The term, ‘Sea Control’, is an oft cited phrase that is used to justify all manner of ships and operations. The problem with ‘Sea Control’, however, is that everyone who discusses it has a different idea of what it is. Is it any wonder, then, that no two ‘Sea Control’ discussions draw the same conclusions?
Note: This post is inspired by comments from many people, most recently reader ‘Lazarus’ who offered this comment that prompted me to think about ‘Sea Control’ definitions and what that might mean for ship/carrier designs.(2) My thanks to all of you!
Here’s a few of the more common definitions/descriptions of Sea Control (SC):
ASW – This view sees SC as more akin to an anti-submarine, hunter-killer function. It is an undersea, sea control concept and, as such depends on uncontested aerial dominance to be successful. This concept typically envisions a helo-centric carrier with a few fixed wing aircraft added in for supposed air supremacy. As a pure ASW task force, this has validity but the broader view of an ASW sea control group that also engages in other naval dominance activities is highly suspect given the lack of firepower.
Anti-Surface – This view envisions SC groups sweeping the oceans, looking for enemy naval forces and engaging them to eliminate the enemy’s navy. This concept typically envisions a converted amphibious ship operating a fixed wing group of 1-2 dozen AV-8/F-35B aircraft. Alternatively, a full Nimitz/Ford carrier has been mentioned as the SC element although this would seem to be simply a carrier task force.
Patrol – This view has the SC group ‘patrolling’ (whatever that means) around an area and presumably attacking whatever it comes across thereby establishing local dominance. There is a suggestion in most such descriptions that the SC group would operate around the periphery of a conflict which, in turn, suggests that the main function would be almost tantamount to blockading and would be largely focused on anti-merchant shipping. This concept typically envisions some kind of hybrid cruiser-carrier and requires total air control to be successful.
Convoy – This view envisions a small carrier operating as a convoy escort providing ASW and AAW protection. This concept typically envisions using a WWII escort type carrier.
Nebulous – This is, honestly, the most prevalent view and is characterized by a lack of any specifics beyond the vague notion of establishing some sort of local naval dominance. Proponents tend to be much more concerned with the type of sea control ship (usually a smaller, specialized carrier of some sort) rather than the actual use/mission.
SC enthusiasts have put forth ideas for ship designs and group compositions that cover a range of concepts including small, specialized escort carriers, dedicated ASW carriers, modified LHA amphibious ships, hybrid cruiser/carriers, and full size Nimitz/Fords. Quite a range! The range of ship concepts reflects the lack of a standardized definition of Sea Control and lack of a concrete mission/role.
How does the military define SC? From Joint Publication 3-32,
Sea control may include naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, protection of sea lines of communications, air lines of communications, blockades, embargoes against economic or military shipping, and maritime interception operations (MIO). (1)
Well, that’s not very helpful. That’s just a very vague definition of what a navy does and is much more focused on peacetime patrol operations than actual war.
Honestly, the only reasonable conclusion is that there is no such thing as sea control and that the phrase is just a buzzword used to justify someone’s idea of a hybrid carrier or small naval group – in other words, the phrase ‘sea control’ is used to describe equipment rather than a role or mission.
Well, before we give up on sea control, let’s give it some more thought.
If ‘sea control’ is legitimate then what are we controlling? Most of the sea, most of the time, is empty. There aren’t that many naval forces around. Even in the Pacific in WWII, how many actual naval battles were fought? Not that many. That suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.
Of the entire Pacific Ocean in WWII, how often was any given square mile of water occupied by an enemy vessel? I’d guess somewhere around 0.000000001% of the time. Again, that suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.
Consider the WWII naval battles that did occur. How many were a total surprise to both sides? I’m guessing around none. Given the highly predictable strategies on both sides and the intel from various sources (scouting, code breaking, coast watching, signal analysis, etc.), both sides were generally aware of where and when the other’s naval forces would appear. On those occasions, task forces were assembled and sent to engage but, of course, that’s a short, specific mission, not sea control, at least not as the term is being discussed here. Again, that suggests that having a standing sea control group patrolling around a given area is generally pointless.
