The
lead ship will cost $1.281 billion, with $795 million of that covering the
shipbuilder’s detail design and construction costs and the rest covering the
GFE, including the combat systems, radar, launchers, command and control
systems, decoys and more. (1)
 |
| Fincantieri Frigate |
Let’s take a look at some aspects of the Navy’s new frigate.
Selection Assessment. Setting aside the fact that the Navy doesn’t
need a frigate, I’ve got to admit to being surprised by the Navy’s choice. I was 100% sure that the Navy would select
the Freedom class LCS as the new frigate until, of course, they dropped out of
the competition. My ranking of the
remaining contenders was:
- Fincantieri FREMM
- Huntington Ingalls
- Navantia F-100
- Austal LCS
Lo and behold, the Navy made the best choice! How often do I get to say that?
Now, recognize that the selection of the Fincantieri ship
does not necessarily constitute a good selection, just the best of what was
offered. To put it in perspective, the
Austal LCS was a joke which was why I rated it last. The Navantia F-100 had serious design flaws
as graphically demonstrated in the sinking of the Norwegian frigate from what
should have been minor and recoverable damage.
The Huntington Ingalls ship was an unknown with almost no publicly
released information and the underlying ship was likely the National Security
Cutter which is not a warship, per se, and is a bit small for the frigate the
Navy envisions. That left only the
Fincantieri offering so, by default, it got my top ranking. Whether it’s actually a good design is
unknown. It may simply be the best of
the worst.
Cost. Let’s firmly keep in mind that the GFE
portion of this program is extensive and expensive. Publicly released contract figures are NOT
the total construction cost even though the Navy will attempt to portray it
that way. Let’s also acknowledge that no
Navy shipbuilding program has come in on time/cost in recent history so the
claimed costs are going to increase, without a doubt.
That said, the choice of an existing hull and equipment
should, theoretically, limit the extent of cost growth. The hull and components are known quantities
with existing, open production lines and proven performance. If ever there was an opportunity for a Navy
shipbuilding program to meet its cost goals, this is it. A significant failure, here, would be most
disheartening.
ASW. The Navy doesn’t see it this way but the main
purpose/function of the frigate ought to be ASW. What concerns me in the ASW role is that the
ship appears not to be designed for ASW but, rather, follows a modular
construction scheme with some ASW equipment as an option. As evidence, the FREMM frigates are offered
and have been sold as user selectable general purpose, ASW, and anti-air
versions. This implies that the hull is
generalized for any role rather than optimized for one. As we’ve extensively discussed, no
generalized asset is as good as an optimized one and ASW is one role where
exquisite optimization is demanded. The
alternative is a resting place on the bottom of the sea. I’ve seen no discussion of specialized
quieting of the ship’s equipment, specialized shaping of the hull to decrease
the acoustic signature, installation of a Prairie/Masker type system, selection
of propulsion equipment specialized for quiet operation, etc.
The ship will, apparently, operate a single helo. For an ASW frigate, this is a significant
limitation. As the saying goes, if you
have one helo, you have none.
The ship has no close in RBU-type anti-torpedo and
anti-submarine system – again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate.
Oddly, the ship will not support the Vertical Launch ASROC
anti-submarine torpedo (VL-ASROC).(2)
This is listed as a future capability but we all know that future
capabilities are rarely implemented.
Again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate.
It is also interesting to note that the Navy capabilities
graphic does not specify a hull mounted sonar although it does include a
multi-function towed array and a variable depth sonar (CAPTAS).
Finally, the cost, at what is likely to be well over $1B per
ship, is too much for an ASW frigate
that is going to be exposed to one of the most dangerous tasks in naval
warfare.
In the ASW role, the ship appears to be significantly less
than optimized.
Strike. At the moment, it is unknown whether the VLS
will be the strike length cells. If not,
the ship will have no Tomahawk capability.
Interestingly, the Navy’s capabilities graphic does not specify Tomahawk
cruise missile capability. The only
offensive weapon of note is the Over-The-Horizon missile which is the Naval
Strike Missile.
Gun. The continued selection of the small caliber
57 mm gun, especially after it was rejected by the Zumwalt program in favor of
the smaller 30 mm gun, is absolutely baffling.
If not a 5” gun, there are very good 76 mm guns available. The Mk110 57 mm gun is decidedly non-lethal
and has encountered persistent problems in use with the LCS.
SEWIP. The SEWIP upgrade to the venerable and now
obsolete SLQ-32 electronic warfare system is most welcome. Currently, only the SEWIP Block II is
specified but there are indications that a scaled down version of the Blk III
may be planned although, again, future improvements are, historically,
unlikely.
Stealth. The Fincantieri design appears decidedly mediocre in terms of stealth when compared to ships like the Visby and others that have clearly made a determined effort to embrace stealth. The Fincantieri ship does have slanted sides but, beyond that, there is little effort at stealth. The ship is covered with exposed equipment, masts, sensors, radars, and hull and deck fittings. Even the slanted sides are only slightly slanted and would appear nearly vertical from an aircraft radar.
Stealth. The Fincantieri design appears decidedly mediocre in terms of stealth when compared to ships like the Visby and others that have clearly made a determined effort to embrace stealth. The Fincantieri ship does have slanted sides but, beyond that, there is little effort at stealth. The ship is covered with exposed equipment, masts, sensors, radars, and hull and deck fittings. Even the slanted sides are only slightly slanted and would appear nearly vertical from an aircraft radar.
Summary. While there is no need for a generalized,
mini-Burke frigate in the US Navy, at least the Navy made the best choice of
what appeared to be a poor stable of contenders. The Fincantieri FREMM frigate represents a
proven design, assuming it’s not too heavily modified for the US Navy, which,
one hopes, will at least offer trouble free basic performance.
As a mini-Burke, the design appears solid and somewhat useful, if not
outstanding, with specified equipment that already exists and has largely been
debugged. All that remains is to
integrate the various components.
I still can't help but wish the Navy had put the money it will spend on this mini-Burke towards dedicated ASW corvettes, MCM ships, logistic support ships, etc.
I still can't help but wish the Navy had put the money it will spend on this mini-Burke towards dedicated ASW corvettes, MCM ships, logistic support ships, etc.
(1)USNI News website, “Fincantieri Wins $795M Contract for
Navy Frigate Program”, Megan Eckstein, 30-Apr-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/04/30/fincantieri-wins-795m-contract-for-navy-frigate-program
(2)The Drive website, “The Navy’s Future Frigates Are
Shaping Up To Be More Lethal And Capable, As Well As Cheaper”, Joseph
Trevithick, 29-Jan-2020,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26217/the-navys-future-frigates-are-shaping-up-to-be-more-lethal-and-capable-as-well-as-cheaper
Agree with above, but if they were going for a large frigate should have gone for the UK type 26 as Australia and Canada did.
