The key to an effective Navy is to have a balanced fleet - a balanced fleet that is designed to handle all of the missions and roles required of it. Is today’s fleet balanced and capable of meeting its requirements? To answer that question, let’s start where wisdom always starts … history. Let’s see what kind of balance the surface fleet of WWII had and how that compares to today. We do this by looking at the various required roles and what ship types filled those roles, as demonstrated in the table below.
|
Role |
WWII Type |
Example |
Current Type |
Example |
|
Strike and fleet defense |
Carrier |
Essex |
Carrier |
Nimitz |
|
Aviation escort |
Escort Carrier |
Casablanca |
- |
- |
|
ASuW and land attack |
Battleship |
Iowa |
- |
- |
|
Escort and land attack |
Cruiser, Heavy |
Baltimore |
- |
- |
|
AAW |
Cruiser, AA |
Atlanta |
Destroyer |
Burke/Tico |
|
ASW/ASuW escort |
Destroyer |
Fletcher |
- |
- |
|
ASW |
Destroyer Escort |
Buckley |
Destroyer |
Burke |
|
ASW and convoy escort |
Corvette |
Flower |
- |
- |
|
Patrol and ASuW |
Patrol |
PT Boat |
- |
- |
Notes:
I have not included the LCS in the table because it has no actual combat capabilities.
I have not included the Zumwalt in the table because it’s only three ships and they have no defined purpose.
The first thing we note is that the WWII fleet had a ship type for every role and, in many cases, multiple ship types for a given role.
Comparing the WWII fleet structure versus our current structure demonstrates that we’ve lost several fleet functions or, more precisely, condensed them down into fewer ship types. The problem with condensing the roles down is that the resultant ships are hugely more expensive, more risk averse, and less optimized which means less capable.
During WWII, the balance and diversity of ship types allowed mixing and matching of ship types to perform specialized roles such as the ASW hunter-killer groups composed of escort carriers and destroyer escorts. The diversity of ship types endowed the fleet commanders with tremendous flexibility to tailor the task forces to the specific needs of the operation.
Today’s fleet commander has no flexibility and no choices. We have carriers (too expensive to risk in combat) and Burkes … and that’s it.
The Navy’s quest for efficiency and cost savings has resulted in a necking down of all the ship types into just two types: carrier and Burke. While the endless production of now-obsolete Burkes has, indeed, produced cost savings, it has produced an inflexible fleet that is going to be mismatched to the specific operational needs when combat comes.
Today’s fleet is unbalanced, inflexible, and ill-prepared for war.
A couple minor points:
ReplyDelete(1) Should you have included the mine warfare role?
(2) RE: the Patrol role, we DO have the Cyclone class, although of course they are aging out. Without replacement, I believe.
"Should you have included the mine warfare role?"
ReplyDeleteIn a post, there's always the issue of where to cut the scope of the post off - otherwise, every post become a book. I opted to just include the surface combatants. I could have widened the scope to MCM, mine laying, amphibious ships, tankers, dry cargo, tenders, and dozens of others. It wouldn't have changed the conclusion … well, it would have made it worse.
"Cyclone class"
For all practical purposes, they're retired. In Feb of this year, three ships (USS Shamal (PC 13), USS Zephyr (PC 8) and USS Tornado (PC 14)) were retired. Ten ships are left and they are being phased out as all are well past their design service life. In comparison, the WWII PT boats numbered several hundred.
"I have not included the LCS in the table because it has no actual combat capabilities."
ReplyDeleteNavy never intends to deploy LCS as part of carrier strike group. I haven't not seen a single case that LCS serve in carrier striker group.
Also, today, nuclear submarine(s) are included in carrier strike group. This didn't happen in WWII.
See my reply to the previous comment.
Delete"Navy never intends to deploy LCS as part of carrier strike group."
Did someone say they did?
Its a relevant exercise to look at the past for what was perceived as needed and what actually got used or could quickly be made available or expanded. The balance is absolutely off. What upsets me is just how fast we could be moving to a more balanced plan if it were just old retired guys in a room who cared.
ReplyDeleteOne can argue the various amphibious assault ships can double as escort carriers, when F-35Bs are embarked- an admittedly stupid argument, due to limitations STOVL capabilities impose (the lift fan occupies space better used for a fuel tank and larger weapons bays), but it can be made. One can also argue the Arleigh Burke provides land attack via Tomahawk cruise missiles, and further argue it's more effective than the battleship, as the cruise missile can be launched from a greater distance, making the launch platform far less vulnerable to enemy attack (as for whether or not a non-nuclear Tomahawk can provide as hard-hitting and sustainable blows as a barrage of 16" shells, that's another matter).
ReplyDeleteThese arguments may be stupid, but I'm certain some admiral has made them.
