We’ll probably never know the real reason why the Navy
decided to terminate the Constellation program but one of the factors certainly
had to be the glacially slow pace of construction progress.
Constellation was laid down 12-Apr-2024 although, as with
most modern ships, construction of subassemblies had already begun. Now, Nov-2025, 19+ months later, the ship is
reportedly 12% complete.[1] That’s 12%
in 19+ months. That’s an average of 0.6%
construction progress per month. At that
rate, it would require 167 months (13.9 years!) to complete the construction
and even then, that would only be the basic hull. Fitting out would require many more months.
Fourteen years to partially build a frigate?
If you were SecNav, would you have continued this program?
 |
| Constellation Under Construction? |
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants
Not sure the point in gauging construction progress without a completed design. We also know they were reconfiguring the yard while finishing the last LCSs. The Synchrolift was to be complete in November 2023. Not sure when it was completed but we have 2 sources making it clear it was still not done by the beginning of February 2024. Now that the lift is complete and LCS are out of the yard, I am interested to see how many of the Saudi ships they can deliver in 2026. Original date for delivery of the final of those ships was to be the summer of next year. No sense in rushing the FFG until those are out of the way. At least assuming a BAU set of priorities.
ReplyDeleteYou almost seem to be defending the glacially slow progress of the Constellation prior to cancellation but I'm not sure. Tell me if I'm misinterpreting you.
ReplyDelete"Not sure the point in gauging construction progress without a completed design."
I'm not sure the point in STARTING construction without a design and yet that's exactly what we did.
If you're trying to excuse the slow progress due to yard equipment issues then the yard should never have been given a contract until they were fully capable.
"No sense in rushing the FFG"
The Navy has publicly stated that the Chinese will invade Taiwan within in the next few years (you can believe that or not but it's what they've claimed). The entire LCS and Zumwalt classes have been abject failures. You could not have more reasons to rush the FFG!
Not defending, but if we fail to accurately understand what's happening we will just flub it up a new way. If we see 4 Saudi ships launch in 2026 I think it might make the case that the building is less the problem than all of the other known problems. My bet is we see more holiday gotchas from SecNav no one is going to like initially. He wants faster. The example we have is LSM. Continue an existing FMS program to build an existing design and buy the data package for a follow on ship in the same role. In this case that would be a Saudi MMSC followed by the Taiwan light frigate using the Gibbs & Cox design which is basically a baby Connie.
Delete"
DeleteThe Navy has publicly stated that the Chinese will invade Taiwan within in the next few years (you can believe that or not but it's what they've claimed). The entire LCS and Zumwalt classes have been abject failures."
The Navy is going to find out the hard way that no matter what they think the 'Burkes themselves are attrition units in the face of a full naval fight.
Yep, $2.5B attrition units.
DeleteAt this point I’d be fine with expensive attrition units as long as there are boats in the water.
DeleteWasn’t like the Constellation was going to be a “cheap” platform anyway, it was a moderately cheaper but also less capable Burke, right?
Perhaps it's on the archives and I missed it... but is there an explanation of the different kinds of contracts the Navy writes?? There seem to be so many, and yet, we seemingly always end up over upset and late on deliveries. I understand the Navys incessant change orders throw a wrench in the works... but isn't there a way to write contracts that could guarantee on time and on budget deliveries? Perhaps that's only possible with complete blueprints ahead of construction and no changes after it starts?? I see "incentive" in the types of contracts... and have no problem with giving an "early/under budget bonus but...
ReplyDeleteContracts have been mentioned many times but I've never done a post on them. It doesn't matter what type of contract; one way or another, there are always provisions for overruns and schedule slippages. Yes, asking a company to bid on a project that lacks a finalized design is insane and yet we do it routinely.
DeleteThe Federal Acquisition Regulations describe types of contracts in chapter 16 here: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part-16
DeleteIn general, the Navy and government at large, does a really good job of getting value on firm fixed price contracts where what the government is buying (e.g. pencils) and at what cost are clearly spelled out. Where the abuse comes in are on the 'cost plus' type contracts where the 'what' (e.g. engine, weapon, computer...) is negotiable and the cost is actual cost 'plus' predetermined profit for the contractor. The Navy is notorious for changing design specs, often modifying, or even ripping out nearly complete hull sections to incorporate some new design (e.g. a new helo hanger). Contractors are totally happy to comply because it means more work at guaranteed, generous profit margins.
GAB
If you think that the LCS and FFG programs are failures, wait until you see the DDG(X) program around 2026-2030's... (it will be the tomb of the US Navy)
ReplyDeleteThe Navy is fortunate the American public is largely unaware of the amount of money wasted the last 20 years on ships that are useless. My co-workers are of the mind that every ship in the US Fleet carries nuclear weapons. Put the idea in the head of Elon Musk to design the Navy a warship. You can laugh at that, yet that could bear fruit. This inability to build a warship is beyond ridiculous. The Navy seems to be run by flim flam men.
ReplyDeleteJim
While Elon certainly has some great qualities, his frequent comments about drones being the future, and how manned aircraft and aircraft carriers are obsolete/easy targets means he'd need some classes on naval warfare before being turned loose...
DeleteMore for interest than relevance, but for comparison purposes go back more than 100 years to the Royal Navy’s HMS Dreadnought.
ReplyDeleteThis was the world’s first all big gun battleship, and the Royal Navy’s first ever warship powered by steam turbines, so plenty of brand new technology for the shipyard to work around.
The Dreadnought was laid down in October 1905, launched in February 1906, and commissioned in November of that same year.
Quite an achievement.
Couldn’t happen today.
The US did similar stuff.
DeleteAccording to Wikipedia, the first Perry class frigate was laid down on 12 June 1975 and commissioned on 17 December 1977 (about two and a half years). And the Fletcher class destroyers went even faster. The first one was laid down on 2 October 1941 and commissioned on 30 June 1942 (less than 9 months). Of course in that case the numbers were much higher, the technology was simpler, and it was an existential war so maybe the rules were different.
We used to be able to do this stuff routinely! Perhaps we should assign a couple of historians (or maybe CNO?) to do a study and remind us of how we were able to do it!
Bob, ‘we’ are not the same people we used to be.
DeleteLook at the pics of the boys who went to war 80+ years ago; my dad
was one of them.
Many of us don’t even speak the same language.
We just live in the same place.
