The Congressional UCLASS

It’s not often that ComNavOps praises or defends Navy leadership but this is one of those moments.  I’ve posted that the Navy’s UAV/UCLASS/UCAV program is an example of a well run program (see, "The Navy's Best Run Program").  It is proceeding in reasonable steps which are providing progress and cost restraint simultaneously.  The program has not given in to PowerPoint hype and run-amok technology insertion.  The Navy has recently initiated the process of requesting proposals from industry for the next step in UCLASS development which will focus on surveillance (ISR) capabilities.  Unfortunately, this reasonable step has met with resistance from a Congress that appears to want a do-everything, stealthy, deep penetration strike UCLASS (Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike).

Rather than continue to develop the UCLASS in measured steps while exercising fiscal restraint and responsibility, Congress wants the Navy to once again try to leap a generation of technology.  You’ll recall that previous attempts to leap generations have given us the LCS, JSF, and Ford among other notable failures.

DoD Buzz website posted an article on the subject and summed the controversy up,

“The thrust of the debate centers around [whether] the platform can adapt over time or whether features like stealth and electronic attack need to be engineered into the original design at from the start. Forbes (ed.: Rep. Randy Forbes, chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the HASC) wants those capabilities from the beginning even though it will increase the drone’s initial price tag.”

Forbes recognizes the impact on cost of trying to leap ahead and yet wants to do it anyway.  History tells us with absolute certainty that such an effort will derail the steady progress of the program and result in a bloated, failed platform mired in cost overruns and schedule delays.

The subcommittee does raise one noteworthy point.  Language from the budget markup of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Randy Forbes states,

“The disproportionate emphasis in the requirements on unrefueled endurance to enable continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the carrier strike group, a capability need presumably satisfied by the planned acquisition of 68 MQ-4C Tritons ..."

There is a bit of an apparent duplication at work.  The two unmanned systems would seem to be filling the same niche.  Not having seen an operational concept for either of the systems I can’t evaluate the apparent duplication.  Perhaps they’re going to perform similar but different roles.  On the other hand, the Navy’s history of questionable decision making doesn’t exactly rule out a complete and unnecessary duplication!  A third alternative is that the Navy views the requested UCLASS as simply a developmental step intended to prove out integration in an air wing while still getting a degree of usefulness out of the aircraft.  If so, that would be a perfectly reasonable approach.  I haven’t seen any indication of the quantity of UCLASS aircraft the Navy wants.  If they only want a few, that would suggest they view it as a developmental step.  If they want dozens, that would suggest they view it as a finished product and would legitimize the duplication question.

The article goes on to state,

“While not willing to comment publicly on plans for stealth or low-observability for UCLASS, Navy program officials have consistently maintained that the program’s requirements do call for a weaponized strike platform as well as an ISR vehicle.  However, the weapons capability is something that is described as incremental, meaning it will be engineered into the platform over time, Navy officials explained.”

Again, this type of incremental approach is perfectly reasonable and ComNavOps just recently stated that the JSF should have been developed this way (see, "F/A-18 Hornet - An Evolultionary JSF?").

As I’ve stated before, the UCLASS program is a rare example of a well run program.  I would hate to see it become the flying LCS with lots of unattainable technology crammed in for no good reason.  Let’s be realistic.  UAVs are crashing constantly.  They’re not exactly a finished product, yet.  We don’t know what the real world difficulties of trying to operate UAVs over extremely long distances in an electromagnetically challenged environment are.  We don’t know what the real world difficulties of trying to operate an unmanned aircraft in and around a carrier are.  It would be foolish and fiscally unwise to attempt to leap ahead as Congress wants.  We need to walk for a while before we attempt an all-out sprint.  The Navy should bring a few UCLASS aircraft into an airwing and gain some operational experience and understand the technological difficulties before committing to the B-2 bomber version of UCLASS. 

Let’s not repeat the LCS fiasco.  Hold your ground, Navy.  ComNavOps stands with you on this one.

(1) http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/07/10/pentagon-reviews-uclass-strike-capabilities/, DoD Buzz, Kris Osborn, "Pentagon Reviews UCLASS Strike Capabilities", 10-July-2014

DoN Transformation Plan

I recently wrote a humor piece that mocked the priorities of the Navy by placing all the non-warfighting requirements at the top of the list.  Well, darn if the Navy didn’t just come out with their own actual list that reads almost the same as my comedy one!  From the Department of the Navy, Transformation Plan, 2014-2016, here is the list of official DoN priorities.

