The LCS program problems are many and, generally, well known. Still, there are aspects that are surprising even for this troubled program. One such issue is the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) anti-air defense weapon for the Freedom class LCS. The issue is that the RAM system has not been tested on the Freedom class and the Navy has decided not to conduct any tests.
Both LCS seaframes have limited anti-ship missile self-defense capability. The Navy has not fully tested these combat systems and the Navy does not plan to conduct further air warfare operational testing of Freedom seaframes 1 through 15 in their current combat system configuration. The Navy has accepted the risk of continued operation with a combat system that is not operationally tested. (1, p.190)
No tests – that’s worse than the WWII torpedo fiasco!
This may also partially explain why the Navy is trying to retire the first fifteen or so Freedom class LCS.
The DOT&E testing also mentions a vital issue that ComNavOps has harped on and that is performance of radars and missiles in the face of debris-filled skies during attempted intercepts. To briefly summarize the problem, many people feel that ships can simply vomit forth dozens of missiles, simultaneously, at any single target. The reality, however, is that only two missiles at a time can be effectively utilized because the explosions from the initial intercepts will fill the skies with radar-reflecting debris and hot (IR) sources and subsequent intercepts will be blinded. DOT&E notes this problem in one of their LCS recommendations:
Correct the SSDS scheduling function to preclude interference with the RAM infrared guidance capability stemming from prior intercepts and warhead detonations. [emphasis added] (1, p.209)
The refusal by the Navy to conduct tests of the anti-air system is also seen in the USS Ford self-defense testing. Significant problems were found with the ‘Slick’ 32 electronic warfare (EW) system, the SPY-3 radar, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
The Navy conducted developmental and operational tests on the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) that revealed combat system deficiencies and limitations associated with the SLQ-32(V)6 electronic warfare system, the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR), and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). These deficiencies and limitations reduce the overall self-defense capability of the ship. The Navy has conducted only one of the four planned CVN 78 SDTS operational test events and has not resourced [funded] the remaining testing. [emphasis added] (2, p.123)
In June 2019, the Navy conducted one of the four planned CVN 78 operational tests planned for FY19 on the SDTS. However, the remaining three tests are unlikely to be conducted in accordance with the DOT&E-approved CVN 78 data collection plan, the DOT&E-approved Capstone Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense TEMP, and the DOT&E-approved SSDS TEMP. The Navy canceled one test event because they did not incorporate software changes required to conduct the test on the SDTS and the event was not resourced [funded]. The Navy delayed another test event due to poor SLQ-32(V)6 performance in developmental testing. The final, most challenging test event planned for 2QFY20 is not currently funded. The Navy may have to cancel the remaining delayed/unfunded events if they are not conducted before the MFR is removed from the SDTS; this removal is currently planned for the end of 2QFY20. If the Navy does not conduct all of the remaining events, testing will not be adequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the CVN 78 combat system.
So, the Navy’s solution to finding problems is to stop testing. Yeah, that sounds about right.
This is telling us that the Navy knows the ship self-defense systems have serious problems but, for reasons unknown, refuses to further test the systems. Presumably, the reason is that the Navy knows that the system problems are serious and, at the moment, unsolvable, and further testing would only reveal more problems that the Navy already knows about. In other words, from the Navy’s perspective, why spend money testing when you already know the results will be bad? I have no problem with this scenario if the Navy is working to correct the problems. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of that they are doing so. In fact, the total cessation of funding suggests that the Navy is simply going to accept the problems and make no effort to fix them.
In addition to halting physical tests, the Navy has also halted its modeling efforts which were supposed to have taken the place of physical testing.
The Navy’s refusal to conduct anti-air tests also highlights the recent post about Intellectual Property rights and the problems the Navy has encountered in trying to acquire them (see, “The Navy and Intellectual Property”). In an irresponsible attempt to cut costs, the Navy is attempting to shift from physical testing to modeling and simulation (M&S) but, in order to do so, they must have detailed design and engineering data and companies are frequently refusing to provide that.