It's hard to say, but when we talk about ships and tech being complicated today, I think it's all relative. The ships of WWII probably seemed extremely complex in their day as well, and I don't think that "complexity" is an excuse for long build times. Compare the ships with the state of the art of automobiles at the time- cars were absolutely stone age. Aircraft used turbo- and superchargers, which didn't find there way to cars commonly for 40 years. Fuel injection got it's start then as well, with the first crude systems only following ( and failing) on cars 20 years later, and only becoming functional and widespread 40+ yrs later. Ships ended up with electromechamical fire control computers, radar and sonar, etc. But cars didn't even progress past points ignition systems for another 20+ years.
DeleteSo I think that our WWII warships ( among other things) probably felt much more Star Wars ( Buck Rogers??) to those that designed and built them than we think...
"I don't think that "complexity" is an excuse for long build times."
DeleteIt most certainly is ... to an extent. In earlier times, you'd take two pieces of metal, place them side by side and weld or rivet them together and you were done. Today, the tolerances are very small, everything has to be perfectly aligned, exotic materials require specialized welding/attachment equipment and methods, surface coatings require exquisite care, and so on. A WWII aircraft had, I don't know, several hundred feet of wiring? Today's aircraft have, what, several dozen miles of wiring? And so on.
Complexity does cause longer build times which is why I constantly harp on keeping designs to the minimum required for the function rather than the maximum.
Time of build has many factors other than just weld time (or whatever measure). For example, consider the stifling avalanche of inspections, rules, approvals, environmental checks, and so on that a ship/aircraft has to undergo today compared to - nothing - in WWII. As another example, consider all the OSHA mandated procedures, health breaks, health exams, safety programs and checks, as well as government mandated training sessions on diversity, equal opportunity, sexual harassment, etc. that today's workers are required to attend. That's all time away from the job which makes the job longer. In WWII, you worked 8 hours with a quick lunch break (if you were lucky!) and that's it.
Now, that doesn't mean that all of this stuff that delays builds is good - most of it is worthless! But it is what it is. It's up to us (the Navy) to do everything it can to shorten the build time by controlling the factors it has control over like minimizing the complexity of designs, eliminating change orders, and so on.
I'm reminded of the M4. I know some people hate it but to me it is a brilliant design. I realize the complexity isn't the same but the tank itself was built not only to tank but also to be reliable and maintainable. It was also built to be 'good enough'. Compared to the German cats it was a logistical miracle, and was good enough to fight in 90% of the situations it found itself in.
DeleteWe need more of that philosophy. Purpose built ships. And ships designed to be built and maintained.
Its the difference between a Bugatti and a Mustang GT. The Bugatti wins in almost every race, but you can only buy very few and you spend half the time they exist just maintaining them.
Ironically, the FFG(X) team won the DAU David A. Packard award in 2020 as a top tier Navy acquisition program.
ReplyDeleteU.S. Navy FFG(X) Program Team
"This team accelerated an acquisition schedule of the Navy’s next generation Small Surface Combatant, the Frigate, advancing ship design and procurement by four to six years, equating to more than $500 million in cost avoidance. These eforts resulted in the early award of a multibillion-dollar, open competition, Detail Design and Construction contract. This new contract was awarded more than four months ahead of schedule despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Navy leadership cited this team as a positive example of accelerated acquisition that is changing how the Navy designs and procures ships".
Here is link:
Deletehttps://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrate/DATLFiles/Mar-April_2021/DEFACQ-DATL_MarApr2021_2020Awards.pdf
I commented this earlier; that the Navy, if they wanted a DE, would be better with something like a modernized Knox. I read this about the Knox:
ReplyDelete"These ships were built on a prod6uction line, with prefabricated modules being assembled upside down, welded together and then rotated into an upright position."
Knox, the lead ship, and likely the slowest, was awarded in '64, laid down in '65, launched in '66, and commissioned in '69.
We have completely lost the ability to plan, design to plan, build to design, and put hulls in the water.
It's infuriating.
Would love to see a modernized Knox. My last ship was one. Really nice ships for their size. I would pretty much leave the weapons layout as it was. Ours had a BPDMS (sea sparrow) launcher aft for self defense that was later replaced with CIWS. Just eyeballing pictures of the box launcher for ESSM the two look to be about the same size. The ASROC launcher had a reload magazine located below with the elevator/reload system under the bridge. We carried a mixed loadout of ASROC/Harpoons. The flight deck and hanger (telescopic) were sized for the SH-2 (barely). It would probably work well for a couple of large size drone. There was supposed to be a MK 48 torpedo room in the fantail (never fitted), ours was used as a crew lounge. I would change the engineering plant, you have three good size engineer spaces (engine room/fireroom/generator room) that could house diesel genpacks, HVAC and all associated equipment, and go with podded propulsion units. Get rid of the old mack, clean up the superstructure, move the hanger torpedo tubes closer to water level and you should have a nice open ocean escort again. ( I might be a little biased though).
ReplyDeleteThat sounds great, honestly. We just need the Navy to figure out what it wants to do. DE? AAW? ASW? Too often it's all of the above.
DeleteI loved how with the Knox's and Perry's they had a mission and built to it. They could do other things too in peacetime but that was bonus to the original mission it seems.
Turns out having hulls in the water and sailors to man them is a benefit all itself when those hulls have a purpose.
To me it was one of the LCS's biggest failures. It tried to be all things to all people and still fit the budget of a small purpose built unit.
"That's part of the problem."
ReplyDeleteComment deleted. Had you left out the personal insults, your comment would have stood. Feel free to repost in a polite and respectful tone.
There is one thing about the ASW stuff that confuses me. I guess I'm just missing something.
ReplyDeleteWhen we talk about the Burke in terms of ASW, from time to time I see comments like "no officer will send a $2.5 billion DDG to play tag with a submarine."
What I don't understand is this: Even if the ship IS doing ASW, why would we want it to play tag (by which I assume we mean get up close and personal) with a submarine? I thought that's what the HELICOPTERS were for.
Helo downtime, basically. 2 helos isn't quite enough to give you round the clock coverage.
DeleteAs far back as the 60s, the Japanese studied this problem and decided that the way forward was a light ASW carrier carrying at least a dozen helos, which lets you do round the clock coverage, or a surge to cover a wider area/prosecute the target. (Sticker shock from the Amatsukaze DDG killed that plan, and they had to make do with the Shirane and Haruna DDH classes, until they finally got their helo carriers in the Hyuga DDH and Izumo CVMs).