ReplyDeleteAs a reminder, the Navy limited designs to existing, operational designs in an attempt to minimize the problems that have plagued recent ship programs.
DeleteAlso, why would the Navy want a ship nearly as big and expensive as a Burke but with less armament? We already have Burkes, we don't need more near-Burkes!
Presumably because the T26 hull, propulsion and sonar outfit is optimised for ASW? There is a decent article on the implications of the drive system here:
Deletehttps://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/powering-the-stealthy-submarine-hunter-type-t26-frigate-propulsion-system-in-focus/
Drifting along in diesel electric drive it should be pretty quiet.
Along with it's inbuilt active/ passive type 2087 VDS,SSTL decoy system and large aviation facilities it builds upon the T23 Frigates which are generally held to be very quiet ships already.
To call the T26 a nearly Burke is slightly unfair. The Burke as I understand it was a top tier AAW combatant that's been progressively multi tasked.
The T26, unlike FREMM and the Burke is clearly built as an ASW platform first and foremost. About the only thing it doesn't have, or at least something not in the public domain is any type of Prairie Masker system, then again that's something no Royal Navy design has gone in for despite that service's usually close following of USN doctrine.
You might want to check out this post on the Type 26:
DeleteType 26
Yeah, and in terms of it's armament mix, the T26 is never going to match the Burke, certainly in terms of it's AAW fitout. Then again, the RN doctrine seems to be still towards single purpose ships, by and large.so the T26 gets you 48 dedicated Sea Ceptor cells for point and local area defence and 24 mk41 cells. The RN probably isn't looking to, or could afford to saturate a land target with dozens of tomahawk missiles, so actually those 24 cells are likely to have ASROC if and when that navy acquires those.
DeleteIt should be noted though, that the size of the ship and the Canadian and Australian fit outs with more mk41 cells indicate that you could get far closer to the Burke readout if you wanted to, and wished to fit the ship out that way.
Where the money got spent is on the quietening of the ship, the drive system is designed to spool down the gas turbine at low speeds, removing both the Tubine, and critically the noise of the Gearbox at the speeds the ship will be sub hunting at.at that point it's running AIMs directly on the shaft line powered by 4 diesels doubly isolated from the hull (two of which are mounted above the waterline). The motors, according to GE have been extensively modelled to remove any harmonics and acoustic conduction paths.
They also went with a large fixed pitch propeller to remove the pumps and hydraulics associated with a variable pitch system as well as optimising the blade diameter for low cavitation at the speeds it's likely to be sub hunting at.
So from a hull outfit point of view you'd be buying something that has been extensively optimised for quiet running at low speeds.
The electronics and sensor fit is obviously something you could alter. The RN fit is for the typec2087 VDS passive/active array and the new type 2150 Bow sonar. So you know it has space for those.
In terms of aviation facilities, it can only carry one Merlin, but then the Merlin is a big machine, it has a lot of onboard data processing capability and Carrie's sonobouys, torpedoes and a dipping sonar. It also has a big space for modular mission bays and you could probably modify that to make the hanger spacious for two helos (one of the touted modules for this space is facilities for ASW UAVs)
I get that the price per unit in RN service is significant. Presumably scale of economies would lessen that in USN service.
I guess basically what I'm trying to say is that if you want an ASW frigate, from the point of view of the hull/drive outfit you'd struggle to do better than the T26 currently.
As the UK "City" class it has no where near the flexibility or load out of a Burke, however some of that is a choice made by the British. Imagine replacing the 48 Sea Ceptor Cells with Mk.41s, a US Sonar sensor outfit. Two US Helos instead of a single Merlin.
It's a very quiet, spacious vessel. How close it comes to emulating the Burke after that is a choice of the operating service.
My understanding is that one of the options for the variable mission bay includes the ability to carry 2x Merlins.
Deletehttps://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/the-type-26-frigate-mission-bay-part-2-configuration-and-contents/
How accurate that information is I don't know.
"My understanding is that one of the options for the variable mission bay includes the ability to carry 2x Merlins."
DeleteFascinating article. Thanks for the link. Looking at the footprint drawings, my first reaction was that they are not practical. While the footprints may fit, they would leave very little (none?) space for people to get around the equipment, perform maintenance, etc.
It's more true to say that it can ferry an extra helicopter. Not operate two helicopters.
DeleteI've pounded on it a few times (like you), training. If you have more functions than you can effectively train for, those extra functions are at best useless. Worse, you might actually think you can do something just because you have the equipment. The training issue is an even bigger problem than the cost.
ReplyDeleteTruth!
DeleteBaby steps CNO, this is the first new ship without magic transformational systems. A new ship that actually works would be quite the novelty to todays' Navy.
ReplyDeleteSo a baby Burke. I little disappointed about the mast and its last gen non stealth setup. But if the FF will not be ASW effective does the mean the navy will may tap somebody to build a Visby variant for that purpose. Doubtful but it would be useful.
ReplyDeleteI miss the Knox class. They weren't all that and a bag of chips but they were (relatively) cheap and did their one job pretty well.
ReplyDeleteWas on a Knox, great ship. Remember we pulled out of Sasebo once , tracked a russian sub with P-3 support all the way down to SCS where we handed off to another Knox so we could pull into Subic to refuel.
DeleteCould be worse you could be looking at a Type 31 a 6000 ton ship with a 57mm gun, 2 40mm guns and 12 sea ceptor vls (basically a SeaRam) that's it all for 80-90% of the cost per ship of a Type 26 (cost increases are fun.,
ReplyDeleteIt sounds like AAW is going to be its primary function?
ReplyDeleteThe only thing that makes sense is that the Navy sees AAW threats as primary and that there isn't much need for ASW.
Or, maybe, the Navy doesn't know what it's doing.
I honestly wonder if the Navy has just given up on surface ASW. The kindest thing I can think of is that they've discovered that submarines are just too good nowadays. My fear is that it is slow, unsexy, and doesn't give either the manufacturer or the local congress critter a nice whizbang ship that can create a ton of budget claims.
DeleteIt's like ASW and MW are becoming more like close air support for the air force.
General comments:
ReplyDeleteWhy is USN going for a mini Burke? Was that really a pressing need? Would prefer to have seen a smaller simpler radar suite and more emphasis on ASW.
Speaking of ASW, as I said before in other posts, it's being left to die: one helicopter and towed sonar is now considered ASW sufficient. Wonder how much time crew is going to bother training in ASW when it's obvious not a priority. We are in a world of hurt if an enemy has a half decent sub force.