"One can argue the various amphibious assault ships can double as escort carriers,"
DeleteAnd if the Navy ever opts to bring the amphibs up to F-35 operating status (which is what they were doing to the BHR when it burned) and actually operates them that way then I'll consider including them as such.
Lacking converted ships, enough aircraft, and operating doctrine, it's just pure speculation.
Going back twenty-years, the Oliver Hazard Perry-class woukd have filled the ASW/ASuW escort, ASW, and ASW and convoy escort roles.
ReplyDeleteAnd filled none of them well which was the point of the post.
DeleteHere is a great article on fleet sizing and "How the NAVY got to where it is today" - applicable to MANY topics discussed on this website - https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/a-new-u-s-maritime-strategy
ReplyDeleteThe article is also over on Cimsec. Good comments sections after both ;)
DeleteWhile the article offers a nice summation of how we got where we are, it falls apart, quite badly, in its foundational assumptions, resultant strategic requirements, and recommendations.
DeleteI approve of Rep. Luria's attempts to provide intelligent oversight on the Navy but her specifics are badly flawed.
"Here is a great article"
DeleteYou see my very brief assessment of the article. In contrast, why do you find it 'great'?
I think the idea behind the article is great. Rep Luria's largest concern is a lack of any real strategy guiding procurement process and an abject failure of the procurement systems. She recognizes that China is the upcoming threat of the US and to win such war against China, there needs to be action on land. She proposes the idea that we need to draw up a concrete maritime strategy to guide procurement and subsequently achieve a better positioned Navy for projection in China's operations.
DeleteHowever, there are a few ideas I think fall short of reality. She talks about the thinking that acquiring the ability to "credibly threaten to sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours, Chinese leaders might think twice before, say, launching a blockade or invasion of Taiwan…" is enough but that contradicts a previous her own citation earlier of “successful deterrence typically involves…taking steps to demonstrate both the capability and determination to fulfill a threat.” We don't lack the capability to interfere with China's operations, we just lack determination. Another problematic idea that she pointed out but still pursue is the length of a ship deployment. She argues that the Army and Marines provide a better deterrence by being a fixed force rather than a mobile force that can't be absolutely tied down to a region and as such does not provide any effects. I happen to agree but then she goes on proposing an older OFRP model as a substitute. That doesn't still solve the core issue of not being there 24h. Besides that, I wholeheartedly disagree with her specifics of implementing the modified CSBA study to achieve this deterrence effect (both in concepts and locations).
I thought Rep. Luria's comments were interesting to read, but were far more platitudes and rhetoric and not enough specifics. I think it is far more helpful to lay out the missions the way ComNavOps has here, and ask how do we address each of them.
DeleteWould be nice to fill in the gaps but don't expect it anytime soon, I think the most pressing need to fill is ASW followed by MCM.
ReplyDeleteShort of a dramatic resurgence of our mining and refining industries as well as a makeover or our shipyards, we don't have the capability to build the ships needed inthe quantity needed. And, I surmise that we would then be incapable of the dramatic build up that occurred during WW2, should war find us.
ReplyDeleteCNO: If you have read Jerry Hendrix's "To Provide & Maintain a Navy", do you agree with his vision for a balanced fleet?
ReplyDeleteNo, I have not read it. What are your thoughts on it?
DeleteI haven't gotten it yet, but I've listened to all his interviews on the book tour. Honestly, he sounds wedded to the standard MIC narrative (Ford is great, need unmanned, etc..), but I always like to hear your opinions.
DeleteUnfortunately, during the interviews he doesn't outline his fleet structure, but he did mention he discusses it in the book.
PS: I'd love for you to do a book review on "Lessons Not Learned" by Roger Thompson. The book stunned me, I had no idea the USN was that bad (until I started reading your blog ha ha ha)
My guess is that if you presented the Navy with the table from the original post, they would respond that many of that gaps are to be filled by unmanned platforms.
ReplyDeleteLooking at the roles you have identified:
ReplyDeleteStrike and Fleet Defense/Air Superiority – I think the non-nuclear strike platforms should be first, SSGNs; second Virginia VPMs; third, surface ship missile launchers, operating under air cover from carriers; and fourth, carrier air. The strike side of carrier air could have a significant anti-ship role, but the other platforms are better suited for land attack. The primary role of the carriers should be establishing and maintaining air superiority over as large an area as possible, in which those other platforms can operate. Building Nimitz CVNs for $9B and conventional CVs that can be somewhat smaller than the CVNs for about $6B, would enable two carriers for roughly the cost of one Ford ($14B).
Aviation Escort/Escort Carriers – There are two roles here. The WWII CVEs/CVLs were basically strike platforms. The Cold War CVSs were ASW platforms. For the CVE/CVL role, see CVs above. For the CVS role, build ASW helicopter carriers (CVH), like Japanese Hyugas. As an interim until both can join the fleet, convert LHAs/LHDs to Lightning Carriers, adding ski jumps and converting troop berthing and equipment spaces to additional hangar, air crew, and aircraft maintenance facilities to increase numbers of aircraft.
