Kirov Class Cruiser Begins Trials

It is reported that the Kirov class cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov (formerly Kalinin in the Soviet navy), has put to sea for trials after decades of modernization (can it really be called modernization if it takes decades?).  The ship last sailed in 1997 and has been undergoing repairs and modernization since 1999 with many stops and starts.
 
Details are sketchy but Naval News reports the following upgraded systems.
 

The vessel reportedly has over 176 vertical launch cells, capable of firing a wide array of anti-ship and air defense missiles. The cruiser reportedly has 10 universal shipborne firing systems (USFS), each capable of housing 8 missiles. This results in 80 launch cells reserved for launching Russia’s most modern missiles such as the subsonic Kalibr cruise missile, the supersonic Oniks anti-ship missile, and the hypersonic Tsirkon cruise missiles. In order to make room for these launch cells, the 20 angled Granit anti-ship missiles were removed.
 
An additional 96 launch cells are reserved for surface-to-air missiles to be used for air defense. It is unclear what missiles are installed on the cruiser with some reports stating that the cruiser operates the S-300Fort-M air defense systems with other sources stating that the S-400 air defense system is installed. Additional air defense systems for close to medium range engagement include six Pantsir-M air defense systems as well as a number of AK-630 close-in weapon systems.  The vessel is reportedly also equipped with the Paket-NK and Otvet anti-submarine and torpedo weapon systems.
 
The 130mm AK-130 dual purpose naval gun has been replaced by a modern 130mm AK-192M naval gun.[1]

Nakhimov heading out for trials

That makes for a large, powerful, expensive to operate ship which leads to the obvious question:  what’s its purpose?
 
The Russian navy is, for all practical purposes, a coastal defense force not an open ocean, globe spanning force.  For one thing, Russia has very limited overseas territories or commitments that would require the presence of a naval force, hence the emphasis on coastal or near coastal forces.  Thus, overseas naval operations would not seem to be a legitimate purpose.
 
Cost is another major factor.  Manning and operating a major warship like this is a very expensive proposition and Russia simply lacks the financial resources to comfortably do so which, again, leads one to question what the purpose of the ship is.
 
The key question, of course, is what combat purpose would this ship serve?  The original Kirovs were intended as anti-carrier strike assets with their twenty SS-N-19 (P-700) Granit supersonic missiles with 1600 lb warheads.  Today, a single Kirov would be no threat to a carrier group and, indeed, if the report is to be believed, the SS-N-19 missiles have been removed.
 
Of course, the ship can launch land attack missiles but against who?  Considering Russia’s likely enemies list, land attack missiles could be launched much more easily and cheaper from land sites or aircraft.
 
The Russian navy, today, consists primarily of frigates, corvettes, and various patrol vessels with a few surviving Soviet era destroyers.  In other words, it is a coastal defense force. 
 
The Russian navy has also demonstrated in the Ukraine war that they lack the equipment, doctrine, and training to survivably and effectively operate in contested waters so it’s hard to imagine they would risk their symbol of national pride in a naval battle that didn’t involve an existential threat.  That makes the Nakhimov a very limited use asset.
 
One obvious purpose, and perhaps the only real purpose, is international prestige and public relations.  Russia/Putin seems very big on trying to generate international prestige (a losing battle but Putin keeps trying) and there’s no denying that a large cruiser does generate a certain amount of attention if not any actual respect.  Of course, knowledgeable naval observers are not impressed by a ship with no naval purpose (hey, we have plenty of those!) but for Russia/Putin this would seem to be a valid purpose, perhaps the only real purpose.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News, “RFS Admiral Nakhimov commences sea and factory trials”, Frederik Van Lokeren, 21-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/rfs-admiral-nakhimov-commences-sea-and-factory-trials/

AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 

The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 

• Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
• Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
• Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
• Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
• Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
• Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
• Added Link 16
• Upgraded computers
• Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
• Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
• Added laser rangefinder.
• Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
• Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
• Added ALBATROS towed sonar
• Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
• Added additional decoy launchers

 

Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2

 
Taiwan
 

• Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
• Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
• Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns

 
 
Spain
 

• Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
• Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
• Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning

 
 
Pakistan
 

• overhaul of all four diesels
• replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
• new bridge and navigational suite
• composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array

 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
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[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

What’s A CNO To Do?

We have become an apologist society.  We excuse and rationalize every failure, often doing so even before the attempt is made.  For example, in past criticisms of CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations), I’ve encountered the apologists who say that the CNO can’t really do anything so I shouldn’t blame them.  ‘The System’ is at fault, not the individual. 
 
Nonsense!
 
From a comment I made a while ago to a reader who was apologizing for a specific CNO’s lack of accomplishments, comes this (note, I won’t identify the reader as I have no wish to embarrass them):
 
 
"is our current system such that even the best qualified CNO will be limited as to how much change they can affect?"
 
