The Marines are moving ahead with acquiring the Israeli Iron Dome system in a modified form.
… USMC officials have developed and tested an MRIC [Medium Range Intercept Capability] prototype that removes the Rafael-made Iron Dome launcher from its heavy base, mounts it on the back of a trailer to fire Tamir missiles, and integrates it with other service capabilities.[1]
Why are the Marines doing this? A Breaking Defense article offers this,
Growing concerns about cruise missile threats have prompted US military leaders to hunt for innovative ways to quickly field new air defenses.[1]
Here’s a bit more,
Ultimately, the service wants to outfit three Marine Air Wings each with an MRIC battery by the end of 2028 … [1]
So, these anti-air units would, presumably, be used to defend Marine air bases? Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)?
The entire point of the Marine’s small unit, hidden base concept is that they’re hidden. Clearly these units would not be suitable for that, given their size and large amount of required resources and support, as we see here,
… in addition to utilizing the truck-mounted Iron Dome launcher paired with the Tamir interceptors, it also uses the Common Aviation Command-and-Control System (CAC2S) and a mini battle management control (BMC) system for the Tamir missile, along with the AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR).[1]
That’s only suitable and viable for a large, well established base. This could fit with the EABO concept if the EABO base is large. That being the case, this is the Guadalcanal scenario where the base is well known to the enemy and we’re in a continuous, pitched battle for the base’s survival.
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| Marine Iron Dome Test |
Of course, we next have to wonder if the system is even suitable and effective as an anti-missile system. Remember that the Israeli Iron Dome was developed as an anti-rocket system, not an anti-missile system. Can it actually intercept cruise missiles? Supposedly the Marines tested the system, however, the description of the testing leaves much to be desired and engenders a lot of doubts.
… the USMC wrapped up its series of three MRIC live-fire tests in September 2022 when it used the more mobile, expeditionary launcher for the first time against several threats including a maneuvering target.[1]
It’s clear from the preceding that the Marine’s testing was mostly conducted under non-representative conditions as the mobile launcher and a maneuvering target were only used during the wrap up testing and the suggestion is that was a one-time event. Did they test it against supersonic targets? Targets with electronic warfare penetration aids? Saturation attacks? Targets with terminal evasive maneuver capability? In bad weather? Against sea-skimming targets?
Given the example of the fraudulent Marine testing and declaration of IOC for the F-35 (see, “Pencil Whipped”), one cannot help but be highly suspicious.
Is that the extent of the concerns? No, there’s also cybersecurity issues.
Questions abound about the [cyber]security of weaving these capabilities together … the Army has flagged it as a prime concern and said it does not plan to integrate the two Iron Dome batteries it currently has in its inventory into its larger air defense architecture.[1]
In fact, the Army has selected a different system instead of Iron Dome.
Does it make sense for the Army and Marines to have selected two different systems for the exact same application? Isn’t that a bit like the Navy building both the Freedom and Independence variant LCS for the exact same application? We see how that worked out.
One of the potential missions for both Army and the Marines is to defend Air Force bases. Wouldn’t it make more sense if they each had the same equipment?
Summation
As with almost every decision the Marines have made over the last several years, I’m at a loss to understand exactly what the Marines are trying to accomplish. I’m all for anti-air defense systems but is selecting a non-Army standard, unproven, large footprint, anti-rocket system really the best way to go about defending against potentially supersonic cruise missiles? Does that really fit with the missile-shooting concept or the EABO concept?
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Marines greenlight mobile Iron Dome launcher development, seek 2025 prototype fielding”, Ashley Roque, 5-Jan-2023,
Technical considderations and questionable usefullness aside 3 batteries, 1 each per air wing, is nothing. If they have money to waste I'm more than happy to send them my account number...Jokes aside why aside the USMC needs to decide very soon what it will really do in future as the actual plans are based mostly on wishful thinking and pipe dreams.
ReplyDeleteIf they are useful systems, I'd want to know where else they'd be useful. And this is just a for instance, could the box be integrated with an LCS mission module? Obviously that's without consideration to can the LCS radar be of any use and could it integrate into the combat system.
ReplyDeleteMy information might be a bit out dated but if I remember correctly even systems like Rapier, Crotale, Roland,etc were "mobile" but the meaning was more move maybe once or twice to a fixed location and stay there, move again and stay there a few days, weeks,etc....wasn't really meant to be moved every day or travel on hard terrain too often. How Iron Dome or any modern system really, apart from MANPADS, can stay moving on and off a beach, scout and move back on board a ship to redeploy on another island is highly doubtful IMO. There's no way it doesn't break down after a few days of travel or embarking disembarking a few times from a ship....
