A reader recently launched a mini-rant about the
classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship, claiming it should be a
heavy cruiser, instead. This led me to
reflect on what it really is. Heavy cruiser? Light cruiser? Oversized destroyer? Arsenal ship?
Something else?
As you all know, President Trump has a fondness for
hyperbole (turning Canada into the 51st state, seizing Greenland,
this pretend battleship, etc.) which is often just a prelude to subsequent
negotiations (he loves making deals!).
Only the left takes the obvious hyperbole as meaning anything. The wiser and calmer among us recognize it
for what it is and get a chuckle out of it.
Thus, the classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship is
strictly for public relations purposes and, perhaps, a bit of a thumbing of the
nose at China.
So, if it’s not a battleship, what is it? Acknowledging that we lack enough
specifications to draw much in the way of definitive conclusions, let’s go down
the list of classifications, just for fun, and see what, if anything fits.
Battleship – It’s
clearly not a battleship as it lacks armor, survivability, and effective fire
support for land forces among other shortcomings.
Heavy Cruiser – A
heavy cruiser is a mini-battleship with appropriately heavy armor, guns (land
attack), and anti-ship weaponry. Again,
this ship is clearly not a heavy cruiser.
Light Cruiser – These
are compromise ships that try to excel at one aspect of heavier ship’s tasks
while retaining some armor and survivability and, most importantly, holding to
a cost-conscious construction budget.
They may be specialized as anti-air, anti-surface, escort, or other
tasks. Trump’s battleship could fall
somewhere in this category, in some respects, although it is stunningly not
budget-friendly and lacks a specialization so it’s not really a light cruiser.
Oversize Destroyer
– Trump’s ship certainly falls into this category in terms of the lack of armor
and survivability but it has way too much in the way of weapons and is insanely
expensive for a destroyer, oversize or not.
LCS – Trump’s
ship checks a lot of the boxes for being an LCS! It tries to be all things. It depends on mostly non-existent
systems. It has no clear mission
focus. One could plausibly call it a
hugely oversized, astoundingly expensive LCS although, thankfully, no one has
yet mentioned interchangeable modules.
Arsenal Ship –
The arsenal ship is a concept ship that is, essentially, a mobile missile barge
with only that one function. We’re
getting close, here. Trump’s ship is,
essentially, a mobile missile barge albeit with large scoops of non-existent,
fantasy gold plating (rail gun, laser, etc.) piled on and lots of independent
capabilities that an arsenal ship would lack.
It also conflates anti-air and strike missions instead of focusing on
just one. Nevertheless, this is the
closest fit as far as classification.
That said, as an arsenal ship it is a hideously poor design
as evidenced by the cost and multiple fantasy systems. An arsenal ship should be a minimally
functional, cheap barge for carrying missiles for some other platform to
control.
Conclusion
The only conclusion is that, like every recent Navy ship
program, the “battleship” is just a collection of disjointed technologies,
mostly non-existent, cobbled together and slapped with the inspiring label of “battleship”. It lacks a CONOPS and, certainly, no formal Analysis
of Alternatives has been performed.
Given the extremely low probability of it ever actually
being built, we should simply view it as an indicator of Trump’s enthusiasm for
a strong Navy and hope that enthusiasm eventually gets channeled into more
productive and useful assets.
As far as this post, take it as a bit of amusement. Don’t get too worked up over it.
On the strong navy front, the NYT had an oped decrying the state of Navy that wouldn't be out of place here.
ReplyDeleteFirst appearance of ATM in the Times since Roosevelt ?
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/01/opinion/iran-hormuz-navy-south-china-sea-naval-power.html?unlocked_article_code=1.fVA.Euld.6wcN7yp9xo4S&smid=nytcore-ios-share
Eliot Cohen had a good section of Navy commentary in the Atlantic a few weeks ago too: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/iran-war-reveals-american-weakness/686532/?gift=cJtrN_LjQGP_7J-HrEDiB5LGSktz1nOrQQEbICdY5vc&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share
Delete"NYT had an oped decrying the state of Navy"
DeleteAs you note, for readers of this blog, the article was nothing new. For casual NYT readers it might be a worthwhile read. The author's basic premise is also incorrect. He blames the demise of the Navy and our resultant world standing on the decrease in the size of the Navy. He could not be more wrong. The problem is not the decreasing size of the Navy but the decreasing political willpower to use it. China hasn't taken over the South China Sea because it has more ships than we do. It took over the Sea because it had the will to do so and we lacked the will to stop it. Iran doesn't control the Strait of Hormuz (even before this current conflict); we allow them to control it because we lack the will to oppose it.