ASuW and Land Attack – Battleships could combine with the CVHs to form the center of surface action/hunter killer (SAG/HUK) groups. I like the 1980s proposed battlecarrier (BC) as a model. The BC gave up the after 16” turret for 320 Mk41 VLS cells and a STOVL/helo angled flight deck with ski jump. I would convert 128 of the VLS cells on a 4:1 basis to carry 32 IRBMs, SRBMs, and/or supersonic/hypersonic equivalents of Russian Shipwrecks, leaving 192 Mk41 cells. The BC was intended to carry 20 AV8s, and the Soviet Kiev carried 10 STOVL/10 helos, so I would guess 10 F35s and 10 helos would work. On the high seas, away from most land-based air and with no opposing supercarrier nearby, this would be a dominant sea control ship.
Escort and Land Attack – Cruisers would be flagships for escort squadrons (CortRons) to screen CVBGs and SAG/HUK groups, and to conduct independent surface ops. Take a Des Moines hull, keep 2x3 or 2x2 8” guns in the A and Z positions, put 96 Mk41 VLS in each of the B and Y positions (192 total, or swap out 64 Mk41s for 16 large cells, leaving 128), AEGIS/AMDR, and a through-deck flight deck in between for operating helos and UAVs, with a hangar underneath from which small USVs and UUVs could be launched/recovered over the side. See WWII proposed flight deck cruiser for concept.
AAW – Burkes are okay here, and the new cruisers can be more capable replacements for Ticos.
ASW/ASuW Escort – The FREMMs would be decent candidates here, particularly with 32 or more Mk41 VLS cells instead of 16 (FREMMs were designed FBNW 32, and the USN added 40 feet of length, apparently to facilitate additional VLS). The USN’s insistence on adding AEGIS suggests that they see a different role, as cheaper and less capable replacements for the Ticos, meaning we will probably never see a replacement cruiser.
ASW – We really don’t want Burkes chasing subs, so build ASW frigates, like ComNavOps’s ASW DE, maybe 4000-4500T, like Knoxes/Perrys.
ASW and Convoy Escort – ASW corvettes, like ComNavOps’s proposed ASW corvette, 1500-2000T, a little bigger than a WWII DE.
Patrol and ASW Escort – Missile patrol boat, maybe something like an enlarged Swedish Visby, around 1000T, for less crowding and better seakeeping.
I would keep costs down by basing almost everything on existing, proved technology, except the IRBM, SRBM, and supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles, which the USN needs desperately to develop. And all of them should be bristling with CIWSs, SeaRAM and Phalanx/Goalkeeper. I would also want to address mine warfare, amphibious ops, and ABM/BMD.
"I would keep costs down by basing almost everything on existing, proved technology, except the IRBM, SRBM, and supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles, which the USN needs desperately to develop."
DeleteJust a minor point of clarification. There is no 'almost everything'. EVERYTHING that's put into production needs to be existing, proven technology. Development, which you correctly identify as, 'which the USN needs desperately to develop', STAYS in research and DEVELOPMENT (it's right in the name!) until it's developed, existing, and proven.
Part of the development process can be building a SINGLE prototype as the Navy often did in the past. What you don't do, under any circumstance, is commit to production with non-existent, unproven technology as the Navy has done with the LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford. The folly in that approach speaks for itself.
That's fine, but we still need major advances in cruise missile and SRBM/IRBM technology, and we need to put those on the fast track while we develop the platforms I am proposing. Obviously, you don't go to sea with them until they are developed, existing, and proved. But you do put a rush on development and proof.
DeleteWhile the posts bemoans the lack of ship diversity and options for commanders, I end up with a bit of quandry here. For instance, the major "escort" for a CVBG, which would probably be a 'cruiser', i.e. a Tico replacement, would be pretty permanently tethered to the carriers, which is pretty rigid and inflexible. Therefore it would be an AEGIS ship, and would not have major caliber guns, because in theatre, it would never be detached and inshore. Any major caliber gun ship wouldnt have AEGIS, and wouldnt have any aviation facilities except some minimal UAV capabilities. Same with the proposed battleships. Their main purpose is the big guns, so with the exception of some VLS strike capability, nothing should detract from that, especially if it means less guns. I'm very against the battlecarrier concept, and see it as a sub-optimized platform. (I dont think history looks kindly on it either) Let every single ship excel at their one main purpose, and then create task groups that include the appropriate ships to accomplish the mission.
ReplyDelete"Let every single ship excel at their one main purpose, and then create task groups that include the appropriate ships to accomplish the mission."
DeleteYou've got it! THAT was the philosophy behind the WWII fleet structure and THAT is the point of the post.
True flexibility comes not from having one ship that can perform every function poorly but from having many ships that each perform one function perfectly.
