical assaults and sustainment.  Look at the number of helos in an Amphibious Ready Group (MEU).

For a typical ARG based on 1 America class LHA, 1 LPD-17 class, and 1 LSD, the vertical aviation component consists of around

• 12 MV-22
• 4 CH-53K
• 6 attack helos

There you go.  That’s 16 transport aircraft for an entire MEU.  Factor in losses and you can see that both the assault itself and the sustainment will be severely impacted.  Remember that losses don’t have to be combat related.  Helos and the MV-22 are notoriously unreliable and maintenance intensive.  Why do you think that every helo assault since President Carter’s disastrous hostage rescue attempt has included spare helos?  It’s not because of their reputation for utter reliability!  Where are the spare helos in the MEU?

We need to recognize that the Marines are sorely lacking in amphibious assault waterborne transport capability and no amount of rationalizing a vertical assault element will make up for that.  The 16 vertical aviation transports of a MEU will suffer heavy losses in an opposed assault and we must factor that into our discussions.  Helos can and will be useful in an amphibious assault but their vulnerability and limited numbers mean they are not a viable option as the main or even important means for conducting an opposed assault against a peer.  The limit of their assault capability is a light raid in an almost unopposed scenario.

Helo assault is not the answer.

(1) Viet Nam Helicopter Pilot's Association,

http://www.vhpa.org/heliloss.pdf

Congress vs. Navy

Breaking Defense website has an article about the Navy’s ongoing battle with Congress over the early retirement of Aegis cruisers (1).  You’ll recall that the Navy attempted to retire several cruisers a couple of years ago, well before their service life was reached.  Presumably, they wanted to free up funds and build a foundation of justification to build new Burke Flt IIIs.  You know, along the lines of, “We have to have more Flt IIIs because we don’t have enough Aegis AAW command cruisers.” – conveniently omitting the fact that the reason they don’t have enough is because they retired the most powerful ships on the planet well ahead of the end of their service life!

In any event, Congress balked at the attempt and directed the Navy to retain the cruisers.

The Navy, undaunted by Congressional mandate, came up with the thinly veiled stratagem of “idling” 11 cruisers (half the cruiser force) for a leisurely eleven year “modernization”.  No one, including Congress, believed that.  The cruisers, once idled, would never be seen again.  Congress responded to this end-around by mandating that only a few cruisers at a time could enter modernization and that the work had to be completed within a four year period of time.  This was the 2/4/6 plan whereby only two cruisers per year could enter modernization, the work had to be completed in four years, and only six cruisers could be in modernization at one time.

The latest development in this saga has Congress modifying the 2/4/6 plan to a 2/2/6 plan in which the modernization work must be completed in two years rather than four.  This seems perfectly reasonable.  Two years is plenty of time to modernize a ship if the Navy is actually serious about the effort and not just trying to use modernization as a back door retirement.

The problem, which has been discussed numerous times in this blog, is that the Navy has no credibility with Congress.  From the website’s article interviewing Randy Forbes, House Seapower Subcommittee Chairman,

“They really don’t want to do the modernization,” Forbes told me. “What the Navy really wants to do is what they did from day one: They want to take seven of these cruisers out of commission and destroy them.”

As evidence, Forbes points out that the Navy has not budgeted the money for modernization.  They're ready and eager to take the ships out of service but have yet to request modernization money.

“They have no credibility,” Forbes said. “They’ve got to show where they’ve put some money to do it.”

There are two points to get from this article.

1.    The Navy is not respecting Congress’ wishes.  Whether they agree with Congress or not, they are duty bound to obey their directives.  The Navy is displaying utter disrespect and contempt for Congress.

2.    Congress seems to have a much better grasp of naval force requirements than the Navy does.

We’ve previously covered the first point so let’s address that second one. 

Now, no one is claiming that Congress is a model of organizational wisdom and efficiency, quite the opposite, in fact.  However, of late, they are head and shoulders above the Navy and the military in general.

While the Navy is publicly bemoaning the shrinking fleet size (while simultaneously proclaiming that they are on path towards a 300+ ship fleet ?!), they are actually early retiring ships left and right.  The entire Tarawa class was early retired.  The Perrys were retired rather than upgraded.  They attempted to retire half the Aegis cruiser fleet, the most powerful surface combatants in the world.  A couple of auxiliaries, the lifeblood of the fleet, are being early retired with no replacement.  And so on.  Now, most of us would logically conclude that if the Navy deems a 300+ ship fleet important, that early retiring highly effective ships with plenty of lifetime left is foolish and illogical.  Thus, Congress is stepping in and providing some much needed logical oversight.  The same applies to the Air Force’s ill-considered attempt to retire the A-10 in order to fund F-35s.  Of course, we’ve already debunked that logic!

