Lasers As Weapons

Do you recall, a while back, the Navy’s video of the “highly successful” laser anti-small craft demonstration?  You know, the one where a laser was focused on a boat’s outboard engine and eventually melted the engine cover?  The video didn’t say, but the impression was that the process took somewhere between several minutes and many minutes.

Have you ever seen a small boat approach at high speed?  Can you see the engine?  No, all you can see is the shiny, reflective bow bouncing up and down.  Depending on the sea state, the boat may actually vanish from sight, momentarily, as it plunges up and down.

Let’s briefly review what a laser is.  In incredibly simplified terms, a laser is a narrow, focused beam of light unlike a flashlight where the light spreads out from the source.  The focus allows the beam to transmit high levels of energy to a pinpoint spot thereby causing damage.  The amount of damage is a function of the intensity of the beam and the duration of contact between the beam and the target.  The laser, being light, travels at the speed of light, 186,000 miles per second, and, for all practical purposes, is an instantaneous event.  Like all light, a laser can be reflected by mirrors or shiny surfaces or attenuated (diminished) by dust and water in the atmosphere.

The Navy’s goal is to create a laser weapon.  We’ve all watched Star Wars and have a mental image of what a laser will do:  an instantaneous vaporizing beam of destruction.  I don’t know what the Navy’s ultimate goal is but presumably it’s along those lines.  Specifically, I suspect the Navy is interested in lasers as an anti-missile defense, in particular as an anti-ballistic missile defense.  Of course, in the shorter term, they may have a lesser goal such as blinding a person in a small boat or some such.

Despite the Navy’s PR claims of wild success with the laser demo film clip, it’s obvious that we’re many years, probably decades, away from anything approaching a Star Wars type laser weapon.  OK, that just means it will take a while longer, yet, right? 

Here, though, is the problem:  I think the potential for effective countermeasures far exceeds the potential for the laser as a weapon.  For example, something as simple as making the attacking missile shiny and reflective would negate the laser’s effect.  I could imagine other, equally simple countermeasures.  For instance, attaching a spinning cap over the missile’s nose would prevent the laser from focusing long enough in one spot to have an effect.  And so on …

That’s the technical problem and here is the consequence:  the cost of developing an effective laser weapon is going to be grossly, insanely greater than the cost of developing countermeasures.  With any foreseeable future laser technology, laser development is headed down a rabbit hole of runaway costs.  Consider that the Air Force recently terminated their airborne laser test bed after decades of work dating back to the 1970’s, as I recall.  I wonder what the cumulative cost of that effort was?  I remember reading Aviation Weekly articles about the Air Force’s laser and the prediction that a practical laser weapon was just a relatively few years away.  Now, several decades later, the Navy is suggesting that we’re just a relative few years away from an effective laser weapon.  Nothing’s changed despite decades of work.  This is just one of those technologies that isn’t going to come quickly to fruition. 

Now I’m absolutely not suggesting that we halt laser research;  quite the opposite.  It’s well worth pursuing but it should be as a pure research effort and only at a low level of funding.  Every dollar spent by the Navy on lasers is a dollar not spent on a practical, near-term weapon.  Building future laser (and rail gun) support capability into the ships we’re building today is pointless.  Lasers won’t be an effective weapon during the lifetime of the ship’s we’re building now.  On a related note, the Ford clearly incorporates laser or rail gun sponsons.

So, let’s enjoy our scifi movies and let’s fantasize about Star Wars lasers but let’s keep a realistic view of the state of the technology.  Building ships based on non-existent technology is what got us the LCS.  Let’s not repeat the mistake with lasers. 

Battle Force Redefinition Redefined

We’ve pointed out that under the current administration, Navy leadership has redefined what constitutes a “battle force ship” to include patrol craft (PC’s), hospital ships, and various other non-combatant support vessels.  This is a blatant attempt to make the Navy’s force levels look better without actually adding any ships.  Apparently Congress has taken note of this and is moving to limit or reverse the practice.  From the H.R. 4435—FY15 National Defense

Authorization Bill, Subcommittee On Seapower And Projection Forces Markup comes this gem:

“Section 231(f) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:”

‘‘The term ‘combatant and support vessel’ means any commissioned ship built or armed for naval combat or any naval ship designed to provide support to combatant ships and other naval operations. Such term does not include patrol coastal ships, non-commissioned combatant craft specifically designed for combat roles, or ships that are designated for potential mobilization.’’.

