Today’s military is myopically focused on data and networks as the key to future warfare. However, no matter how much data you have, you eventually have to kill the enemy’s troops and destroy their equipment. That requires firepower … explosives. ComNavOps has stated that the military is substituting networks and data for firepower, not supplementing and supporting firepower. Is this true or just a misconception? Let’s look.
Since … oh, I don’t know … say, Desert Storm in 1991, how many new networks, sensors, and data collection and analysis systems has the Navy developed? Here’s a partial list:
- CANES (Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services) – provides shipboard network
- NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air) – integrated area wide data/targeting sharing
- CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability) – provides data/targeting sharing and remote fire control
- TTNT (Tactical Targeting Network Technology) - waveform technology providing high throughput, anti-jam, low latency and quick net join waveforms for IP connectivity
- SQQ-89 – anti-submarine software that integrates ASW sensors and weapons
- NMCI (Navy Marine Corps Intranet) - provides a shore-based enterprise network in the continental United States and Hawaii via a single integrated, secure information technology environment for reliable, stable information transfer
- ONE-Net (OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network) - evolved from the Base Level Infrastructure Information (BLII) Modernization Program in 2005, ONE-Net provides secure, seamless and global computer connectivity for the DON outside the continental US
- NGEN (Next Generation Enterprise Network) - provides secure, net-centric data and services to Navy and Marine Corps personnel
- NTCDL (Network Tactical Common Data Link System) - allows the Navy to share large quantities of critical ISR data across platforms and networks
- NIWC (Naval Information Warfare Center) Pacific Command and Control - fleet support center for command, control and communication systems and ocean surveillance
- Link 16 – data transmission
- AESA Radar – provides detection, tracking, communications, and electronic warfare
- JADC2 (Joint All Domain Command And Control) – overarching network that connects sensor from every service into a single network
The preceding list is only a partial list that barely scratches the surface of all the Navy’s data and networking applications. A new networking command and control scheme comes out seemingly every day!
Now, for comparison, let’s list the new Navy ‘explosives’ that have been developed over the same time period.
- LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile) – Tomahawk replacement
- NSM (Naval Strike Missile) – Norwegian small anti-ship missile
- JSOW (Joint Stand Off Weapon) – guided glide bomb with altitude dependent range
That’s it. That’s all there are unless I’ve missed one - which I'm sure I have and I have no doubt that someone will triumphantly point it out!
Regardless, it’s clear where the Navy’s focus has gone, isn’t it? We truly have stopped pursuing firepower and have replaced it with networks and we’ve done so without testing those networks in realistic combat conditions against full spectrum anti-network effects (cyber, jamming, disruption, spoofing, etc.).
There’s a few other weapons that you might be tempted to think of as new but they’re actually just upgrades from existing weapons or they’re pre-1991:
- Mk54 torpedo – upgrade from Mk50
- JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) – not a weapon but a guidance package for dumb bombs
- ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) – upgrade to Sea Sparrow
- SLAM-ER (Stand Off Land Attack Missile – Expanded Response) – modified Harpoon
- Mk77 Incendiary Bomb – napalm replacement
- AARGM (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile) – upgrade to HARM
Note that most of the weapons are just minor evolutionary improvements of existing weapons that have been given a new designation, like Standard -1, -2, … -6.
There’s absolutely nothing wrong with weapon system upgrades but they offer no new capabilities, just generally minor enhancements to existing weapons. Good but not new capability and not any increase in firepower.
Now, here’s a list of weapons that haven’t been developed but desperately need to be.
- Cluster munitions
- Supersonic anti-ship missile
- Short range conventional ship launched ballistic missile
- Intermediate range conventional ship launched ballistic missile
- Self-propelled, armored, medium range SAM vehicle for Marine Corps
- Self-propelled, armored, short range SAM vehicle for Marine Corps
- Littoral torpedo
- Anti-torpedo torpedo
- Large caliber naval gun (8” and larger)
- Navalized MLRS
- Navalized 5” rocket launcher
- Wake homing torpedo
- High explosive, 1000 lb warhead torpedo
These would offer substantially new capabilities (or revival of old, dropped capabilities!) and increased firepower but the Navy clearly has no interest in developing firepower. They’d much rather focus on the sexy, shiny, high-tech networks – which won’t work in a contested environment, anyway.
