Thursday, November 15, 2012

LCS - Mass or Disperse?

In his book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (1), Capt. Hughes discusses the concept of dispersion/massing as applied to surface ships and, particularly, to smaller ships.  He notes,

“When dispersion is an important means of defense, small ships and distributed firepower are an important advantage.  Much of the modern debate over the size of warships concerns the comparative merits of dispersal in small ships (to complicate enemy targeting) and of concentration of force in large ships (to fight off the enemy).  …  Today if a commander’s fleet comprises large ships with strong defenses he masses and fights the enemy off.  If he has small ships or weak defenses he must disperse.  In either case he is buying time to carry out his mission, which is not to steam around waiting to be sunk.  If the defense cannot buy time for the offense to perform, then the fleet ought to be somewhere else.”
 
Hughes brings up two good points in this short paragraph which are highly relevant to the Navy’s LCS.  Remember, the LCS was built before a coherent concept of operations was developed (we’ll set aside the lunacy of that sequence, for the moment) and they are now trying to develop one.  Let’s see what Capt. Hughes has to offer in the way of guidance for the LCS.

Hughes’ first point is that the purpose of a ship/fleet/Navy is to conduct offensive operations.  While a Navy may occasionally be forced into defensive operations (protecting a base or defending sea lanes, for example) they would still, ultimately, be linked to offensive operations - for instance, defending a base from which future offensive operations may be launched.  So, offense is the purpose of a Navy.  Herein lies the initial problem for the LCS.  Currently, it has no offensive capability.  The Navy is working to develop modules which will give it some offensive capability but that appears to be a long ways down the road.  Nonetheless, let’s assume that the LCS acquires offensive anti-submarine, anti-surface, or land strike (either direct via munitions or indirect via Marine/SOF land forces) capability.

LCS Operations - Mass or Disperse?

The small size of the LCS precludes applying a significant strike capability from a single ship.  Thus, multiple LCSs will need to mass to apply a significant strike of whatever form.  This leads directly to Hughes’ second point concerning the balance between massing and dispersion.  Massing creates an efficient target for the enemy.  As Hughes points out, if massing creates a defense strong enough to compensate for the easy target the mass makes, then massing is desirable.  If not, dispersion is the better tactic. 

The LCS was not designed to be able to provide area anti-air defense nor to have a significant anti-surface defense.  Thus, massing provides no enhancement in defense.  One LCS cannot “cover” another so LCSs derive no defensive benefit from being grouped.  This leads to the conclusion that the LCS should operate dispersed to maximize the chance of surviving long enough to carry out offensive operations.

But wait …  If the LCS should operate dispersed and no single LCS can generate a significant strike, how then can the LCS be effective?  Well, we may well have uncovered a flaw in the LCS concept.  However, bear in mind that massing for a strike does not necessarily mean that the massing must occur at the point of origin of the strike.  Massing can be at the destination of the strike.  In other words, ten ships, each with a single missile, don’t have to be near each other at launch time in order to conduct a massed strike of ten missiles – they can be dispersed and simply time their individual missiles to arrive at the target together to achieve the massed strike.  So, it is possible for LCSs to operate dispersed and still provide massed strike, under the right conditions.

The preceding discussion has enormous implications for the development of the LCS.  As the Navy attempts to develop a concept of operations for the LCS and continues to develop modules, the concept of physical dispersion for defense and massing for offense should be the guiding light.  The LCS needs weapons and offensive capabilities that are capable of destination point massing.  This implies a level of range and targeting capability that the LCS not only doesn’t have currently but is not even being discussed, as far as I know.  The dispersion aspect also suggests that a certain amount of attrition of individual units will occur which should dictate that the ships be small, cheap, and expendable.  Unfortunately, that ship has already sailed.  The LCS is neither small nor cheap nor expendable (given its cost).  Since the desired characteristics of a dispersed unit are not achievable, additional emphasis should be placed on self-defense, meaning a better anti-air (more CIWS/RAM) and anti-surface (bigger/more guns) fit.

Griffon - The Right Weapons Development Path?