1. Take care of our people

2. Maximize warfighter readiness

3. Lead the nation in sustainable energy

4. Promote acquisition excellence and integrity

5. Proliferate unmanned systems

6. Drive innovative enterprise transformation

Taking care of our people is laudable but it shouldn’t be the Navy’s top priority.  Warfighting is, because that’s the Navy’s reason for existence.  It’s as simple as that. 

Well, hey, you say, at least warfighting is number two.  Unfortunately, if you read the explanation in the document, maximizing warfighter readiness is actually about sizing the fleet rather than combat training, tactics, or any other actual warfighting activity.

The number three priority is to lead the nation in sustainable energy?!  Are you kidding me?!  In what alternate universe is leading the nation in energy development one of the Navy’s responsibilities let alone a top priority? 

Did you catch number five?  Proliferate unmanned systems.  The explanation states that the Navy will proliferate unmanned systems across all areas, responsibilities, and activities.  You’ll note that there is no caveat like “if it makes sense” or “if it actually enhances combat effectiveness”.  Nope, we’re going to do it regardless;  just because.

Finally, here’s a paragraph from the summary section.

“The FY14-16 DON Transformation Plan translates the Secretary of the Navy’s strategic guidance into a blueprint for the entire department to follow. Changing culture, wider use of analytics, and effective governance will enable the department to transform business operations and to reform the institution so we continue to provide the nation a vital service through global naval presence.”

Not a single word about warfighting.

This sounds an awful lot like one of my comedy offerings but it’s not.  That’s sad beyond belief.  The incompetence that this document codifies is staggering.  I weep for my Navy.

Modularity Versus Weapon Modules

Today’s post involves a simple conceptual clarification concerning the difference between modularity and weapon modules.  Too often, the two terms are used interchangeably when, in fact, they are completely separate concepts.

ComNavOps has gone on record numerous times about the fallacy of modularity (see, "Payloads Over Platforms" or "The Myth of Modularity").  However, a friend reminded ComNavOps about the concept of weapon modules.  In this context, perhaps a better word than “module” is “pit”.  A weapon pit is a standardized and designated space for a single weapon system that is built into the design of a ship at the outset.  During the course of the ship’s lifetime the weapons that fit that pit can be changed as weapons are upgraded or as weapon requirements change.  The pit, then, is limited to weapons.  Of course, there’s no inherent reason why a pit couldn’t be devoted to some other function – a sensor pit, for example.

The modular pit is typified by the Spruance class which was designed with pits that could be upgraded throughout the life of the class.  The MEKO family is another example.

ComNavOps is fully supportive of the modular pit concept although there is nothing that inherently requires such an approach.  While the ability to swap out what’s in the pit is an attractive capability on paper, the reality is that ships very rarely do so.  In fact, off the top of my head, I can’t recall an instance of any warship from any nation actually doing so.  There probably is an example somewhere but the frequency of occurrence is clearly very low.  In the USN, at least, the combination of early retirements and diversion of funding to new construction effectively precludes pit level upgrades.  Thus, pits are pointless.  On the other hand, they cost little to include in the design and have no significant impact on design, hence, my support or, at least, lack of objection.

In contrast, modularity, as the term is used now, refers to the ability to completely change the function of the carrying platform by changing the module.  The LCS is the obvious example of this in the USN.  This topic has been thoroughly covered so I won’t rehash it.

As I said, just a simple exercise in clarification of terminology. 

Idled Cruisers - Update

We’ve previously discussed the Navy’s plan to “idle” and “modernize” 11 of the 22 Aegis cruisers (see, “Idled Cruisers”).  ComNavOps suggested – no, he didn’t, he stated flat out – that the Navy had no intention of ever modernizing the cruisers.  They were being early retired by leaving them tied to the pier to rot until they’re too old to modernize.  Remember that the Navy had proposed retiring seven in the previous budget and that Congress had slapped them down and told them to keep the cruisers.  Well, what better way to bypass Congress and retire the cruisers then to “idle” and “modernize” them.  It keeps Congress happy, retires the cruisers in terms of operating costs, frees up money for new construction (which is, after all, the entire reason the Navy exists, right?), and, as an added bonus, allows the Navy to continue to count the retired cruisers as active ships in the fleet count – a PR win.  I’m sure the only regret the Navy has is that they didn’t think of this ploy earlier.  If they had, we’d have “idled” amphibious ships, frigates, and whatever else just waiting to be “modernized”.

