Recently, a reader (username “Chinese Gordon”) made the
astute observation that mine countermeasures (MCM) was not a path to flag
rank. He’s correct, as far as I can
tell. Of the 250 or so flag officers we have, how many are former
MCM operators? I don’t know but my guess
is somewhere between none and almost none.
This may explain, in part, why the Navy has, for all practical purposes,
abandoned MCM. If we had a couple dozen
flag officers with MCM career backgrounds, I’d like to think the Navy would be
paying more than lip service to MCM.
How do we get more MCM officers into flag ranks?
Well, this is where we run into a brick wall. Even if the Navy magically decided to add MCM
officers to the flag ranks … … there aren’t any to add. There simply are no MCM focused officers left
in the Navy. The Avengers are
essentially gone, parked pierside, rotting as they wait to be officially
retired. The LCS has yet to field a
viable MCM module so there are no LCS officers that have worked LCS-MCM.
You’d have to go down to the Lieutenant level to find anyone
who deals with MCM to any degree and those few are doing one-at-a-time,
unmanned mine hunting technology development, not real world MCM.
Who in the Navy has ever cleared a thousand-mine field, or
even just a hundred, in the real world?
No one. Who has engaged in an
amphibious assault exercise that included actual clearance of mines from a 50
mile approach to the beach? No one. Who has cleared mines from a chokepoint while
under enemy fire, real or simulated? No
one. And so it goes. No officer in the Navy has even a rudimentary
level of MCM expertise as it would pertain to a peer war or even a disagreement
with a group of radical Girl Scouts.
We can’t develop flag level focus on MCM because no one in
the Navy has any MCM experience.
We’re screwed. We’ll
be forced to learn MCM on the fly in a real war and that is a very costly way
to learn anything.
By the way, the same applies to offensive mine warfare.
CONOPS, if you were an actual CONOPS, what would you do about this?
ReplyDeleteThat would require a near book length explanation but, in brief, I'd largely abandon this one-at-a-time mine hunting approach that we are so enamored with and concentrate on sweeping. As we build expertise in that, we can then begin to promote mine warfare officers to higher levels and start making mine warfare a priority.
DeleteThe Navy needs to split the surface warfare officer field and form an expeditionary warfare field for the mine warfare, amphjb, and small support ships like PBs. This would make such officers more competent and provide a career path upwards. They can attend the Marines 41-week expeditionary warfare school as O-3s.
DeleteToday, it's common for a surface warfare officer to become the captain of a big amphib with zero experience in the field. These officers always want to take their ships on patrol because that's what they know.
Just give it to SOF. And MCM would be prestige job!
ReplyDeleteYou aren't wrong there. SOF are familiar with ESBs and the other thing ESBs are supposed to be supporting is MCM.
Delete"ESBs are supposed to be supporting is MCM."
DeleteThat was one of the vague, general statements regarding the ESB use (along with dozens of other such use statements!). However, no one developed a CONOPS for actually using ESBs in MCM before building them and no one has bothered to develop a CONOPS after the vessels were built. So, we have no idea whether an ESB can effectively support MCM or not and, if they can, how to actually go about it.
For example, a ESB is a very large, very non-stealthy target. Can it survive in a contested MCM operation? If you lose the ESB, you presumably lose a LOT of mine clearing capacity so you have to ask whether an ESB is a good way to go? In the past, MCM has been conducted by NUMEROUS, small vessels. Trying to conduct MCM from an ESB is concentrating a LOT of risk in one non-survivable platform. And so on with questions. This is why a CONOPS is so incredibly important, preferably BEFORE the vessel is built only to find out it's not really suited for the job.
I said nothing about using ESBs for further MCM. Just saying 2 groups of people that have been using them might want to meet up and see if they have a means of enhancing MCM.
Delete"I said nothing about using ESBs for further MCM."
Delete???? You said, "ESBs are supposed to be supporting is MCM." That sure sounds like you're suggesting ESBs for further MCM! And now you said, "see if they have a means of enhancing MCM." Again, that sure sounds like further MCM.
Regardless, I'm simply saying someone should have developed a CONOPS for ESB/MCM prior to building the ship and noting that they still lack a CONOPS. Not sure what you could possibly object to about that.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/navy-must-fix-mine-warfares-institutional-structure
ReplyDeleteBy Lt Commander Mathew Hipple "Like mines, mine warfare is always just below the surface in peacetime—and as with mines, allowing it to remain there is a dangerous proposition. "The Navy needs a strong advocate for fleet mine warfare, one who operationally and programmatically unites the mine warfare mission. There is no such advocate or unifying commander now—and without one, the naval mine warfare enterprise will flounder in facing the threats and grasping the opportunities of rising global mine warfare capabilities. "
You have addressed the very slow
very slow mine clearing technology .
DeleteAs far as i remember the last large scale MCM operations where during and after the Gulf War. A number of US allies (europeans, japanese and south koreans) have mantained relatively robust MCM capabilities compared to the overall size of their navies and are innovating. As the americans seem to have lost all useful capabilities for MCM they should ask others to relearn about it. The first step would be admitting that there in no US MCM capability.
ReplyDeleteThe only problem is that, by and large (maybe totally?), the Western navies have shifted their MCM focus from sweeping to individual mine hunting which is useless in war. Thus, it is highly doubtful we can learn anything relevant from them.
Delete"individual mine hunting which is useless in war."
DeleteActually, I would disagree with this SLIGHTLY. It's true that individual mine clearing is useless for amphibious assaults (which, if I recall correctly, you've stated we're unlikely to be doing). However, there is also the requirement to clear our own harbors (Guam, Pearl, San Diego) if the Chinese sneak in a small number of mines with submarines or maybe even cargo ships. It seems to me that mine hunters could be very useful for that purpose, since the number of mines is much smaller and it's probably not a contested environment. Maybe even more useful than sweeping, since sweeping produces a "statistical" removal (can't guarantee they're all gone) and since for our own harbors we need to protect civilian ships, perhaps a more complete removal would be preferable there.
Fun fact: international law requires you to declare your minefields when you lay them. It doesn't require you to actually lay said minefields tho. But your adversary cannot take that chance. He HAS to treat your declared minefield seriously, and he HAS to make the utmost effort in clearing out said minefields.
ReplyDeleteIt would be trivially easy for China to declare more minefields than we had the minesweepers to clear. I'm reminded of the minefield clearing operation that went alongside Desert Storm; largest international naval demining effort since WW2, and it still took them 6 months to clear a relatively small patch of water.
Other friendly countries do this stuff better than we do, or at least they’re still building MCM ships.
ReplyDeleteWe don’t we get the ships constructed in eg Japan and lease them to the Navy.
Or, better, turn the Austal yard over to building aluminum hull minesweepers which would be more useful than continuing with the LCS program.
Of course we’d need a crash training program for the crews, but that could be done.