That’s a slap on the wrist for the Navy.  Well done Congress!

Frigates – Build To The Immediate Threat

Many people greeted the announced truncation of the LCS build as the advent of a true frigate.  ComNavOps has already gone on record as stating that the Navy won’t build a frigate but will simply build an upgunned version of the LCS – watch, though, they may designate it a “frigate” as a PR move to placate Congress and the LCS critics.  That said, what if the Navy did actually build a frigate?  Well, here’s a thought on the subject.

Frigates are smaller and lighter built vessels which are, theoretically, cheaper than their full featured, larger cousins such as destroyers and cruisers.  As such, they aren’t expected to last as long.  A 20-25 year life would be typical as opposed to a 40 year life for a larger ship.  This imparts a potentially valuable characteristic to a frigate:  it doesn’t need to be built with the long term in mind.  Properly recognized and utilized, this characteristic offers the basis for significant cost savings, speed of construction, and flexibility.

If we’re not building for far future threats that we can only barely imagine right now, we can, instead, focus on the immediate threats that are clearly defined.  Those threats can be dealt with using currently available technology and existing, proven weapons and systems.  In other words, the threats won’t change significantly enough over the life of the frigate to warrant investment in non-existent, what-if technology that will escalate costs, delay construction, and provide only portions of the promised or hoped-for performance.



Frigates - Inherently Adaptable?



For example, consider AAW.  A frigate, by definition, is not an area AAW platform.  It only needs to defend itself and a few nearby ships it might be escorting.  While future ballistic missile defense concerns might suggest a need to invest in sophisticated BMD radars and missiles, that threat does not yet exist and won’t for many years.  We don’t need to invest in imaginary technology to defeat a non-existent threat for a ship whose lifetime won’t see the threat.  We can limit ourselves to existing threats and existing solutions – a much cheaper approach.

Or, consider the current darlings of naval development:  lasers and railguns.  Oooh my …  I got a tingle just typing that!  Despite the Navy’s public relations announcements, these weapons are many years, probably decades, away from full functioning versions.  For a frigate with a 20-25 year lifespan, there’s no need to build in enormous electrical capacity, cooling capacity, and whatever other structural or utility support they might need.  We can save all that money and effort and in 20 years, if the weapons have panned out, we can build new frigates that are designed to support the systems.  Plus, we’ll know by then what’s actually needed instead of building in guessed-at capacities that may or may not meet the needs.

We see, then, that the shorter lifespan of a frigate actually offers the potential for greater flexibility and adaptability than a larger warship.  If the lifespan is around half that of a larger warship (say 20 years versus 40 years, to illustrate) we can build an entirely new frigate halfway through the lifespan of a larger ship and the new version can be completely adapted to the threats that exist at that time. 

If executed correctly, the more limited lifespan of the frigate offers some advantages.  The build can be cheaper since we don’t have to worry about far future, non-existent threats and can use off-the-shelf weapons and systems.  The ships, as a class, offer a larger degree of flexibility thanks to their shorter lifespans.  The use of existing technology should allow a much quicker design to construction timeframe instead of the usual R&D concurrency delays so prevalent today.

Of course, this is all predicated on being able to build a “cheap” frigate with a focused mission and specific, limited capabilities.  If we try to build a frigate with all the capabilities of a Burke then it won’t be cheap and it won’t be on-time and we won’t be able to afford to retire them at 20-25 years. 

The Navy has an opportunity, now, to adjust the fleet’s size and composition in a more useful and effective direction.  Will they?  History suggests not.  We’ll see.

Competition Brings Out The ... Best??

Competition brings out the best, so the saying goes.  Competition breeds improvement.  When two athletes compete for a position, not only does the best one win but both improve from the competition.  When companies compete the buyer reaps the benefits as both companies sharpen their products, cut costs, and produce better products. 