Doesn’t it seem odd that the Navy thought the cruisers were so superfluous that they wanted to retire them and then, in the blink of an eye, now claim that they want to modernize them and extend their lives?  Doesn’t that strike you as just a bit suspicious?

Well, it appears that others are now catching on to this scheme.  Chris Cavas, at Navy Times, has posted an article that’s right up this alley (1).  Here’s a few quotes from the article,

“A level of discomfort — if not outright distrust — has been created as the service changed its original 2012 request to decommission seven cruisers under a spending reduction strategy to one where the Navy wants to keep them, but temporarily inactivate 11 its 22 Ticonderoga-class CGs under a modernization plan. Many on the Hill suspect that behind the rhetoric, there lurks a desire to save money by killing the ships.”

Cavas also recognizes that the Burkes, even in a Flt III version, are not a direct substitute for the Ticos.  He points out that the command and control functions associated with being the air warfare commander are not well supported on the Burkes.

“… the service announced its decision to put the air missile defense radar on standard DDG hulls, and the ships will be poorly suited to embark the extra staff and provide proper command and control facilities for the air warfare commander.”

Cavas appears equally as skeptical as ComNavOps about the Navy’s abrupt reversal on plans for the cruisers.  He cites an unnamed Congressional staffer commenting on the plausibility of the Navy’s plan,

“They wanted to get rid of them, then overnight they came up with this plan.”

Chris, you’re a bit late to the party but better late than never!  Welcome aboard.

(1)http://www.navytimes.com/article/20140707/NEWS04/307070028/Navy-s-cruiser-problem-Service-struggles-over-modernization-replacements , Christopher Cavas, Navy Times, 7-Jul-2014

Expansion Through Reduction

The Navy faces some significant gaps and shortfalls in capability, worsening problems with numbers of platforms and weapons, and, compounding the problem, severe budget restrictions.  It’s unfortunate but, realistically, there’s nothing that can be done about it.  Before we totally agree with that last statement, let’s consider the following questions, just briefly.

Would cutting a hundred Admirals and their staffs have any negative impact on the fleet’s combat capability?  No.  Would it free up funding?  Yes.

Would cutting the LCS program at the several ships already built or under construction have any negative impact on the fleet’s combat capability?  No.  Would it free up funding?  Yes.

Would terminating the JHSV adversely impact the fleet or ground forces’ combat capability?  No.  Would it free up funding? Yes.

Would terminating the America class reduce the fleet’s combat capability?  Not if we stop prematurely retiring amphibious ships.  Would it free up funding?  Yes.

Would terminating the F-35C program hurt the Navy’s aviation combat capability?  Not if we purchase additional Super Hornets and Advanced Super Hornets (ASH).  Would it free up funding?  Yes.

Would cutting the next Ford class carrier hurt the Navy’s combat capability?  Not if we maintain the carriers we already have.  Would it free up funding?  Yes.

Admittedly, the lack of impact on combat capability of some of the preceding cuts is dependent on taking specific alternative actions and the savings are not as simple as adding up the costs of the deleted items.  The alternative actions would have their own costs but the savings would still be significant.

So, given that the preceding cuts would have little impact on the fleet’s combat capability, could we use the freed up funding to procure additional ships and aircraft that would increase fleet numbers and overall combat capability?  Certainly!

The LCS has been reduced to filling the MCM mission if the module can be developed to even do that.  ASuW has been abandoned and ASW is likely to be abandoned given the reduction in numbers from 52 to 32.  With the money saved, we could buy a LOT of small, dedicated MCM vessels along the line of a slightly beefed up Avenger as well as -53 MCM helos and myriad unmanned MCM vehicles.

By dropping the JSF program back to an R&D effort until it matures and buying Advanced Super Hornets we can procure more aircraft, fill out the shrinking airwings, and possibly have a bit left over for reactivating S-3 Vikings for the dedicated tanker and fixed wing ASW roles.  The R&D has already been done on the ASH and the cost was borne by the manufacturer.  Yes, there will be additional developmental and production costs but the heavy lifting R&D is finished.  ASH procurement would cost around $60M-$70M from most recent cost estimates.  Of course those costs would increase.  Every estimate is optimistically low.  Still, the costs would be far less than the F-35 and the ASH actually works!

