Satellite Surveillance Reality

People keep wanting to believe that satellites can track every ship on the ocean in real time, with the data being tied directly to the launch buttons of anti-ship weapons.  I keep refuting this idea but it persists.  Here’s some relevant information on the subject from our space force. 

By the early 2030s, the Space Force hopes to have satellites equipped with sensors to target aircraft in the hands of operators, according to the service’s second in command, Gen. Michael Guetlein.
 
Satellites equipped with Air Moving Target Indicators (AMTI), which would send precise tracking data to “shooters” on the ground, at sea and in the air, would be a new capability — joining the Space Force’s joint program with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) satellites that track vehicles and ships.
 
“I would say you’re looking at probably early ’30s for some of that capability to start coming online, both for GMTI and for AMTI,” Guetlein told the annual Defense News conference today.[1][emphasis added]

 
These statements demonstrate that satellite tracking is something that does not yet exist but is being worked on and someone hopes to have it working in several years (which, of course, will stretch out to a decade or two, at best).
 
The next quote demonstrates that data is not directly linked to anti-ship launch buttons: 

Space Force since 2021 has been pushing their case to fill part of the gap in ground tracking/targeting left by the Air Force’s retirement of the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. That campaign has run up against roles and missions related challenges — some of which have yet to be fully resolved — from both the NRO and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NRO owns and operates the nation’s spy satellites, while the NGA is responsible for disseminating space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) imagery and analysis to users across the US government.[1][emphasis added]

Difficulties abound: 

… the closer I can come to the target, the more resolution I get on the target. As I move to space, it becomes harder and harder to get that same level of resolution on a target … [1]
 
… one of the key challenges for tracking enemy aircraft from space is that airplanes and drones move much faster than tanks, trucks and ships. This is compounded by the fact that to be best able to take high-quality pictures or establish radar images of objects on the ground or in the air, satellites would have to be stationed in low Earth orbit where they themselves move around the Earth at about 7.8 kilometers per second (4.8 miles per second) … [1]

 

I see a ship.  Fire!

We see, then, that the common belief in omniscient satellites, tied directly into fire control circuits is pure fantasy.  The Space Farce wants to make that a thing but the military constantly wants things that never happen (how’s that rail gun and laser coming?).  We’re looking at a decade or more for even the rudiments of this king of capability to happen and that’s probably being ridiculously optimistic.
 
Once and for all, let’s give up the fantasy of the all-seeing eye-in-the-sky providing real time weapons launch control.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Space Force vice wants sats to track aircraft by early 2030s”, Theresa Hitchens, 4-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/space-force-vice-wants-sats-to-track-aircraft-by-early-2030s/

Does the Navy Want the F-35C?

The Navy has never appeared to be very enthused about the F-35.  They’ve gone deep into fantasy land to rave about the wonders of the LCS, the Ford, the Zumwalt, and many other programs but the F-35 praise has been very muted.  The actual procurement numbers of F-35s has been minimal, to put it mildly. 
 
Now, however, with a war with China looming on the horizon (by the Navy’s own public statements), has the Navy’s enthusiasm for the F-35 increased?  Is the Navy requesting more F-35s, possible on a crash basis to prepare for the coming war?  Let’s check the 2025 defense spending bill.
 
Congress is in the process of finalizing the 2025 defense spending bill.  Currently, there are various versions of the bill floating around as the various groups put forth their own versions and attempt to reconcile the various versions.  The various actors and their budget versions are shown below.[1]

• President’s budget: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House NDAA: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House defense appropriations: Includes $833 billion in defense spending
• Senate Armed Services Committee: $878.4 billion for the Defense Department
• Senate Appropriations Committee: $852.2 billion defense spending

That’s interesting but let’s look, specifically, at the F-35 requests in the budget.

F-35
 
The President’s budget calls for 9 F-35C for the Navy, 4 F-35C for the Marine Corps, and 13 F-35B for the Marine Corps.  The other actors have similar numbers.
 
The Navy plans to buy 82 F-35C across the five year FYDP, split between the Navy and Marines.  That’s around 9 F-35Cs per year for the Navy, depending on the exact Navy-Marine split.
 
That doesn’t seem like a great deal of enthusiasm for the F-35 on the Navy’s part.
 
 
Notes
 
Here’s some related notes.
 
As you know, despite having 11 aircraft carriers, the Navy has only 9 air wings.  Two carriers have no air wing.  This is slightly understandable as one carrier is always in a mid-life refueling and overhaul.  In recent years, a second carrier has been hard down due to intensive maintenance due to deferred maintenance racked up during too many deployments for too many months.  This is not normal and is an emergency condition.
 
The real problem with this is that 9 air wings leaves us two short in the event of war when we would surge every carrier. 
 
The Navy is statutorily required to maintain 10 air wings.  Congress, as they so often do, neutered their own requirement by granting the Navy a waiver. 