It’s also quite depressing to recall some of the weapon systems that have been dropped, with no replacement, since 1991:
- 16” Battleship Gun
- Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM)
- CAPTOR Mine
- Cluster munitions
- Marine Corps Tanks
- SHORAD (AAW Short Range Air Defense)
We have got to regain our focus on firepower.
APKWS and HAAWC are other mods. I'd say SDB-I and Strombreaker/SDB-II are also relevant and new. I'm more concerned about failing to get what we have on things that can shoot. To me, putting NSMs on big ships is the wrong missile and wrong ship. Put NSM on MH-60s and patrol ships that can find targets with UAVs. LRASM on anything that can launch some method of finding the target first whether larger UAVs, H-60 etc.
ReplyDeleteAndyM, yeah APKWS are excellent answer against overhelming boats in the Persian Gulf. Three or four years ago one of the companies presented a new project based on patrol boat Mark VI design (unmanned version) equipped with 4 LRASM or NSM. Big ships need bigger missiles like SM-6, Tomahawk Block V and LRASM.
DeleteYeah, that LRASM concept was classic, Lockheed knows nothing about boats/ships. Maybe they place 2 NSM on one. For US purposes I'd sell it as an export like Ukraine.
DeleteA good (if older example) of this line of thinking would be Nelson's change in how he used signal flags in battle. Before Nelson the Royal Navy used evermore sophisticated commands to control the battle line. Nelson didn't eliminate the use of signals, but simplified them and provided a playbook for when the signals were un readable or not relevant to the current situation. If in doubt kill the enemy the best way you can.
ReplyDeleteIt's not either/ or. Both are needed. Sorry had to put the last in just in case one of our admirals had a come to Jesus moment and we ended up with gunboats without even radios.
"and we ended up with gunboats without even radios."
DeleteActually, that's not far off from what you want. We'll be fighting in EMCON in order to survive so what's the point of having radios?
Without intending to, you just described the doctrine of EMCON. We did this throughout the Cold War and then promptly forgot it when the Soviet Union collapsed. We need to relearn it.
We used to launch and conduct carrier strikes without a single radio transmission. We knew how to do that and we need to relearn the skill.
"If in doubt kill the enemy the best way you can."
DeleteThat's what we are losing sight of.
To be effective we have to be able to fight under EMCON, but we also have to be able to fight when we can using radar and comms to full effect. If you fight as a one trick pony or entirely predictable manner you can at first. In warfare if there is any capacity that is lacking that is where your enemy will attack.
DeleteBut for the record I agree with you. The armed services, in general, and the Navy in particular, are over emphasizing unfettered communications over firepower.
"we ended up with gunboats without even radios"
DeleteUSN seems a lot likelier to end up with radioboats without guns, frankly.
"USN seems a lot likelier to end up with radioboats without guns, frankly."
DeleteThat's priceless! Absolutely outstanding!
"USN seems a lot likelier to end up with radioboats without guns, frankly."
DeleteYou realize if you add busted transmission, you just described the LCS.
I wrote about a partial solution in 2015 using infrared communications. I don't know if this has been adopted by any Navy, but here is the article that begins:
DeleteEveryone knows the importance of radio silence to avoid detection. Modern warships have powerful computers that exchange data among ships and aircraft, but are unable to secretly communicate in a task force unless they use the crude method of flashing Morse code with signal lights or flags. A major breakthrough will occur when navies discover infrared communications. This technology has been around for decades; it's how your television remote control works. In recent years, companies such as DataSoft have developed infrared computer networks that allow mobile computers in factories and laboratories to exchange data up to 25 meters away.
The rest is here: https://www.g2mil.com/Infrared%20Comm.htm
https://www.g2mil.com/Infrared%20Comm.htm
"infrared communications"
DeleteInteresting article. Thanks for the link.
You've obviously researched this so perhaps you could save me a bit of time and answer a few questions?
1. From your article, it appears that the comm distance is quite short, at least in terms of naval groups which, in war, would be spread out over many dozens of miles (25-50 mile radius for escorts). Even multi-carrier groups would likely see the individual carriers separated by 5-10 miles. One of the letters in the article claimed a 5000 yd (2.8 mile or so) comm distance. Assuming this kind of comm distance holds, what uses do you see for this type of communication? My first thought, before seeing a short comm limit was CEC networking but that wouldn't be possible. Any thoughts?