Now, let’s consider the idea of a SC group lounging around some area in the general vicinity of, say, the first island chain during a war with China. Given the ranges of today’s various anti-ship weapons, the density of various ISR sources, and the presumed weakness of a sea control group’s AAW defenses, is it really safe/wise for a lightly armed group to be loitering around a war zone? There are many naval observers who doubt that even a full-fledged carrier group can survive in a modern war zone (they’re wrong but, I digress …). If that’s true, what chance would a SC group have of surviving long enough to be effective? Logically, then, a SC group would either have to operate so far from the active war zone as to be irrelevant or would be quickly detected and destroyed if operating near an active war zone.
Conclusion
Sea control, as a phrase, appears to be much like ‘littoral’ which was used to justify new ships for the Navy despite there not actually being any such thing as littoral naval requirements (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There Such A Thing?”). The phrase ‘sea control’ has no useful, valid definition and has no specific mission associated with it. It is used to justify fanciful ship designs rather than describing a viable, bona fide mission or role. In fact, there does not appear to be any readily identifiable and relevant mission or role that we could label sea control. Further, historical evidence from WWII strongly suggests that there is no justification for a SC group regardless of what mission/role it would be attempting.
I just can’t give the concept any credence.
__________________________________
(1)Joint Publication 3-32, “Joint Maritime Operations”, 16-Dec-2020
I don't have a navy background, so I always thought that sea control meant something like sea dominance.
ReplyDeleteSimilar to having air dominance, the enemy's naval forces would be defeated and you would control the region's oceans.
Lutefisk
" I always thought that sea control meant something like sea dominance."
ReplyDeleteAnd there you have the crux of the post … that no two people have the same definition or concept of what sea control means.
What you're describing is not sea control, as most people use the term, but rather it's simply the Navy's overall 'mission'.
Also, with regard to the Navy's overall mission, remember that it is not domination of the sea. The seat of purpose is on the land. Therefore, the Navy's overall mission is to support land efforts. Of course, one such way to assist in that is to dominate the seas!
Loved the old conceptual art. I grew up reading Proceedings as a kid in the 70s and 80s.. And I always marveled at the fanciful sea control, Swath, and DD(x) art!!! Of course we DID get the Zumwalt, so it wasnt all science fiction...
ReplyDeleteGiven what the Zumwalt has become, it was certainly fiction! How much science was involved is questionable.
Delete"Sea control" is being able to use the sea for your purposes, and denying its use by your enemies. Movement of forces, logistics or trade by sea are all an exercise of sea control.
ReplyDeleteSimply denying the use of the sea to your enemy is not sea control. It's sea denial. The sea can be in a state of mutual denial, where it's not safe for anyone to use. Submarines can do denial, but they can't fully exercise sea control, because they can't defend shipping from air attack.
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=720055
Whether this mission justifies a distinct SC force model is a separate question.
Sea control certainly can't be tied to a ship and it best is the shape of a capability that can be used for tactical or strategic purposes. As pointed out, what Sea and to what end? At its heart it should look like an ability to take control of ocean territory when we need to control sea traffic, resources, or to serve as our base at sea off someone else's coast.
ReplyDelete"Sea control certainly can't be tied to a ship"
ReplyDeleteThat may be your opinion but the phrase 'sea control' is most certainly tied to particular ship designs in common usage. You've heard the discussions of converting LHAs to sea control ships. You've heard the discussions of hybrid cruiser-carriers for sea control. And so on. The discussions all focus on the ship, not the mission.
Good for you that you see beyond the particulars of the ship but that is not the common view!
I agree that Sea Control seems to be a buzz word, and seems to get dragged out now and again. To myself, Sea control, littoral, distributed, minimally manned, unmanned, networked, all seem to mean "minimal useful systems, maintained profit margins". There is something woeful about the state of naval procurement in the liberal democracies.
ReplyDeleteAlthough, littoral always meant to me "boats are useful here". From the rigid raiders in the Falklands (whose main contribution was logistics) to the patrol boats the USN is trying to get rid of.
So, if we are trying to determine a practical definition of Sea control that has design/procurement relevance, my bet would be the old-fashioned Destroyer Escort role ie convoy escort. Although, modern container ships and USNS ships have a posted speed of 24-25 knots, which is not much less than the posted speed of some frigate designs (the official speed, anyway). So speed might not work as a definition. Ouch, this is hard.
The best sea control is an SSN with a well trained crew. They should be able to (with a high degree of probability) destroy or put at prohibitive risk any surface ship or submarine lingering in or transiting through their area of operations (I cannot with a high degree of accuracy define the area but I would think a radius of 50 to 100 miles is conservative). Obviously, submarines cannot control the air space but we’re talking about sea control. During 1944-1945 our submarine fleet effectively had sea control of the waters around Japan and the sea lanes from Japan to her colonies in the Southwest Pacific.