The 2024 NDAA granted the Navy relief from the Title 10 requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025 pending SECNAV submission of a report to congress analyzing potential approaches to the manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th CVW.[2]

Thus, Congress is complicit in the Navy’s air wing and aircraft shortfall.
 
The Navy, as they so often do, is dealing with this not by acquiring more aircraft and air wings but by playing an aircraft accounting game. 

By 2025, the Navy will have solved its strike fighter shortfall in part by changing how it will field the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. Instead of two squadrons per air wing with 10 tails, the Navy will now field a single squadron with 14 tails, Rear Adm. Andrew Loiselle, director of the Air Warfare Division (OPNAV/N98), told the House Armed Services subcommittee on tactical air and land forces on Tuesday. testified it was reducing F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fight from two to one squadron per air wing.[3]

How reducing two 10-aircraft squadrons with 20 total aircraft to one squadron with 14 total aircraft alleviates the shortfall is an arithmetic miracle beyond understanding.  Nevertheless, it’s what the Navy is doing.  This further demonstrates the Navy’s lukewarm view of the value of the F-35.

 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “F-35s, frigates and FRA woes: Here are the issues facing Congress in upcoming FY25 budget process”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Sep-2024,
http://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/f-35s-frigates-and-fra-woes-here-are-the-issues-facing-congress-in-upcoming-fy25-budget-process/
 
[2]https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117134/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS25-Wstate-GeringB-20240416.pdf
 
[3]USNI News website, “Navy Adjusts F-35C Squadron Size to End Fighter Shortfall by 2025”, John Grady, 14-Jul-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/07/14/navy-adjusts-f-35c-squadron-size-to-end-fighter-shortfall-by-2025

Protecting the Sea Lanes?

The Navy is out there, every day, protecting the sea lanes.  That’s why we do deployments, right?  So, how’s that sea lane protection working out?  According to shipping giant, Maersk,
 

Attacks in the Red Sea by Iran-aligned Houthi militants have disrupted a route vital to east-west trade, with prolonged rerouting of shipments, pushing freight rates higher and causing congestion in Asian and European ports.
 
Maersk said recent data showed that the number of ships crossing through the canal has fallen 66% since carriers began diverting their vessels around Africa.
 
Maersk in July said disruption to its container shipping via the Red Sea had extended beyond trade routes between the Far East and Europe to its entire global network, and warned of a "cascading impact" causing congestion.[1]

 
So, what is the mightiest navy in the world doing about this threat to the sea lanes?  Well, we’ve shot down a few drones and missiles and bombed some suspected launch sites … to no effect.  Attacks on shipping continue and ships continue to get hit.
 
Similarly, Iran continues to harass shipping, attacking, seizing, and mining passing ships while our navy stands by and does nothing.
 
 
Conclusion
 
I know I’ve criticized our endless deployments but if we weren’t out there protecting the sea lanes, bad actors might attack shipping with drones and missiles so thank goodness we’re out there, continuously deployed.
 
Our presence is deterring nothing.  We’re clearly not effectively protecting the sea lanes.  Tell me again, why are we doing deployments?
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Maersk: Impact From Red Sea Attacks Intensifying”, 5-Sep-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/finance/streettalk/maersk-red-sea/2024/09/05/id/1179157/

MEU vs. Army/Air Force Rapid Response

MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars.  Thus, they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to reach the area of concern.
 
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they could deal with minor resistance.
 
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the world in 24 hours. 
 
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure thing and might even be considered unlikely.  However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty minimal with dirt strips being adequate.  From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example, 

The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).

 
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an airfield.  The 2^nd Ranger battalion, 75^th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield seizure.  Of course, an airfield is not even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
 

In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude multi-parachute drops.  Similarly, I’m aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time.  I don’t know whether the Army still maintains such a capability, or not.
 

LAPES - Sheridan Air Drop

Stryker Parachute Drop

 Up until around 2014, airborne forces also included artillery.  From Wiki, 

1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.

Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
 

Air Dropped 105 mm Howitzer

The following units are considered to be rapidly deployable.  I don’t follow Army matters that closely so there may be others.
 
- XVIII Airborne Corps 

• 3rd Infantry Division
• 10th Mountain Division
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 101st Airborne Division

- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times.  Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
 
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor.  At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks which offered a justification for the use of MEUs.  Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery - and that justification has now vanished.
 
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs.  Add to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very suspect.
 
 
 
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Note:  I’m trying to assemble a current list of the combat equipment of a deployed MEU.  As best I can tell, this is the current list: 
 
7 to 16  Light Armored Vehicle  
15         Assault Amphibious Vehicle      
6          155mm howitzer: M777 
8          M252 81mm mortar       
63         Humvee           
 
That’s not much in the way of firepower.  Anyone have any modifications to the list?  In particular, I’m very unsure that MEUs deploy with any artillery, today.  Anyone know?
 
 
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[1]Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Fourth ed.). MacDill AFB, Florida: Joint Special Operations University. June 2015. pp. 78–82. ISBN 9781933749914. Archived from the original on 28 March 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2017.