Congress was also the reason why the Navy was forced to stop the original LCS program and come up with a new frigate.  Of course, the Navy once again backdoored Congress with the slightly upgraded LCS that is now designated as a frigate – fooling no one.

What does it say about Navy leadership when Congress is exhibiting more wisdom than the Navy?!  It is rare that I can say this but, well done Congress.  Keep exercising your oversight responsibilities and hold the Navy to account.

(1)Breaking Defense, “Randy Forbes: Navy Has ‘No Credibility’ On Cruisers”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., May 01, 2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/randy-forbes-navy-has-no-credibility-on-cruisers/

Not Deterred In The Least

By now, you’re undoubtedly aware that Iran has seized a Marshall Islands flagged merchant ship (1).  The reason is unclear although it seems to ComNavOps that it is in retaliation for the US using a carrier group to turn back the Iranian convoy bound for Yemen.

The rationale for the action doesn’t matter.  What matters is the US’ nearly non-existent response to the seizure of a US protected vessel.  The Navy is doing nothing more than monitoring.

“In response to the taking of the ship on Tuesday by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy patrol boats, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has ordered a Navy guided missile destroyer and three Cyclone-class patrol craft to monitor the situation.

…

Marshall Islands is an American protectorate and the U.S. is responsible for its defense and the defense of vessels under its flag.”

Navy supporters continually make the argument that forward presence is required to deter potential enemies.  However, time and time again, the Navy (and US military, generally) stands aside as unfriendly countries abuse the boundaries of acceptable behavior right up to, and including, acts of war.  We have allowed the force-down and seizure of electronic surveillance aircraft and ships, harassment of US forces, and many other acts constituting war.

The point of this post is not to debate responses but to point out that if we are completely unwilling to use military force to respond to these incidents then there is no point and no justification for maintaining those forces forward deployed.  They aren’t deterring anyone.

The Navy can’t have it both ways.  If they want to make a case for a given force level based on forward deployment and deterrence then they have to use the forces for that purpose.  If they have no intention of using the forces then they don’t need the forces and certainly don’t need them forward deployed.  A strongly worded letter is just as effective as unused force.

(1)USNI, “Pentagon Unclear Why Iran Seized Maersk Tigris; U.S. Destroyer, 3 Patrol Craft Nearby”, Sam LaGrone, April 29, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/04/29/pentagon-unclear-why-iran-seized-maersk-tigris-u-s-destroyer-3-patrol-craft-nearby

Short Legs

Reader “Nick” pointed out some interesting data on the LCS operating range that is worth repeating as a post. Thanks “Nick”!

As reported in the DOT&E 2014 Annual Report, the LCS-1 variant failed to meet its endurance/range requirements by a substantial amount.

“During operational testing, LCS 3 did not demonstrate that it could achieve the Navy requirement for fuel endurance (operating range) at the prescribed transit speed or at sprint speed. ... Based on fuel consumption data collected during the test, the ship’s operating range at 14.4 knots is estimated to be approximately 1,961 nautical miles (Navy requirement: 3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots) and the operating range at 43.6 knots is approximately 855 nautical miles (Navy requirement: 1,000 nautical miles at 40 knots). … The shortfall in endurance may limit the flexibility of the ship’s operations in the Pacific and place a heavier than anticipated demand on fleet logistics.”

We’ve previously noted that the speed requirements have been steadily downgraded and now the endurance/range are also being downgraded on top of previous downgrades to range!  This severely limits the usefulness of the class.  

Given that the LCS is planned to make up a third of the Navy’s combat fleet (setting aside the nearly non-existent combat capability of the class), it should be a bit disconcerting that a third of the fleet won’t be able to venture far from their bases.

Honestly, this is an embarrassment for a blue-water, global navy.

LCS Operating Costs - Follow Up

Here’s a follow up note about the LCS operating costs.  The LCS was sold, in large part, as a lower operating cost vessel whose operating concept would establish the pattern for future ship classes of all types.  The crew would be minimal.  Maintenance would not be performed at sea but would be deferred to, and performed by, shore support groups.  Multiple crews (similar to Blue/Gold of SSBNs but on a 3 crews for every 2 ships ratio) would maximize underway time.  Ships would be forward deployed.  And so on.