There's also the Italian helo cruiser, which is basically a gun cruiser with a flight deck and hangar large enough for 8 helos, but you don't *really* need cruiser guns for the ASW mission...
"2 helos isn't quite enough to give you round the clock coverage."
DeleteI keep hearing this too. But keep in mind that we shouldn't require an individual ship to win the war all by itself. In any actual escort situation, there will never be only one escort. For a battle group or convoy or other high value asset, in a war there will be a bunch of escorts. Maybe 5 or 10 or more. So there won't be 2 helicopters, there will be 10 or 20.
The question then becomes, is it better to distribute the helicopters among the escorts or concentrate them on a helicopter carrier. Concentrating them allows the individual escorts to be smaller and less expensive (and more risk worthy), and we can build more of them. And it's probably more cost effective to manage and maintain the helicopters if they are concentrated.
But, on the other hand, you do have to buy the extra ship (the helicopter carrier). And that ship becomes a single point of failure. Sink it, and all the helicopters go with it.
The choice between those options is above my pay grade, but it does seem to me that there's something to be said for dispersing the risk.
"I thought that's what the HELICOPTERS were for."
DeleteYou're correct to an extent and in a perfect scenario. In reality, helos are used to fix and attack rather than detect. The ship would more often provide the initial detection. Given the quietness of modern subs, that all too often will mean that by the time detection occurs the sub will already be in range of the ship (tag!). In shallow waters, detection is via active sonar which, by definition, means close contact (tag!).
Helos simply don't have the numbers to provide wide area search/detect. Consider the area that, say, a convoy's escorts must cover to eliminate the sub threat. We're talking about something like a 50-100 mile radius from the center of the convoy. Do the math for the area of that circle. It's on the order of 8000 sq.mi. to 30,000 sq.mi. !
In short, anytime there's a sub involved, the destroyer IS playing tag because any detection of a sub will likely be within the weapons range of the sub to the destroyer - hence, playing tag.
"is it better to distribute the helicopters among the escorts or concentrate them on a helicopter carrier."
DeleteAn excellent, and age-old question whose answer depends on the particular scenario and whether you actually have available ships. How many helo carriers do we currently have? None! Even if we built, say, a half dozen or so, only a very few, very high value convoys/task forces would get a helo carrier. Ships conducting isolated patrols or other lesser priority duties would not rate a helo carrier so you have to have distributed helos.
Consider a group of supposedly stealthy Burkes. Do you want to risk their detection by including a large, slow, non-stealthy helo carrier? Maybe, maybe not. Depends on the situation.
I don't think that we need as many helicopters for ASW as we seem to be thinking.
DeleteUnless I'm misunderstanding something, the detection process is going to be with fixed wing aircraft and the various sonars mounted on the ships themselves.
Helicopters are not fast and they're not efficient. They don't cover large areas and they can't fly indefinitely without needing preventive maintenance.
What they can do, though, is hover over a spot and drop a sonobuoy or use a dipping sonar to pinpoint the location of a suspected sub and drop a homing torpedo if needed.
That is super valuable.
But unless you are having a spectacularly craptastic day, your ASW escort screen is not going to be prosecuting an endless number of suspected contacts.
Every ASW ship does not need a helicopter. Every third or fourth ship having a pair of helicopters should be sufficient.
The standard ASW ship could easily be a WW2 destroyer sized ship like a Fletcher (or the improved version - Gearing).
Two or three of these could work as a team.
As part of that team, add a slightly larger ship (like a Mitscher class) that would hunt with the team, but also have a pair of helicopters to help prosecute the team's suspected contacts.
Two helicopters should be sufficient for that group. The key to that is not adding helicopters, but having 4 aircrews assigned so that you can always have two crews on duty and two crews resting. That way you can fire up the second helo on the odd chance that you need two at once.
And while helos need regular maintenance, that shouldn't be a problem if you follow CNO's missions instead of deployments philosophy.
To illustrate that point:
- If you are doing months-long deployments, you need more helicopters because some will need to go through thorough preventive maintenance at regular intervals....so your ship needs more hangar space, helicopter parts, and maintenance personnel and equipment.
- But if you go on missions, you only send out on board the ship the helicopters that are not scheduled for extensive maintenance - since you're only going out to conduct a mission and then will be back where you can swap out the helos.
I don't think this is as complicated as we are making it out to be.
Lutefisk
"your ASW escort screen is not going to be prosecuting an endless number of suspected contacts."
DeleteActually, they will be regardless of whether there are actually subs in the area or not! In combat, the prudent commander is going to pursue every suspect noise (whale farts, eddies, bottom objects, wave noise, turbulence, biologics, etc. as if it's a real contact because ... it might be! No sane commander is going to ignore a possible contact in combat. Thus, the available helos will be overwhelmed and sonobuoy depletion has been raised as concern in every semi-realistic exercise.
Here's a real world, combat example, in the Falklands war, the British prosecuted hundreds of contacts and expended most/all of their ordnance despite the fact that the Arg subs were almost never anywhere near them, based on post-war analysis.
"the detection process is going to be with fixed wing aircraft"
DeleteOccasionally, yes, but most of the time, no. We have no carrier based, fixed wing ASW aircraft so that only leaves land based. There are simply far too few land ASW assets with far too little endurance to provide 24/7 coverage for every ship, task force, convoy, or whatever that's at sea.
"No sane commander is going to ignore a possible contact in combat. Thus, the available helos will be overwhelmed and sonobuoy depletion has been raised as concern in every semi-realistic exercise."
DeleteI wonder if that is a factor of inexperience? Kind of like green ground troops will tend to shoot at everything that moves or makes a sound until they get a feel for what is actually a threat (think Guadalcanal's early days).
or
Is it just the nature of ASW warfare (which is arguably as difficult an endeavor as combat offers)?
If it's the second one, how many helicopters would be the correct number?
Lutefisk
"We have no carrier based, fixed wing ASW aircraft"
DeleteThat feels like such an enormous shortcoming for our current navy.
I don't think that there can be enough helicopters to make up for that missing component (fixed wing ASW assets).
Lutefisk
"I wonder if that is a factor of inexperience?"
DeleteNo, it is not. ASW, especially the detection portion, is an extremely difficult task and contacts are never clear cut. The best you can hope for is the barest hint of noise that might or might not be a sub. Are you going to ignore it and risk a multi-billion dollar ship? I hope not! You aggressively pursue every contact until you know it's not a sub.
"missing component (fixed wing ASW assets)."