As mentioned by just about everybody, we really needed a more generalist or ASW dedicated ship, not another AAW heavy ship.
The bright spot should be cost and time. There's no show stoppers here and nothing super fancy, if nothing else, USN should be able to execute this program close to on time and budget PLUS we finally will see if Euro designs are so much better than US designs. We keep hearing about it, we'll see if it's TRUE.
Slightly more upbeat on FREMM-US, ~7,400t ~500t larger than Italian variant, reflecting additional 300t steel added as required by NAVSEA to meet survivability standard after the Navy fiasco with non-survivability of the LCS.
ReplyDeleteThe original FREMM was an ASW frigate and reflected in HED propulsion system, CODLAG, upgraded to more powerful 4x 3MW diesel gensets, think silenced, driving thru shaft mounted motors not driven via noisy gears, understand motors DRS which more powerful than Jeumont motores on FREMM-IT, 6,000+nm range at 16/17 knots (a big improvement on a Burkes range) plus a LM2500 for max sprint speed, ~27 knots.
Would point out hanger can fit 2x SH-60s, the VDS partnering the MFTS TB-37 is the Raytheon SQS-62 not CAPTAS, the spec had the SVTT LWT launchers as an objective and guessing FREMM-US included as the FREMM-IT ship had the European equivalent. Whats positive as besides the SEWIP Blk II and possible SEWIP Blk III lite is the new SIGINT Spectral (replacing the SSEE Inc F), not seen much on Spectral.
FFG to largely operate in the ASW role and able operate independently in a contested environment with its AA defense capability, said the FFG brings not a high low mix fleet but a big small mix with the FFG in a cheaper package than the $2 billion DDG
ComNavOps,
ReplyDeleteAgain, I think it's a failure to establish a proper CONOPS before buying. All in all, I don't think it's a bad ship, probably my choice out of the options available. But exactly what is it to do.
The way I envision and escort squadron, I'd have four ship types:
1 Cruiser - This would be a bit of a jack of all trades, but it's a big enough ship to be a master of most. I'd go with a Des Moines hull, 8-inch triple mounts forward and aft, for a secondary NGFS mission, a large VLS suite (perhaps 192 cells) with AEGIS or whatever the most advanced version is, and a large area devoted to various unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles. Use the model for the flight deck cruiser floated in WWII, but upsize it to DesMoines size so you have room for the 8-inch turrets, the AAW suite, and the unmanned vehicle area. I would give it a sonar for independent operations, but it would not be a primary ASW vehicle. It could take care of itself enough to operate independently, such as for fire support missions, but its main role in squadron would be as the AAW leader.
2 Destroyers - These would be primarily AAW ships. They could function as squadron AAW leader if the cruiser were disabled or sent elsewhere. A Burke would work well for these.
3 Escorts - These would be the mini-Burkes. They would be optimized for SUW and ASW, with a minimal AAW suite. That's a bit different from this version of FREMM, but but this version could be adapted easily enough.
4 ASW Frigates - These would be exclusively ASW ships, with SUW and AAW self-protection weapons. They could be detached for convoy screening, along with a class of ASW corvettes.
That would be the escort squadron, 10 ships, possibly less 1-2 ASW frigates detached for convoy duty.
Reading your post, makes me wonder: Is new FFX down the road going to replace early flights of Burkes? Why are we buying mini Burkes that we are adding to already heavy AAW DDG component escort duty of carriers or convoys? It makes me wonder if this isnt some back door way of getting rid of early Burkes which are getting old....
DeleteWell, the Navy has already stated that they will be replacing some of the Burkes with the medium and large displacement unmanned vessels.
DeleteThe quiet FFG HED propulsion architecture is essential with less moving parts/gears for ASW at the lower speeds, 10 to 15 knots for deploying the VDS and MFTAS, you need to carefully adjust speed at the lower speed levels for ASW whereas Burkes high speed GTs needing noisy gears and don't operate efficiently at low speed/rpm, Burke's GTs hard to manage at low speed and so need to control speed by constant adjusting of the CPP which create more noise.
DeleteBurkes have other higher priority missions, air defense, BMD, surface attack and as C & C platform for surface action groups.
"Well, the Navy has already stated that they will be replacing some of the Burkes with the medium and large displacement unmanned vessels"
DeleteAnd as you've pointed out consistently, that's an absurd mistake. You can use unmanned vehicles to supplement and complement the skill sets of manned ships. But replacing a major combatant with an unmanned vehicle is nuts.
I know where the Navy is going. Do everything possible to reduce manpower requirements, whether it makes combat sense or not. But there are other ways to solve the problem. Here is a breakdown of Navy and Marine personnel per the CBO Military Force Structure Primer at
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51535
Combat: Active 210,000, Reserve 34,000, Total 244,000
Combat Support: Active 93,000, Reserve 25,000, Total 118,000
Admin/Overhead: Active 202,000, Reserve 38,000, Total 240,000
Totals: Active 505,000, Reserve 97,000, Total 602,000
This includes both Navy and Marines and the split is something like:
Navy: Active 325,000, Reserve 60,000, Total 385,000
Marines: Active 180,000, Reserve 37,000, Total 217,000
I've got an idea. Let's cut the Admin/Overhead active component in half, and split the numbers 1/3 to Combat, 1/6 to Combat Support, and 1/2 to net reduction in numbers. Then let's double the reserve components. You end up with:
Combat: Active 244,000, Reserve 68,000, Total 312,000
Combat Support: Active 110,000, Reserve 50,000, Total 160,000
Admin/Overhead: Active 101,000, Reserve 76,000, Total 177,000
Totals: Active 455,000, Reserve 194,000, Total 649,000
Since this includes both Navy and Marines, the split could be something like:
Navy: Active 305,000, Reserve 110,000, Total 415,000
Marines: Active 150,000, Reserve 84,000, Total 234,000
In total, we've identified 34,000 more Combat and 17,000 more Combat Support personnel. Assume the Navy/Marine split is 20,000/14,000 Combat and 10,000/7,000 Combat Support, I think we’ve found 20,000 more sailors that the Navy can use, and another 5 MEUs (using my redesigned MEU) worth of Marines, with an overall active duty force reduction. In Navy terms, that 20,000 more sailors is enough for 50 more cruisers at 400 each, or 67 more Burkes at 300 each, or 100 more escorts at 200 each, or 135 more frigates at 150 each, or whatever combination strikes your fancy.
What we give up is the excess admirals and staffs that ComNavOps has noted, and a significant reduction in the number of folks driving LMDs (more large metal desks) around the Pentagon. I understand we now have more of the latter than it took to win WWII.