When naval ship designs compete …  ah, actually …  well, to tell the truth, the design that’s favored by Navy leadership gets funded and immediately stagnates and the other design gets SINKEX’ed or sold off to foreign countries.  There’s no benefit for either of the competing designs.  The winner doesn’t get better (it may not even be the best of the competing designs) and the loser gets disposed of.  In fact, the winner, with no viable competition or alternative to worry about generally sees a massive increase in costs, delays, and failed technology (for an aviation example, anyone want to defend the JSF program?).  Here’s some examples.

When the Tico/Aegis radar system was being developed it had a competitor.  The Spruance DDGs could have undergone an upgrade to their radar system, the New Threat Upgrade (NTU).  At that time, the NTU was probably superior to Aegis and would have been immensely cheaper to implement.  However, the Navy was determined to proceed with Aegis so, to eliminate any possible alternative to Aegis, the entire Spruance class was SINKEX’ed.

As the LCS program was being proposed, many observers noted that simple upgrades to the Perry FFGs would have provided as much or more capability.  Again, the Navy was determined to go with the LCS so the Perry class was early retired, sold off to foreign countries, or defanged by having their main weapon system, the Mk 13 missile launcher, removed.  The Navy claimed that the Perrys couldn’t be upgraded to use the newer Standard missiles – a claim the Australian upgrades demonstrated was false.

Now, we’re looking at a competition between the Burke Flt III and the Ticonderogas.  The Flt IIIs are being justified on the basis of their BMD/AMDR ability.  Unfortunately for the Navy, the Tico/Aegis system has already demonstrated a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability which would seem to eliminate the need for a Flt III.  Further, the latest Aegis software iteration allows simultaneous BMD and AAW, a previous weakness which supposedly justified the Flt III.  So, the Navy is dealing with this the same way they always have.  The Ticos are being early retired and scrapped.  Unfortunately for the Navy, Congress stepped in, restored funding, and directed the Navy to retain the Ticos that were slated for retirement.  Not to be denied, the Navy has now come up with the ploy of “idling” the Tico force.  

There you have it – competition Navy style!

Deputy Defense Secretary - A Sad Day

Robert Work has been sworn in as the Deputy Defense Secretary under Chuck Hagel.  I am hard pressed to imagine a worse pair leaders for our nation’s defense.  Work, you’ll recall, was famous for his impassioned defense of the LCS.  That alone would be bad enough but his zealous demonization of critics of the LCS is what really stood out.  He stifled every legitimate criticism and ignored all negative data.  He continued, and presumably still does, his defense of the LCS despite all evidence to the contrary that clearly indicates the program and concept was an utter failure.  As if that isn’t bad enough, he authored an extensive history of the LCS program which is one of the most egregious rewrites of actual history that I’ve ever read.  For example, in his history he claims that the Navy got the warship it wanted with the capabilities it wanted and at the price it wanted.  Even the most ardent supporters of the LCS would shy away from that statement!

With that kind of history of ignoring reality and facts is that really the person we want in that position?  He is not a man who encourages discussion or alternative viewpoints.  This is the latest sad, sad decision in a seemingly endless series of bad decisions involving the military.

Where's the LCS?

ComNavOps generally refrains from simply repeating articles posted elsewhere unless some analysis and value can be added.  However, Defense News website has an article (1) that should be noted and I have no additional analysis to add.  The article says it all.

To summarize what they wrote, RIMPAC, the world’s largest international naval exercise, is held every other year and the next iteration will be this summer at Pearl Harbor.  No LCS is scheduled to participate.  This is another in an endless series of truly baffling decisions associated with this program.  Wouldn’t you think that a program that is fighting as much bad press as this one would seize every opportunity for some good public relations, favorable press, and real world exposure and operating experience?  And yet, despite having four vessels in commission, none can be made available to attend.  The LCS is being justified, in large measure, as a key to the Pacific Pivot strategy.  What better opportunity is there to interact with the various Pacific actors than RIMPAC?

Whether you support the LCS or not, this is clearly a golden opportunity for the program and it’s being squandered.

Of course, the cynical might wonder if the Navy hasn’t already recognized that the LCS isn’t really capable of contributing to these types of operations and would, in reality, turn out to be a negative PR exercise. 

Please read the article linked below.  Again, my apologies for having little to contribute on this one but it was noteworthy enough to point out.