The Navy has neither resourced nor conducted any air warfare test events against anti-ship cruise missile surrogates planned as part of the DOT&E-approved Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) or the LCS TEMP. The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems halted all work to develop a Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) M&S [Modeling and Simulation] suite of the combat systems in FY15 and has not yet restarted the effort. [emphasis added] (2, p.141)
DOT&E noted in its 2017 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the LCS combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:
The Navy halted all work to develop a PRA M&S suite of LCS combat systems in FY15 because some combat system element models (e.g., radars) were not available. (1, p.190)
DOT&E noted in its 2019 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the Ford combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:
The Navy has not resourced [funded] combat system testing on the lead ship or the modeling and simulation (M&S) required to support evaluation of the ship’s Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) requirement. (2, p.124)
Conclusion
The decision to drop physical testing in favor of modeling is purely a budget driven attempt to save money. However, moving to a modeling approach to testing has run into the issue of intellectual property rights. The Navy’s conflict with industry about intellectual property rights is complex and challenging. Both sides have very valid concerns. The Navy needs the data rights in order to conduct modeling and simulation but industry, quite rightly, has no desire to give away its hard-earned competitive advantages which is exactly what would happen. Of course, if the Navy would show an ounce of wisdom, they’d return to actual performance testing and the data rights issue would be largely moot.
The result of all this is that Navy leadership is knowingly sending combat systems to the fleet untested. That’s an obvious recipe for disaster when combat comes. This violates the trust of the sailors under their command and constitutes dereliction of duty.
________________________________
(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2017 Annual Report
(2)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2019 Annual Report
RE: the intellectual property rights
ReplyDeleteIs it ONLY for simulating test situations that they need these rights, or might it also perhaps be so that they can maintain and repair the equipment in a combat zone, where the manufacturer probably wouldn't want to send technicians?
There are many reasons for the Navy wanting intellectual property (IP) and data rights and there are many ways that information can be used. One of the obvious uses, that I didn't discuss, is modifying source code (which is the 'product' in so many cases) or using source code to create new products. This would deprive the manufacturer of income so it's easy to understand why the manufacturers are reluctant to turn IP over to the Navy. Further, if the Navy were to obtain and modify source code, the manufacturer would be unable to provide effective technical support. This would hurt both the manufacturer and the Navy.
DeleteThe entire IP issue is a mess.
Also, the military has terrible security so China would steal any IP/code manufacturers gave them.
DeleteAs a former computer programmer, I agree completely that we shouldn't rely entirely on computer simulations to test equipment like this. It's not for nothing that computer science types have invented the "GIGO" (Garbage In, Garbage Out) principle.
ReplyDeleteAnd in this case, you are relying not only on the software itself being perfect, but also the data from the manufacturer being perfect and correctly modelling all the necessary cases.
Computer simulations are fine for part of the testing (and certainly for preliminary testing) but at some point you need to test the actual hardware.
Incidentally, I feel the same way about our nuclear weapons, where we seem to believe that we can verify the safety and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons for decades, and even design new ones, without ever testing the complete system.
I wonder if this might suggest that we need our officers to study more history at places like the Naval War College. Especially World War 2 history.
ReplyDeleteObviously some things have changed since then, but it seems like we are repeating some of the same mistakes that were made then (like the torpedo fiasco, for example) and which were already solved at the cost of considerable loss of life.
There's a saying: You should always learn from other people's mistakes, since you can never live long enough to make them all yourself.
So the Navy has decided that the first comprehensive T&E of the system, if it occurs, will be against actual war shots, probably in multiples, with the lives of the crew and the survival of the ship on the line.
ReplyDeleteThe Ukranian Navy is offering to do comprehensive testing,
ReplyDeleteif Navy isn't too picky about the condition of items after
testing. The Ukrainian PRA M&S is currently the best in the world.
This may be a silly question but I can't help asking : if the air defence radars or IR system can be fooled by debris, isn't it possible that the attacking missile is faced with the same problems ?
ReplyDelete"isn't it possible that the attacking missile is faced with the same problems ?"
DeleteTo a lesser extent, yes. Bear in mind that the attacking missile is emerging in a couple of seconds from the debris cloud and 'seeing' clear fields ahead. In contrast, the defending ship's sensors are staring at the debris cloud the entire time. There is no 'emerging' for the defender. Even when the attacking missile emerges from the debris cloud, the defender is trying to see the missile against a backdrop of the debris cloud. All the defender can do is wait for enough of the debris to fall away to re-establish which 'target' is the real one.