As for the increase in reserves, we pay reservists 60 days a year, versus 365 for active duty. That would suggest that a reservist costs 1/6 what an active duty guy costs, but in reality some admin costs eat into those savings and it's probably about 1/4. So the current model calls for 505,000 active duty headcount and 97,000 reserves (equivalent to 24,250 full time equivalents, FTEs), or about 529,250 FTEs. The revised model calls for 455,000 active and 194,000 reserves (48,500 FTE) or a total of 503,500 FTE’s. That’s a 5% reduction in personnel cost, with a 15% increase in active duty Combat and Combat Support personnel, and an 8% increase in potential end strength.
Look at it another way, the consulting firm McKinsey did what they called a “tooth to tail” analysis of OECD (developed countries) military expenditures. The average OECD country spends 24% of its military budget on Combat, 13% on Combat Support, and 63% on Admin/Other. That’s bad enough, but for the USA it’s 14% Combat, 9% Combat Support, and 77% Admin/Other. Out of a $700B defense budget, that’s $98B for combat, $63B for combat support, and $539B for Admin/Other. We can’t live with that from a budget standpoint.
Of course, there is a simple reason why nothing like this will ever occur. If any cuts are mandated, it’s those bloated admin types who decide where to cut, and they aren’t going to get rid of their gravy train.
This is so true it's sickening. Imagine the combat power they could wield, assuming they could fix the ships and keep them going, if they didn't have so much non-fighting bloat?
DeleteIf they can truly keep the FFG(X) price art 1/2 a Burke and something close to similar on Operationa and maintenance this is probably a big win. Especially if they start bidding these out in flights 10/20 at a time. Those NSMs could easily by LRASM or ADL launchers and the gun could be a Mk 45. I see lots of deck space left that could mount a laser. Now if LUSV sticks to budget they will get 3 of those for each FFG(X) and actually have a distributed, durable surface fleet again. Even if they go manned corvette instead of LUSV thye should be able to make a 2:1 ratio.
ReplyDeleteAlso, the constant on line love affair with the Des Moines class scares me a lot. It's the sure way to burnt cash and no numbers. We built 3 of them. When you look at surface ships bigger we have only the Alaska's and contemporary battleships. When you go down a bit we got 20 hulls the size of the Baltimore/Oregon/Worcester/Northamptons. Then 40 Cleveland size. Post War the cruiser numbers got under 20 by 49 and stayed below that until the Vietnam ramp up in 64. By the time you come out of that you have most actual cruiser retiring and the numbers blending with the DLs. Their is a guidepost and a warning here and we have the Zumwalt's even as a fresh reminder. I think the large combatant should grow larger and maintain an AAW focus and probably be an even smaller part of the fleet. There is a tipping point though. You better have something that can get delivered at a qty of at least 1 per year from 1 yard. Keep all the work fresh in the workers minds to benefit from production experience. The carrier gaps are going to get so far apart that will become a problem. Let alone the need to design new classes inside of the engineering work force's living memory.
" the constant on line love affair with the Des Moines class scares me a lot."
DeleteYou know what scares me far more? The love affair with small, unmanned vessels as replacements for Burkes. The love affair with data and networks as a substitute for firepower. The love affair with fictional, magic, secret island bases. The love affair …
The Des Moines at least offers some serious firepower. You remember firepower, right? The stuff that actually destroys the enemy? Too many people have forgotten that.
When all you have is light infantry and an enemy armored division is approaching, it doesn't matter that you know the serial number of every enemy tank - they're still going to roll right over you because you don't have the firepower to stop them.
Nico, think you could be correct. What will be the difference in crew sizes between the two?
ReplyDeleteBurke about 300 and Italian FREEM about 130 so it's about half. It's a significant difference and long term cost consideration that USN been talking about for years.
DeleteHmm, other information says Italian FREEM crews 160 with possibility of going to 200. Living space seems very generous with numerous references to "4 to 5 star hotel accommodations".
DeleteMy understanding is that FREMM was designed with ASW in mind, so fairly quiet, and that played a role in choosing her.
ReplyDeleteRead where the Mk 41 vls can accept ASROC. The proposed ship does not have a bow mounted sonar but a VDS system.
DeleteThe ship is supposed to have silencing at 16 knots due to a diesel electric drive system, They had a model of the ship at the last SNA conference
"Read where the Mk 41 vls can accept ASROC."
DeleteIn a general sense, you're correct. However, the Mk41 VLS comes in three different sizes (vertical heights) and the Vertical Launch ASROC (VL-ASROC) requires the strike length VLS, I believe. It is unknown but I think the frigate is going to receive the shorter tactical length VLS and will not be VL-ASROC capable, therefore. Detailed specifications have not yet been published so I may be wrong about this but VL-ASROC was listed as a future capability which implies that it will not be an initial capability. Of course, it could also be a software combat system integration issue, as well.
VL-ASROC is tactical length. See the pdf on this page. https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/adaptable-deck-launcher
DeleteThanks for the link. Read where BAE was also trying to get the Navy interested in the adaptable deck launcher. The article alludes to using this for ASW missiles ( Aka ASROC)
Delete"VL-ASROC is tactical length."
DeleteIt appears you're correct. Thanks for the correction. Must be a software integration issue then, that makes it a future capability.
Last year a final RFP was drafted where a planned vertical launch ASW weapon was desired.
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2019/06/20/navy-issues-final-rfp-for-ffgx-next-generation-frigate
"Last year a final RFP was drafted where a planned vertical launch ASW weapon was desired."
DeleteIf you look in the ASW box, it says 'future'.
You are correct. I looked further down the ASW box and it mentioned ship board torpedo launch. (obj) Not sure if this means beyond the mk 41 VLS.
Delete"ship board torpedo launch. (obj) Not sure if this means beyond the mk 41 VLS."
DeleteThe SVTT (Surface Vessel Torpedo Tube) refers to the standard lightweight Mk32 triple torpedo tube launcher commonly seen on US ships. VL-ASROC is a different weapon system.
FREEM is a frigate? Consider the comparison.
ReplyDeleteBurke - L 509, B 59, Dis 9,700, Dr 31
Adams - L437, B 47, Disp 4,500, Dr 20
FREEM - L 496, B 65, Dis 7,500, Dr 26
Perry - L 453, B 45, Dis 4,100, Dr 22
LCS 1 - L 387, B57, Dis 3,450
LCS 2 - L 421, B 103, Dis 3,200
New US FREEM sure looks like a destroyer to me. But with only a 57 mm main gun? Seems like ASW suite is light, if that is primary mission.