There is no amount of ships that can make up for lack of will. China sees our forces as the hollow, impotent force it is not due to size but due to lack of will to use our force. Even in Iran, right now, we lack the will to finish the job decisively (same mistake we made in Desert Storm).
But then again, didn't we have the Long Beach Class Cruisers, The USS Bainbridge (CGN-25), USS Truxtun (CGN-35), California-class cruiser and the Virginia-class cruiser
ReplyDeleteI hadn't paid much attention to the particular specs of the Trump Battleship, since it seemed obvious vaporware and not worth spending time on - but I had vaguely assumed that in calling it a battleship they were proposing armor on it, and am surprised to learn that's not the case
ReplyDeleteWe have so few specs on it that it's possible armor may be planned but I've heard not even a rumor of such and armor would be a major departure for a modern ship so I assume there won't be armor. Of course, I give this no chance of actually being built so it's a moot point.
Delete"surprised to learn that's not the case"
DeleteCan any bad decision by the Navy be a surprise, at this point? This is also why you never make common sense assumptions involving the Navy.
I kind of like the Trump Class Battleship.
ReplyDeleteIt is the culmination of all the ills that are the modern US Navy, consolidated in one glorious monstrosity.
Lutefisk
Edit:
DeleteI just realized that it does not specifically specify that F-35B aircraft will launch from the fantail flight deck, it just says VTOL aircraft.
So it's not perfected....yet.
Lutefisk
It had previously mentioned the ability to hangar and launch v-22s, but that already looks to be fading.
Delete$17B it won't be funded. Also, scant details assume a 32J railgun, what happens if this is 16J, or 40J, how much does that change the design? Asking because USN doesn't have a railgun working, what if the ship actually gets built before the railgun is ready? For the $$$,, that's 3-4 more Burke's, or some combo of ships and munitions.
ReplyDeleteOr a few dozen asw escort ships...just saying.
DeleteI have yet to see any concrete evidence that anyone has built a railgun that doesn't self-destruct after a few rounds.
DeleteFor $17 billion you could update all four Iowa class ships.
DeleteLutefisk
"For $17 billion you could update all four Iowa class ships."
DeleteYes, no, and maybe.
Yes, you could certainly do a lot of upgrades in habitability, electronics, computers, ?engines?, communications, etc.
No, you could not upgrade anything that requires penetrating the armored hull/superstructure or needs large superstructure area such as radar panels, SURVIVABLE (armored) sensors, VLS, turbine air intake/exhausts, ?engines?, etc.
Maybe you could upgrade 5" guns, rack mounted anti-ship missiles (overpressure concerns from main guns), sensors (overpressure), electronics (main gun shock), computers (shock), etc.
It is really hard to estimate shipyard costs, I would venture to say nearly impossible for a layman like myself.
DeleteI try to look at things this way; could I update an Iowa for the price tag for two new construction Arleigh Burkes?
Using this 2017 post to estimate the cost of modern electronics and weapons, and adding in some inflation, you could probably do the electronics and weapons systems upgrades for $1.5 billion. Just to be conservative, say $2 billion.
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/10/burke-class-cost-breakdown.html
That leaves a little over $2 billion for the engines.
Assuming that the ship is going to be converted into an electrical driven ship, you'd need to remove the boilers and engines from the existing ships.
You would also need to install 8 x 25 MW marine electric motors to drive the screws.
And let's say 10 LM2500 gen-sets to provide the cornucopia of electrical power for the ship's drive motors, sensors, weapons, and future needs.
A quick internet search indicates that the above-listed equipment could be purchased for less than $500 million.
If accurate, that leaves a little bit over $1.5 billion available for the removal and installation process.
The existing funnels would need to be replaced (add in the cost for those too), as would the air intake systems.
The existing engines and boilers could be cut up and removed in pieces through the openings created doing the funnel/air intake replacement.
The electric motors and turbine gen-sets would be installed through those same openings. Plus all the piping, ducting, and electrical wiring and busses.
Would the money be enough?
I don't know.
But from a practicality standpoint, it would still be easier than taking sunken battleships out of the mud of Pearl Harbor and then repairing and modernizing those ships for combat duty.