2. Any feel for the bandwidth? Modern militaries seem fixated (unwisely) on massive, full image, full color, screens and accompanying massive data transfers. Does IR comm have the bandwidth capacity?
3. IR sensing is subject to degradation from weather effects (fog, rain, etc.). Would this be the case for IR comm signals, as well?
Again, thanks for the discussion and article link!
Yes, range is very limited, but very valuable for aircraft talking to ships, aircraft in groups, underway resupply, amphib operations. Ships might occasionally move closer to exchange info via IR. Otherwise we only have signal flags or flashing lights.
DeleteIt's also enlightening to recall the extent of operations we performed in WWII and the Cold War under radio silence (WWII term) and EMCON (Cold War). Entire carrier strikes were launched, assembled, and executed with no radio transmissions. That's a skill that we've not only lost but we've gone to the opposite end of the spectrum and seem unable to conduct even the tiniest action without continuous communications! That suggests a failure of doctrine (doctrine - the standardized responses and actions to a set of circumstances - is what allows acting without the need for communicating) and training.
DeleteWe've become focused on permissive peacetime operations, which breeds bad habits, and have lost our focus on war.
"Short range conventional ship launched ballistic missile" the SM6 can do that.
ReplyDeleteNo, the SM-6 is not a ballistic missile. SM-6 is a guided, not ballistic missile. Short range ballistic missiles are those with ranges of, typically, a few hundred to several hundred miles. Further, ballistic missiles typically contain large warheads. Even the small, very short range US ATACMS Block IVA has a 500 lb HE warhead.
DeleteI recall hearing talk of how the move to the Mark 57 VLS was to allow Navy ships to carry the ATACMS missile. It's physically possible to fit one in the dimensions of a Mark 57 cell. *shrug*
DeleteYou could quad pack regular MLRS rounds in the Mk 41. I'm sure the ATACMS replacement could fit one per cell in a Mk 41. To me this is the kind of move that would make having plenty of cells worthwhile.
Delete" I'm sure the ATACMS replacement could fit one per cell in a Mk 41. "
DeleteHow sure are you about that? The Mk41 cannister is 25" square which, I believe, is the outer dimension of the cannister. If so, the inner dimension will be less by the wall thickness (x2). ATACMS is listed as having a diameter of 24" so it may not fit. For comparison, the Tomahawk, which is a snug fit, has a diameter of just over 20".
Have you seen some documentation that an ATACMS can fit in a Mk41 cannister?
The MLRS launch containers are 13'10" x 41.5" x 33". If they are to fit 2 of the ATACMS replacements in 1 box as per the requirement, they are constrained by that 41.5" width.
DeleteI'm not familiar with Army equipment but I assume the dimensions refer to a single MLRS container cell. If so, the 24" diam ATACMs would fit comfortably inside with room to spare. That does not, however, indicate that it could fit in a VLS cannister. Unless you have some information to the contrary, I assume it cannot.
DeleteIts the box the 6 cells go into. Page 2. https://www.dau.edu/cop/ammo/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/Load%20and%20Roll%20Pallet%2019-48-8184-GM15RS3%20-%20Revision%201.pdf
DeleteThe replacement is 2 missiles per box, not 1. 2 missiles per Himars, 4 per MLRS.
DeleteI think you're incorrect about the number of ATACMS per container. It's one. Per Wiki (see, "M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System"),
Delete"Each pod contains six standard rockets or one guided ATACMS missile"
Thus, the MLRS holds 2 pods and each pod can hold 6 rockets or 1 ATACMS. So, 2 ATACMS per MLRS. Double check whatever source you're using to come up with 4 ATACMS per MLRS.
I'm talking PrSM, the ATACMS replacement. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/precision-strike-missile.html?gclid=Cj0KCQiA3Y-ABhCnARIsAKYDH7uDHXewdPIiPcJ1A8F5it4HIWWDKGwbJYaMXWGPVgtu7FgJkpeBDFAaApJyEALw_wcB
DeleteAh, replacement. Okay.
