You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill
the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many
years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga
class cruisers. They attempted to early
retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress. The Navy’s solution was to agree to a
blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove
funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy
could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented
by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has
settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance,
and support of the A-10. As Redstate
website reports,
With no funding for support, the aircraft will rapidly fall into unflyable status. The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold
all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
The military seems to feel it is above the will of
Congress. It is past time for Congress
to re-exert its authority.
______________________________
… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]
With no funding for support, the aircraft will rapidly fall into unflyable status. The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670
I love the A-10, and it was an excellent weapon in its heyday, but it has only survived so long because we were operating in permissive environments with zero AD. A-10s took the heaviest losses and casualties out of all airframe types in ODS, despite being only engaged by SHORAD and AAA. Even in their heyday in the Cold War, it was estimated that the entire A-10 force would be lost after 3 weeks of fighting.
ReplyDeleteStill. There's just something to be said for an airframe that forces you to give up your knightly dreams of being a fighter ace to focus wholly on supporting the troops. The seat of decision is the land, afterall.
"because we were operating in permissive environments with zero AD. A-10s took the heaviest losses and casualties out of all airframe types in ODS"
DeleteAll that says is that the asset that is the most exposed to enemy fire will have the heaviest losses. It doesn't mean it's a bad asset. In fact, it means it's the most heavily in demand which means the most valuable!
Given that the vast majority of our combat is in permissive environments, the A-10 is ideally suited for its role. Take a poll of the troops on the ground and ask what their favorite aircraft is.
The measure of an aircraft is not how many were shot down but how much damage they inflicted. In Desert Storm, we lost six A-10 (two pilots killed, the rest survived) and, from a Google AI summary, "Despite the risks, it proved highly effective, credited with destroying over 900 tanks, 2,000 vehicles, and 1,200 artillery pieces." That's a pretty good return on investment and a pretty good trade off in terms of damage inflicted versus aircraft losses.
The F-14 flew lots of sorties in Desert Storm and lost no aircraft, that I'm aware of, but they inflicted no damage on the enemy, either.
If safety is our priority then, sure, let's get rid of the A-10 and pull every aircraft back a thousand miles. We won't lose any aircraft but we won't accomplish anything, either.
The AF initially claimed the F-16 could perform the A-10 role. Nobody believed that. Now, the AF claims the F-35 can perform the role. Again, no one except F-35 fanboys believes that. The troops on the ground certainly don't believe it!
DeleteNote that General Horner, who commanded the air war portion of desert storm, deliberately pulled A-10s off attacking the Republican Guard after 2 days because their loss rates were so much higher than every other aircraft type. Maybe it was a coincidence that his son was an A-10 pilot, and maybe it wasn't.
DeleteInterestingly I once spoke to an A-10 pilot who was convinced that the F-35 could not perform the CAS role of the A-10, even if you had A-10 pilots in the hot seat. I asked him if that meant that the A-10 community's pride in their proficiency in CAS and ground attack was a little misplaced, in that they were only good at CAS because they were in an airframe that forced them to do CAS, since he seemed to be implying that once his squadron transitioned to the F-35, they would all completely forget about CAS. He had no answer to that.
On the other hand I had the opportunity to speak to a Marine AV-8B Harrier pilot, and he was convinced that they would be as proficient in CAS as they were in the Harrier, because the Marines were treating the F-35B as a super Harrier.
So maybe, as a certain movie argued, it's not the plane, but the pilot.
Is the A-10 really a 'close support' aircraft? Is the A-10 really the best 'close support' aircraft? In the context of war against a peer competitor, does the A-10 help or hinder the force mix?
DeleteGAB
"pulled A-10s off attacking the Republican Guard after 2 days because their loss rates"
DeleteIncorrect. A-10s were not pulled due to loss rates. They were pulled because the issue was no longer in doubt and, that being the case, there was no need to expose pilots to even a little bit of risk. In fact, the A-10s later returned to close air support missions.
Hopefully, you're not under the misguided notion that an aircraft is not effective if it can be shot down?
The A-10s suffered losses because they were sent into the fight while the lightweight fighters tossed GPS bombs from afar. The A-10s were built to take hits with a stronger airframe and two engines mounted in the rear and separated.