Perhaps it should be called a DE? Ir us ut really a DDG light?
I don't know why they went with the 57mm gun. The French FREMM has a 76mm, and the Italian FREMM has 2 76mm. I kind of like the French or Italian FREMM better than the one we are getting.
DeleteI wonder if the 57mm is a result of 32 VLS cells rather than 16 cells like the Italian and French designs or stupidity. It really could be either. I'm favoring stupidity. The Mk110 has significant performance issues and was replaced on the DDG1000 because of them. They could recycle all the 57mm guns from the LCS's before they sink them but not likely.
DeleteOTO Melara needs to really up the amount of money they spend taking admirals out to lunch so we can get some better guns on the ships.
If it's space, I would think they could move the front of the bridge back 10 feet and live with less space somewhere. A 57mm on a ship this size makes even less sense than on the LCSs. And the Italians were able to go up to a 127mm gun with 16 VLS cells, so I can't imagine that 32 VLS cells would be that big a problem. And the Italians had 2 76mm, one forward and one on top of the hangar aft. So maybe you put a 57mm on top of the hangar and either a 76mm or 127mm forward, and you adjust the bridge and superstructure to accommodate.
DeleteI rather liked the Italian double gun set up. Sad to see it go for a fairly pointless gun.
DeleteI really like the French and Italian designs for handling lines on the bow. All of the line handling appears to be done below the weather deck. It makes for a very clean and slightly raised bow compared to the US FREMM design.
DeleteThe 5 more recent Italian FREMM have a single 127mm gun, like the first One CARLO Bergamini, being all General Purpose version.The other 4 ASW have a couple of 76mm.I cannot find a reason do use a 57mm gun on a Frigate.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, the question that needs asking is for the duties and missions a frigate is typically expected to undertake, how relevant is the gun to those missions?
DeleteIn a most navies, certainly in most European navies, Frigates are the primary surfaces vessels.
DeleteThey are expected to also fill roles like NGFS. Hence the two 76mms on the ASW FREMMs and the 127mm gun on the general purpose ships.
The question is whether the same would be expected of the FFG(x).
I would question why you would limit a ship by giving it such a small calibre gun, when the trade off to up-gun the ship with something a little more powerful like a 76mm is likely so low.
I think the FFG(X) will morph into an Arleigh Burke replacement. The frigate with just good enough weapons load with morph into a destroyer with increased numbers of VLS cells and weapons load equivalent to the Burke's. If they can man with 160 to 200 sailors the current orders for flight III Burke destroyers will be the last, especially if Bath Iron works or HHI start building the second batch of frigates and can offer a new destroyer on a hot production line. A new destroyer based on the "proven" hull of the FFG(X) will take the Burke's place.
ReplyDeleteI have the theory the Fremm are our new destroyers and the Flight III Burkes are the new Cruisers replacing the Tico's
DeleteSounds about right to me!
DeleteI am very glad they did not go with the Navantia offering. Aside from the Helge Instad, a Navantia-built OPV sank after colliding with a civilian ship recently.
ReplyDeletehttps://navalnews.net/venezuelan-opv-sinks-after-colliding-with-a-cruise-ship/
Two Navantia-built ships have collided with other ships in recent years, and both sank, while the Burkes at least stayed afloat.
The Navantia design also caused a lot of problems for the RAN.
DeleteThe Hobart class faced significant issues during production due to bad design and blueprint drawing s provided by Navantia and sub-standard welding int he Navantia yards.
The ships required extensive modifications to meet the standard expected by the RAN, including massive amounts of re-welding, and having to essentially redesign the compartmentalisation of the frigate. As designed the bulkheads weren't watertight, which is staggering really.
There are still concerns within the RAN about the ships survivability, and it's the reason that only 3 frigates were built instead of the original 4 that were optioned.
It's also one of the reasons the RAN went with the Type 26 for the next batch of frigates being produced.
Something to consider with the EASR and Aegis Baseline 10 as the combat system - I've always speculated that the Navy was going to fold FFGX into a desron to push the picket further. You have it out, radiation, being the first line of detection, using CEC to guide defensive missiles fired over the horizon by the DDGs (or using its own ESSMs as interceptors).
ReplyDeleteAn actively radiating ship is still going to increase the risk of eating a missile, but better a to trade a frigate before you have to trade a DDG.
On one hand, an AAW-spec radar and combat system might be overkill for a frigate . On the other hand, from a training and operational perspective, I can see the benefits of consolidating radar and software types; it reduces retraining, and lets the operators and maintainers build experience and proficiency in the system. A guy who spends 6 years working on the same radar damn well better be more proficient than the guy who spent 3 years each working 2 different radars.
And then there's the other concern that as naval threats start increasing at sea, a sophisticated AESA radar may well be the price for entry if you want to play in the big leagues. Certainly China is working very hard on getting AESA radars throughout their fleet.
If the US is to build an ASW ship, this ship could be a good basis for it, given it's electric drive, and some sound reduction design. Using the details in previous entries in this blog, costs can be reduced by using cheaper sensors, like Sea Giraffe , for above the water, add on board torpedoes, put 2 helos in the hanger again, and even remove the 57mm gun and put a 30mm gun fore and aft instead.
ReplyDeleteWhile this is not the small cheap in high numbers version CNO has discussed, given the USN has a certain mindset, this is an opportunity for using something already meant to be cheaper, and has both long range (for independent action, long endurance sub hunting, should it be alone) and has some quietness built into it.
I mean, if they really do get the FFGX at $800-900m, then by removing the expensive software and sensors, surely another $100-200m can be lopped off, given us what the LCS was meant to be, a $600m ASW vessel. Now they can go ahead and build 30 of them.
Again, this is imho
Andrew
"some sound reduction design."
DeleteA truly effective and optimized ASW vessel needs every component to be optimized for minimal acoustic transmission from the very start. The hull shape needs to be optimized for minimal acoustic generation and minimal turbulence. All machinery needs to be acoustically isolated from the hull. Every piece of equipment needs to be as inherently quiet as possible. And so on. I don't know if all this is part of the FREMM frigate or not. I've read vague statements about 'sound reduction' but that can mean anything. I strongly suspect that a ship that was designed as a general purpose frigate with equipment options to be able to call it ASW or AAW or whatever, probably is not a ship that has been optimized for ASW and acoustic minimization. Undoubtedly, some acoustic measures have been taken but I would be very surprised if the ship was truly ASW optimized.
If I'm right, we're going to be sending a billion+ dollar ship to play tag with submarines who have all the inherent advantages. That does not seem wise.