If the Navy would think this through, direct the module development along these lines, and consider modifying the core capabilities to increase self-defense, we might be able to someday have a moderately useful LCS.  Of course, it’s equally possible that a rational analysis of the above might lead to the conclusion that the LCS was incorrectly designed, can’t be sufficiently modified, and should be terminated.  Either approach would be better than the floundering that’s occurring now with the Navy desperately searching for a mission for the LCS.  This is why a concept of operations should come before construction, not after!


(1) Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd Ed., Capt. Wayne Hughes, Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN-13: 978-1-55750-392-3, p.191

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Burke Fails INSURV

A Burke class destroyer, the USS McCain (DDG-56), failed an INSURV inspection conducted  in June, according to a Navy Times report just released.  I have no other information about this.  I had been hoping that Navy maintenance and training issues were being addressed and showing improvement but this makes me wonder anew.  Admittedly, a single INSURV failure proves nothing.  Still, it's disturbing that the Navy's backbone ship type would fail. 

This is the first failure I've heard about in some time which had led me to hope things were improving.  Of course, given that the Navy went to the length of classifying these inspections due to the poor PR and resultant public criticism and pressure who knows how many inspections have been conducted over the last year and whether there were other failures?

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Marine Detachments

ComNavOps occasionally has distinguished visitors drop by and today is such a day.  We have a guest post provided by WireguidedMarine.  Regular readers will recognize the name from his frequent and insightful comments throughout the blog and especially concerning Marine and amphibious matters.  Indeed, it is exactly these topics that WireguidedMarine offers his unique perspective on in today’s post.  He is a retired Marine SNCO who started off using missiles and eventually moved to Intel.  He later went to college on the GI Bill where he majored in history.  An authoritative and unique perspective, indeed!  Enjoy!

____________________________________________________________


Recently the Navy and Marine Corps have begun to focus on the Pacific and China.  In addition, within the Corps, there is a feeling that the last decade has seen the Marines become “a second land army” to the detriment of the Service’s core capability. How should the Marine Corps go forward post-Iraq/Afghanistan and refocus on the sea?   

One way to bring some capability back to the Fleet is to reinstate the Marine Detachments (MarDets). Until the 1990’s, Marines were regular components of battleship and aircraft carrier crews. During the Cold War, detachments usually consisted of two officers with 35 to 44 Marines on cruisers and two officers with 46 to 64 enlisted on carriers. By the late 1990’s, budget and manpower constraints had reduced these numbers by half on carriers before being eliminated altogether. As the regulations at the time specified, Marines were: “To provide for operations ashore, as a part of the ships landing force; or as a part of the landing force of Marines from ships of the fleet or subdivision thereof; or as an independent force for limited operations.” Does this not sound familiar to us in the present day?


MarDets - More of Good Thing

These Marines would have no major impact on carrier operations. Transport would be by MH-60S Knighthawk, a good surrogate for the Marines’ UH-1Y and integrated with the carrier air wing. Current plans are for about half a dozen Knighthawks to be in a Carrier Strike Group, enough to transport most of the Leathernecks in one flight. Another option is that one or two MV-22s can be cross-decked as necessary, or used to help justify the overdue replacement of the old C-2A as both a cargo and tactical transport on the carrier.


Marines I knew who had been part of these MarDets talked of how they worked with the crews of the SH-3s (and later SH-60s) on all types of insertions including on land, on ships, at night, and in bad weather. They were the Captain’s personal assault force when necessary. Not to take away from the SEALs, but these roles of hostile ship-boarding and raiding are tailor-made for Marines. This would ease up demand on the already stretched thin SEALs.

I believe the MarDets need to be placed on cruisers again as well. A smaller contingent of one officer and 25 enlisted Marines would add to the flexibility of any task force.

A CSG under my plan with a carrier and two cruisers would have over 100 Marines fully integrated into the force. MH-60s (and possibly MV-22s) organic to the group would provide airlift. Any tasking more than the CSG’s Marines could handle might be brought in by the ESG with the LHD or LPD to handle the C3 and logistics. The Marines would be a small enough unit to get in and out quickly and would have naval gunfire (5”/54, 5”/62, 155mm AGS), MH-60Rs, and fast movers to provide the support needed during their brief time ashore.