ReplyDeleteWhy a foreign system that's not already in the inventory? Why not a land-based system using Sea-Sparrow, AMRAAM (NASAMs), or RIM?
ReplyDeleteMy guess? For the same reason the Marines tried to prevent the Army from using MARPAT on the Army Combat Uniform: The Marines want to be "special."
DeleteSeriously, the USMC can load and launch Sea Sparrows into the same truck-mounted Mk 41 VLS cells it uses for antiship missiles. That should be good enough- but NO, the USMC must use something the USN doesn't, so it must be something incompatible with Navy hardware and software.
Why does it seem to me that the FD 2030 foot print is getting larger? How big is this thing now? It was approx 75 Marines.....now how big is it?
ReplyDeleteReminds me of the mythical Movement Control Team of 12 Soldiers. These 12 needed a Platoon to protect them... who needed a DFAC to feed 'em.... who needed an aid station to keep 'em healthy..... who needed generators to keep the the power flowing.... who needed a contact team to repair the generators.... who needed transportation from a truck company... who needed a maintenance company to repair all the equipment.... who needed a CSSB to coordinate with the SUS BDE.... etc.etc... till there is a Logistics Support Area with an airfield and a General in charge. Because..... because.....
DeleteIt appears that as the Marine leadership becomes increasingly aware of FD 2030's flaws, their attempts to address them simply become ludicrouser and ludicrouser.
ReplyDeleteI suspect it'll be far more cost-effective to simply have Marines serve as seamen aboard Arleigh Burke class destroyers, if the Marines want to attack Chinese Navy warships. At least then, everything the Marines need to detect and attack a target, and to escape or otherwise defend themselves from enemy counterattacks, is right on their ship.
DeleteThe DOD & perhaps congress should ask the question as to why the Army wants one anti air system and the Marines another .
ReplyDelete"Does it make sense for the Army and Marines to have selected two different systems for the exact same application? Isn’t that a bit like the Navy building both the Freedom and Independence variant LCS for the exact same application? "
ReplyDeleteI'm goning to have to disagree with you here. Wisconsin and Lower Alabama are radically differing environments. A bribe that will fly on the Great Lakes simply won't cut in the Gulf. That's why our LCS is of the greatest quality.
I stand corrected !
DeleteThis system only works for high arcing ballistics missiles. Cruise missiles fly in very low. By the time the radar detects one and cues the system to launch, the missile will explode on target. Another example of corrupt Generals.
ReplyDeleteWhat the Marines really need is a 40-mm AAA system with its own radar, like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aeMZttTftk
Great for anti-air, anti-missile, anti-infantry, anti-armor, anti-boat ect. It can shoot up anything that moves.
The gun turret should be mounted on the USMC amphibious vehicles, to increase commonality; reduce operating costs; and of course, let it deploy WITH the marines, instead of waiting for an LCAC to transport it from the LPD or LHD, which (due to the ship remaining over the horizon, to reduce her vulnerability to enemy defenses) will take an hour, time enough for a determined and well-equipped enemy to kill all the marines the air defense vehicle is meant to defend. That should be doable, as long as the USMC limits its demands to "will work in a maritime environment" like with the UH-1Y and AH-1Z, instead of "all-singing, all-dancing" like with the F-35B.
Delete"Cruise missiles fly in very low. By the time the radar detects one and cues the system to launch, the missile will explode on target. ... What the Marines really need is a 40-mm AAA system with its own radar"
DeleteNote, however, that the radar horizon with a 10 ft high radar mount (I'm guessing from the video) is only 5 miles and a cruise missile flying at, say 20 ft, is visible at 7 miles. To be fair, that's a very short reaction/engagement time and is the same problem you noted for the Iron Dome.
I have doubts about the Iron Dome ability to engage a cruise missile, at all (software and intercept missile performance), but the radar limitation is the same for Iron Dome or the 40 mm in the video.
Off Topic but you probably want to check out this Taiwan Invasion Wargame report: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ
ReplyDeleteOne of the findings: The US Navy surface fleet is “extremely vulnerable,” with it “typically losing two carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations,” CSIS said.