CNO,
Delete"If I'm right, we're going to be sending a billion+ dollar ship to play tag with submarines who have all the inherent advantages. That does not seem wise."
Totally correct, and I agree.
But given the USN is not going to build a asw ship, and a factor of asw ships are large numbers, which is governed by cost, the FFGX is the only option available which can provide larger numbers and long legs at this time.
It is not the wisest option, but the only option available, unless their going to turn each amphibious assault ship into a help carrier for anti sub missions.
Andrew
Thx to AndyM, looking at the BAE ADL site mentioned and the weights shown for their canisters and with missiles what is striking is how much heavier is the LRASM, 240% mass of the NSM, partly due to its length requiring heavier strike length canister whereas shorter NSM can fit in the tactical length canister.
ReplyDeleteFigures for the FFG with sixteen deck launchers for the NSM, and you can see the effect that would have the ship stability at weapon deck height.
Missile Cannister
LRASM 3,320 lbs + 2,880 = 6,230x16=99,680 - 45.2 tonnes
Harpoon 1,520 lbs + 1,800 = 3,320x16=53,120 - 24.1 tonnes
NSM 900 lbs + 1,700 = 2,600x 16=41,600 - 18.9 tonnes
1. Fincantieri VP Goddard at the January SNA2020 on NavalNews day 2 video explicitly stated that their proposal submitted to Navy had sixteen deck launchers to meet the Navy objective capability, now contradicted by Fincantieri spec only showing eight.
2.Think low weight of NSM explains why both Harpoon and LRASM both withdrawn from OTH missile competition as Navy needed lowest possible weight for the very limited payload of the LCS ships and expect stability limitations of the Freedom class .
3. Recently seen info saying the 1,000 lb LRASM warhead only contains 240 lbs explosive, balance the titanium penetrator?, secondly range only ~200 nm due to its large and sohisticated seeker, which if surface launched would drop considerably, Congress has been pushing Navy to R&D a longer range Mk 2, so guessing the range of NSM similar to LRASM and much cheaper and maybe not much difference in warhead explosive content.
A concern for the FFG is why the long drawn out length of the Navy program, FOC sometime in early 30's, detail design starts now from contract award, construction latest April 2022, delivery 2026, IOC 2030, FOC early 30's?
Oh yes, weight was a big factor in NSM selection for OTH on LCS. The requirement was a system under 26,000 lb.
Delete"Recently seen info saying the 1,000 lb LRASM warhead only contains 240 lbs explosive, balance the titanium penetrator?,"
DeleteI have not seen that. Do you have a reference?
"The requirement was a system under 26,000 lb."
DeleteI have not seen that. Do you have a reference?
"Recently seen info saying the 1,000 lb LRASM warhead only contains 240 lbs explosive, balance the titanium penetrator?"
DeleteQuick Google, apologizes should have have checked before posting
AGM-158A JASSM warhead WDU-42/B 1000 lb class armor penetrating warhead with 240 lbs AFX-757 insesitive explosive.
AGM-158B JASSM-ER "with a 1,000-pound penetrator and blast-fragmentation warhead" Don't know if the same as the WDU-42/B.
LRASM AGM-158C based on the AGM-158B.
The JASSM 'warhead' is described as a 1000 lb penetrating warhead. I've come across a single statement, which is the one you quote, claiming that the 1000 lb warhead consists of 240 lb explosive. This suggests that the remaining 760 lbs of 'warhead' is actually a dense metal shell designed to penetrate hard targets. This is exactly in line with WWII battleship gun munitions which were 2000+ lb shells containing around 200 lbs explosive. As you know, the explosive effect of a weapon is not merely the weight of explosive but is related to the degree of containment of the blast.
DeleteThe JASSM-ER supposedly attained its greater range via more efficient motors and greater fuel fraction in the same size body. A great fuel fraction in the same size body can ONLY come from reducing the volume of some other component and the statements I've read suggest that the JASSM-ER warhead was reduced to allow for the larger fuel storage. Whether the warhead reduction was from the explosive, the non-explosive penetrating shell, or both is unknown.
How any of this translated to the LRASM, if at all, is, again, unknown.
Information on all this is sketchy, to say the least!
Still hunting. I jot a lot of these tid bits down on google spreadsheets as I go. Pretty sure it was the RFI or RFP.
DeleteThe Air Force moved on from the AGM-158A JASSM with range of ~230 miles to the ~575 range AGM-158B JASSM-ER on which LRASM AGM-158C is based. DARPA chose the AGM-158B as the missile to fit the DARPA funded BAE highly sophisticated passive and expensive seeker. My reading of the tea leaves is that the seeker takes up substantial volume and reduces fuel capacity so why range of LRASM is said to be only ~200+ miles, mention of version 1.1 to update and extend range.
DeleteThe seeker cost, ~$2.5 million? reflected in price of the LRASM AGM-158C at $3.5 million each (Air Force $167 million contract for 48 LRASMs April 7) vs the AGM-158B at $1 million each (Air Force $818 million contract for 790 JASSM-ER April 1).
"The Fincantieri design appears decidedly mediocre in terms of stealth when compared to ships like the Visby and others that have clearly made a determined effort to embrace stealth."
ReplyDeleteThe difference is that the Visby-class was designed from the start to be stealthly, not so with the Fincantieri design. Since the Navy was seeking an existing design their options were limited from the outset. And, judging from the other options, I doubt stealth was high on the priority list.
One other thing that maybe considered why NSM was chosen it's simply the cheapest at 900,000 per missile Harpoon comes in at 1.5 per shot and LRASM is last dont have a price for it though so LRASM is the heaviest longest range and most expensive of all 3 not saying it's a bad system from everything I have seen its excellent but probably just to much money and NSM is no slouch either possibly better in some areas in fact
ReplyDeleteLRASM is quoted as 3 million apiece in 2018 dollars per Wikimedia
DeleteCould someone explain why the modified FREMM that we are buying is better than just buying an off-the-shelf FREMM? We're going to end up paying twice as much for the ship, and waiting a long time, to get all these "improvements," but I don't see where there is any quantum improvement in capability to justify the action. I do see the advantage of 32 VLS cells versus 16, but the base FREMM had that as an option. Seems to me that getting a bunch of ships cheaper and faster, especially given the LCS debacle, is far more important than whatever "improvements" we are making.
ReplyDeleteAre there that many people in whatever command buys ships these days that need to justify their jobs?
My understanding a lot of the price jump is related to increased armour in areas plus less amenities etc that aren't included in the European versions
Delete"increased armour in areas"
DeleteDo you have any reference for that?
Admiral Hunt (retired) from Fincanteri described adding the 300 tons of steel to the ship to meet Navy standards
DeleteSee the link below.
