The Marines have stated publicly and repeatedly that they are out of the amphibious assault business. Let’s set the wisdom of that aside and just look at what that means for the Navy.
From the Navy’s official current ship count, the fleet consists of 220 combatants (carriers, surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships) in the ‘Active in Commission’ category.[1]
|
Combatant Type |
Number |
|
Aircraft Carriers |
11 |
|
Surface Combatants |
110 |
|
Submarines |
68 |
|
Amphibious Warfare Ships |
31 |
If we’re truly out of the amphibious assault business, as the Marines say, that means that 31 of the 220 combatant ships in the Navy – that’s 14% of the combatant fleet - have no purpose.
If we subtract the 22 LCS which have no viable combat capability, that leaves a fleet of 198 combatants and that means that 16% of the fleet has no purpose.
That’s a lot of operating cost, personnel, and resources being devoted to ships that have no purpose.
And we’re continuing to build more amphibious ships!
_____________________________________
[1]https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML
Is it possible that the USMC are attempting disinformation by saying they're out of the amphibious assault business, and talking about their littoral missile-shooting fantasies? It's not very good disinformation, if that's the intention. Or it could be that the Marines are serious, but the Navy is sticking to its key mission of buying new ships.
ReplyDeleteWell, time to toss some creative thinkers at the problem of converting LSD/LPD into drone carriers. They already have vehicle storage space and flight decks. Design a roll-on/off drone racking system for the vehicle storage areas. Line the flight deck with launch rails to throw a bunch of cheap drones in the air fast. They are ever needed for their original purpose, unbolt and switch back. They just decommissioned the Whimbley Island, experiment!
ReplyDeleteThe Marine Commandant says they are out of the amphibious business. But he must answer to Congress and the Commander in Chief as well. While sometimes Congress and the Executive branch interfere too much such as Vietnam--LBJ demanding to personally approve each bombing raid at one point--they also have and should exercise their authority as well. The current idea of Marines doing Navy jobs instead of killing people and breaking things needs to be ignored. Congress should refuse to authorize the light, easily killed, and ultimately useless light ships he wants, and doing things like ASW.
ReplyDeleteOne of the reasons FDR didn't interfere as directly as he could have during WW2 was that General Marshal was more than ready to fire people for failing to perform, and being idiots. Our present crew of military leadership lacks common sense but somehow totally full of themselves. Berger makes an argument that basically says the Anti-Marine section of the Navy is right that we don't really need marines. The head of the joint chiefs brags in print that he told the Chinese he would ignore the lawful orders of the Commander-in-chief. The Navy builds ships with no idea what to do with them.
Congress and the President don't have to be military geniuses to see the current lack of strategy and common sense needs overidden.
"One of the reasons FDR didn't interfere as directly as he could have during WW2 was that General Marshal was more than ready to fire people for failing to perform, and being idiots. Our present crew of military leadership lacks common sense but somehow totally full of themselves."
DeleteThis is one of the few things Thomas Ricks got right in his numerous works about the military over the last fifteen years or so. Accountability has become inverted, and the level of competence seems to decline rapidly as you look at the cohorts in each ascending rank through field grade and flag.
And while on the subject of ships numbers, could someone help explain something to me? A short Defense News article spoke on how the navy has a goal to have 75 mission-capable or full-mission ships at the same time. This is a GOAL not the current operational capability. It is also a vague goal as the statement doesn't refer to they type of ships, missions, etc.
ReplyDeleteHelp a former Army and Air Force guy out here ComNavOps.
How could we only have less than 75 mission capable ships?
Am I misunderstanding that? Seriously. I admittedly don't know what counts as mission capable for every service. I know that there are always ships that are undergoing maintenance, training new crews, etc. But that's not even a quarter of the fleet.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/01/10/navy-aims-for-75-mission-capable-surface-ships-amid-readiness-drive/
The Navy attempts (with extensive failures!) to employ a cyclical readiness model. A ship comes off a deployment and immediately enters a prolonged cycle of 'un-readiness' during which it undergoes maintenance, training, workups for the next deployment, etc. Only after completion of the final workup does the ship once again become 'ready'.
DeleteOn top of that, we have extensive backlogs of ships awaiting maintenance. For example, we have several subs that have been sitting idle waiting multiple years for their turn at drydock/maintenance. At one point, we only had one deployable carrier due to maintenance backlogs!
The rule of thumb is that it takes three [non-deployed] ships of a given type to support one deployed.
The situation is deplorable and every flag officer in the Navy should be fired.
The two major contributors to this situation are pure incompetence by Navy leadership and the Combatant Commanders incessant demands for ships. Demands that serve no purpose. The Navy refuses to say 'no' to the Combatant Commanders so maintenance gets deferred until the ships can't run anymore which is the current situation.
Thank you. That explains it precisely and succinctly.
DeleteQuoting from the above-referenced link, "Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener last year unveiled a data-driven effort to better understand ship and crew readiness, with a focus on the specific factors keeping ships from being combat credible and the costs associated with addressing those deficiencies."