Lutefisk
Whoa, whoa, whoa! Back the scow up there a moment! There is a WORLD of difference between new construction costs and retrofitting and I know you know that but you may be overlooking the context which is an armored battleship. It's one thing to cut openings through a deck or bulkhead of a Burke which is about the thickness of aluminum foil and cutting through several inches of battleship armor. It's also one thing to tack some replacement aluminum foil over the hole you made in a Burke and quite another to replace/repair several inches of no longer manufactured specialty armor on a battleship. Have you contemplated how many decks and bulkheads you'd have to cut openings (large openings!!!) through on a battleship to replace the power plant and drive train? Of course, you could approach from the side of the ship but then you'd have to cut through 16 inches of armor (or whatever it actually is) and somehow replace/repair it without compromising the armor's integrity.
DeleteThat brings us to design and planning. You don't just show up with a handful of welders, pick a spot, and start torching. It requires detailed study and planning to decide how to "attack" the ship, what equipment will be in the way, how to protect/move it, and how to reroute/reinstall everything. Upgrades are several times the cost of new installation and are far more challenging on a battleship!
Upgrades can be done but likely not the type of wholesale, "let's remake this into a modern battleship" kind of approach so many envision. We would have to limit ourselves to selective, upgrades and less deeply embedded, smaller systems.
We've talked about the intake/exhaust requirements and I see no way to establish the necessary number of size of intake/exhaust ductings and penetrations that would be required to do as you envision without compromising armor integrity to the point that you no longer have functional battleship. Far too many penetrations leading straight through the armor and into the bowels of the ship. USS Iowa becomes the HMS Hood or USS Arizona.
design plans
I agree that the conversion would be difficult, but I don't see why it would be impossible.
DeleteTo access the citadel, some area of armor will need to be cut through.
The deck of the Iowas generally was protected with a bomb deck of 1", an armored deck of 5"-6", and a splinter deck of 1". That would be a preferable access over cutting through the very thick side belts.
The existing mechanicals will need to be removed, but they are essentially scrap and can be cut up into manageable sized pieces.
The electric motors and LM2500 turbines need to be placed in, but anything that is assembled could be disassembled and reassembled, if necessary.
The hole created shouldn't need to be enormous.
And I've been in the engine spaces of the USS New Jersey (it is, of course, a museum ship). Once the old equipment is removed, there is a lot of space that would become available.
The obvious point to create this entry is where the funnels and air intakes already exist. They will need to be updated anyway, so that would be the logical place to make this happen.
As far as airflow, the existing oil boilers need about 600,000 cubic feet per minute of air to function efficiently. That is achieved through forced air rather than natural aspiration.
The 10 x LM2500 turbines would need about double that amount of air when all are in operation simultaneously.
That makes sense when considering the upgrade from 212,000 hp to 400,000 hp.
This would need to be achieved through a higher velocity of forced air. I would expect that to be well within our technological capabilities in 2026.
As far as replacing any removed armor when reworking the armored airflow channels and extraction/insertion hole, that shouldn't be insurmountable either.
Any armor slabs removed should be reusable.
But even if they aren't, new armor can be added.
Of course, new armor would not be the same as that removed. But does it need to be?
The armor on the Iowa class ships was specifically designed to counter 1940s weapons.
Bomb decks to activate the fuses of armor piercing bombs so that they explode against the main armor deck. Armor configured to de-cap AP shells.
Modern weapons are much more akin to HE bombs and artillery rounds.
The armor must protect against blast damage and pressure waves.
This should be able to be accomplished with layers of
STS, closed cell steel foam, and Kevlar.
It might even be more effective against blast effects, and would almost certainly be lighter.
I truly do not see why any of this can't be accomplished if approached with a can-do mindset.
Lutefisk
"I don't see why it would be impossible."
DeleteNo one says it would be impossible ... just very challenging and expensive.
In addition to the top level items you identified for upgrading, consider the mundane stuff that would have to be ripped out and replaced. All of the plumbing is 1940's to 1980's materials. What kind of condition do you think it's in? If it were a house, you'd have to replace it all to deal with the built up corrosion and fouling. What kind of condition do you think the miles and miles of cabling is in? Again, you'd have to replace it all. Consider the hundreds/thousands of valves that are all 40-80+ years old. All would have to be replaced. And the list of mundane stuff goes on and on. Every fluid storage tank would have to be replaced (you wouldn't accept a 40-80 year old water heater tank in your home, would you?) After this amount of time, you'd have to basically rebuild the entire ship while cutting through every deck and bulkhead over and over again.
One of the supposed major problems with, and reasons why the Navy refused to upgrade the Ticos was condition of all the fluid storage tanks and the cost/difficulty of refurbishing or replacing them.
You'd have to run miles and miles of new fiber cable throughout the ship.
And the list goes on.
Not impossible but far more challenging and costly than you think.
I agree with you that there would be a lot of maintenance to do on those Iowa class ships.