"THAT was the philosophy behind the WWII fleet structure..."
DeleteAgreed... And history proves its validity. Our fleet, ships, and design/function evolved significantly from 1939-1945. In retrospect though, with the rapid evolution (for instance, deep into the 30s, aviation was still thought of as the fleet scouting arm, and destroyers were still thought of as torpedo boat destroyers), how much of that wasnt philosophy, but luck, mostly masked by the large numbers of everything we built?? Sure by late war we had it pretty figured out, but...
Food for thought
"how much of that wasnt philosophy, but luck, mostly masked by the large numbers of everything we built?? Sure by late war we had it pretty figured out, but..."
DeleteAn astute question but history provides the answer. If you go back and look at fleet structure/composition from, oh, say, 1900 on, you'll see the same kind of diversity of types and specialization. Yes, the war certainly moved developments along at light speed but we were heading that way anyway. Check out the Fleet Problems of the 1920's and '30's and you'll see that carrier aviation was already headed towards domination. WWII just sped up the process.
What does this mean for us today? We should be doing the same kind of development, albeit on a slower pace since we're not in the middle of a world war. We should be trying out ship types and doctrine/tactics in very large scale Fleet Problems.
We've argued this before, and by now it is pretty clear that nobody is going to change his/her mind. I think the strongest fleet architecture is a mix of a few large multi-purpose ships and a lot of small single-purpose ships--ADM Zumwalt's high/low mix philosophy. Therefore I would build a few battlecarriers and multi-purpose cruisers, and fill out the numbers with single-purpose AAW, ASuW, and ASW ships (that would have some self-defense capability against other threats).
DeleteThat's not the USN approach of all high-end ships (leaving enough money only for unmanned vehicles to fill out the numbers) and it's not all single-purpose ships. Each of those approaches has its supporters, and I am way past expecting to change any minds.
" I think the strongest fleet architecture is a mix of a few large multi-purpose ships and a lot of small single-purpose ships--ADM Zumwalt's high/low mix philosophy."
DeleteThat was NOT Zumwalt's philosophy, at all. From the Navy history site,
"Project Sixty”: A plan to drastically reduce excess ships in the fleet within 60 days. Through the project, Zumwalt came up with what he called a “high-low mix,” reducing the numbers of large single-mission vessels while keeping a higher number of smaller multi-mission ships."
You keep referring to Zumwalt's hi-lo mix but you've got it backwards. He wanted the opposite of what you describe. Here's the Navy history reference: Zumwalt
Well, all I can say is that my active-duty time pretty well coincided with Zumwalt's term as CNO, and that's not the way I recall it coming down at all. I'd be really interested in knowing what "large single-mission" ships he got rid of and what "smaller multi-mission ships" he kept or built.
DeleteMaybe you should research his 'Project 60' where he lays it all out. In fact, his original writings are available on line.
DeleteHis thinking was actually quite pessimistic and defeatist with budgets being the main factor in his fleet design. His concepts were totally defensive and abandoned the concept of victory.
Hmm … budget driven … sounds like someone I know! I can see why identify with Zumwalt so readily.
My suggestion that you research 'Project 60' is sincere. I think you'd find it fascinating and informative and it might give you some perspective on your own fleet designs. If you opt to look into it, let us know what strikes you.
"Well, all I can say is that my active-duty time pretty well coincided with Zumwalt's term as CNO, and that's not the way I recall it coming down at all."
DeleteHmm … you say that and yet … consider your own statement:
"a lot of small single-purpose ships--ADM Zumwalt's high/low mix philosophy."
Arguably, Zumwalts most significant impact was the Perry class figate which was the epitome of multi-purpose, do-everything but nothing well … the opposite of what you claim Zumwalt's philosophy was. So, your statement is demonstrably incorrect!
The Lo portion of Hi-Lo was NOT small, single purpose ships but, rather, small multi-purpose ships, principally the Perrys.
Before you claim that the Perrys were single purpose ASW ships, recall that they were area air defense (Standard missiles), ASuW (Harpoons), ASW (though with substandard sonar and no ASROC, as far as I know, but a good tail and helos), which is pretty much the definition of multi-purpose.
Maybe a better way to describe what I would do is some sort of combining high/low with your single-purpose ship philosophy. Build a few high-end multi-purpose ships and fill out the numbers with smaller, cheaper single-purpose ships. What seems to get overlooked is that I am totally onboard with single-purpose ships as the only way to build the numbers we need, and in fact I have always proposed building them in large numbers. When I say we are not far apart, that is what I am talking about. I just don’t think you can get the fleet you need with EVERY ship being single-purpose, and thus have proposed some multi-purpose large ships on the top end. Large ships are presumably big enough to accommodate multiple missions, at least more likely so than small ships. A battleship or cruiser would seem to have room for big guns, a large missile farm, and either some air or lots of unmanned vehicles, or at least more likely than a destroyer or frigate to do so.