DeleteAlso Tomahawk is being upgraded and given ASM ability. See 1The Navy’s Tomahawk Cruise Missile Is Becoming More Lethal, More Versatile. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/10/23/the-navys-tomahawk-cruise-missile-is-becoming-more-lethal-more-versatile/amp/
ReplyDelete"Also Tomahawk is being upgraded and given ASM ability."
DeleteThat's not an upgrade, it's a re-implementation of an old Tomahawk capability (-B variant) that was dropped in 1994.
Warheads on foreheads.
ReplyDeleteIf you can't do that, then the rest really doesn't matter.
The navy wants a new lightweight torpedo.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/12/23/navy-to-field-first-new-torpedo-in-decades
FIREPOWER!
ReplyDeleteNo question about it.
I've been thinking about firepower and 8", 12", and 16" guns on ships.
The ranges on those guns are something like 18 nautical miles, 21 nm, and 23 nm respectively.
If EMCON is being practiced, and the engagements primarily take place at the radar horizon, wouldn't that make naval artillery a viable option? Especially with longer range sub-caliber rounds?
It might be nice to be able to supplement anti-ship missile strikes against enemy surface ships by hammering them with naval artillery fire as well.
Lutefisk
I don't think that it is an 'either or" issue.
ReplyDeleteMost today and future naval battles are beyond visual range. Key is to find enemy far away first (before they find you). After targets are identified and precisely tracked, missiles can then hit in precision. It is not practical to fire many upon many long range rockets to cover a large area.
Guns on naval ships would have little use in navy battles among advanced nations as each can find another far beyond today's 5 in naval guns' ranges. Naval guns are used to support troops on shore.
CAPT Wayne Hughes--find first, shoot first, win.
DeleteNavweaps lists a planned sub-caliber 16" round with an 11 in projectile with a range of 100 nm.
Deletehttp://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.php
I'm not sure how reliable that 100 nm estimate is.
But if you have 8" rounds for the new Des Moines class in inventory they could be housed in a discarding sabot round for 16" or 12" application.
What would the range on those be?
An 8" HE round on an un-armored ship should be very effective.
If you could also put some kind of basic terminal guidance, like heat-seeking, to decrease the number of misses, it could be very effective against warships.
The challenge, as always, is locating the enemy.
And in the fog of war how often will there be incomplete situational awareness?
I could see naval gunfire being highly effective in those short-range circumstances if they were to take place.
But, of course, the main purpose for naval artillery would be pounding coastal targets and sinking enemy merchant shipping.
The primary surface attack weapons for those cruisers and battleships would still be anti-ship missiles.
Lutefisk
The so called 100nm HE-ER was a projectile which was canceled in FY91. A projectile is a missile fired from an artillery and use dynamite as its first stage rocket. US falls behind Russia and China in projectiles. This idea was first materialized by Soviet Union and US was not as keen. Today, both Russian and Chinese tanks can fire projectiles but not US' M1A2. You can google the web on US Army's development on it and how the project terminated. Now, both Army and Navy show interests to projectile again.
DeleteOne thing for sure - it is a missile thus don't believe the nonsense -- it is as cheap as an ammunition. No way!
It is a simple math, if you fire unguided ammunitions 100 miles, it possible landing area is huge.
Reconnaissance and network are tools to guide missiles to hit target. Therefore, it is not an "either or" but complimentary - network and firepower.
Have you seen this book yet? It seems like the book is addressing some of themes we have been discussing here with a little bit of naval history behind it. Provide some fresh perspectives perhaps?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.amazon.com/Provide-Maintain-Navy-Americas-Strategy/dp/0960039198/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&qid=1609712153&refinements=p_27%3AHenry+J+Hendrix&s=books&sr=1-1&text=Henry+J+Hendrix
What's wrong with upgrades to existing weapons? Over the years, we've done the same with ships and aircraft. Giving an existing weapon greater range or a better warhead or making it less susceptible to countermeasures is a good thing.
ReplyDeleteIn the case of ESSM, even though it has "evolved" in its name, its more of new missile than an upgrade. ESSM has a new, larger motor and better aerodynamic controls giving it about twice the range and greater maneuverability compared to the Sea Sparrow. Plus, ESSM can accept mid-course updates and the Block 2 version has an active radar homing seeker. And, unlike the Sea Sparrow, ESSM can be quad-packed into a Mk 41 cell.