If that's the same report being discussed at https://old.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/107ogd8/notes_from_csis_presentation_on_wargaming_a/ then it's HORRENDOUSLY flawed, for reasons the OP noted:
Delete1) It assumes the bulk of operationally active Chinese forces come from the Eastern Theater Command, which only has 1/3 of their combined naval and aviation systems, and other Theater Commands contribute minimal forces, in order to achieve operational surprise
2) In spite of that sacrifice for operational surprise, it assumes that the US has had enough advance warning to have already deployed ground forces into Taiwan at the start of hostilities, and can maintain resupply of those forces for the entirety of the campaign
3) It assumes Chinese airborne ASW is nonexistent even though local airspace IVO Taiwan is permissive enough to enable round-the-clock bombardment of Taiwanese assets for at least two weeks
4) It assumes US TACAIR (including 4th-gen airframes) has extreme attritional advantages once airborne
5) It assumes US subsurface assets do not experience resupply interruptions even though no SSN transit time to/fro Hawaii is modeled into the simulation and UNREP for submarines is barely discussed
6) It also assumes local Taiwanese forces do not experience resupply issues once cut off from maintenance, spares, and ammunition for their US-origin equipment
7) By contrast, it makes heavy assumptions about Chinese resupply issues once forces are landed on Taiwan itself
8) It also makes generous assumptions about the awareness, cohesion, and mobility of Taiwan's military once subject to nearly two weeks of sustained EW and fires from China
In short, the report assumes China is guaranteed to do everything wrong,.and the US is guaranteed to do everything right. That is NO WAY to plan for war- something we should've learned from our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Korea, and World War II.
" probably want to check out this Taiwan Invasion Wargame report:"
DeleteFrom a quick glance, I immediately note that the game is turn-based in increments of 3.5 days per turn. That, right there, stops me dead in my tracks as it imposes ridiculously unrealistic conditions.
Was there some aspect that you thought particularly noteworthy?
I skimmed it. Some items of interest:
Delete"Potentially disruptive reductions in force structure have
also been undertaken, and the combination of those reductions and the failure to fully staff units
has reduced the [Taiwan's] army’s size from 200,000 in 2011 to 94,000 in 2022."
So Taiwan don't want to fight.
"Concrete (hardening) lacks influential constituencies within military bureaucracies, but the large benefit
justifies a strong effort."
I've argued this for years. The report notes Anderson AFB on Guam is key, but has no hardened aircraft shelters. It notes 90% of aircraft losses occurred on the ground. I've argued for years to move aircraft out of Korea and Okinawa and have squadrons fly in frequently from Hawaii and Alaska for exercises. Otherwise they are sitting ducks with families in tow.
It also note both sides will quickly run out of missiles.
JASSM-ER may have a latent anti-ship capability with software upgrades to its IR seeker.
DeleteThey call for far more LRASMs, as CNO has.
The base case involves no US ground forces on Taiwan.
It certainly doesn't assume the US and Taiwan does everything right and China does everything wrong. The US takes some massive casualties in most of the variations. The US alone loses 270 aircraft and 17 ships (including 2 carriers) in the "optimistic" case.
It makes sense that the Chinese have trouble resupplying their forces on Taiwan. They have a tenuous sea bridge being heavily attacked by air and submarines.
I haven't read through all of it, but it seems pretty reasonable, given its limitations.
One of the major questionable aspects is the effectiveness (Pk) of BOTH the offensive and defensive missiles/weapons of various types. The game assigned Pk's in the realm of 70%. To be fair, the game notes that these values are questionable and explores variations in the offensive Pk's. The historical reality, however, shows effectiveness rates far, far below what the game uses. If one assumes that missile effectiveness, both offensive and defensive, is far less than what was assumed, then the overall ship and aircraft losses drop drastically and the success of the Chinese amphibious fleet goes way up.
DeleteIf missiles are less effective than they model, the reduction probably isn't symmetric. It's much harder to hit a missile with a missile than it is to hit a ship with a missile. So SAMs are probably impacted by this more than LRASMs. Therefore, net reductions in ship defenses favors our side since the Chinese have more ships vulnerable to attack in these scenarios.
Delete"They have a tenuous sea bridge being heavily attacked by air and submarines."
DeleteThe USN's MASSIVE nuclear submarines may have difficulty operating in the Taiwan Strait's shallow waters.
"submarines may have difficulty operating in the Taiwan Strait"
DeleteThere's also the issue of blue-on-blue. You can't have multiple subs operating in the same area or you risk blue-on-blue or, even worse, hesitancy due to uncertainty. Thus, forecasting heavy submarine activity to stop an invasion fleet in confined waters is unrealistic.
In 21 of 24 scenarios the Chinese players attacked from the south, due to the preponderance of Taiwanese forces in the north. The beaches in the south have deep water not far from shore.
DeleteI expect we would see continuous cycling of SSNs into this congested area, rather than all trying to attack at once.
"I expect we would see continuous cycling of SSNs into this congested area, rather than all trying to attack at once."