DeleteActually, if you follow the description you are giving for Zumwalt’s high/low, getting rid of large single-purpose ships and building small multi-purpose ships, then there were no single-purpose ships anywhere, large or small. There would be simply large multi-purpose ships (because we got rid of large single-purpose ships) and small multi-purpose ships (because we didn’t build any small single-purpose ships). I don’t know what large single-purpose ships we got rid of. As far as smaller ships, the Perrys were originally criticized as having no purpose, since they weren’t big enough to have enough to do the AAW, ASuW, or ASW mission well. Put a tail on them, plus their ability to operate helos, and they became pretty stout ASW platforms. They were never going to do AAW at the level of Ticos or Burkes, and they were rather limited in ASuW as well. So they more grew into a single purpose than being designed that way. The Knoxes (pre-Zumwalt) were actually designed to be the ASW ships, but their combination of SQS-26 sonar and ASROC proved less useful than the Perrys’ combination of helos and a tail. Thus my preference for helos on ASW ships, until they get too small to make it work.
As for budgetary focus, remember that Zumwalt was CNO during the Vietnam drawdown, when budgets were destined to decrease. With that in mind, our understanding of the high-low mix in the fleet back then is better described as, “During the 1970s, … Adm. Elmo Zumwalt struggled with the twin problems of a declining post-Vietnam defense budget and the obsolescence of large numbers of World War II–era Navy ships. If Zumwalt didn’t do something, he risked a huge drop in the number of battle-force ships. Zumwalt’s proposal to keep the size of the fleet large was to create a high-low mix of ships split between very capable high-end ships and less capable low-end ships” (1)
The two “poster children” for high/low were the Perrys and the sea control small carrier. We built the Perrys, and they turned out to be good ASW ships. We didn’t build the sea control carrier, but Spain did (Asturias) and apparently got pretty good use out of it. That’s kind of the lineal predecessor of the Lightning Carrier concept today. I’m not a big fan of the Lightning Carrier, but we have these LHA/Ds that are pretty worthless as amphibs, there’s a lot of sunk cost that Congress is going to have a cow about if we park them, and while we really need a conventional carrier like a Kitty Hawk to enable the required carrier numbers, we are 15 or so years away from having them in the fleet. So maybe the answer is to convert the LHA/Ds as interim solutions.
I am very much onboard with your idea of single-purpose ships, at least smaller ones. I think our differences are that I think 1) there is a place for a few multi-purpose ships at the top end, and 2) we need some kind of amphib capability (but not the one the Navy/USMC want). With that, I’m out.
(1) https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/why-us-navy-said-no-medium-aircraft-carriers-189946.
" I just don’t think you can get the fleet you need with EVERY ship being single-purpose"
DeleteSingle purpose is the ONLY way to build a ship and a fleet because it's the way you ensure that a ship has a purpose that it fulfills perfectly as opposed to just sort of okay (like a Perry). Single function doesn't mean they can only do one thing. It means that they may perform other tasks but they have one function that they do exquisitely well. EVERY WWII US ship was single purpose so that proves that a single purpose fleet is not only doable but preferable because it's flexible and maximum effective.
"Single purpose is the ONLY way to build a ship and a fleet because it's the way you ensure that a ship has a purpose that it fulfills perfectly...."
DeleteI have read a few posts you wrote on this topic but I still have questions I like to ask. I understand that when you design a single-function ship, you must also budget in necessary self defenses (in other sectors) to be survivable in the battlefield. How do you go at designing limited self-defense capability? Is it only reactionary defense? For instance, say I want to design an ASW ship, do I outfit it with the Aegis system loaded with ESSM? Or should I outfit it with other missiles? Should I add on Harpoons or NSM for ASuW? And if yes, where is the cut off point? When are you mission-creeping into other ships?
"design a single-function ship"
DeleteA single function ship is a ship that has a SINGLE primary purpose. You give that ship everything it needs to accomplish that purpose but nothing more. You also develop a CONOPS which defines how it will be used and how it will interact with other ships. The CONOPS and the primary purpose tell you everything you need to know about what capabilities to design into the ship.
Defense (assuming that isn't the primary function, like AAW escort) is necessary to allow the ship to survive to perform its primary function. Broadly speaking, AAW defense is either area (Standard and ESSM), local (ESSM), or self (SeaRAM/CIWS). You choose whichever is appropriate for the CONOPS. For example, a small corvette which will not normally see front line duty needs only AAW-self. A frigate which may encounter attacks during various escort duties would need AAW-local. A task force AAW escort needs AAW-area.
Secondary functions can be added to a ship AS LONG AS THEY DON'T SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OR COST. Thus, a bolt on Harpoon/NSM rack is probably acceptable on a frigate but would be wasted on a corvette.