DeleteWe lost so much when we retired the S-3 line without replacement. We lost an effective fixed wing ASW aircraft, a remarkable SigInt platform (the ES-3A), the best tanker we've had, and an excellent all around scout aircraft.
I wonder if the insistence of making every warship capable of carrying helicopters is an effort to make up what was lost when the Essex-class carriers were retired.
DeleteIt's occurred to me that an ASW ship designed to protect a large aircraft carrier doesn't need its own helicopters if the carrier has enough ASW helicopters.
"an ASW ship designed to protect a large aircraft carrier doesn't need its own helicopters if the carrier has enough ASW helicopters."
DeleteOf course, every helo on a carrier reduces the fixed wing aircraft by one. In WWII, carriers had 90+ aircraft and ALL of them were combat aircraft. An air wing today has 60+ aircraft which includes several to a dozen helos which means the real wing has only around 50 aircraft. How much we've lost since WWII in carrier combat power!
"I wonder if that is a factor of inexperience?"
DeleteA fair question. For the Falklands Conflict example, I would say not. Back in those days, the Royal Navy had around 54 frigates (excluding destroyers), and conducted ASW exercises involving dozens of craft regularly. A Cold War navy with a ASW-focus at the top of it's game.
The Admiral commanding, Sandy Woodward, was an ex-Submarine skipper who famously "defeated" CV Coral Sea in an exercise by disguising his missile-carrying ship as a cruise liner just prior to the conflict, so willing to consider sneaky tricks.
If the Royal Navy depth charged anything suspicious, I suspect it was because they thought it was worth the effort.
"If the Royal Navy depth charged anything suspicious, I suspect it was because they thought it was worth the effort."
DeleteOf course it was worth the effort. The fact that they were 99% wrong (false contacts) doesn't make it less worth the effort. Expending sensors and weapons is ALWAYS a good choice in combat if it means potentially saving a multi-billion dollar ship.
The problem is that a ship/task force only has a finite supply of sensors and weapons and, in combat, will quickly exhaust their supply pursuing false contacts, as the British found out. In fact, the British wound up being forced to ration ASW supplies because they were quickly depleting them. Of course, doing so exposed the ships to greater risk if any of the contacts had proven to be real.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence that the British EVER actually had a real contact on an Arg sub.
The point was that any number of available helos, whatever the number, would be woefully insufficient due to all the false contacts that have to be pursued.
I'd separate the questions of what does the Navy need and what Navy/industry can actually design and build. Perhaps we need to accept we've lost some ability and lower our expectations. Just build a simple, small single purpose ship, as Comnavops has suggested before, in large numbers as we rebuild our skills and capacity. Then gradually increase size and complexity as our experience returns.
ReplyDeleteIndustry can build ANYTHING we ask for. Obviously, the more bleeding edge we ask for, the more time and money it will require. The issue is not industry, it's unreasonable demands from the military.
DeleteThe U.S. Navy has suffered one setback after another over the past 15 years, without a single positive development.
ReplyDeleteThis has given the Chinese Navy years of laughter, laughing so hard it's nearly cramping up—it needs to see a doctor to stop the laughter.
To be fair, we don't know the true state of the Chinese military because they never release accurate reports. Obviously, they have problems. We just don't hear about them. For example, the story about Chinese missiles loaded with water instead of fuel, if that story is true.
DeleteLet's put the weapons issue aside for now—that's highly contentious.
DeleteJust look at the past 15 years: their warships have been launched one after another, right on schedule, without a single delay. It's truly like boiling dumplings, just as the news reports describe.
Then there's the Type 055 with its sleek new design, fully equipped with active AESA radars—unlike our aging Arleigh Burkes, which mostly rely on PESA and are cluttered with messy antennas and masts.
The hull design is clearly sound, since their 30-year-old domestically built ships are still going strong.
Recently, we've witnessed various aircraft taking off from their aircraft carrier using electromagnetic catapults.
After seeing this, comparing it to the U.S. Navy's progress over the same 15 years, I feel a mix of emotions.
Regardless of design flaws leading to failure, ships that can't be built, construction progress as slow as constipation, or rampant corruption meaning what costs us to build one ship could fund three for others.
DeleteTake recent incidents: four consecutive Burke-class destroyers stationed in Japan colliding with merchant ships,
a nuclear submarine running aground in the South China Sea,
aircraft crashing repeatedly—even two within half an hour.
Most photos of our warships show them riddled with rust.
It's not intentional, but I can't help comparing them to China's navy.
And then I feel utterly disheartened.
In short,
DeleteI feel the U.S. Navy seems to have made every possible mistake.
Insufficient ships and personnel lead to excessive overtime while tasks remain undone. This explains the rusty hulls, constant collisions, carriers unable to undergo scheduled maintenance, and inadequate overseas deployments.
Flawed high-level decision-making, corruption at every level, and inadequate shipyard capacity and numbers. This results in suitable new vessels being delayed, delayed again, or simply not built in sufficient quantities.
Ships age and are decommissioned, but replacements are insufficient. We watch the total number of vessels steadily decline.
Meanwhile, our primary adversary faces the exact opposite situation.
Frankly, it's hard to be optimistic about the Navy's future.
"I can't help comparing them to China's navy.
DeleteAnd then I feel utterly disheartened."
China is clearly outbuilding us. However, do you think Chinese ships are perfect? Do you think they have no problems, whatsoever? Of course they have problems. Likely major ones with some systems, just as we do. The difference is we make our problems somewhat public knowledge while they put out only glowing propaganda.
"Insufficient ships and personnel lead to"
DeleteThat's incorrect. We have more than enough ships and personnel for everything that's WORTH DOING. The combatant commander system is the culprit. They are divorced from the responsibility for operating and maintaining the fleet so there is no end to their requests. For reasons that elude me, the Navy refuses to say no to worthless requests (probably a budget ploy to demonstrate that we need more ships/money) and so we wind up with the problems you note. For worthwhile tasks, we have far more than enough ships and personnel.
Indeed, the Chinese Navy won't publicize their issues, but we can observe from the sidelines and analyze using facts and logic.
DeleteFor example:
Regarding the Chinese Navy's Type 052 series destroyers, how can we analyze their status—whether problematic, highly satisfactory, or otherwise—by examining the patterns in their model types, production quantities, and production intervals?