ReplyDelete"The best sea control is an SSN with a well trained crew."
DeleteA submarine is not a sea control unit, it is a sea denial unit, i.e., a mobile minefield that prevents the enemy from exerting sea control.
But you still put in more thought on what sea control is, than many USN officers nowadays. The problem is many think sea control can be done on the cheap, with a single specialized ship. It cannot- we will need FLEETS, with multiple multirole ships (i.e., Aegis Combat System equipped destroyers) supporting specialized ships (i.e., carriers), and acting as each other's backups, in case enemy attacks sink some (e.g., a destroyer must self-sacrifice to shield the carrier from enemy missiles). A half-assed guided missile cruiser-carrier must be HUGE, and thus, EXPENSIVE to even be marginally useful (see the Soviet Navy's aviation cruisers); or be useless in a fight against peer competitors.
I'm not sure what to call it. But, during WW2 we had ships (and aircraft) patrolling the mid-Atlantic area to protect convoys and keep German U-boats at bay.
ReplyDeleteJust read a article stating in 2025 the mavy will convert the Zummies to hypersonic missiles by removing the AGS my question is then would these 3 big ships (for the times) be considered Sea Control Ships rhe hypers btw have a range of 1400 plus miles
ReplyDeleteNo. Without having any details about the missiles, it would probably be land attack against known, fixed targets. 1400 mile range sounds impressive but, as always, the problem is targeting at that range. Other than known, fixed targets, we have no way of targeting at a range of 1400 miles in a combat zone.
DeleteThis would be sort of the opposite of sea control.
"article stating in 2025 the mavy will convert the Zummies to hypersonic missiles "
DeleteJust a note of caution … This will be around the Navy's 15th idea of what to do with the Zumwalts and each has been eventually abandoned. Also, does it seem believable to you that a hypersonic missile will be ready for ship use in just 4 years? Consider the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) that began development in 2009 and 12 years later we still don't have a ship launched VLS version ready.
I think the problem is not so much that sea control or littorals are bad concepts, as it is that--as you suggest--we've approached the problem from the standpoint of coming up with a platform first, and then trying to force it into a concept of operations.
ReplyDeleteThe primary missions of a navy in the 21st century would seem to be strategic deterrence, sea control--meaning securing the ability of your and allied military and commercial shipping to use the necessary sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and denying that ability to enemies or opponents--and power projection ashore (of which control of the littorals would be an element).
My problem with the old sea control ship is that I could never quite figure out how it would achieve sea control. My problem with the littoral combat ships is that among their very few capabilities were almost none relating to combat in the littorals. It's more like, "Hey, we've come up with a new ship concept that we'd like to build, let's find a buzz word to justify it." Seems to me that's exactly backwards.
The "sea control ship" was an attempt to gain sea control CHEAPLY- that's her greatest flaw. By using VTOL aircraft, a navy can do without catapults and arrestor gear necessary to launch and recover high performance aircraft, and thus, have a smaller, cheaper carrier- but "buy cheap, pay twice," i.e., a full-sized carrier and high performance aircraft (including AWACS to detect incoming enemies and direct fighters to intercept them) can easily slaughter such half-assed ships and their embarked aircraft.
DeleteYes, the Sea Harrier's extreme maneuverability will let it slaughter the Sukhoi Su-33 in a dogfight- but if the Su-33 uses its powerful radar to detect the Sea Harrier before the latter detects it, launches long-range missiles for which the Sea Harrier has no answer (a small size prevents the Sea Harrier from carrying the large radar necessary to exploit a long-range missile's performance), and then uses its superior speed to escape before the Sea Harrier can retaliate? Then the Sea Harrier will be literally washed away, like rocks on the shore, which repeated waves grind down to nothing.
The LCS and the Zumwalt were more examples of "buy cheap, pay twice." Sail a practically defenseless ship (the LCS) into the teeth of enemy shore defenses, instead of launching special forces helicopters from a proper warship that's beyond the enemy's reach- and even if she isn't, she has the defenses necessary (Aegis Combat System-equipped destroyers as escorts, in an LPD or LHD's case) to prevent the enemy from sinking her? Sail a gunboar (the Zumwalt) into the teeth of enemy shore defenses so she can shower relatively short-ranged artillery shells upon them- and let the enemy shower her with long-range antiship missiles- instead of using longer-range cruise missiles, for which the enemy has no immediately effective answer? That'll just get the ships sunk.