DeleteWhen Generals recently needed aircraft to fly low over the Persian Gulf to deal with small boats and slow drones, they chose to send A-10s.
"Is the A-10 really a 'close support' aircraft?"
DeleteAs you have noted in past discussions, "close support" covers a multitude of tasks, many of which, involving close coordination, direction, and scouting for troops, are better performed by something like an OV-10, Super Tucano, or even a Piper Cub! Perhaps a better tag for the A-10 is "close attack" and, in that, it excels. Since the AF has as little interest in small aircraft as the Navy has in small patrol boats, the A-10 comes closest to what we need, at the moment.
The biggest tank killer of the first gulf war was the F-111, not the A-10.
DeleteSome 64 F-111 aircraft from the 48th TFW destroyed ~1,500 Iraqi tanks; far more than the 120 A-10s which accounted for ~900 Iraqi tanks. In fairness the A-10s killed another 3,000+ Iraqi vehicles and artillery, but the F-111s accounted for a number of strikes on high value targets like airfields, air defenses, and C4ISR. F-111s were also able to ‘outrun’ MIG-29s. This is amazing because Iraq presented a perfect environment for the A-10.
The primary sensor for the F-111 was the Pave Tack pod and the primary tank killing weapon was the GBU-12, which enabled F-111s to bomb at night. The primary sensor for the A-10 was the human eyeball and the primary tank killing weapon for the A-10 was the AGM-65 Maverick, not the 30mm cannon.
None of this is to crap on the A-10, which more than fulfilled its design specifications, and certainly its air crews have matched the plane.
GAB
"Hopefully, you're not under the misguided notion that an aircraft is not effective if it can be shot down?"
DeleteAll aircraft can be shot down, what matters is that they are being effective enough before they get shot down. The aircraft needs to at least survive long enough to release its weapons on the target. Preferably, we want it to survive multiple sorties.
All military assets are expendable, for sure, but we should try get the best and longest use out of them. It's the difference between long lasting parts and parts that wear out after a single use.
Incidentally I was doing a study of aircraft loss rates during Vietnam. By todays standards, these would be nightmarishly high. 678 F-4s lost, 481 A-1s lost, 382 F-105s (almost the entire F-105 force!), 363 A-4s. These are more single types of airframes lost than many airforces today have aircraft, total.
With the exception of the A-1 and F-105 force, these losses, while severe, were nevetheless not crippling because we were able to 1) build replacement aircraft in a reasonable amount of time, and 2) we had sufficiently large aircraft fleets that we could absorb these losses. Neither is true today.
@G2mil: "The A-10s suffered losses because they were sent into the fight while the lightweight fighters tossed GPS bombs from afar."
DeleteDuring the first Gulf War several F/EF-111 strike packages flew into deep into Iraq (e.g. Tikrit) penetrating at sub 400' altitudes - because F-111s were designed to do that.
GAB
A little late but I'd like to point out the F111s predecessor, the F105 Thunderchief, was also designed to do that and despite being an excellent aircraft, was removed from service from combat losses.
DeleteI do not put much faith in the combat lessons learned in the First Gulf War, that conflict is can be blamed for a significant portion of the issues currently facing the military as whole, a prime example of victory disease.
"I do not put much faith in the combat lessons learned in the First Gulf War, that conflict is can be blamed for a significant portion of the issues currently facing the military"
DeleteReally? First time I've heard that. Give me some specific examples of lessons you think have now harmed the military. Honestly, I haven't got a clue what you're thinking so it ought to be interesting.
@Purple Calico The F-105 was designed as a single seat penetrating 'nuclear' fighter bomber; the F-111 was designed as a multi-role, multi-service, fighter bomber. Both were maintenance intensive air frames, but the F-105 showed a number of structural issues early on.
DeleteI argue that the F-111 proved far more effective and survivable in two polar opposite combat environments (Vietnam vs Iraq).
GAB
The 1st Gulf war first & foremost, instilled in many the notion that war could be quick & easy with minimum losses of men & equipment, which in turn leads us to defense cuts of men & equipment... if we're not suffering attrition, why do we need large reserves of both.
DeleteThen, under that logic, we started building platforms that don't need to easily replaced, etc, etc.
Far better author's have written on this subject than I, if you want, I can track some down and post the links here.