If you're lazy, just ask various AI tools. I won't delve into the lengthy details of the intermediate answers. Here's the final conclusion:
------------
The evolution in model types, production numbers, and time intervals clearly traces the Chinese Navy's development trajectory: from reliance on imports and external constraints (Type 052), through technological transition and pursuit of rapid results (Type 052B), to breakthroughs in key technologies and cautious testing (Type 052C), ultimately reaching design maturity and mass production (Type 052D).
The massive quantity and sustained production of the Type 052D serve as the strongest evidence of its highly successful and satisfactory design. Conversely, the limited production of the Type 052 and Type 052B reflects either technical/external supply issues at the time or a design still in transition.
-------------
Therefore, your argument can be largely addressed using the above methodology.
Interested parties may inquire about China's various warship series using the aforementioned example with AI China.
It also becomes evident that China's naval vessels indeed present no major issues.
As for minor issues? Certainly there are some. They might cause inconvenience, but they can be fixed—or even if left unfixed, they don't affect normal operation.
DeleteThen they can simply improve upon them in the next batch of warships produced.
For example, the Type 052D was extended to accommodate the Z-20 helicopter, becoming the Type 052DL.
----------------------------
But it's nothing like the LCS, where significant production runs were completed before major flaws were discovered, leading to forced decommissioning. Yet ships already in the production pipeline were still finished, only to be retired. That's truly outrageous.
Or the Zumwalt-class destroyers: a few were built before their limited utility became apparent. Unwilling to scrap them entirely, the Navy is now exploring ways to repurpose them.
Or projects scrapped before completion, like the Constellation-class.
These are major problems.
What if? take a half dozen or so of the older Burkes and convert them to ASW command ships. everything aft of the second stack would be hanger/flight deck. Should be able to carry 3 or 4 Helos, leave the AAW weapons fit forward. Paired up with 4 corvette/frigates for an ASW hunter killer squadron.
ReplyDeleteYes, this would be the Burke equivalent of the proposed Spruance class DDH. Hmm ... maybe we shouldn't have sunk the entire Spruance class?
DeleteI've pondered using LPDs to set up a destroyer screen, like for a landing site or island gap. They can carry 4-8 ASW helos and two LCUs. After they are launched, the LCUs have a flight deck atop that folds out, along with fuel bladders underneath, like aircraft use. So the helos operate from the LPD but the LCUs push out a few hundred miles as a rest and refueling platform. I doubt an attack sub would risk detection trying to sink a small LCU of little value. Also great for CSAR support.
ReplyDeleteThat's one of the more interesting ideas I've heard lately. I like the concept but there are some practical problems. Number one is the speed of an LCU. No naval force will ever stop in combat and the average speed will be something on the order of 18-20 kts. An LCU typically has a max speed of around 12 kts. How would an LCU, launched from an LPD, ever get out in front of a task force? It might be possible for a very slow convoy but not a naval group. What do you think?
Delete"After they are launched, "
Why have some sort of complicated folding deck mechanism? Why not just add a permanent "flight" deck if that's what it's purpose is?
"LCUs push out a few hundred miles"
An LCU would be loud and slow - what submarines call a target. This would give away the group's location and offer the enemy a free shot (I'm less sanguine about a sub not wasting torpedoes on an LCU if it was the support source for helos but that's a minor point). Is the benefit worth the drawbacks?
"Number one is the speed of an LCU"
DeleteNote that it doesn't necessarily have to be an LCU. Amphibs can also carry other things in their well decks. For example, according to this:
https://www.twz.com/39240/the-navy-wants-to-get-rid-of-its-nearly-brand-new-patrol-boats
the Whidbey Island class can carry 8 Mark 6 patrol boats, which have speeds up to 40 or 41 knots.
Now the Mark 6 itself probably isn't a good choice because it likely doesn't have good enough seakeeping for routine open ocean operations and it's probably too small to land a helicopter on. I suspect we don't have a vessel in the fleet today that would work but the Sentinel class coast guard cutter is similar in size and displacement to a loaded LCU and something similar with a flat deck (and probably would need to be not as tall) might well work.
A Mark VI boat can carry the same payload as a H-60 LAMPs, so can a boat version do ASW? Sea state is a big issue, but then it can stay on station far longer and even shut off its engines. Our Navy doesn't want to send its huge $4 billion destroyers with 300 crewmen out looking for subs. Why not send out a $4 million boat with a crew of 14 supported by a distant LPD mothership?
DeleteLCU is the largest well deck vehicle out there and its way too small (and light) to land an H-60. Plus freeboard is chancy at best.
DeleteLittle secret on Mk VI. The guide on securing them in a well deck does not indicate they can nest side by side as originally indicated when they were being introduced. Its not quite the same procedure as a flat bottom landing craft.
A USV will have the legs and speed to go out and do the distant screening. The LPD would be a good mother ship.
Not a new idea, we can call these boats "sub chasers."! Great for patrolling port entrances too where subs like to lurk.
Delete"can a boat version do ASW?"
DeleteSure. So can a guy with a pair of binoculars ... but not effectively. Similarly, a tiny boat like a MkVI can technically do ASW but not well. It can't operate a towed array or VDS. It has no sonar. It has no ASW weapons although you could probably rig up some sort of one or two torpedo launcher. It would be limited to tossing sonobuoys over the side which in the right conditions could work.
Consider speed. One of the great advantages the helo has in ASW is its speed. It can get to a possible contact quickly, lay patterns of sonobuoys over large areas very quickly, and reposition quickly, as needed. A MkVI is, by comparison, very slow.
Consider seakeeping. A small boat is going to be severely impacted by anything less than ideal calm seas.
A MkVI might be a decent choice for harbor ASW defense but not open ocean work.
"A USV will have the legs and speed to go out and do the distant screening."
DeleteWhat USV do you know of that has the sensors and weapons to be an effective ASW vessel? As you answer, consider that the Burke, our biggest and best equipped ASW vessel, is inadequate for the task.
Its a matter of how we manage the ASW game in its entirety. We could easily do a CUSV style USV hull with MH-60R dipping sonar for littoral work. No reason one couldn't also bring out the weapons, but if its shoot time just send the helo.
DeleteOn the larger size, there is nothing stopping large USV like the OUSV or now Marauder size from towing a CAPTAS-4 Compact.
It is a cancer hard to cure.
ReplyDeleteOnce there is a big Pentagon project. Congressmen elected by you care most are jobs in their districts on top of their donors (cannot say publicly). Lots of interest groups want pieces of pies thus want to insert something into it. Many want it to be omnipotent thus want to put every possible new features into it.