"Yes, the Sea Harrier's extreme maneuverability will let it slaughter the Sukhoi Su-33 in a dogfight- but if the Su-33 uses its powerful radar to detect the Sea Harrier before the latter detects it, launches long-range missiles for which the Sea Harrier has no answer (a small size prevents the Sea Harrier from carrying the large radar necessary to exploit a long-range missile's performance), and then uses its superior speed to escape before the Sea Harrier can retaliate?"
DeleteIf a sea control ship is operating Sea Harriers (or F-35Bs) in the mid-Pacific, how likely is it ever to see an Su-33, and if so how did it get there? There are something like 42 Su-33s in the world, their range is 3,000 km, the only operator is the Russian navy, and their one carrier would likely be under tow from a tug long before it could even smell the Pacific. It would be make the Second Pacific Squadron look like a model of efficiency.
I realize the the Su-33 is not the only aircraft that could defeat a Harrier, but my point is about numbers and geography. If the USN had 10 Lightning Carriers and no super carriers, it would still be the most formidable naval aviation force in the world.
I'm not saying go that way, so don't go putting words into my mouth. I'm merely saying that our force design needs to look honestly at what our missions are and what opposition we are apt to face in carrying out those missions first. Sea control is a viable mission concept, and littoral conflict is a signifiant portion of power projection, which is another viable mission concept. But the ships that we have designated for those purposes are almost uniquely ill-suited to those tasks.
If the USN leadership were intending to design a fleet that we can't afford and that would be incapable of meeting our wartime needs, what would they be doing differently.
I don't think we are disagreeing, just making the point slightly differently.
"Sea control is a viable mission concept"
DeleteI've concluded that there is no viable sea control mission using the commonly bandied definitions so what definition are you using that makes you think there is a viable mission concept?
I guess what I am saying is that I don't buy any of the "commonly bandied definitions," which seem to me to be more rationalizations for bad procurement decisions than mission statements. The problem with the LCS is not that the littoral mission does not exist, but that the LCS is singularly incapable of fulfilling any part of it. Same may or may not be true for "sea control" ships, since we've never actually found out.
DeleteIf protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for our and our allies' use, and denying them to the enemy, are not viable mission concepts, then why do we need a navy?
It's not the conceptual mission that is the problem. It is our fascination with stupid and ineffective (not to mention, ferociously expensive) ways to accomplish the mission that is the problem.
"protecting the sea lines of communication"
DeleteThat's not sea control, that's just a general description of what a navy does. If that's your definition of sea control that's fine but it has nothing to do with post.
That's my point. Sea control is what a navy does. A good sea control ship is a good navy ship.
Delete"There are something like 42 Su-33s in the world, their range is 3,000 km, the only operator is the Russian navy, and their one carrier would likely be under tow from a tug long before it could even smell the Pacific."
DeleteYou forgot the reverse-engineered Su-33 that China operates, i.e., the J-15.
"If the USN had 10 Lightning Carriers and no super carriers, it would still be the most formidable naval aviation force in the world."
No, it wouldn't. ComNavOps repeatedly noted the USN only has NINE air wings for its ELEVEN CVNs, meaning the USN doesn't have enough pilots to make those "Lightning carriers" anything more than overpriced LHDs- and even if it did, the F-35C's superior performance means those pilots will be far more useful flying CTOL planes from a supercarrier, than they would flying STOVL planes (with fuel tanks removed and internal weapons bays reduced in size to accommodate the F-35B lift fan) off an LHD.
"A good sea control ship is a good navy ship."
The STOVL carriers some navies define as "sea control ships," are NOT good navy ships, as they're too small to do supercarrier's job, yet too large (and thus, expensive to acquire and operate) to do an Aegis Combat System-equipped destroyer's job. It's a half-assed answer to a question no sane person asked. If you want to do "sea control" right, either spend a fortune to acquire supercarriers (and high performance fighters, carrier-borne AWACS, and Aegis Combat System-equipped escorts), or don't bother.
"You forgot the reverse-engineered Su-33 that China operates, i.e., the J-15."
DeleteSo there's 50 of them, and they are badly underpowered. And their effective operating area would be how far you can get Laoning out to sea, plus their range. Not a huge area.