@GAB
DeleteMy knowledge of the F111s combat record in Vietnam is quite limited, thou I'd like to note F105 was in use throughout the entire duration of the conflict in mostly anti-air suppression, something I do not believe the F111 was tasked with when reintroduced into the Vietnam war in 1972.
That said, the F111s performance in the 1st Gulf war is legendary, but Iraq's air defenses were not particularly impressive.
@purple Calico - The F-111As flew plenty of strikes against air defense systems, frequently single-ship strikes. The EF-111 was a legendary tactical EW aircraft that had capabilities that are still sorely missed. Even the EA-6B lacked some of the capabilities of the EF-111.
DeleteGAB
"instilled in many the notion that war could be quick & easy ... leads us to defense cuts"
DeleteNothing I've encountered over the years leads me to believe anyone has concluded that! I would say the lesson learned from that conflict was that the way to conduct a war is with overwhelming force and unrestrained violence. That conclusion has appeared in print many times over the years. Have you ever seen your conclusion stated anywhere as a justification for defense cuts? The only stated justification I've ever seen for defense cuts has been the illusory "peace dividend" or the misguided desire for increased social programs.
This is entirely predictable. The AF generals don't want to be in the CAS business, therefore they believe it is not neeeded, therefore they plan to retire the A-10. In the next conflict they'll release that in fact A-10 style CAS is needed in some way, therefore they'll want to be in that business, but won't have a suitable tool. They'll use what they have and do the job less well with higher costs. Then the lesson will be forgotten and the cycle will repeat.
ReplyDeleteSpeculative fantasy here: Since the Air Force doesn't seem to really want to do CAS anyway, perhaps that mission (along with the remaining A10s) should be shifted to the Marines. Marine Air is much more focused on supporting ground troops than the Air Force, for which this mission seems to be a secondary mission of less interest than some of their other missions.
ReplyDeleteObviously this will never happen for all kinds of political reasons, including within the Marine Corps (conflict vs the F-35B, for example). But hey, a guy can dream, right?
China had completed retiring all Q-5 ground attack aircrafts in 2017. Last new Q-5 was built in 2012. PLA found that this kind of aircrafts were no longer fit for modern wars. Yes, Q-5 is not as capable as A-10 but both are same vulnerable against today's SAM. There are many other ways to conduct close-in air supports. Drone is only one of them.
ReplyDeleteHow would China know what's suitable for combat today more than the US?? Fact is, they dont. We have weeks-old data to look at. When was the last time China engaged in combat CAS? Just because China does somthing doesnt mean its an intelligent or good decision!!! And what other ways exist now that can accomplish the job like an A-10 can?? The answer is: nothing.
DeleteBring back the Army Air Corps.
ReplyDeleteExcellent idea!
DeleteThe A-10 and any other CAS should be shifted to the Army.
ReplyDeleteHi. The comment policy says that the comments are meant to further the discussion on the associated post.
ReplyDeleteWhat happens if I want to ask a question or make a comment on naval matters that aren't related to the specific posts. For example, the UK has just released its Defence Investment Plan, and I have looked at it through the lens of the various discussions on this blog (very helpful to do so btw).
Do we wait for a post about the DIP before commenting and if there are no such posts, then does that mean the topic was probably not relevant or interesting enough for this blog?
One thought that crossed my mind was the emphasis in the DIP on drones and various new automated platforms for arsenal ship, sensing, asw etc. versus the view here that while drones have their place, relying on them, especially in the wide Pacific would be a mistake.
Another thought was that the Royal Navy used to be a reliable "partner" for the US Navy (albeit much less these days given their vessel numbers and availability). With the new DIP, they will have even fewer vessels and are unlikely to be able to partner / help / whatever you want to call it the US Navy in the future. Am reminded of CNO's previous comments that the US Navy should not bother about "partners" or "training with them" given all the associated issues and it looks like this will play out with the Royal Navy.
Sorry for this long post, just wanted to ask about non-post comments.
"What happens if I want to ask a question or make a comment on naval matters that aren't related to the specific posts. "
DeleteWell, you just did! Since I don't do open posts very often, you're welcome to do exactly what you did.
The RN is rationalizing their insufficient budget by claiming that drones are just as effective as manned assets. That's absolute nonsense and shows the moral cowardice of the naval leadership. There comes a point where you have to stand up and tell the truth. The RN is being eviscerated and turned into a third world navy.