I like the idea of bringing back the MarDets. They are the Marine Corps’ past, and I believe they can be the Marine Corps’ future.


Bibliography

The Naval Institute Guide To The Ships And Aircraft Of The U.S. Fleet Norman Polmar 18th edition 2005



Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Amphibious Assault - Reinventing the Wheel

The Navy and Marines have recently begun to make public the results of the Bold Alligator 2012 amphibious exercise held earlier this year.  An article in the latest Proceedings (1) describes some of the findings.  For those who aren’t familiar with it, the exercise was an attempt to re-establish an amphibious capability in a Marine Corp that had largely forgotten its primary purpose due to extended land battles over the last decade or so.  Indeed, the author states,

“Many participants , from novices to veterans, had never participated in combined naval amphibious operations prior to the exercise.”

The exercise involved 27 ships and 15,000 personnel. 

While discussing the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) forces, the author assesses them with the following statement.

“… the most recent iteration [the exercise] reveals our ESG/MEB-sized naval forces to be in the early part of the ‘walk’ phase of the ‘crawl, walk, run’ approach.”
 
The author noted a lack of expertise and familiarity among participants with the details of amphibious operations and goes on to list additional shortcomings such as the importance of integrating Navy and Marine staffs, incompatibilities between Navy and Marine communications equipment, and the realization that the various commands are still trying to determine the optimal means of command and control.

This exercise and its findings represent a sad state of affairs regarding our amphibious capability.  We have institutionally forgotten how to conduct amphibious operations.  It’s kind of embarrassing to hear Naval and Marine personnel proudly talk about our progress in the amphibious realm.  Didn’t we master the art in WWII?  Sure, the equipment has changed over the years but how did we allow our amphibious expertise to atrophy so badly?  Communications incompatibilities?  Really?  Didn’t we learn this lesson after Grenada? 

I won't belabor this any further other than to state the obvious - our leadership has failed us badly over the years.

I know, many of you are going to excuse the leadership by saying that they had no choice.  The Marines were ordered to commit to an extended land battle and it was bound to happen.  No one's fault, right?  Wrong!  What good leadership should have done was to loudly and persistently point out what was happening to the Marine Corp.  They should have taken the issue to Congress and the public.  Where were the leaders willing to sacrifice their careers to ensure that the Marines remained America's ready reaction force instead of just a smaller version of the Army?  Poor leadership.

On the plus side, at least we recognize we have a problem and are doing something about it.  Given enough time we’ll probably figure out how to do something we mastered over 65 years ago.



(1) Naval Institute Proceedings, “Still in Demand”, Lt. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, USMC (Ret), Nov 2012

Monday, November 5, 2012

OpFor

We’ve discussed in previous posts (here and here and here) about the lack of realistic training in the Navy.  Oddly, though, the Navy established one of the best and certainly the most famous training program of all time, namely Top Gun.  Top Gun assembled a group whose dedicated mission was to assemble and study everything known about enemy aircraft, weapons, and tactics, develop our own tactics for defeating the enemy, and then train a continual rotation of pilots to take advantage of their findings.  By all accounts, the program was a major success until the mid ‘90s when it was merged with the Navy’s strike training program.

Consider this, though …  Almost all of the information collected and taught at Top Gun was available to the pilots on their own.  In other words, the pilots in the fleet had access to everything needed to draw their own conclusions and develop their own tactics and yet it didn’t happen.  Why not?  Well, the pilots were too busy with routine training, patrols, paperwork and the thousand other things that consume a pilot’s typical day.  It was necessary to form a group whose entire day was devoted to studying the enemy because the fleet pilots simply didn’t have the time to do their own studies.  There’s also an economy of scale – no sense having every pilot in the fleet reinvent the wheel.  Of course, it was also beneficial to have a set of standardized tactics that all pilots knew instead of having each pilot develop their own with the result that no pilot would know what pilot next to them would do in combat.

The other services also offer similar dedicated adversary (Opposing Forces - OpFor) forces for realistic training such as the Air Force’s Red Flag or the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA.