This is why I've said that we don't need ever bigger super-Aegis radars that can see a mosquito at a thousand miles. Instead, we need a very short range radar (or IR or EO sensor) that can separate out the real target from a debris cloud as quickly as possible.
"isn't it possible that the attacking missile is faced with the same problems ?"
DeleteNot the same problem (CNO covered that), but a similar one that may be easy or surprisingly difficult for the missile to handle depending on the capabilities of the target ship and the parameters of the terminal phase of the engagement!
Look at things from the ship's side: the incoming missile has a closure rate that is > 500kts more than the closure rate of the 'ground', while the fragments from an SM-2 or ESSM or RAM exploding will drop to near-zero closure relative to the ground within seconds, and there is no getting around this. Even the ancient AN/AWG-9 with its (by modern standards massive) +/- 133kts doppler notch will reject this clutter as if it weren't even there (outside of obscure circumstances). A modern phased array radar (whether PESA or AESA) will be completely unphased. Shoot-shoot-look (and eventually shoot-look-shoot-look) is mostly done for other reasons.
Now look at things from the missile's perspective. It's looking down at a target with a closure rate that is within 35 knots of the 'ground' if it's approaching from ahead or astern, and zero if it's approaching from abeam. As such, it can't get much use from a doppler filter to help it distinguish the ship from the sea (which often isn't a problem) or from chaff that the ship launches (which might be a real problem), and if it did use some stupidly low doppler notch (say abs(Vc - Vg) > 15 kts) the chaff would stay outside of that notch for a long time, and it would also not be able to 'see' the ship when attacking from abeam regardless of the ship's speed. So the missile needs to use other means to distinguish the ship from any chaff that the ship might launch, and those other means are generally less effective than a good doppler notch. Read Stimson for details.
Incidentally, this is why chaff on its own is nearly completely ineffective as a missile countermeasure for aircraft in the modern era - the chaff drops into the doppler notch of either the attacking platform's radar or the missile's own radar (depending on missile type, where in the engagement the chaff is deployed, etc) in an absurdly short period of time, on the order of 5ms. It is effectively invisible to modern fighter and SAM radars. Now, chaff that has been illuminated by a jamming pod (eg. the ASPJ) is a very different story. Read Schlesinger for some details of that scenario - I say 'some' because much of EW is effectively permanently outside of open literature.
"fragments from an SM-2 or ESSM or RAM exploding will drop to near-zero closure relative to the ground within seconds,"
DeleteTo expand on that a bit ... Bear in mind that the standard protocol is to fire pairs of defensive missiles and these some seconds (3-5???) apart. Thus, about the time the first debris field may be clearing, the second missile explodes and a second field is formed (unless the missiles just clean miss and continue on, unexploded?) which also takes some seconds to clear. Thus, the 'total' debris field clearance time is at least several seconds and may well be more. A radar operator who's actually seen/done this would have to tell us. My best guess is around 7-10 sec. The problem is that during that time, the incoming missile will have continued traveling towards the target.
I further assume that there is additional time required for the radar computer to re-establish an 'understanding' of the picture. Just because the debris pieces may have dropped below a speed threshold doesn't mean they cease to exist. The radar still has to continually scan them and determine that they've stayed below the threshold. Even for a computer, this takes a finite amount of time. What that time is, I don't know but it adds to the 'reacquiring' time after an intercept.
Any particular reason your referencing outdated DOT&E reports? To be fair the DOT&E is still calling the testing inadequate. From the 2021 report:
ReplyDelete"In December 2020, the Navy concluded the
Self‑Defense Test Ship phase of CVN 78 ICS
operational test by conducting a test against
supersonic ASCM surrogates. The Navy completed
three of the four planned Self-Defense Test Ship
tests in the DOT&E-approved test plan, and those
that were completed deviated from the approved test
plan. "
"Only a limited assessment of CVN 78 combat system
effectiveness is possible."
Coverage varies for any given year and the more recent reports have been increasingly sparse about reporting useful details. Unless DOT&E makes their restricted (not classified!) reports available again, I won't be referencing them anymore as they've become useless.