Saving the $12B or so that the next Ford would cost would allow the Navy to acquire patrol vessels, missile boats, frigates, or whatever would be useful for our peacetime and Pacific Pivot needs.  Of course, this assumes that the Navy would buy existing ship designs rather than engage in a costly new design program.  Ambassador missile boats and MEKO frigates are good examples of mature, proven designs along with any number of other good foreign designs.

The America class adds no significant improvement in combat capability and is being paid for, at least partially, by early retiring perfectly capable amphibious ships.  The $4B or so that each ship costs could not only maintain the current ships that are, instead, being early retired but would certainly help acquire modern, far more capable LSTs and/or LCUs that would improve our assault capabilities far more than replacement amphibious ship that is only marginally better, if that, than the legacy ships they’re replacing.

It’s obvious that the Navy could increase both numbers and capability through some judicious reductions.  Expansion through reduction!  We’re locked into a death spiral of ever increasing costs resulting in ever fewer ships.  We can continue with the status quo and ride it right down to a totally ineffective fleet or we can begin to explore alternatives.

USS Arlington Upgrade

Kris Osborn at DoD Buzz website has an article about current upgrades to the USS Arlington, LPD-24 (1).  The main item discussed was modifications to the ship’s computing/data network, the Shipboard Wide Area Network (SWAN).  Briefly, the SWAN routes all data through a common network rather than having separate networks for each major function.  Claimed benefits include fewer physical servers, fewer physical server cabinets (down to four, according to the article), and the use of virtual servers which enhance flexibility.  The benefits are real.  The question is whether they constitute a battle ready system. 

One of the main characteristics of a battle ready system is redundancy.  If one element of a system is damaged, identical, redundant elements can take over the lost function. 



Cost Efficient or Battle Ready?



Another characteristic of a battle ready system is separation.  Critical elements need to be physically separated from each other so that a single hit can’t take out too many elements of the system.  The obvious connection to the previous paragraph is that the redundant elements should be physically separated by as large a distance as reasonably possible.

Unfortunately, this is about as far as my analysis can go.  The article did not specify whether the remaining servers were redundant or to what degree, if any, the server cabinets were separated.  The flip side to having a highly centralized, cost efficient server architecture is that a single hit can incapacitate every ship system that uses the network – essentially, the entire ship! – unless the principles of redundancy and separation have been observed.  Given the Navy’s oft demonstrated tendency to apply business and cost efficiency principles over battle readiness, my fear is that this is another example of a cost efficiency improvement resulting in a degradation of battle readiness.  I hope I’m wrong.

(1) http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/07/03/navy-overhauls-amphips-electronics-ahead-of-deployment/

I Believe!

I believe!  Say it with me, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that simulators provide all the training I need and that chaos, shrapnel, smoke, power outages, and noise are just stories told to frighten the untrained.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that GPS will be with me always, to comfort and guide me.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that air superiority is my birthright.  Let the Air Force bear witness.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that minefields can be cleared through the Power of Point and True Belief.  Wish with me, that we may pass untouched!  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that although I jam the heathen’s electronic systems, their jamming shall pass me by.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that manufacturer’s claims are true and right.  So sayeth Lockheed.  So sayeth Raytheon.  So say we all.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that stoutness of heart will armor my ship.  The purity of Aluminum will transcend damage.  Steel is the Devil’s Material.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that the Accountants of Optimal Manning will be my strength and my Damage Control.  Praise be the Minimal Crew.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

I believe that “F” is the Holy Letter and “35” is its Number.  Long has my faith been tested as I have awaited its coming and though it be longer still till I shall see it serve, I remain steadfast in my belief.  Say it, brothers.  I believe!

Finally, and most importantly, I believe that, though all else be lost, I will still build new ships as shrines to the Gods of Acquisition.  Let me not blaspheme by walking the false paths of Upgrade or Maintenance.  Keep me true to the Way of the New Build.  Say it, brothers.  Say it with faith and fervor.  I believe!  I belieeeeve!

__________________ 

OK, fine, I’m mocking the culture of blind faith that all too often substitutes for objective and analytical thinking in the Navy.  Blind faith is only way to explain so many of our obvious shortcomings and capability gaps.  As you ponder various Navy matters, continually ask yourself if they are grounded in logic and reality or, instead, blind faith.