You design to the MINIMUM necessary to execute the primary function, not the maximum you can fit (which is what most naval commentators want to do). This is how you get useful ships while still controlling costs.
Consider the Constellation. It has no primary purpose. It has no CONOPS. As a result, the Navy is trying to cram as many functions and capabilities as possible on it because they haven't defined what they want it to do beyond 'everything'. The result is a billion-plus dollar frigate that we can't afford to buy in numbers. It's a mini-Burke at a near-Burke price. That's horrible value for the money.
"When are you mission-creeping into other ships?"
When you add the first item that is not NECESSARY to execute the primary purpose.
"do I outfit it with the Aegis system loaded with ESSM?"
You design the MINIMUM necessary to accomplish the function. Assuming you're designing a ship that needs ESSM as it's AAW defense, you only need a radar that can see to the horizon. That's a simple TRS-3D/4D or equivalent. It's not a full Aegis system which would be wasted overkill and just adds cost.
"What does this mean for us today? We should be doing the same kind of development, albeit on a slower pace since we're not in the middle of a world war. We should be trying out ship types and doctrine/tactics in very large scale Fleet Problems."
DeleteOne area where we are in complete agreement.
My only possible exception would be that the area of SRBM/IRBM and supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles is one where we currently trail so badly that we need a warp speed effort to catch up. And while we're at it, address counters to those threats.
"Consider the Constellation. It has no primary purpose. It has no CONOPS."
DeleteOh, it has a primary purpose all right, it's just the elephant in the room that nobody wants to talk about. It's a cheaper, less capable replacement for the Ticos. Don't believe me? They are rushing to get rid of 22 Ticos at the same time as they are rushing to get 20 Constellations into the fleet. Quacks like a duck, probably a duck. Of course, it has nowhere nearly enough VLS cells to be a capable replacement, but c'est la vie.
The original FREMM was a decent GP escort that could fill the ASuW/ASW ship role in your table quite nicely, particularly if you added the extra 40 feet that the Navy added and used that to accommodate more VLS cells for a mix of AAW/ASW/ASuW missiles. But by turning it into an AEGIS platform, they sacrificed a bunch of that GP capability, and with a drastic reduction in missile cells from the Ticos, it's really not a capable AEGIS platform.
Go back to the original FREMM-GP. Add the 40 feet and the VLS cells that go with it, and fill them with a mix of ESSM quad-packs, Standard, VL-ASROC, and VL-NSM. Keep a 127mm gun (or at least a 76mm) forward. Swap the 76mm aft for SeaRAM and add a SeaRAM forward (with some of that 40 feet) and 4+ Phalanx (2P/2S). Keep the EMPAR radar, and if the weight works, add SMART-L aft where the director for the 76mm gun was. Keep the two helos. Replace the trainable torpedo tubes (that are a bear to reload, almost impossible at sea) with fixed tubes originating in a sub-like torpedo room with mechanized reload equipment (I like two stacked combos, P/S, with a 324mm tube on top of a 533mm tube, so that we can develop and use a heavyweight longer-range torpedo in addition to the Mk46). Also dependent on weight, consider replacing the canister launchers with additional VLS cells for VL-NSM/VL-ASROC (by lowering weight, that may actually help). OK, the VLS take up some interior space, so the internal layout will have to be adjusted a bit--maybe go with one gelato machine instead of two.
Now you have a true beast of an ASuw/ASW ship, and one that can pretty much take care of itself in most environments.
My thinking about EMPAR (or better, EMPAR/SMART-L combo if the weight works) is that we need something other than AEGIS on at least some of our ships for backup/redundancy. Given the reliability problems with AEGIS, it would be good to have a backup. And if the bad guys figure out how to jam or fool AEGIS, we are in a world of hurt. Having a second and different system complicates their jamming problem significantly. Now it is up to the software guys to make the two systems talk to each other, but that effort had better be pretty far along already for NATO purposes.
DeleteIn escorting a large main body, working from inside out, I would see the cruisers and the AAW destroyers with AEGIS/AMDR in rings 1 and 2, respectively, the GP escorts with EMPAR/SMART-L in ring 3, and the ASW frigates in the outer ring.
"Now you have a true beast of an ASuw/ASW ship, and one that can pretty much take care of itself in most environments."
DeleteHave you considered adding 16" guns, a catapult, and arresting gear?
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DeleteWhat you're saying, or what the sources you quote are saying, is that Zumwalt's high/low meant all multi-purpose ships. There weren't any single-purpose big ships, because he got rid of them, and there weren't any single-purpose small ships, because he didn't build any. The Navy is still going with multi-purpose ships at every level, and complicating the situation by insisting on cutting-edge, state-of-the-art systems, many of which are unproved.