(1) http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140504/DEFREG02/305040009/LCS-Will-Miss-World-s-Largest-Naval-Exercise

  

Replacement LCS – How Do We Get There From Here?

We’ve discussed how the Navy’s supposed new “frigate” that will replace the LCS is just going to be a slightly upgunned LCS.  We also noted that the Navy will do this backwards by forcing requirements to conform to the ship rather than designing the ship to fit the requirements.  No sense beating that horse any more.  Instead, let’s look at what the Navy can do and needs to do to make the replacement LCS (RLCS) even marginally useful.

The first and most important change is not additional weapons or sensors …  Ah …  Hang on.  Several people who were looking over my shoulder while I typed that sentence passed out in panic and disbelief and one ran off wailing and gnashing his teeth.  I’ll be back in a minute…   …   …   …   OK, I’m back.  I gave them smelling salts and a picture of a foreign frigate to hold tight.  They’ve calmed down and they’re happy now.

As I said, the most important change is not weapons or sensors;  it’s endurance.  The Navy envisions the RLCS as a key actor in the Pacific Pivot.  In order to make that work, the RLCS needs much greater endurance.  Currently, the LCS has around 14 days endurance due to food storage limitations.  With anticipated increases in crew size coming, that endurance is going to be further reduced.  To be effective, the replacement RLCS needs a much greater endurance.  We need to greatly increase food and water storage so that the RLCS can spend more than a couple of days on station and doesn’t need to have a replenishment ship tethered to it.

Unfortunately, additional storage space will eat into the internal volume available for new weapons, sensors, and additional crew.

The second and next most important change, closely related to endurance, is range.  For Pacific operations with limited basing options we need as much endurance as we can reasonably get.  The WWII Fletcher class destroyer had a range of 5500 nm at 15 kts.  By comparison, the LCS has a range of 3500 nm at 18 kts.  We need to add range in the form of bunkerage and whatever engine modifications are needed to at least get to the 5500 nm ballpark. 

Unfortunately, additional bunkerage will eat into the internal volume available for new weapons, sensors, and additional crew.

The third change is survivability.  There’s no point to fielding a vessel around the size of a WWII destroyer only to have it susceptible to one-hit kills or even near miss kills.  We need to add armor to the level of a WWII Fletcher, as I’ve opined in previous posts.  However, the Navy isn’t going to do that.  So, at the very least we need to add additional compartmentation and shock hardening of installed equipment.  Further, since the gun (of whatever caliber) is going to be considered an important part of anti-small craft defense, we need to mount the gun in an armored enclosure similar to the Navy’s 5” guns of WWII.  Those armored mounts consisted of 1”-2” steel and were proof against shrapnel and cheap kills.  If we’re going to have only one gun on the ship we need to at least protect it to the extent possible. 

Unfortunately, additional compartmentation and armor will eat into the weight margins and internal volume available for new weapons, sensors, and additional crew.

The fourth change is crew size.  We’ve already seen that the LCS is badly undermanned.  If we increase the range and endurance and add weapons and sensors the ship will be at sea for much longer periods of time.  The current model of doing no maintenance on board ship will not work.  The ship will need to perform onboard maintenance just like any other ship and that means a much larger crew.  We also need more crew for combat and damage control.  Of course, a larger crew means additional berthing, heads, laundry, galley space, food storage, water storage, etc.

Unfortunately, additional crew comforts and support will eat into the internal volume and weight available for new weapons, sensors, and additional crew.  Are you seeing a trend, here?

Lastly, and everyone’s favorite, we need to add better weapons and sensors.  I won’t discuss this further because it’s been beaten to death.  I will remind everyone that by the time the first four needs are met there won’t be all that much weight and space left to go sprinkling weapons and sensors all over the ship as so many want to do.  It’s just the reality of ship design.  It may be fun to talk about the whiz-bang technology of weapons but it’s the other aspects that will determine whether the design is ultimately successful.

So, there you have it.  That’s what the Navy could reasonably do to get from the current LCS to the RLCS.  Of course, that’s not what I’d do but given the Navy’s near certain selection of the existing LCS as the basis for the new small surface combatant and the ass backwards “design” process they appear to be embarked on, this is the logical way to get from here to there and wind up with even a minimally useful vessel.  Quite sad but this is what it’s come to.