Constellation is a product of above thus its failure is no surprise. If you it to have everything in Burke 3, just build Burke 3, right? Now, Pentagon has generated a new record, ships under construction without design freeze. Ship builder cannot go at full speed, just like workers in production line waiting for instructions on production changes.
Likely, DDG(X) will go same route. You believe your Congressman is right but others are crooks. Any hope? Hopeless!
It all begins with a lack of CONOPS and then inept leadership where concurrency is not seen a a major problem. Also, as mentioned above, the engineering plant required a land based version for training purposes. Now we will have 2 unique ships with unique engineering plants.
ReplyDeleteNo wonder Australia decided to practically double it's frontline manned warships (back to Cold War levels) . It's painfully obvious to them that the US is declining as a military, at least the navy.
ReplyDeleteTheir own aging Anzac's, combined with no US warship being newly designed since the 1980's , meant they even needed Japan to build the first 3 Mogami's since the US navy was going to be in continual decline, while China was in continual build up.
Andrew
RE: S-3 Viking
ReplyDeleteHi CNO,
A little over 10 years ago, you had a post that suggested we should simply restart manufacturing the S-3 Viking, since it is a proven, fully designed and debugged aircraft that completely meets the needs of ASW, which does not require a super stealthy, vastly maneuverable, hypersonic whizbang thingy.
I'm wondering if you still feel that would be a sensible thing to do today. Or would it be better to design a new airframe that is somewhat stealthier than the original. Obviously the new S-3 would not be trying to penetrate the Chinese integrated air defense system or even attack their fleet, so it doesn't need F-22 or B-21 level of stealth. But given the presence of stealthy fighters and long range air to air missiles in the arsenals of our enemies, I'm wondering if perhaps somewhat more stealthy shaping might be in order to make it harder to attack the plane from long range.
67 of them still sitting in AMARG and in type 1000 condition, so not parts birds. I think if they really wanted to do a stopgap, just lube them up, put back in the sensitive equipment- much of which would be obsolete- and let them primarily do 3 things. 1. most important, they are superior as tankers to anything the Navy has, including $150 million a copy drones (that hurts to type) 2. use as secondary attack craft for lessor threats where as you point out, stealth not a big deal 3. Actually hunt subs, which with updated equipment they may do well at.
Deleteactually this might be the most intelligent cancellation, if not decision, the Navy has made in years. This program grew to be an abomination, with far more screwing around with design than the Zumwalt class, more tepid in build time than the Ford and just ridiculous to the point where you say add a few billion more (at the expense of some other idiot projects, like building ships they have no idea what they will do with) to the budget and just pump out Burkes until the new hopefully armored cruiser replacement gets designed (or Golden fleet battleship, don't care about the name). I feel as much for the Wisconsin folks as much as the Admirals not getting their frigate, but all parties played a role in the garbage. At this stage, upgrade the LCS with some type of VLS to do some escort duty (at this stage all that is left is unretiring the 7-9 OHP mothballed and these LCS) and perhaps one could take a look at an "easier" Burke, something with less gold plating and more anti-sub, save costs where you can, and that would be the new mega-frigate. Frigate lifespan in the next big one is not something one wants to view, so perhaps a "cheap destroyer" might actually survive it better.
ReplyDeleteThe USN is drowning on data on the Spurance class. Get some work done on a stealthy deck house. There is space for 2 modern GT gen sets, 2 med diesel gen sets, and motors on the shaft within the original framing. I bet Elon could get it designed and built in 5 years..........
DeleteRE: New build updated Spruance:
ReplyDeleteNote that the Spruance ships were destroyers (the same hull was the basis for the Ticonderoga cruisers) which are nearly the same size as the Burke. So I suspect that (crudely speaking) new ones (modified as you suggest) will cost in the same price range as Burkes. So if Burkes are too expensive to risk playing tag with a submarine, I imagine a new build Spruance is also likely too expensive to play tag with a submarine.
People get hung up on labels like “destroyer” or “frigate,” but the Spruance hull is fundamentally just a large, proven steel box with excellent seakeeping, spacious internal volume, and well-understood structural behaviour. Using it saves years of design risk and integration headaches. Roughly 40% of a warship’s cost is hull, machinery, and hotel services; the remaining 60% is combat systems, sensors, and weapons. Re-using the Spruance hull does not mean cloning a 1970s ship or building an 12,000-ton cruiser — the difference between the Spruance and the Constellation was only about 1,000 tons. The idea is to start with a validated, roomy platform and use modern systems to create a simpler, faster, and cheaper ASW escort, rather than reinvent the hull from scratch.
DeleteOnce more unto the breach dear friends, once more.......
DeletePeople get hung up on labels like “destroyer” or “frigate,” but the Spruance hull is fundamentally just a large, proven steel box with excellent seakeeping, spacious internal volume, and well-understood structural behaviour. Using it saves years of design risk and integration headaches. Roughly 40% of a warship’s cost is hull, machinery, and hotel services; the remaining 60% is combat systems, sensors, and weapons. Re-using the Spruance hull does not mean cloning a 1970s ship or building an 18,000-ton cruiser — the difference between the Spruance and the Constellation was only about 1,000 tons. The idea is to start with a validated, roomy platform and use modern systems to create a simpler, faster, and cheaper ASW escort, rather than reinvent the hull from scratch.
" I imagine a new build Spruance is also likely too expensive to play tag with a submarine."
DeleteYou make an excellent point. The Spruance was the best ASW vessel in the world FOR ITS TIME. Its time was when threat submarines were only moderately capable and a Spruance would have had a decent chance of success going up against one. Today, the submarine threat is far more serious and you're correct that a Spruance with a Burke price tag would not be a desirable choice to go one on one with a sub. However, if we take the CONCEPT of a Sprance and strip out anything that isn't ASW or self-defense, we'd could create a much cheaper vessel with pure ASW that could be risked.
Alternatively, the DDH version of the Spruance would be immensely useful even today, unmodified.
"People get hung up on labels"
DeleteYour initial comment went to spam. This is a problem that occurs on fairly rare occasions and has no known cause or solution. I look for those regularly and transfer them to publication as soon as I see them which is why you now have duplicate comments.
While I agree somewhat with your concept, it should be noted that the Spruance hull, itself, is decidedly non-stealthy. If, as you appear to be suggesting, the rest of the ship is heavily modified for ASW and non-ASW functions are stripped out, the resulting hull requirement would be significantly smaller and, if that's the case, a modern, stealthy hull design like the Visby would be a better starting point for a new ASW escort.