DeleteData-driven? I think we may have identified the source of the problem. It's just like the corporate world, where IT and HR are driving everything.
"data-driven effort to better understand ship and crew readiness"
DeleteData driven????? DATA DRIVEN????!!!!!!!
You don't need data to understand readiness issues. Our ships are rusted, rotting hulks that spend most of their time pierside, idle. Our crews are spending their time in diversity, sensitivity, and gender training instead of combat training. We're routinely deferring maintenance. We've neglected dry dock and depot funding for decades.
What more data is needed? There's no subtle mystery about this. Leadership is focused on everything except readiness.
Amphibious assault is not the only mission for amphibious ships.
ReplyDeleteWe don't need a fleet of 30+, multi-billion dollar ships to handle the occasional 'other' mission - missions that can largely be handled by other, existing US military forces and, generally, better handled.
DeleteA group of six amphibs is more than sufficient to maintain a core capability against future need and to handle the occasional 'other' mission.
31 Amphib ships at over $2 billion a pop is a heck of a lot of money just sitting there to do "other" missions...even for USA, thats some serious money that could be used somewhere else...
Delete"A group of six amphibs is more than sufficient to maintain a core capability against future need and to handle the occasional 'other' mission."
DeleteThat makes a lot of sense.
The Marine units rotate through getting qualified on amphibious operations using those ships.
The rest of the ships are put in storage until needed. They don't need to be scrapped or converted, just kept in reserve.
If they age into obsolescence, they they would be scrapped.
Lutefisk
Amphibs are extremely expensive to slowly offload gear via well deck so close to a landing. They do have a combat system worthy of a warship that is being underutilized. I'd keep the ships sooner than I would LCS.
ReplyDelete- Put the 16 VLS in
- Consider cannister launchers
- Embark MH-60R - no reason these ships can't perform the ASW mission similar to Japan's smaller carriers.
- Without Marines aboard, consider what available space might be used for like more medical space or command spaces.
- Figure a good use of that well deck. 4 USVs for an ASW or surface mission that can be launched early and maintained by coming along side the ship while under way.
With all its excess manpower, I've argued that some 20% of amphib crewmen should be Marines - in the mess, refuelers, ect. This would save the Navy much manpower, improve service coordination, give Marines some sea time and a real mission. Marines once manned all the big guns on Navy ships.
ReplyDelete"Marines once manned all the big guns on Navy ships."
DeleteIs that so? I thought the tradition was to have the ship's detachment of Marines man one battery, not all the guns.
"I've argued that some 20% of amphib crewmen should be Marines - in the mess, refuelers, ect."
DeleteAre you suggesting that they act as sailors while still retaining their 'primary' mission of amphibious assault or are you suggesting that they become permanent marine-sailors and have no other duty such as assault?
Downgrade the USMC to USN naval infantry units, i.e., what they already are, after the Commandant's EPIC FAILure of a doctrine? Makes sense, to conserve scarce resources- especially manpower, followed by and the industrial capacity to build what the military needs to perform its missions- for more ACHIEVABLE goals.
DeleteThousands of Marines work in kitchens stateside. They could be assigned that role on a ship for a three year tour. Marines have lots of aircraft refueler personnel. And task embarked Marines to augment the crew while on board, rather than sitting in their bunks half the day. Also have the Marines take over the COD squadrons since they both fly V-22s.
DeleteMy feeling is that, in spite of the lack of amphib assault support capability (connectors, NGFS, etc), the Navy still thinks theres a place and a future in amphib assault, and that frankly, theyre just trying to wait out Berger, and then scrap all the EABO silliness and get somewhat back on track. It doesnt address all the problems with it I mentioned, among others, but the Navy isnt thinking things through completely either. I just think theyre trying to continue building amphibs, and delay building the new ship Berger wants until he's gone...
ReplyDeleteOne wonders if a number of amphib ships could be converted to a logistical function. Just a thought.
ReplyDeleteExcellent idea. Throw some money to the ship designers, ask for design studies and precise estimates of how much time and what resources are necessary to make the necessary modifications, and the Navy should be good.
DeleteI think the first two ships of the America-class LHA's were built without the well deck. Why not convert both of them to MCM ship, like the old USS Inchon, one for each coast and forward deploy to the Fifth fleet and 7th Fleet respectively. Look at the cost of developing a MH-53K King Stallion version. Just a thought.
ReplyDelete@ComNav: Did the Navy ever disclose why the destroyer tenders were decommissioned? Wouldn't it be prudent to look at designing a new, modern destroyer tender-class ship? I think it would be beneficial to forward deployed DDG's at Rota and maybe 1-2 in the Indo-Pacific at Guam. What percentage of maintenance on a surface ship is accomplished pier-side vice shipyard/drydock?
I can answer the "why the destroyer tenders were decommissioned" question. A long time ago the Navy, in its infinite wisdom, stated that the crews on the LCS were 'operators not maintainers" and all maintenance would be done by contractors. That mentality has permeated the fleet. They Navy has closed the SIMA's that allowed sailors shore duty to sharpen skills or learn skills to rebuild valves, doe electronic repairs, weld to a higher level etc. now, those areas that were the bastions of higher maintenance learning are the places of the sick, lame, and lazy.