DeleteI also like your analogy about house maintenance, especially as I own a house built in 1915 so it literally hits home.
But even with that, I don't replace every pipe or mechanical or electrical wiring automatically. I let them continue to work until they need attention.
And while the effort and cost would be high, it would still be cheaper than trying to build gunships from scratch.
When I laid out my plan for returning the Iowa class ships to the fleet, I used a rotation system to ensure their viability.
In quick review:
Only one ship would be in the active fleet except in times of need.
The four battleships would be split, with the Iowa and Missouri in San Francisco and the New Jersey and Wisconsin in Norfolk.
Each pair would get a single full complement crew of 1500-1800 sailors.
Each pair would also get a single full complement crew of reservists.
The active duty ship would switch back and forth between the Norfolk group and the San Francisco group.
The active ship would spend one full year with the fleet.
The active duty crew of the active ship would, of course, serve on the active ship.
The other active crew would put the ship just coming off of active service into drydock, and then begin working up the next ship to be ready to serve in the active fleet.
The reserve crews would spend their weekend drills and annual training times performing maintenance on the idled ships, taking classes, and serving on the active ship when active sailors need leave time.
In time of war, these crews could be quickly blended to create up to four capable crews to man up to four of the Iowa class ships, as needed.
The maintenance value of this system is that each ship gets three years of maintenance time for each year of sailing. With that system these ships would last indefinitely.
Of course, that is not the way the US Navy seems to do maintenance.
When I was in the army, we did our preventive maintenances on schedule. Sometimes it felt stupid to be changing clean oil and grease in trucks that had hardly been used.
We over-maintained our equipment.
The Navy seems to do the opposite. The are given what are effectively, multi-billion dollar machines...and they do as little maintenance as they feel that they can get away with.
They under-maintain their equipment.
That is not likely to change until Naval Officer careers start getting derailed for unperformed maintenance.
The three year time between active duty stints would keep these ships in top condition and also allow time for upgrades to systems and the crew costs for 4 Iowa class ships would be the same as for a single CVN.
Lutefisk
"I don't replace every pipe or mechanical or electrical wiring automatically. I let them continue to work until they need attention."
DeleteAnd that's a moderately reasonable approach to take FOR A HOME (although I prefer to replace BEFORE something breaks!). A breakdown in a home is easily repaired (parts and service are readily at hand) and IS NOT A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH. Conversely, waiting for breakdowns of antiquated equipment in a war scenario IS A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH and repairs are not necessarily readily at hand especially in today's Navy which has all but eliminated onboard fabrication shops and skilled trades. So, it is mandatory to bring a ship's mundane, but vital, services up to "code", as it were.
Of course, there are a lot of different approaches to maintenance.
DeleteI was following along with the homeowner's analogy, but have worked with a number of approaches.
As a young army officer, I was a scout helicopter pilot. There is certainly someplace that you don't want to run something until it fails, as the consequences for a failed part are severe.
One of my additional duties was to oversee the squadron's motor pool.
There we performed maintenance (mostly trucks) on a schedule, changing a lot of 'clean' oil and white grease that had barely been used.
Of course, that needs to happen too, since regardless of usage, time will cause all of those fluids to 'return to nature' eventually, as they say.
When I got out of the army, I supervised diesel mechanics for a major trucking company.
That wasn't life and death, but when you have a just-in-time inventory load heading to an auto plant, and your company will pay massive fines for shutting down a production line, it can certainly feel that way.
But the trucking company approach was interesting. They needed to make a profit, and you can go broke by either over-maintaining equipment or under-maintaining and having highly inconvenient and expensive break downs over the road.
Our most valuable mechanics were not the ones that worked the fastest or hardest, although you certainly wanted those attributes.
The most valuable guys were the ones that could make the repair, replace, or let-run decisions.
Will that component make it to the next preventive maintenance?
Can it be repaired?
Does it need to be replaced?
Mechanics that are simply 'parts changers' will make a company non-profitable in a hurry.
That is the approach I'd like to see out of the Navy.
Intelligent decisions made through experience.
I wasn't in the Navy, and don't know their culture specifically, but I'm sure that the old Chiefs have a pretty good idea what can run and what can't.
That wise approach is what I'd like to see out of the them. It's just really hard to make that work in a big bureaucracy like the Navy (or the Army for that matter).
What I see (from the outside looking in) is a Navy that instead approaches maintenance from a 'what can we get away without doing' standpoint.
They've been trusted with multi-billion dollar machines, and they don't seem to be good stewards of that trust.