Hulls themselves aren’t “stealthy” or “non-stealthy” in any practical radar sense — RCS is dominated by the superstructure, mast shaping, and topside edges. That’s why I explicitly said you’d design a modern stealthy superstructure on the Spruance-derived hull. I also never proposed “stripping out everything but ASW gear”; that wasn’t the plan for Constellation, and it isn’t the plan here. Spruance carried Mk 41 VLS why would I want a future ship to have the same? A hull of that displacement can easily support a modern medium-to-large radar and a balanced combat system. The point isn’t to resurrect a 1970s destroyer, but to reuse a proven, spacious, quiet-friendly hull to avoid years of fresh hydrodynamic development — exactly the opposite of starting from zero. Suggesting a Visby hull misses the mission entirely: Visby was designed for Baltic littorals, with limited range, fuel, seakeeping, and aviation capacity, and is completely unsuitable for deep-ocean ASW escort work. Ironically, the only truly “stealthy hull” in US service is the Zumwalt, yet nobody suggests using that for blue-water ASW — despite its massive volume, ultra-low acoustic signature, and enormous power margin. Assigning a Zumwalt prepared for ASW to the 7th Fleet to lead ASW operation seems a better use of the hull that as test bed for supersonic missiles. A modernised Spruance-form hull sits in the sensible middle ground between those extremes.
Delete"Hulls themselves aren’t “stealthy” or “non-stealthy” in any practical radar sense"
DeleteOf course they are! It's not as if the laws of physics no longer apply when a structure is a hull instead of a building or superstructure or whatever. The straight sided hulls of earlier decades were abandoned for much more sharply sloped hulls today. The extreme example is the Zumwalt with its tumblehome. That certainly wasn't chose for its seakeeping! Look as the Visby or Sea Shadow or any vessel with emphasized stealth.
"I also never proposed “stripping out everything but ASW gear”;"
That seemed to be the implication but, if not, then you've just created a modernized Spruance which would be a ... Burke! And we've already got many dozens of those so what's the point?
If all you want is to reuse the hull, we have even more experience with the somewhat stealthy Burke hull than the Spruance.
"Suggesting a Visby hull "
Now you've missed it. I didn't suggest using the Visby hull, I suggested a hull design like the Visby. It can be scaled up or down as needed for the equipment fit.
"Zumwalt, yet nobody suggests using that for blue-water ASW"
Probably because of its known limitations in seakeeping and the fact that its wetted area DECREASES (less buoyancy) as it sinks instead of increases (more buoyancy). You'll note that the Navy didn't choose to use a tumblehome hull for its frigate.
Wetted area DECREASES (less buoyancy) as it sinks instead of increases (more buoyancy)? You mean reserve buoyancy? It only matters at extreme heel angles well beyond anything the ship will ever see in service. Most of the problems in this area dialled on the CAD screen. In day-to-day and even worst-case realistic operations, the stability margins are entirely adequate and meet (or beat) Navy standards. The Zumwalt is not fragile or prone to capsizing. Why wasn't tumblehome used for the new frigate? Cost. The technology in Visby is the same as that used in Zumwalt.
DeleteAs for my comment about hulls. It was a poor comment which I have should explained at greater length considering the audience. I wasn’t arguing that hull shaping has zero effect, only that in practical radar engagement geometry the hull is a secondary contributor to RCS compared with the superstructure. Most of a hull is masked by sea state and seen at very low grazing angles, so the deck house, masts, and topside edges overwhelmingly dominate returns. Even the examples you cite — Visby, Sea Shadow, Zumwalt — achieve their real stealth gains through faceted superstructures, enclosed sensors, and topside management rather than the hull form. So using a proven Spruance hull doesn’t stop you designing a modern low-observable superstructure, and that’s where the meaningful, consistent reduction in signature actually comes from.
"well beyond anything the ship will ever see in service."
DeleteThis is a damage control issue. Ships take on water in combat damage scenarios and, unlike conventional hulls, this ship has a greater tendency to sink as it settles.
"The Zumwalt is not fragile or prone to capsizing. "
Fragile remains to be seen. As far as stability and seakeeping, the Navy early on placed significant restrictions on the seas and sea conditions (quartering seas, if I recall correctly from the documents) it can safely sail in.
"The technology in Visby is the same as that used in Zumwalt."
"only that in practical radar engagement geometry the hull is a secondary contributor to RCS "
I have never seen that. Do you have any documentation to support that claim? Given that the superstructure side profile "footprint" is something on the order of 30% to 60% of the total side "footprint", that statement seems unlikely to be correct.
I don't know which particular technology(s) you're referring to but the Visby hull is NOT a tumblehome hull like the Zumwalt.
I did answer this but the post disappeared. I shall wait until this evening and if it hasn't appeared I will do it again.........
Delete"I see my post hasn't returned. Swallowed up by the internet? Or deleted because the site owner wasn't winning? Who knows?"
DeleteYour post was deleted for being impolite, disrespectful, and a personal attack, as is your last comment. If you post a comment that is polite and moderately logical and well founded, it will stand regardless of whether the site owner agrees with it or not. Be disrespectful and it will not stand regardless of whether the site owner agrees with it or not. It's up to you.
If I was SecNav, I would continue the program:
ReplyDeleteThis is based on 2 issues, the first of which is as bad as the Constellation class would be, it is at least a workable frigate in the works.
If you are going to cut and run, at least make damn well sure that you actually cut first before you run.
As it stands, the USN is out of billions and without result.
The cancellation should have been in the early 2020s not 2025, and if it had to be 2025, there should have been another acceptable alternative at hand.
Right now there is neither.
"bad as the Constellation class would be, it is at least a workable frigate in the works."
DeleteEven without any problems, the Constellation is already obsolete. Worse, it serves no purpose. It's a mini-Burke and we already have several dozen full Burkes.
Obsolete and no useful purpose ... Even without any of the cost/schedule problems, it should be cancelled. It should never have been started!
"As it stands, the USN is out of billions and without result."
Not quite. They are going to complete two ships. That aside, the only thing worse than wasting a few billion is wasting many, many billions and having nothing useful to show for it!
You're also overlooking the opportunity cost. The Navy is saving many, many billions in opportunity cost. Of course, rather than spend that opportunity cost wisely, they'll undoubtedly throw it away on some other idiotic program so ...