All of this was supposed to minimize operating costs.  The main impact in minimizing costs was, presumably, the greatly reduced crew size given that the Navy claims that personnel costs are the biggest contributor to operating costs.  As we saw in the previous post (see, "LCS Operating Costs and Lessons Learned"), that has not turned out to be the case.  The issue we want to address today is not whether the original operating cost estimates turned out to be inaccurate but whether the original estimates were ever even remotely realistic.

Smaller crew size means smaller operating costs.  Seems straightforward, right?  But was it?  Setting aside the issue of core crew size, which everyone but the Navy knew on Day One was ridiculously undersized, there is a bigger issue.  The twin concepts of reduced manning and multiple crews per ship meant that the personnel costs were going to be bigger than simply adding up the core crew size costs.  With the new core crew size of around 50 and the 3:2 crew:ship ratio, that means that the Navy is maintaining 150 crew for each pair of ships or an average of 75 crew per ship.  Throw in a helo detachment and the module specialists and the average crew size increases to around 110-120.

On top of that are the mandatory shore maintenance personnel.  We don’t know exactly how many of those there will be but we’ve seen that the manning has already tripled over the original estimates, to 862 according to the Navy.  Averaged over the initial buy of 32 LCS, that adds an additional 27 crew per ship. 

Added to that are the contractor personnel that are dedicated to the LCS.  The Navy used teams of 30-70 for Freedom’s Singapore trip.  If all 32 LCSs are putting into port every couple weeks for routine, scheduled maintenance, that’s going to require a LOT of contractors.  They, too, have to be accounted for in the operating costs – say, the equivalent of an additional 20 crew per ship.

If you add the total crew and crew equivalents you get an average crew size of somewhere around 165.  That’s around the Perry class crew size.  Is it really that surprising that operating a Perry size vessel requires a Perry size crew?

Rolling In Hot

Breaking Defense website has a report on a Close Air Support (CAS) summit sponsored by the Air Force (1).  There were a few nuggets of information that reveal just how little interest the AF has in CAS.

"Carlisle [ed. Gen. Hawk Carlisle, head of Air Force Air Combat Command] told us “gaps” were spotted in training and to, some degree, in future equipment.

The biggest gap in Close Air Support right now, Carlisle told reporters, is the training CAS pilots currently have to operate in what the Air Force nicely calls “contested environments” — places where the enemy has a decent chance of shooting you down."

"Pilots have operated in uncontested environments over the last 13 years and haven’t had time to train for high-end operations, the general said."

The biggest gap in AF CAS is training for contested environments!?  Isn’t that kind of what CAS is all about – providing direct air support to ground forces at the front edge of the battlefield in what is, almost by definition, a contested environment?  That the AF is not providing that training pretty well indicates their level of commitment, or lack thereof, to CAS.  However, beating up on the AF about their lack of commitment to CAS, which has been a poorly kept secret for many years, is not the point of this post.  We’ll move on.

"... the three versions of the F-35 will, Carlisle noted, be the main CAS weapons operating in hot environments."

The F-35 is not even remotely an optimal platform for CAS.  That’s not even a debatable point and, again, that’s not the point of this post. 

Instead, for the sake of discussion, let’s accept the use of the F-35 in the CAS role.  What I want to look at is the F-35’s ability to provide gun support in CAS. 

What we currently have, in the A-10, is the GAU-8 30 mm Avenger rotary gun which carries and fires up to 1350 rounds of depleted uranium armor piercing shells at a rate of 3900 rounds per minute.  The gun is installed at a slight downward angle to assist in strafing runs.  Contrast that to the F-35’s gun system, the 25 mm, four barrel, 3300 round per minute, rotary GAU-22/A.

The A-10 projectiles weigh 13.3-14.0 oz, depending on type.  The F-35 projectiles weigh 6.5-7.5 oz.

The A-10 carries up to 1350 rounds compared to the F-35A which carries 182 rounds.  The F-35B/C do not have an internal gun.  They carry the gun in an external pod with a capacity of 220 rounds.  Of course, the external pod impacts the aircraft’s stealth.