DeleteOf course, bearing in mind that we would also see continuous presence of Chinese subs and ASW assets so it's not as if we would leisurely cycle a sub into the area, have it unload its torpedoes, and then cycle out with a new sub cycling in every hour until the Chinese fleet was eliminated. Each attack sub would have to slowly and carefully sneak or fight its way into the area and then work to find a target and achieve a firing position without being detected. Of course, every attack reveals the attacking sub's position (flaming datum) and makes the exercise highly risky. We'd be extremely fortunate to achieve one successful attack every few days and that's not going to decimate an invasion fleet.
The Chinese would know approximately where we'd be attacking from and would flood the area with ASW assets. Again, we'd be fortunate to only suffer 20% attrition of attacking subs unless the Chinese turn out to be utterly inept at ASW. Any sub lost won't be replaced in useful time frame.
I just don't see the massive destruction of a Chinese invasion fleet that the report suggests.
Most of the destruction in the report came from massed JASSM/LRASM-firing bombers, not from submarines.
DeleteThe "withholding submarines" excursion had less of a negative impact than "no maritime strike JASSM".
"Most of the destruction in the report came from massed JASSM/LRASM-firing bombers, not from submarines."
DeleteDid you see a breakout of the kill sources? I'm trying not to read every word of the report since I see little value in it due to the unrealistic assumptions.
I've found it a worthwhile read. I don't see a breakdown.
DeleteA few passages,
"Submarines are inherently stealthy and can also reliably inflict attrition on the Chinese fleet. However, submarines carry a limited number of munitions, so while
they can impose steady attrition, submarines must periodically return to port to rearm, and their effect
therefore plays out over an extended period of time. Given the high carrying capacity and rapid rearm
times of aircraft, bombers and fighters equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles provide the most
potent threat to Chinese shipping. "
"Inside the straits, U.S. submarines wreaked havoc on Chinese shipping. Based on the agent-based
modeling found in RAND’s U.S.-China Military Scorecard and historical evidence from World War II,
each submarine would sink two large amphibious vessels (and an equal number of decoys and escorts)
over the course of a 3.5-day turn. Every submarine squadron (four submarines) in the strait sank eight
Chinese amphibious ships and eight escorts or decoys, but at a price of roughly 20 percent attrition per
3.5 days.311 U.S. submarines operated on a “conveyor belt,” whereby they hunted, moved back to port
(Guam, Yokosuka, or Wake Island), reloaded, then moved forward again and hunted. Doing this cycle
as quickly as possible was important because the number of submarine squadrons was limited during
the early phases of the conflict and their contribution was so significant. Submarines were also needed
to screen against Chinese submarines exiting the first island chain."
"In games where the JASSM-ER has maritime strike capabilities, the abundance of U.S. munitions made
U.S. strategy an almost uncomplicated exercise. With each squadron of 12 bombers carrying around
200 stealthy, standoff ASCMs, the United States could rapidly cripple the Chinese fleet and leave the
invasion force stranded. For this reason, many studies that look at this problem recommend expanding
the arsenal of anti-ship weapons.316"
@B.Smitty, a few of your comments are going to the blog spam folder for unknown reasons. I check the folder several times a day and transfer them out as I see them. Unfortunately, there's nothing I can do about it happening. Rest assured they'll appear in short order. Sorry.
DeleteThe entire idea of buying one system that solves all requirements is basically stupid and always results in a dismal failure. You can go as far back in history as you like. There are 2 totally different air defense regimes in question. One is BMD and the other is defense against supersonic/hypersonic missiles that fly very low and fast on terminal approach. One system designed to defeat both attacks will cost the earth and of course be subject to endless compromises that further reduce its utility or effectiveness or both. Also, they'll cost a hundred times more/missile. There's a reason warships sport air defense systems that are totally separate from terminal air defense systems which are usually stand-alone systems.
ReplyDeleteBig log bases don't move all that much. That's what helos and trucks are for.
You may have missed a key point. We aren't talking about BMD and cruise missile defenses. If we were, you'd be completely correct. In this case, we're talking strictly about cruise missile defense and, more specifically, fairly short notice/detection cruise missile defense. Both the Army and Marine applications, in this case, are for cruise missile defense, hence, identical requirements.
DeleteThere may well be a need for Army and Marine EABO ballistic missile defense but those needs will have to be met by other systems.
"one system that solves all requirements is basically stupid"
It is stupid, as you so eloquently put it. HOWEVER, that's not what we're talking about. A single system that tries to do everything and be everything will fail. In this case, we're talking about very specific, single function systems - late detection, cruise missile engagement - instead of a do-everything anti-air system.