To clarify - are you saying that the FREMM design itself was always going to be a useless waste of time and money for the USN, or that it became so as a result of the 85% Constellation Class redesign that the Navy brass insisted on?
DeleteIf the former, does that mean that you consider pretty much every frigate and destroyer currently serving with navies of our allies in the same light, or is your view that these ships are good enough and useful enough for the British, French, Italians and Japanese etc., but not for us, as our requirements are very different?
Thanks.
Regards,
BF
"are you saying that the FREMM design itself was always going to be a useless waste of time and money for the USN"
DeleteYes, that's exactly what I'm saying. The design dates back to the early 2000's which makes it a 20 year old design (pushing 30 years by the time it would have entered service for the US). It was, debatably, adequate for its time but is now obsolete. Think about it. Would any sane naval commander want a 20-30 yr old ship design for their newest ship? Of course not!
Debatably, if the USN had been able to magically make 20 complete FREMMs appear instantaneously at the start of the Constellation program, one MIGHT be able to make the argument that it was adequate as an emergency (what emergency?), stop-gap measure until a proper ship could be designed and built.
Remember, we don't build new ships for today's battlefield, we build them for TOMORROW'S battlefield. Intentionally designing a 20-30 yr old ship for TOMORROW'S battlefield is crazy.
Consider all the things I've posted about being necessary for tomorrow's naval battlefield: extreme all-frequency stealth, uber-quiet acoustic signature, totally passive main sensors and fire control, total IR signature reduction, heavy weapons fit, separation and redundancy, extensive EW, heavy long range torpedoes, extensive small UAV capability, and so on. The FREMM/Constellation has/had none of that. It would have been totally ill-suited for tomorrow's battlefield.
Does that answer your question?
Not disagreeing, but both LCS classes and NSC are even slightly older designs than Fremm at this point. I think their propulsion plant is the keeper in terms of foundation for FREMM EVO.
Delete"but both LCS classes and NSC are even slightly older designs"
DeleteAnd I don't want either of them for the Navy's next ship. Note, however, a key difference. The LCS is not suitable for tomorrow's battlefield but it was fielded several yrs ago which makes it a ship for TODAY'S battlefield. Unfortunately, it is completely useless for today's battlefield but if it had been somewhat useful it would already be fielded as opposed to the Constellation which was still close to a decade away from service, hence the assessment of it as a "tomorrow" ship and the differing standard I assess against as opposed to the LCS/NSC.
I have absolutely no use for the NSC in naval service, either, by the way. Many people are enamored with it but unless it were totally redesigned to bear no resemblance, whatsoever, to the current vessel, it, too, is useless for tomorrow's battlefield.
Yes, that answers my question.
DeleteThank you.
BF
"Yes, that answers my question."
DeleteAnd what do you think? Would a 20-30 yr old Constellation design have been a wise move for the Navy?
No, I think your skepticism is well warranted, however the Navy excluded any better options by insisting that the contending submissions be based on an in service, in the water design. Effectively then the obsolescence of the winning submission was baked into the RFP to 'de-risk' the project (hollow laugh).
DeleteI'm wondering if this project wasn't designed to fail. 30 year old base design; endless tinkering with every aspect and feature; armed with a 57mm popgun; hmmmm...idk but this is a first rate scandal and I hope someone is held to account for it.
I still think we need a frigate, because we don't need a $3 billion Burke for everything. A frigate that could be built for half that price, and with half the crewing requirements would give us twice the ships for the same money; self evidently a good thing.
Whether these frigates should be designed for general escort/constabulary duties or whether we need an ASW variant is a good question.
A better option might be a new class of cheap 'expendable' ASW ship, somewhere between an OPV and a corvette. Maybe 2,500 ton displacement, space for a couple of helos, with a decent range and good turn of speed, a couple of CIWS, but not much more than that. These could provide the ASW screen for a CSG.
That's my ten cents worth, and thanks for asking.
"A better option"
DeleteOne of the problems that we've fallen victim to is the tendency to think in terms of single platforms or weapons instead of families. A better ASW option is not any single ship/type; it's a family of ships ranging from minimally capable patrol boats to ASW corvettes, to destroyer escorts to full destroyers ... as we had in WWII. That way we cover all ranges and requirements instead of being forced to pick just the "one" best ASW ship (there's no such thing as a best ASW ship).
I see " The War Zone" has an article saying the Navy has picked the Damien LST 100 as it's new landing ship medium. Will this be built in Holland or in the US. I hope that some of the smaller yards here would be able to get in on the action.
ReplyDeleteYou wait until the DoN, USN and USMC have modified the design:
Deletehttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/Amphibious_Ivan_Rogov_class.jpg/960px-Amphibious_Ivan_Rogov_class.jpg
It will be built domestically. Damen sells there stuff to yards all over.
DeleteAs long as we are talking about other ships to replace the Constellations with (upgraded Spruance, or perhaps even Zumwalt), how about thinking about an upgraded Perry class frigate?
ReplyDeleteIt's an American design, designed and built during the Cold War, and so attention was paid to survivability. And of course they are known to be fairly robust, given that one survived a mine strike and another survived cruise missile strikes.
I'd suggest backing off on the mini-Burke requirements of the Constellation and sticking to ASW and local (and self) air defense (plus, I assume, self defense against things like swarming small boats).
We could keep the hull (at least for the most part) and the propulsion, but make the superstructure more stealthy.
For ASW, they were fairly good at it at the time. I'd try to put on a better hull mounted sonar (maybe the same one on the Burke if it's not too heavy). They could already operate towed sonars and ASW helicopters. And they had torpedoes. We might want to put in an 8 or 16 cell VLS, primarily for ASROCs and ESSMs.
They already had some quieting (they had Prairie Masker, for example). Perhaps some more could be added.
CNO suggested something along these lines a number of years ago. Perhaps it's now too late?
The Perry's weren't cheap, of course, but this ship would certainly be much less expensive than using Burkes for this mission. Hopefully even less expensive than a Constellation.
"CNO suggested something along these lines a number of years ago. "
DeleteI did. However, that was years ago when it would have been an alternative to the LCS. For tomorrow's battlefield, it would no longer be suitable. Aside from the non-stealthy, slab-sided hull, you would have to COMPLETELY rework the entire internal layout to support the many new technologies, the entire superstructure would have to be reworked and minimized, and the list goes on. The end result would have no resemblance or relationship to the Perry. It would be a new design so what would you have gained other than a new ship on an unsuitable hull?
Testing Testing Testing
ReplyDelete