DeleteOnce upon a time the sounds of needle guns and air chisels were your "musical" accompaniment while walking down the piers. now, if you hear that noise, it is most likely coming from a civilian contractor.
plain and simple, the navy no longer has the skilled trades that the destroyer and submarine tenders require to do the work aboard ships.
I think the ideas to convert the amphib ships to other uses is a good idea....in wartime.
ReplyDeleteBut the LHA/LHD's are 40k + ton ships. Unless there is a serious emergency, you probably can do better (cheaper?) by building dedicated single-purpose ships tailored specifically for that mission.
IMO it's best to just put the amphib ships in storage until they are needed.
Lutefisk
The biggest problem with the Navy’s current “amphibious” fleet is that you can’t run a proper amphibious assault off them. My time in the Gator Navy coincided with the introduction of the “large-deck amphibs,” the LHAs/LHDs. Our feeling was that they put too many eggs in one basket, and one lucky (or unlucky) hit could knock out your whole assault. So the Navy responded by deciding to keep them 25-50 miles offshore where the risk of land-based missile attack is less (although one might think that the risk of submarine torpedo attack is greater).
ReplyDeleteThe problem with that doctrine is that there is no viable ship-to-shore connector for tanks and heavy artillery from that far out—boats are too slow, helos and V-22s can’t lift the weight, and LCACs are not approved for assaults because of reliability issues. With no way to get tanks and heavy artillery ashore, the Commandant dropped them from the Marine inventory, and is now searching for a mission that an ultralight infantry can perform. Hint: It’s not amphibious assault. So Marines are now out of the amphibious business.
This prompts two obvious and related questions:
1) What kind of amphibious force should the Navy maintain?
2) What should be the mission and composition of the USMC?
I’ve previously posted my ideas for both, with some agreeing and some disagreeing. Here is a quick recap of my thinking:
1) I would opt for smaller and more versatile amphib ships that can be operated closer in without posing unacceptable risk, but more capable than the small, slow, and unstealthy LAW, something like a conventional PhibRon--smaller LHA/LHD like SP Juan Carlos/AU Canberra, LPH like the FR Mistral, LPD/LSD like the UK Albion, LST with a real beaching bow (like TU Bayraktar or Newport/AU Kanimbla with LST bow), LPA/LKA like WWII APA, and a land attack frigate (2x 155mm, rockets, counterbattery, with RHIBs and helo platform for inserting commandos). All PhibRon ships would incorporate heavy EW/ECM and stealth technology. Each PhibRon could lift a combined-arms 4000-Marine Expeditionary Regiment (MER), including infantry battalion, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, engineers, support, and air. Have 10 squadrons for total lift capacity of 40,000 Marines. Each PhibRon could be built for about the same $4B as a new LHA/LHD.
2) I would have Marines take a page from what the Royal Marines did when faced with budgetary extinction after WWII—become commando and amphibious specialists. Copy the Brits and have 30,000 or so Marines take over the cadre of SOCOM, supported by 10,000 each SEALs, Green Berets, and AFSOC, the way SAS and SBS support the RMs. Every Marine E-5 or above would be commando trained and certified. Have 80,000 active FMF Marines (supported by 40,000 reserves). Add 10,000 Marine air in addition to air included in FMF (focused on ship-shore movement, close air support of Marines ashore, and possibly transfer the air superiority mission to Navy VF squadrons and the land attack/strike mission to Marine VMA squadrons) and another 15,000 for admin and training, and you get a leaner, meaner, and more focused Corps of around 135,000.
This leaves the Navy with the issue of what to do with the LHAs/LHDs and the LPD-17s. I would convert the LPD-17s to the ABM/BMD ships that HII has proposed for the same hull. I lean toward converting LHAs/LHDs to interim Lightning Carriers until a class of 75,000T conventional CVs can be built to supplement the 100,000T CVNs, but other uses could be considered.
Let's not forget the two of the largest amphibious landings in US history had virtually no USMC participation at all - Normandy (Overlord) and Sicily (Husky).
ReplyDeleteAlso US Army participated in a lot of amphibious ops in Pacific.
The US Army still maintains a large fleet of Runnymede large landing craft (LSTs) as well as smaller LCMs.
Thus there is a large conventional force equipped with tanks and artillery capable of using those amphibs in an assault though not as specialised (no AAVs or fixed wing VSTOL jets). However the USMC can still embark F-35Bs if required.
The problem with modern USMC is they've made themselves obsolete.
When Berger is out, suddenly these ships will be needed. Until we can send them all over by air, we will need those ships, and the supplies and equipment they carry.
ReplyDeleteBe sure you clearly understand what an amphibious ship is and can do. For example, they are NOT used as transports. In Desert Storm, as far as I know, none were used as transports. They are very much a narrow niche application (opposed assault) which the Marines claim to be out of. There is no other purpose for them.
Delete