So, we see that the A-10 has a larger gun with around 5 times the ammo capacity, firing depleted uranium shells that are twice the weight, from a gun that is mounted and optimized for ground attack, compared to the F-35 whose gun is, literally, an afterthought add-on for the Marines and Navy.  Anyone claiming that the F-35 is capable of performing the CAS role is playing loose with the facts.  The F-35 is capable of performing the gun support portion of the CAS role only in the sense that it has a gun that can be pointed at the ground.  In no other way is it capable or effective.  A man shooting a handgun from a glider can be claimed to perform CAS, too, I guess.

Of course, there is much, much more to CAS than just the ability to fire a gun at the ground.  There is also much more to it than just the characteristics of the CAS platform.  Training is paramount.  The understanding of ground force strategy and tactics, the understanding of where, when, and how to best support ground forces, the ability to effectively interface with ground controllers, knowledge of the local terrain, understanding of enemy forces and their movement, and so on are as important or more so than the weapon characteristics of a given platform.  There are also many more CAS weapons than just a gun and we won’t examine those today.

Today’s post simply points out the inadequacy of the F-35 gun system when used for CAS when compared to the A-10.  Combine that with the AF’s acknowledged lack of training and it’s obvious that anyone claiming the F-35 will adequately fill the CAS role is kidding themselves and their audience.

 (1) Breaking Defense, "Close Air Support Summit Sparks Nod To Textron’s Scorpion", Colin Clark,  March 09, 2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/close-air-support-summit-sparks-nod-to-textrons-scorpion/

Surface Warfare Perfect Storm

USNI website has an interesting article about the size of the future surface warfare fleet.

“Rapid growth in the capability and quality of guided missiles — mostly Chinese in origin — is causing the U.S. Navy to rethink the number of surface ships it needs to effectively fight a high-end war.”

“Early estimates based [on] ongoing war games could mean the current number of 88 large surface combatants — the Navy’s fleet of guided missile destroyers and cruisers — needs to grow to more than a hundred into the 2020s just to keep to today’s current level of risk, USNI News has learned.”

From 88 ships to more than a hundred?!  As you digest that, consider that we’ve documented the steady decline in combat fleet size and the coming shortfall in destroyers as retirements outpace new construction.  We’ve also discussed the extremely unwise decision to forego maintenance and upgrades.

This is all very disturbing but we’ve already covered it and warned about the shortfall.  So, what’s the point of this post?  Well, the article touches on some interesting implications.

For instance, the article states that the existing requirement for 88 surface vessels is based on, among other factors, a requirement to provide 5 major surface combatants as escorts for each carrier group.  However, the new requirement places the escort number at 7 or 8 per carrier group.  OK, again, aside from not having that number available, what’s the point?  The point goes back to one we’ve previously addressed which is tactics and training.  Carrier groups currently deploy with 2 or 3 escorts.  If we intend to fight with 5-8, where and how are our commanders learning to tactically handle a group that is 2-3 times larger than what we routinely deploy with?  We have Admirals who have never commanded or tactically exercised the size group that they would fight with.  This is not the way to prepare for combat!

Another interesting point that the article makes is the impact of the LCS on the major combatant force level.

“In addition, decisions to leave the two emerging Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variants without a significant AAW capability also stresses the cruiser and destroyer fleets, since the LCS could not then help protect non-combatant ships like oilers and logistics ships in an escort role …”

Thus, we see that the decision to continue producing the non-combat LCS and to add only very minimal improvements to the follow on “frigate LCS” have the consequence of requiring more Burkes.  Thus, the LCS, which was supposed to free up major combatants is actually tying down more Burkes conducting low end missions because the LCS is so impotent and ineffective.

Finally, the article documents the Navy’s decision to forego Burke upgrades that would allow the ships to conduct simultaneous BMD and AAW.  Thus, in many cases, it may require two Burkes to fill the role of a single upgraded one. 

“Planned upgrades that would allow destroyers to fight ballistic missiles and aircraft at the same time have been scaled back in some cases, requiring two less capable ships to do the mission of one upgraded destroyer.”

The prioritization and decision making of the Navy is mystifying, at best (that’s my polite way of saying incompetent).

Please read the linked article.  It’s well worth it.

The surface warfare perfect storm is coming and the Navy is ignoring it.

  

(1)http://news.usni.org/2015/04/21/global-guided-missile-expansion-forcing-u-s-navy-to-rethink-surface-fleet-size