DeleteI tend more toward having some multi-purpose big ships and filling out the numbers with single-purpose small ships, and preferring proved and tested technology on all, with the opportunity to upgrade at mid-life major maintenance. That's philosophically different from you, and both of us are way different philosophically from the USN. I'm pretty sure neither of us would do what the USN has done to the FREMM to get the FFG(X). I still think the driving purpose there is to create a cheaper (and far less capable) replacement for the Ticos. We might not build the same ship as each other, but neither of us would build the same ship as the USN is building. I'm probably not going to convince you, and you probably aren't going to convince me. I can live with our differences with each other. What is a lot harder to take is that the USN refuses to go the way that either of us would.
"Have you considered adding 16" guns, a catapult, and arresting gear?"
DeleteNo, and that's kind of an absurd comment.
All I'm doing is taking your ASuW/ASW destroyer concept and updating it to the 21st century. There's an argument that it doesn't need the Standard missiles, but if it's going to carry EMPAR (and particularly if it has SMART-L too) then it is going to have considerable AAW sensors so it might as well carry some long-range AAW weapons. The only other big change to the FREMM is substituting VLS for the canister launchers. If NSM can be launched from a Mk41, then we could probably put 16 Mk41 (8 each side, similar to the Danish Huitfeldt layout) with NSM. That gives us more missiles (good) and lowers the weight a bit (also good), but does require some rearrangement of internal space (not good, but if it helps focus us on warfighting rather than ancillary stuff, maybe not bad either).
I'm not sure that weight considerations will allow it to carry both EMPAR and SMART-L. At least I'm not trying to put AEGIS on it and make it a Tico replacement, which is what I fear the Navy is doing.
I think a lot of the flak I've taken has focused too much on the high-end muti-purpose ships that I have proposed, and not enough on the low-end single-purpose ships that I would use to fill out the numbers.
"All I'm doing is taking your ASuW/ASW destroyer concept and updating it"
DeleteNo, you're taking a small, focused design and trying to give it everything you cram onto it. It's not intended for AAW and yet you give it EMPAR/SMART-L plus area air defense Standard missiles. You appear to want to give it something on the order of 48-64 VLS which is way more than it needs.
You seem to want to turn it into a combination area-AAW/ASW/ASuW multi-function, expensive, mini-Burke. Is this your idea of a 'low-end single-purpose ship' or are you calling this a high end, multi-function ship which is what you've spec'ed it to be?
It already has EMPAR and area air defense missiles, I'm saying SMART-L to complement if the weight works. If the weight doesn't work, don't. It came with 16 VLS, and FBNW another 16 for 32 total. And the Navy added 40 feet to its length, which presumably gives plenty of room for the second 16. The rest, I'm just saying that if the NSM can actually be fired from VLS, and indications are that it can, you should be able to put 16 VLS instead of the canisters. None of those seems like a huge (or hugely expensive) tradeoff. If they are hugely expensive, give them up and you still have a pretty good GP escort.
DeleteWhat I'm not doing is turning it into some super-expensive ship like the Navy by insisting on AEGIS, which really makes little sense with only 32 VLS. I still think the Navy sees the Constellation as a cheaper, less capable replacement for the Ticos.
I am aware that the FREMMs are intended as cheaper replacements for the Horizons that turned out to be too expensive. The Horizons had APAR (predecessor to EMPAR) and SMART-L, and they dropped the latter going from Horizon to FREMM. I would want to understand that decision before arguing too strongly for putting SMART-L on the US FREMM. As far as VLS cells, I'm pretty sure you complained about the FREMM having only 16, and they were actually designed FBNW 32, so I don't see the issue with 32. They also had area-defense AAW missiles, so I don't see the issue there. Any additional VLS would be replacements for the canisters if NSM is truly Mk41 compatible. Even with none of my changes, IMO the FREMM is a better ASuW/ASW platform than the FFG(X) if we load some VL-ASROC in the Mk41s. I kinda like my warships bristling with war things.
DeleteThe discussion is about Zumwalt's hi-lo mix (and now your modified version). Is this pumped up frigate supposed to be the hi or the lo in your scheme?
DeleteI would propose it to be a good bit cheaper ($1B) than the average per-ship cost ($1.5B) in my proposed fleet, so I suppose it fits by default in the low end of the mix. It is basically designed to fit the ASuW/ASW ship in your hierarchy of ship roles, so sort of the lineal heir to WWII destroyers, which were similarly jack-of-all-trades (ASW, ASuW, AAW) ships. My pure high end ships would be CVNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, and Virginia VPMs. My low end ships would be ASW frigates, ASW corvettes, all of my amphibs and littoral ships, and AIP SSKs.
DeleteI’m just looking at a FREMM and it should come in at or below the price range I’m looking for and it is already a pretty decent ASuW/ASW platform, so I use that as a starting place. What I am most definitely NOT trying to do is what the USN has done and turn it into an AEGIS AAW ship. With only 32 VLS cells, that seems pretty absurd. What seems even more absurd is that I still think the justification for doing so is a desire to replace the Ticos with a cheaper and less capable platform. Somewhere down the road, the USN is going to say, “Well, the CG(X) is just too expensive, so we’ll just use the FFG(X)s as the successors to the Ticos.”