The key feature to these Opfor commands is that they provide training by using platforms and tactics that closely simulate the expected enemy.

Previous posts have discussed and documented that even current leadership of the Navy, by their own admission, recognize that ships and crew are not being trained against realistic threat platforms using enemy tactics.  Simply gathering ships, splitting into two groups, and then “fighting” is not providing realistic training in recognizing and countering enemy tactics.  For the same reason that individual pilots were unable to develop their own tactics, ship’s Captains just don’t have the time to study enemy platforms, weapons, and tactics and then develop counter-tactics.  The Navy needs a standing OpFor – a Top Gun of the sea.

To the extent possible, OpFor’s use platforms that mimic the characteristics of the enemy platforms.  Instead of retiring and selling off the Perry FFGs, why not use them as simulators of enemy corvettes/frigates/destroyers?  The Meggitt Hammerheads would provide extremely realistic simulations of small boat swarms and missile boats.  The Cyclone class, which the Navy has never embraced, could simulate fast attack craft, missile boats, and corvettes.  There are plenty of used (or new) non-nuclear subs on the market that could be used to simulate enemy platforms. 

It's Got To Be Real

A standing OpFor would certainly not be a cost-free program but compared to the cost of the first multi-billion dollar ship saved as a result of superior training, the cost would be negligible.  All the platforms already exist and have been paid for.  Most are headed for retirement and scrapping so their use as OpFor platforms wouldn’t deprive the fleet of active ships.  All that would be needed is some minor upgrading and instrumenting for the role.  Even the manning requirements of the simulator platforms could be greatly scaled back through automation and the need to only man for exercises of a few days duration. 

The combination of a standing OpFor and appropriate live fire exercises would provide the most realistic and useful training possible.  It’s one thing to read a book about tactics or run through a computer simulation but it’s another to stand on the bridge of your ship watching a Hammerhead approach at 35 kts, about to crash into the side of your ship and leave a giant dye mark splashed all over the side of your ship because you didn’t honor the threat appropriately, while a drone flashes overhead that you didn’t detect in time, and knowing you’re going to be mocked by your fellow Captains (even though they wouldn’t do any better) upon your return with your ship bearing the red blotch of shame.

Before I close this discussion out, I know I’m going to have to address those of you who are already starting to type in your reply that all we need is to use simulators;  that combat takes place in the CIC, anyway, so we can train dockside in front of computers.  Well, the Air Force found that as simulator usage increased, so too did real world mishaps.  Simulators just can’t replicate the stress, adrenalin, and confusion found in the cockpit of a plane pulling G’s and with the threat of collision with other planes or the ground only seconds away.  Yeah, but that’s the Air Force;  it’s different for naval combat, right?  Wrong!  Remember the Vincennes incident where a highly trained CIC crew made every mistake possible and a few considered impossible.  Simulators largely remove stress.  Once stress is added back in, performance suffers greatly – and that’s the environment to train in! 

Don’t get me wrong.  Simulators are a great complement to, but not a replacement for, live training.

It’s time to start putting our ships and crews up against trainers who thoroughly know and can apply enemy tactics.

Friday, November 2, 2012

LCS - Cost Cap

I’ve long been fascinated by the Congressional cost cap that has been applied to the LCS program.  It’s been interesting to watch Congress’ attempt to apply oversight and fiscal restraint and then observe the Navy’s response.  The cost cap was Congress’ reaction to the combination of controversy about the LCS combined with the early indications of runaway cost growth.  Congress was, in essence, telling the Navy that they weren’t comfortable with the LCS program but that the Navy could continue the program if they could keep the costs below a threshold.  So, how did it all play out?  Let’s review …

The original Navy cost estimate was for a $200M ship.  It’s unclear whether that estimate included the module cost.  As it became clear that that target would not be met, Congress in 2006 passed Section 124 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006) which set a cap of $220M per ship.

Then, in 2008 the cost cap was changed by Section 125 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) to $460M  per ship.  The cap was applied to all LCS procured from 2008 on.

Later in 2008, the cost cap was amended again by Section 122 of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14,
2008) which deferred the implementation of the cost cap by two years, from 2010 on. 