My answer … Of course not! A properly motivated and directed (meaning focused on the proper priorities) CNO could turn the Navy around in a heartbeat. Here's a few day one items that could be implemented with no input from Congress or anyone else:
 
1. Eliminate the use of waivers. Period. No exceptions. That, alone, would immensely improve training, safety, new ship completion, ship quality, and readiness by forcing actions to be completed instead of waived.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
 
Day two items that might require some input from others:
 
1. Fire 80% of flag officers
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
 
I could go on endlessly but you get the idea. All it takes is a Trump-like CNO who has a clear, combat-focused mentality and has the courage to act.
 

A Realistic Exercise?

As you know, ComNavOps has often criticized Navy exercises as being absurdly unrealistic but does anyone do it better?  Well, the French have conducted  what they feel is a realistic combat exercise, Polaris 25, involving air, sea, and land forces.  How realistic was it?
 
Before we go any further, note that the details of the exercise were few and sketchy for obvious reasons.  Still, we’ll do the best we can with what we have to work with.
 
The French claim it was realistic and unscripted in terms of the actions of the participants.
 

… the POLARIS exercises seek to make naval combat as realistic as possible, … where almost any move is permitted within the constraints previously indicated.[1]
 
The two forces were ‘free’ in their tactical choices. The exercise therefore unfolded according to the decisions made.[2]

The exercise included electronic warfare, cyber, social, and other domains to an unknown degree.[2]
 
Okay, that sounds good but what public relations blurb doesn’t?  Let’s look closer.
 
The French blue force consisted of,
 

• 5 frigates
• 5 LHDs
• ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• Rafales Marine from the French Navy and the French Air and Space Force
• Special forces from the French Navy
• Helicopters and infantry from the French Army

 
The opposing red force consisted of,
 

• 6 ships reinforced by a French Suffren-class submarine

 
 
Hmm … does that sound like equal, balanced forces offering realistic capabilities and fostering a realistic free play exercise or does it begin to sound like a fairly one-sided, pre-ordained setpiece?  Let’s keep going.
 

If a ship was hit, its damaged systems remained out of service until the end of the exercise, or until it was repaired if possible. Similarly, if a vessel was sunk, it was permanently out of the exercise.[2]
 
In the scenario, ships sailed with their theoretical ammunition levels and other logistics. There were no “magic” reloads. The ship had to withdraw to reload with food or ammunition, either by refueling at sea or by reaching support points.[2]

Okay, that’s outstanding, if they actually held to that.
 

Aquitaine Class FREMM

 
Results
 
Little was offered publicly in the way of results but let’s look at what we do have.
 

During the second phase – phase of the naval combat, the officers suggested that a great deal of damage had been caused on both sides with water leaks, loss of communications, etc. More importantly, “several ships were sunk or torpedoed”,[1]

Given the extremely limited number of ships in the exercise, if several ships were sunk, what was left to carry out the mission/exercise?  This is where one begins to wonder about the realism of the exercise.  Were sunken ships really removed from the exercise or did they continue on?
 
What did losing several ships teach the French?  What was the major lesson learned?
 

… firepower is everything. When lethal weapons are used, which was the case for both forces, the damage is rapid and significant.[1]

Firepower is important??!!  Really?  You needed an exercise to tell you that?  If so, you’ve forgotten everything about warfare and naval combat … which, like the US Navy, you probably have.  Sad.
 
The landing portion of the exercise was decidedly unrealistic.
 

It should be pointed out that the coastal threats were relatively low, with only a few ‘red force’ air defence units in the way.[1]

So … no opposed landing.  That’s optimistic in the extreme and offers no potential for lessons learned.  At that point, it’s just an administrative unloading of troops.
 
More on the landing portion.
 

… the LHDs simulated the landing of US Marine units with their HIMARS on islands off the landing zone in order to create a A2/AD area and secure the operation … [1][emphasis added]

So, simulated HIMARS operations?  So much for realism.
 
And,
 

Another first was that the image stream captured by the S-100 could be transmitted directly to land units disembarking, enabling them to adapt their manoeuvres.[1]

So, unhindered broad bandwidth streaming data?  I guess electronic and cyber warfare wasn’t included in the realism, after all?
 
 
Conclusion
 
Well, without more actual information it’s impossible to draw much in the way of valid conclusions but it sounds like aspects of the exercise were conducted with more realism than US Navy exercises (admittedly, a pretty low bar) but there are suggestions that they did not hold to the degree of realism they claimed.
 
The finding that firepower is paramount was absurdly hilarious.  What has this entire blog emphasized?  For that matter, what did WWII emphasize?  Do we really have to conduct exercises to learn the patently obvious?
 