Enhanced protection with that extra 300 tons of steel armor.
ReplyDelete"Enhanced protection with that extra 300 tons of steel armor."
DeleteDo you have a reference for that?
ComNavOps,
DeleteThis article describes ballistic protection etc. By adding 300 tons of steel to the design,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/05/fincantieris-fremm-frigate-design-bulks-up-for-the-us-ffgx-competition/
"This article describes ballistic protection etc. By adding 300 tons of steel to the design,"
DeleteWell, it kind of does describe SOME extra frag protection but not armor, per se. Here's the relevant quote:
“[The extra steel is] going into scantling, ballistic and frag protection, the way the spaces are laid out: We’re as compliant as a DDG. That’s a lot of steel. The compartmentation, the toughness of the ship, the U.S. requirements that are different from the European ships — we moved around some of that extra space; it gets classified very quickly.”
Scantlings, as the term is used here, refers to the dimensions of structural members from which I assume they mean that they've increased the dimensions of some structural members. The rest is self-explanatory.
So, it appears that the extra steel went into structure and, likely, some Kevlar frag protection for certain spaces which is fairly standard on US warships. There appears to be no actual added armor.
So the greatest economic, military, and industrial power on planet earth believes that it no longer has the ability to design a frigate. What a disgraceful situation in which to find ourselves.
ReplyDeleteSpecifically addressing the FREMM; too slow to be a fleet escort; too noisy and under equipped to be a decent ASW platform; too few guns to defend itself against a swarm attack; too lightly armed to provide useful fire support to an opposed landing; and doubtless lots more bad stuff that we don't yet know about. On the other hand, the crew accommodation in the Italian versions seems to be 5-star, and the three cappuccino stations will be a blessing during those long dark winter nights.
There is a photo of an "improved FREMM" at
ReplyDeletehttps://i.imgur.com/VloepRg.jpg
This has a 127mm (5-inch gun) and 32 VLS cells forward. It is probably pretty close to maxed out on topside weight, and still has only one helo. For the 300 tons of armor and improved bulkheading that the Navy wants to add (which I totally favor, even if it means losing one cappuccino shop), I'm wondering if you could trade off by replacing the 76mm (3-inch) gun on top of the helo hangar with a 57mm or a bolt-on SeaRAM or Phalanx, and using the room created by getting rid of the feed mechanism below to fit a second helo, or one hero and one UAV.
Load the VLS with 32 ESSM in 4-packs, 12 ASROC, and 12 with a mix of Standard and SSMs, and I think you'd have a pretty capable ship.
Like your ideas my load would consist of 20 Standard 16 ESSM and 8 Asroc VL remember they will have 8-16 cannister launchers for SSM
DeleteOne other thing. I kind of like the NATO APAR and SMART-L radar combination on the Dutch Zeven Provincien, German Sachsen, French/Italian Horizon, and Danish Huitfeldt classes. If the weight and physical separation issues could be worked out, I'd like to see a FREMM kitted out with them. I like having two radars in two different bands to complement each other and provide a bit of redundancy. Parts would add to the logistics chain, but I think the flexibility just might be worth it.
ReplyDeleteYou might want to read this post: Warship Design"
DeleteI've read the Warship Design post several times and generally agree.
ReplyDeleteOne thing that I worry about is if we try to put that APAR/SMART-L combination (or some similar US-only combination of TRS-3/4 and something like SMART-L) that may be too much AAW capability for a ship that is not our primary or secondary AAW platform (Ticos and Burkes fill those bills). On the other hand, I wonder if we are putting too many of our AAW eggs in the SPY/AEGIS basket. We know the SPY panels are touchy and somewhat fragile. Or what happens if the bad guys figure out how to jam it or fool it? The Argies did that with the Brit Type 42s, which were supposed to be their premier AAW destroyers, and put two of them on the bottom with air attacks.
One thing I like about the APAR/SMART-L combination is that they operate in two different bands, which theoretically should make jamming harder. But I don't know if you can actually do fire control off the SMART-L, like you can off the SPY/AEGIS/APAR. I would guess that if a missile has terminal homing, all you have to do is get in the neighborhood, but anti-air weapons have come a long way since I last fooled with them in the 1970s.
I see an escort squadron as consisting of 10 ships in 4 types, with the possibility of moving ships in and out, but this would be the notional organization:
1 Cruiser (somewhat comparable to ComNavOps’s Independent Cruiser, but with differences) bigger than a Tico, maybe Des Moines size, 8-inch twin/triple mounts fore and aft, 128 VLS cells, 64 forward and 64 aft, with a midsection devoted to helos plus unmanned air, surface, and subsurface vehicles, SPY/AEGIS or similar AAW sensors, with defensive ASW and ASuW sensors and weapons for independent operation. It would look something like the pre-WWII proposed flight deck cruiser (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_deck_cruiser) only bigger. Big enough to handle multiple missions--primary AAW leader for escort squadron, secondary NGFS for amphibious landings, and extensive unmanned vehicle platform for scouting/other.
2 Destroyers (similar to ComNavOps’s AAW Escort) primary mission AAW in support of cruiser or able to take over as AAW leader when cruiser is absent; 64 VLS cells, SPY/AEGIS, defensive ASW and ASuW sensors and weapons; could be Burkes or Burke replacement
3 Escorts (similar to ComNavOps’s Destroyer) primary missions ASuW and ASW; defensive AAW; 32 VLS cells; TRS-3D/4D, maybe in combo with SMART-L or something similar; this could be a FREMM with a bit of an upgrade
4 Frigates (like ComNavOps's Destroyer Escort) one or two could be detached from each squadron for convoy duty as needed, along with a separate class of ASW corvettes (similar to ComNavOps’s ASW Corvette)
All ships would have some CIWS combination of SeaRAM and Phalanx. Costwise, targets would be $4B for Cruiser, $2.8B for Destroyer, $1.2B for Escort, and $0.6B for Frigate, so a whole squadron would cost $15.6B to build. Obviously, we would take savings anywhere we can get them. Personnel targets would be 400 for Cruiser, 300 for Destroyer, 200 for Escort, and 150 for Frigate, so 2200 for squadron. Probably go with CODLAG or IEP for as many ships as possible for fuel economy and quiet running to avoid or hunt subs.
"too much AAW capability for a ship that is not our primary or secondary AAW platform"
DeleteFrom what little I know about APAR it is intended to be a functional equivalent to Aegis/SPY-x. As such, it is vast overkill for a frigate's role. I don't know the cost but vast overkill usually implies vast cost.