In 2010 the cost cap was amended again by Section 121(c) and (d) of the FY2010
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28,
2009) to set a cap of $480M.  However, the cap excluded certain costs from being counted against the cap and included provisions for adjusting the $480 million figure over time to take inflation and other events into account, and permitted the Secretary of the Navy to waive the cost cap under certain conditions.  The Navy has stated that the cap equates to $538M as of December 2010, due to inflation.

In summarized form, here’s the progression of the cost cap:

2006     $220M
2008   $460M
2008   $460M  deferred
2010   $480M  inflation and “events” adjustment clause; waivers
2010   $538M  Navy inflation adjustment

What was the Navy’s response to all this?

The Navy sought and obtained the cost cap language that allows the cap to be adjusted and even waived because they know they can’t build the ships for the cap amount.  But wait!  Doesn’t the Navy have a fixed price contract for less than the cap amount?  Doesn’t that prove they can build the LCS for the cap amount?  If you’re asking that, then you haven’t been a regular follower of this blog.

Yes, the Navy has a fixed price contract for less than the cap and, no, they can’t build the LCS for the contracted amount.  I’ve said it before and I’ll repeat it.  The fixed price contract is only for the seaframe (the hull).  The weapons, electronics, computers, fire control software and systems, sensors, radars, and most other equipment is being supplied from another, separate account line that is not included in the cap limit.  Pretty clever of the Navy, huh?  If you can’t meet the cost cap, just split off half the cost into an unregulated account and then you can claim to be building cheap LCSs.  Technically true but bordering on fraudulent in that it is a deliberate ploy to bypass Congress’ intent.  Add to that the fact that the modules, without which the ships are useless, are also being funded from a separate account and you’ve got a pretty fraudulent accounting practice by the Navy.

The real cost of the LCS is the seaframe (~$500M inflation adjusted) plus government supplied equipment ($200M ?) plus module ($30M - $200M) and you’ve got an actual total cost for the LCS of $750M - $900M.

Also, the fixed price contract contains language allowing the manufacturer and the Navy to split cost overruns, 50:50, or even allowing the manufacturer to recover all overrun costs under certain circumstances.  That’s not a fixed price contract!  

I also don't know whether the fixed price contract automatically increases each year due to inflation adjustment or whether it stays at the original contract price.  A few things I've read, including the contract's inflation adjustment clause, hint that the fixed price increases each year.  If so, the current fixed price for the seaframe is actually somewhere around $550M each per the Navy's stated inflation adjustment and allowing for continued adjustment through 2012.  As I said, I'm unsure about this aspect.  If anyone knows for sure, cite a reference and let me know!

Regardless, you’ve got to give the Navy credit.  Faced with a seemingly impossible cost cap, they manipulated the system, bypassed the intent of Congress, and got their LCS program.  That’s some outstanding integrity being demonstrated there, Navy!  What’s wrong with being upfront about the real costs and then letting Congress do their job and decide if it’s worth it to the country?

Thursday, November 1, 2012

SSBN(X) Update

The United States Naval Institute has a short article with a few details about the future SSBN(X). 

Here's a bullet list of features:

  • Single mission
  • X-stern
  • Electric drive
  • Virginia anechoic hull treatment
  • Virginia Large Aperture Bow Sonar array
  • Water jet propulsor
  • Dimensions 561 ft x 43 ft - 2 ft longer than Ohio
  • Crew of 155 - same as Ohio

The most interesting feature is the focus on single mission.  There has been a lot of discussion about using the SSBN(X) as a combination SSGN & SSBN or acting as a Special Forces platform.  It appears that none of that will happen.  This will be a straight up repeat of the Ohios with modernized equipment.

The next most interesting feature is the crew size which is identical to the Ohio.  Given a significantly greater degree of automation in this sub versus the Ohios, this seems odd.  I would have thought a reduction in crew size would have been part of the design.

I still don't get the why the sub is the same size (2 feet longer, actually!) as the Ohio when it has 33% fewer missile tubes. 

Cost estimates are unchanged from those reported in our previous post.  This is a very expensive sub!