"What's wrong with upgrades to existing weapons?"
DeleteNothing! There's lots of good! The problem is when you stop developing new weapons to deal with new threats and new realities and, instead, place your focus on networks and data - that was the point of the post. We've switched our focus from needed new weapons to networks.
If all we did was upgrades we'd still be throwing rocks. Upgraded rocks but still rocks. We need to regain our focus on firepower and weapons development.
As often is the case, upgrades to existing weapons are usually intended to deal with new threats. But, networks are just as important as weapons since you can't hit what you can't see. And, I agree over reliance on sensors without the weapons to back them up is pure folly.
DeleteBut, some of the weapons you propose require an investment in platforms that don't exist. We have nothing, short of maybe an aircraft carrier, to launch short or medium range ballistic missiles. Nor do we have nothing that can launch a Brahmos-like antiship missile or mount an 8-in gun.
"But, some of the weapons you propose require an investment in platforms that don't exist."
DeleteNo, they don't. That's what development is all about and that's why we should be focusing on weapon and platform development instead of networks.
As far as ballistic missiles, we could use subs, surface ships (maybe a use for Zumwalts? or a derivative of Zumwalts?), arsenal ships, or large unmanned surface vessels. So, what are we actually looking at for ballistic missiles and platforms? Nothing. That's the point of the post. We're looking at all manner of networks and artificial intelligence command and control but almost no focus on firepower. A famous person once said that over reliance on sensors without the weapons to back them up is pure folly.
Generally I'm of the opinion that ballistic missiles are not relevant for the Navy's operating scope; whatever the navy needs doing with missiles can be done with cruise missiles.
DeleteThat said, as I said before with the Constellation, if Antiship ballistic missiles proliferate then it forces all parties to drastically uptier their radars and combat systems to be able to engage ballistic missiles (such as Constellation carrying an AAW-grade radar).
I believe that there is a value in diversity of weapons and we should proliferate all types of weapons as well. How many times in history that we waste much money trying to redevelop a lost capability? Unless there's absolutely good reason to not keep such capability, such capabilities are always useful for any kinds of operations we are looking to conduct. It's more of many options and combinations that makes it hard to predict rather than constraining to a single way to operate. Generally there is not, I think amphibious landing is probably the only case in history and it's probably because we are unwilling to understand the amount of devastation involved in such operations.
DeleteOn the other hand, I don't think we are developing anything at all. We have two or three missiles in development, comparing to the dozen different types that China and Russia is developing. Granted most of them are experimental but I just feel like they are making more and more discoveries every year and we don't know even know if ours achieve half of irs proposed capabilities. If having some competition speeds us up, I would love to pay for these "lost" capabilities.
"16” Battleship Gun"
ReplyDeletePurely use chemical explosive energy, its range is limited. If use it to launch projectile, as some posted above, it is impossible to be cheap as projectiles need to install guiding system like missiles.
Winds would move ammunitions from its aimed positions. I think college freshmen Physics teaches students to calculate this.
"Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile"
LASRM is better than it. Actually, you can consider LASRM as next generation of Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile.
In the PB FY2021 SCN proposals the second Constellation ship, Congress, budgeted at $1,053.1 million (budget figures prior to award of contract to Fincantieri). Ordnance total $44.4 million, 4.2 % of total. Would be of interest if able to compare ordnance percentages to previous generation ships, would think it would support CNO contention that ordnance is now a poor relation to networks.
ReplyDeleteDetail of Ordnance $44.4 million budget
MK 41 VLS, 32 cells - $15.1 million
RAM Launcher,21 Cells, - $12.9 million / looks expensive compared to the VLS
MK 48 Gun Weapon System - $13.6 million, (Bofors 57mm main gun; MK 160 Gun Fire Control System; MK 20 Electro-Optical Sensor) / no high definition K band radar as the with the Oto Melara 76mm / Oerlikon 35mm millennium guns
Nulka 4 tube Decoy Launcher - $1.2 million
Other Ordnance - $1.5 million / Deck launchers for NSMs, Portable Ordnance Handling Equipment and Machine Gun Mounts.
What I notice is how these same things vary a good bit in price between ships in the budget. What I specifically worry about is the price difference in the Mk 41s from the DDGs. I hope they really are buying the same thing for each.