"No, it wouldn't. ComNavOps repeatedly noted the USN only has NINE air wings for its ELEVEN CVNs, meaning the USN doesn't have enough pilots to make those "Lightning carriers" anything more than overpriced LHDs- and even if it did, the F-35C's superior performance means those pilots will be far more useful flying CTOL planes from a supercarrier, than they would flying STOVL planes (with fuel tanks removed and internal weapons bays reduced in size to accommodate the F-35B lift fan) off an LHD."
You're making an argument that is irrelevant to the point I am making. I'm not comparing it to CATOBAR carrier air, because other than France (1 carrier) nobody else has any CATOBAR air. I didn't say it would be better than 11 CVN's. I said it would be better than anything anybody else has.
"The STOVL carriers some navies define as "sea control ships," are NOT good navy ships, as they're too small to do supercarrier's job, yet too large (and thus, expensive to acquire and operate) to do an Aegis Combat System-equipped destroyer's job."
So they're not good sea control ships. That's my point.
"I'm not comparing it to CATOBAR carrier air, because other than France (1 carrier) nobody else has any CATOBAR air."
DeleteThe USN can't just measure its carrier-borne aviation against potential enemies' carrier-borne aviation, but also to potential enemies' land-based aviation, e.g., Russian Tu-95, Tu-22M, and Tu-160 bombers raining long-range antiship missiles on USN ships. The F/A-18 and F-35C have a chance of intercepting those bombers before the latter can attack the carrier they're launched from; the F-35B has no such chance, due to its poor range.
And you forgot China is building its own CATOBAR carrier(s).
"I didn't say it would be better than 11 CVN's. I said it would be better than anything anybody else has."
No, it wouldn't. Any potential F-35B pilot will be more useful flying a high performance fighter off literally anything else- even USAF airbases- where the absence of an STOVL plane's performance compromises, means their plane has the range and payload capacity (which translates to air-launched weapons' range) to hit the enemy before the enemy can hit them or anything they're protecting (a carrier battle group, in the case of carrier-borne fighters).
"I didn't say it would be better than 11 CVN's. I said it would be better than anything anybody else has."
DeleteThis is a common example of failed logic. We don't fight carrier against carrier, we fight our combined military against the enemy's combined military. We happen to have chosen to emphasize carriers as one of our preferred methods of fighting while our enemies have chosen other methods. Comparing carriers to carriers is utterly irrelevant.
" STOVL plane's performance compromises"
Does anyone have any information on the actual fuel and payload that a F-35B can launch with when operating from a non-cat for ski-ramp?
"Sea Harrier's extreme maneuverability will let it slaughter the Sukhoi Su-33 in a dogfight"
DeleteWhere does that definitive statement come from? I have no reason to believe that's true and every reason to believe it's false. Are there exercise results that prove the Harrier is a super A2A asset?
"Are there exercise results that prove the Harrier is a super A2A asset?"
DeleteRead https://hushkit.net/2020/05/29/how-the-sea-harrier-clipped-the-f-15-eagles-wings-interview-with-commander-sharkey-ward-part-2/ The Harrier is only superior in a dogfight, meaning it's inferior to a more conventional fighter in every other kind of fight. The design sacrifices high speed and rate-of-climb, long range and combat radius, rapid acceleration, heavy payload (and thus, the ability to use long-range weapons) to achieve VTOL performance and low-speed maneuverability. Hence my belief the Su-33 will win if the pilot uses his brain and applies that design's advantages, and prevents a Harrier pilot from applying that design's advantages.
And now here's the exact opposite article: Harrier vs F-15
DeleteWhat I got from the article you cited is that it was describing the very first encounters and the F-5/15 pilots had no idea what they were facing. Once they (quickly) learned, the Harriers became routine kills - in addition to all the other exceptions and weaknesses you noted.
I'm left to conclude that an Su-33 with any experience against a STOVL aircraft will routinely beat a Harrier for all the reasons cited.
I think what the Navy requires for both sea control and littoral combat are simply good naval ships. The LCSs are not that. I don't know whether the sea control ships would have been or not. The Spanish adapted the design and seem to have gotten good use out of it, but sea control was not a primary objective of their navy.
ReplyDeleteWhat is sea control and why is it important is explained here
ReplyDeleteusni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/sea-control-and-command-sea-remain-essential .
Note usni is quoting proceedings: Enough said