As far as the changes I have proposed, adding another 16 VLS forward and keeping the 127mm (or 76mm) gun is basically something the FREMMs were built FBNW (for cost reasons, so need to see what that does for my cost number, but that would be my first priority, and the USN has added 40 feet to the length which should accommodate the space easily). The rest of my proposals would involve cost and weight tradeoffs, and they either can or cannot be done. Anything that blows either cost or weight doesn’t get added unless there is something to take away to offset it. I would get rid of the 76mm on top of the helo hangar. That should save some money and weight, and eliminating the room taken up by the loading mechanism would free up space in the hangar. I would propose to replace it with SeaRAM (and also add Phalanx in several spots). I would also like to put a SeaRAM forward, maybe back the bridge up a few feet to make room.
That leaves two issues. Do we add SMART-L, and do we use additional VLS cells instead of the canister launchers? The latter depends first on whether NSM can be launched from a Mk41 (I am reading that it can). If it can, then some kind of Iver Huitfeldt VLS configuration in that part of the ship seems to make more sense to me. Obviously, you sacrifice some internal space and we would have to look at that, but that’s a tradeoff I would be inclined to make. The SMART-L comes down strictly to weight and cost. If the weight works and it doesn’t blow the cost number out of whack, I’d like to have it. If it fails either of those, then no go.
I’ve taken what I think is basically a pretty good ASuW/ASW design and looked at where I could add more capability within budget. My priorities would be 1) extra 16 VLS cells (that’s almost a given), 2) VLS instead of canister launch for NSM, and 3) SMART-L added. That kind of walks you through my thought process.
Id also add that with the Marines getting out of the large assault business it seems, the LH platforms might be better used as ASW helo platforms, as I just dont see the Lightning carrier bringing much to the table. Their speed is problematic for attatching them to a CVBG, but as the core of a separate ASW group, they might have more value being helo aviation-centric. That could even help future escort design by shrinking or eliminating the need for aviation facilities. AAW and ASuW ships dont need them. It's easy enough to include flight deck space, and maybe even fueling equipment for cross-deck/emergency capability, but eliminating the hangar and detachment requirements removes quite a bit of cost and space from the platform. Again, its about optimization, and deleting anything that isnt part of a ships primary mission, with the one small exception that all platforms should have significantly increased CI self defense added.
ReplyDelete"with the one small exception that all platforms should have significantly increased CI self defense added."
DeleteThat's not an exception, at all. Self defense is NECESSARY to be able to successfully carry out the primary function.
"the LH platforms might be better used as ASW helo platforms"
DeleteBetter than what they're doing now? Yes!
Good? No.
The LHA/LHD are poorly designed and optimized for ASW work. They're far too large (lots of wasted well deck, cargo, and troop space) and far too manpower intensive. They should be half the size and a third or less the cost.
One also needs to consider the question of fixed wing ASW aircraft. Would they go on a ASW 'helo-carrier' thereby making it a true ASW-carrier or should they go on a full size carrier? Good arguments can be made for and against both.
Those comments were in the "what we have now" category. Ideally I would like to see the return of fixed-wing ASW, and an appropriate platform for it, separate from the CVN. Agree that an LH is too big, and not ideal for my suggestion, but if we're hunting for a new CONOP for them, ASW wins out over a Lightning concept in my mind.
DeleteAs far as ASW on a CVN, in my perfect world, there'd be a true ASW carrier for fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Id focus the 90+ airwing of a CVN on air superiority/dominance.
Delete"but if we're hunting for a new CONOP for them"
DeleteShould we be? Or, is it better to simply retire them and their enormous operating costs and build a new, smaller, cheaper, purpose designed ship? I would lean that way but I don't have the cost data to say for sure. Sometimes it's better to but your losses and start over. Just something to think about.
I agree with you, by the way, that they're better as ASW than a small carrier.
"Should we be? Or, is it better..."
DeleteWell again we're in that "what we have now" vs "perfect world" zone. With all the indicators that any large amphib assaults are unlikely (lack of connectors, NGFS, current doctrine, etc, as well as the Marines shedding of capability),and the fact that we are still building them, it seems that maybe we should be finding a new "fit" for them. Thats not to say that Im even convinced theyre original role couldnt be valid again with some doctrinal shift, replacing the Commandant and his crazy concepts, etc. But in light of current events, repurposing seems a good idea. In the "perfect world" spectrum, though, youre right, they should probably be mothballed and new optimized platforms built...
"That's not an exception, at all. Self defense is NECESSARY..."
ReplyDeleteOh agree 100%, that was just poor word choice on my part. Strike 'exception', insert 'addition'... 😁