As far as the battleships, make sound judgements as to what needs to get repaired/replaced and what doesn't (easier said than done, of course).
Lutefisk
"I wasn't in the Navy, and don't know their culture specifically, but I'm sure that the old Chiefs have a pretty good idea what can run and what can't."
DeleteThat was true once upon a time but all the old Chiefs are retired. The new "old" Chiefs have grown up in the "hands off" maintenance culture. Maintenance costs money so we'll defer maintenance, hence, the rotting physical condition of our ships.
If you haven't, be sure to read the INSURV reports. They're damning.
"If you haven't, be sure to read the INSURV reports. They're damning."
DeleteI'll do that, thanks!
Lutefisk
Note that the INSURV reports are the best possible spin on the situation and that's after the inspected ships KNEW the inspection was coming and had time to make as much right as they could. An actual, no-notice inspection would produce results only half as good as what was found and what was found was not good.
DeleteI've done a post or two on INSURV inspections. Check the keyword "INSURV" in the archives. Good place to start.
My only question is... how does it end up with a price tag in the neighborhood of a Ford?? To me... if you just delete all the nonsense (railgun n lasers), it's really just a bigger DDG... Get the VLS count at Tico levels and poof... a Tico successor! Big enough to act as an AAW commander, and big enough to have the big SPY panels. Under the vaporware camo netting hides a new cruiser... an upgrade to the DDG(X) which was a program I expected to fail anyway... so... now we're shooting for the moon... hoping to end up with at least a competent and relevant new CG/DDG after it's whittled down (??). All the Presidents hyperbole and boasting aside... I think it's an end run around the DDG(X) Program... hidden under the Battleship name and silly armament specs...
ReplyDelete"after it's whittled down"
DeleteThe problem is that the Navy has never "whittled down" a ship acquisition program. They do the opposite by gold plating. Only once the ship is under construction and costs have begun to skyrocket do they begin to cut performance specs resulting in a neutered ship.
And perhaps the new (now departed ) SECNAV, or someone else finally noticed that? Maybe someone has an epiphany and decided to try and rectify old habits? I know... unlikely and probably not the case. But... we're all entitled to our fantasies lol...
DeleteI mean... if you roll out plans for another ship with powrr/weight/space for nonexistent weapons... once you delete the wonderweapins that don't exist ( removing the gold plating) and pare fown the size acvordingly, what do we get?? I'd say a big new cruiser!
DeleteRemove all the gold plating and non-existent technologies and downsize the hull accordingly and you're left with a non-stealthy, unarmored, missile barge or, as we refer to that type of ship, an arsenal ship and, as such, it would still be hugely overspec'ed.
DeleteThere is something wrong with American shipbuilding. The no frills FFX, with the same combat capability as LCS, is projected to cost 1 billion.
Delete"There is something wrong with American shipbuilding."
DeleteThere is but there's far more wrong with NAVY shipbuilding. Industry will build whatever the customer pays for. It's the customer (the Navy) that constantly issues change orders during construction, insists that industry begin construction without completed blueprints, establishes unachievable deadlines, imposes ridiculous overhead and legal requirements, routinely terminates construction contracts well short of the bid amounts, etc. And then we blame industry for high costs?????
That's not to say that industry is blameless but they are nowhere near the main problem. As evidence, our shipbuilding industry routinely builds very large commercial ships on time, on budget, and at reasonable costs because their customer follows well established best practices for design and construction. If industry were allowed to apply the same best practices to naval construction, you'd see similar good performance.
What ever the USN specifies it needs a VLS cell count greater than a PLAN Type 55. Trump should push to go the whole hog and build a nuclear ship.
ReplyDelete"needs a VLS cell count greater than a PLAN Type 55"
DeleteWhy?
"build a nuclear ship"
Again, why?
Nuclear only makes sense for a large cruiser in order to have power generation to fit in the big ticket items: AAW radar, microwave weapons, laser weapons, railgun.
DeleteAs it stands, the Burkes are already maxed out on electrical generation - just adding the SEWIP EW package is already straining their power generation capacity.
"makes sense for a large cruiser in order to have power generation to fit in the big ticket items:"
DeleteThat makes sense ONLY if there is no conventional way to supply the requisite power, however, that is not the case. Burkes lack the power because they weren't designed for it. The Zumwalt, for example, WAS designed for much greater power levels with purely conventional means. Power is simply a matter of adding sufficient generating equipment and that's just a matter of providing internal space for the equipment.
One should also note that, while they have been promised for decades, microwave weapons, laser weapons, and railguns do not yet exist on any viable, effective scale.