Delete"So, the Navy’s solution to finding problems is to stop testing."
ReplyDeleteIndisputable logic on the part of the navy,
Lutefisk
Hey, it 'worked' with the Ford's EMALS and AAG and weapon elevators! Why mess with success?
DeleteIf they're retiring a bunch of the LCS-1 class, there's no reason not to button them up unmanned and with the system on full auto and shoot at them. Surely we have enough Harpoons that are scheduled to be replaced by NSMs on a one-for-one basis that we can do this cheaply.
ReplyDeleteStart with simple and easy-to-defend scenarios and work up to more complex and challenging scenarios to get a good handle on how well the system performs across the spectrum. If necessary, put in inert warheads and/or program the missiles to send a signal then nosedive into the water just before impact (like the turn-away maneuver of an exercise torp) to maximize the number of scenarios that can be tested before you run out of hulls.
If the Navy is worried about potential embarrassment, just announce a planned SINKEX and pretend that the air defense system was on standby when a ship gets nailed. If the air defense test goes unexpectedly well, turn the system off after the test shots are done and sink the thing anyways and release that video.
To be "fair", the LCS wasn't actually expected to fight, even though the Navy lied about this, so it makes sense, in a perverse way, that they wouldn't care about its combat effectiveness.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, the Ford mess is just too big to hide, and far from being over.
"To be "fair", the LCS wasn't actually expected to fight"
DeleteWell, it depends on your definition of 'fight'.
For MCM, it was expected to lay off from the minefield and simply deploy unmanned assets so that could be considered non-combat. Of course, if the enemy didn't cooperate and allow the LCS to conduct its MCM work unhindered, then the LCS would have to fight to stay alive so that's definitely combat.
ASW was the same as MCM in that the original ASW concept was for the LCS to lay a 'net' of some undefined sensors and then ... well, no one really knows what then. Again, if the enemy didn't cooperate then the LCS would have to fight.
For ASuW, the LCS would be directly involved in combat using the NLOS networked missiles.
So, yes, the LCS was expected to fight.
That is not what I meant.
DeleteThe LCS were built in peacetime, "served" (sorta) in peacetime, and are very quickly being retired in peacetime.
Yes, they were sold to the public as combat capable but were also to be swept under the rug before Joe Average could notice they were a dud, have people look at them new Connies and call it a day.
Very different for Fords who will replace Nimitz carriers with apparently very inadequate ones for 50 years or so.
I remain disappointed that nothing ever came off the LIDAR mapping module they were developing for MCM and ASW LCS. Being able to mount a laser imaging module to a Seahawk and generate 3d images of the seafloor would have been invaluable for ASW and MCM - you see a lot easier than you hear, and you can do wider sweeps with faster time. Truly a pity it doesn't seem to have worked.
Delete"LIDAR mapping module"
DeleteI assume you're referring to the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)? The system was not a seabed mapping instrument. It was a floating and near-surface mine detection device. While I don't know what specific reliability and performance problems it suffered from, it did have a couple of conceptual problems.
1. It did not have a swiveling sensor head. This required the helo to fly straight and level which is generally fatal in a combat zone.
2. It could not provide real time analysis. The data was collected and analyzed post-mission. As such it was not useful for ASW (never heard of anyone discussing it in an ASW context).
"Yes, they were sold to the public as combat capable but were also to be swept under the rug before Joe Average could notice they were a dud, have people look at them new Connies and call it a day."
DeleteExcept "them new Connies" are seriously flawed. The USN took a GP frigate design that was at least a reasonably capable ASW/ASuW platform (a place where the current fleet has a big hole), and bastardized to fit AEGIS (with too few missiles to be a legitimate AAW platform). So it ends up really being no good at any of the three.
The navy will fund a Constellation class land based propulsion plant for testing before using this in frigates.
ReplyDelete"The land-based engineering test site was mandated by the Fiscal 2021 National Defense Authorization Act as an expression on Congressional intent regarding solving engineering problems as construction proceeds. "
https://seapowermagazine.org/navy-invests-in-land-based-test-site-for-new-frigate/
So now we have shipboard self defense weapon systems that need testing .
Note that it was Congress that mandated the testing rather than the Navy doing it because it was a good idea.
Delete