DeleteSomthing in this vein that I think we're 'missing the boat' on is that so much of our ships ordanance loads are defensive... How many of any AEGIS ships VLS cells are loaded defensive?? While of course any CG/DDG tasked in CVBG will have AAW as a primary purpose, how much is left for offensive purposes?? It seeme like our ships should be fairly bristling with basically bolt-on CIWS/RAM in order to have a more offensive VLS loadout. At least double what they have now!! The carriers could probably carry more of the defense weight as well- Im sure theres room with minimal mods for a carrier to add 6-8 RAM or CIWS!! I think we need some entreprenurial "weapons density" advocates that only think about "how many more ______ can we fit on here?"...?
ReplyDelete"How many of any AEGIS ships VLS cells are loaded defensive??"
DeleteYou've got the right thought but you're roaming around the periphery of the real issue. The issue isn't what the loadout is but, rather, what the focus is. I urge you to read the following post and then comment again:
Offensive Aegis
Sure... I think that my point was kind of in line with the idea that the strike mission shouldnt so much lie with the CVNs as with the surface missile platforms.(of course subs are a large part as well, but...) Youre right in that most surface combatants are designed around AEGIS, and are then by default, defense-oriented, and defense doesnt further sea control, win battles, etc...
DeleteBut to clarify, the major point was that the standalone close in systems should be vastly multiplied in order to help "take the heat" off the CG/DDGs and allow them to potentially have a more offensive focus.
DeleteW76-2 or is that an upgrade?
ReplyDeleteIt's just a lower yield version of the ballistic missile warheads we've had for decades.
DeleteWhy not networks AND firepower?
ReplyDeleteI don't see them as mutually exclusive. I do think we need to train both with and without the snazzy gadgets, because who knows if they would work in a peer-contested environment.
No one, least of all me, is claiming that networks and data have no place in military operations. They do. The point of the post is that our focus - our overwhelming focus - has become networks instead of firepower. The balance has shifted from what it should be: firepower supported and complemented by networks, when they're available, to networks almost exclusively … as described in the post.
Delete"No one, least of all me, is claiming that networks and data have no place in military operations. They do. The point of the post is that our focus - our overwhelming focus - has become networks instead of firepower. The balance has shifted from what it should be: firepower supported and complemented by networks, when they're available, to networks almost exclusively … as described in the post."
DeleteNot disagreeing at all with any part of that. See my post below on spending too much on ships and not enough on weapons. And the solution, to bring in the distributed lethality argument a bit, is not to keep building super-expensive ships and expand the numbers with unmanned which are basically worthless in a war. The answer is to be more reasonable about what we spend on ships and spend more on weapons.
It seems to me that the major problem is that the Navy is spending too much on ships and not enough on weapons--neither R&D nor equipping the fleet. And almost certainly not enough practice rounds to develop the proficiency needed.
ReplyDeleteLook at it this way. The CBO estimates for the cost of the Navy's proposed 355-ship fleet worked out to $2.8B per ship. If we spend $21B/year on ship procurement, in line with recent years, that means we can buy 7.5 ships a year. If we assume a 40-year life, that supports a 300-ship Navy, 30-year life means 225 ships, or 20-year life means 150 ships. That's very simple math.
Now, suppose instead of $14B for a Ford, we spend $9B for essentially the same capability for a Nimitz, that leaves $5B for aircraft and weapons. Or instead of $3B for a Zumwalt we spent $1B for a FFG, that's $2B for weapons. Or instead of $750MM for a LCS we spend $500MM for an ASW frigate, that's $250MM apiece. And maybe we have to spend $9B apiece for the Columbias, but instead of spending roughly the same amount for SSGNs based on Columba, suppose we spend about $5B for SSGNs based on the perfectly good and tested Ohio plans, that's another $4B apiece, or alternatively building about twice as many.
If we go with those and other cheaper alternatives, we can cut the cost/ship in half, to about $1.4B. Now that $21B buys us 15 ships a year (or we could spend part of the savings on weapons). Let's assume 15, now a 20-year average life builds and maintains a 300-ship fleet, a 30-year average life gives us 450, and a 40-year life gives us 600. Or we have considerable wiggle room to cut back on those numbers a bit, still have a dominant fleet, and give those ships the weapons they need to compete in a peer war.