All in all, it sounds like a better exercise than the US Navy conducts but still far short of being realistic and useful.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 2”, Martin Manaranche, 4-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-2/
 
[2]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 1”, Martin Manaranche, 16-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-1/

The Thousand Ship Navy

Do you remember the Thousand Ship Navy concept?[2]  To refresh your memory,
 

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that “the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”  He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:
 
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity. As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.[1]

Consider this excerpt from Mullen’s speech:
 

“…leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain …

What a bunch of verbal garbage!  No wonder this concept didn’t go anywhere or amount to anything.  Mullen’s Thousand Ship Navy proposal was just vague fantasy for the purposes of public relations.  It was tantamount to calling for world peace – a fine sentiment that is totally divorced from reality or action.
 
Okay, so is this post just a quick shot at Mullen and we’re done?  No!  While Mullen had nothing worthwhile to offer, the idea of an international, thousand ship navy has enormous potential though not in any way that Mullen would ever have imagined.  Let’s examine a better Thousand Ship Navy.
 
Consider the following truths:
 

• Reality is that the US Navy is the biggest and only truly significant friendly naval force in the world.
• Reality is that the US Navy, through its own incompetence and mismanagement, has glaring gaps and weaknesses in its force structure.

 
Now, let’s lean back in our chairs, close our eyes, and think fairy dust thoughts:
 

• Wouldn’t it be nice if we didn’t have those gaps and weaknesses? 
  
• Wouldn’t it be nice if those gaps and weaknesses could be magically filled without us having to spend any money or resources?

 
Opening our eyes, we realize that those things can’t happen, right?  I mean, the only way we could fill those gaps and weaknesses without spending money or resources would be if someone else built the missing assets and gave them to us and that’s not going to happen.  It can’t happen … could it?
 
Well … what if other navies around the world focused their efforts and force structures on the assets we’re missing.  What if they built the minesweepers and SSKs, among other needs, that could fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy and we could call on those assets as needed?
 
Think about it.  As an example, when the global war with China comes, and it will, will the UK’s one carrier with a couple dozen short-legged F-35Bs make any difference?  Not much.  However, a couple of squadrons of highly effective mine countermeasure ships would be invaluable to the war effort.
 
Will some country’s couple of underarmed frigates make any difference?  No, but large numbers of small ASW corvettes would be a big help.
 
And so on.
 
The idea is that other countries would partner with the US to fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy.
 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Consider the following challenges.
 
Command and Control – This is a challenge in peace and in war.  Who commands these fill-in assets?  No country wants to give up command and yet a single, central command, the US, is necessary.

Agendas – Every country has their own geopolitical agendas and, often, those don’t perfectly align with the US.  A fill-in force can’t be subject to the whims of each individual country.  A NATO-like imperative is needed that would compel every participating country to actively contribute their eligible assets to meeting certain defined needs such as mines in international waters, war with China (with the US required to formally declare war on China).  It is the defined nature of the compelling threats that allows countries to still pursue their own agendas outside the bounds of the defined threats and ensure that the assets are available in the face of the defined threats.  What can’t happen is, for example, a Spanish frigate pulling out of a task force because their country doesn’t perfectly agree with the task force’s mission.  If the mission is a response to a defined threat then the assets are in, pure and simple.

Force Structure – Which country would build which assets?  That can’t be left up to the individual countries.  The individual contributions must come from analysis of the US Navy’s needs and, ultimately, be subject to US dictation.  Otherwise, each country will build whatever suits them and the US gaps won’t be filled other than haphazardly, if at all.

Reciprocity – In return for, say, building mine warfare ships instead of frigates, participating countries must be supported by the US Navy for any legitimate defense needs.  In other words, the US becomes the participating country’s navy against defined threats.
 
 
Discussion
 
Ideally, this shouldn’t be necessary.  The US Navy is big enough and well funded enough that it should be able to build its own complete naval force without any gaps or weaknesses.  However, until we clean house and fire every flag officer, that won’t happen.  We’ll continue to obsolete Burkes for the next two hundred years and bigger carriers as our air wings shrink ever smaller.  This NATO-ish concept at least provides a work around to the Navy’s abject stupidity for the foreseeable future.
 
The key to making this work is a set of very specific, well defined, major international threats that would trigger the combining of assets.  This precludes, as an example, other countries being forced to go along with, say, a US strike on an aspirin factory in the middle of nowhere for political messaging purposes.
 
It should be made crystal clear that any country that opts not to participate is on their own if they find themselves threatened by an enemy.  Participate and share or stand alone.  A simple choice.
 
In order for this concept to work, it has to be divorced from any of the political maneuverings of the type that prioritized the F-35 as an international jobs program rather than a lean, focused production program.  Ship types can’t be assigned based on politics or jobs or whatever.  Of course, the individual countries can build their assigned vessels any way they like but the assignments have to be based strictly on naval combat needs.
 
Finally, note that none of the above precludes any country from still building their own ships of whatever type as long as they meet their assigned gap-filling quota.
 
 
 
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[1]https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=2029&context=nwc-review
 
[2]USNI Proceedings, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network”, Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, November 2005, Proceedings Vol. 131/11/1,233
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/1000-ship-navy-global-maritime-network