For a frigate that mounts only ESSM short/med range AAW missiles and will only engage in horizon range (15-20 mile) engagements, a simple TRS-3D/4D is more than sufficient and, likely, costs far less.
I would also give a strong nod to whatever system can actually be maintained by only mildly trained personnel. Aegis has proven that it is not maintainable even by highly trained US Navy personnel. It requires manufacturer's tech reps to achieve spec'ed performance.
I don't about the SMART-L capabilities.
"I see an escort squadron as consisting of 10 ships"
I've got a post coming that's going to open your eyes!
"I've got a post coming that's going to open your eyes!"
DeleteI'm sure you probably do. I'm guessing you want more than 10. I don't know that 10 is the right number, but I know two things:
1) We can build those ships, and
2) 10 makes a lot more sense than 3 or 4, which we are going with today (if that many).
So my response would be that you're probably right, but 10 is at least a step in the right direction. And nothing says you couldn't add in ships from another squadron, or even assign a second squadron.
Just to clarify, I wasn't talking about putting the APAR/SMART-L on the ASW frigates. Where I would consider the combo is the mini-Burkes. On the con side, I'm not really thinking of them as a primary AAW platform, that's the cruiser and the Burke, so that may be overkill. On the pro side, I'd like to have some AAW capability other than AEGIS, given the problems that system has had, and in the configuration I'm looking at, the mini-Burke may be the place that makes the most sense. You'd probably have to rearrange the stack/2nd mast layout along lines of the Zeven Provinciens in order to get enough separation between the APAR and the SMART-L to avoid interference (just guessing, that's for people who know more about it than I do to figure out). And you'd have some top weight issues to deal with as well. Replacing the 76mm on top of the hangar with something lighter (57mm? SeaRAM? Phalanx?) would help and also probably free up room for a 2nd helo in the hangar. After that, you're probably looking at eliminating some superstructure, which unfortunately means fewer square feet for the cappuccino bars. Maybe you push the bridge a bit further back and put a couple of RBU-like launchers in between the VLS and the superstructure. Just kind of spitballing here, interested in other ideas.
Maybe the APAR/SMART-L or similar US combination belongs on the AAW Destroyer instead of the mini-Burke. Or maybe on the Cruiser, since it's a new ship and we are keeping a number of the Burkes around for a while. I'm just not sure about trusting all our AAW to a system that's hell when it's well, but often sick. Then again, considering that it's been around going on 30 years, and its best known kill is an Iranian Airbus, I'm not sure how much hell it is when it's well.
DeleteI'd like to have something else with which to take another look at the air picture. I go back to the Falklands, where the Brits' super duper area air defense Type 42 destroyers had a 965 radar that had trouble picking out low flying aircraft from ground clutter, so the sent them out with Type 22 frigates (the so-called "Type 64"), whose point defense 967/968 radars covered that hole, but they still lost one before and one after they started doing that. I would guess that AEGIS similarly has a hole somewhere, and complementing it with something that covered that hole (not sure if APAR/SMART-L does, to be fair) just makes a lot of sense to me. One concern, given the Navy's passion for distributed data, I don't know how well APAR/SMART-L and AEGIS talk to each other, although I tend to wonder if any of that stuff actually works in a jamming environment.
One other manpower issue. We may laugh about the cappuccino bars, but those kinds of amenities may be what it takes to recruit in this generation. I'm reminded of the old British joke about a man who was conducting an All Service member briefing one day, and he posed the question: “What would you do if you found a scorpion in your tent?”
A RN Sailor said, “I’d step on it.”
A British Army Soldier said, “I’d hit it with my boot.”
A Royal Marine said, “I’d catch it, break the stinger off, and eat it.”
An RAF Airman said, “I’d call room service and find out why there’s a damn tent in my room.”
That's the competition, and we may have to meet it to some extent to keep enough sailors around.
"those kinds of amenities may be what it takes to recruit in this generation."
DeleteIf it requires amenities to recruit someone then you don't want them. You want people who want to serve for reasons like patriotism, challenge, sense of belonging, etc. People who join because you 'bribed' them will quit when the going gets tough. Recall the Iranian seizure of our riverine boats and how the crews just laid down? Maybe you can meet your recruiting quotas but you don't really want them.
Put the challenge and adventure back into the Navy and you'll get plenty of recruits. The Marines had it right (before they began accepting women) when their recruitment pitch was, 'we don't really want you because you're not tough enough to be a Marine'.
"Put the challenge and adventure back into the Navy and you'll get plenty of recruits."
DeleteI don't disagree, and more important than quantity, you'll get the quality you want. But if concerns over manpower are driving us to go for bad unmanned systems, then we have a problem.
I don't think the Navy knows HOW to put the challenge and adventure back in. They've become so overly concerned about making mistakes (see your thread on data versus action, for one) that they've lost contact with fun and zest. I think we need a complete rethink of what the culture should be about.
As far as the numbers, I think I found where 22,000 sailors and officers could come from--reduce the number of people pushing paper from one desk to another. The Navy is top-heavy and admin-heavy, and those push the Navy away from fun, zest, challenge, and adventure.
I don't think I could--or would want to--serve as a naval officer in the current climate. Maybe a thread on the Navy culture--where it is, where it should be, how to get it there--is in order.
I'm not sure how much of the problem--if any--is due to the greater role for women. I just had a rugby player graduate and enlist. She finished AO "A" school #1 in her class. Her ambition is to go to BUD/S. I'm not sure that's a viable path for women yet. But if there's one who can handle it, she can. Her dad was Navy and she has been brought up on the challenge and adventure part. If we can get women like that, we'll be okay. But I worry that too many of our Navy men are turning into milquetoast wimps instead of warriors. That's what I think we need to fix.
As far as the Iranian boat seizure, I have my thoughts about that but will avoid them in order to stay out of politics.
" She finished AO "A" school #1 in her class. Her ambition is to go to BUD/S."
DeleteNot to belittle the accomplishment but AO A school is not about combat, combat mentality, or physical prowess. It's about technical weapons knowledge. No reason a woman can't do that and do it well although I absolutely wouldn't want a female AO on my ship because, in combat, EVERYONE has to be capable of pulling my unconscious body to safety, lifting me up/down scuttles/hatches, conducting physically exhausting damage control, etc.
BUDS/SEALs, in contrast to AO, is all about over-the-top physical prowess and mental tenacity (finess and technical knowledge comes eventually) and no woman in the world can meet the physical demands of the training … unless we water it down as we apparently have for Ranger training.
And, yes, I have worked intimately with the very best of the best, highly trained, female athletes and they are pitiful in comparison to average, untrained males.
The problem with women is not that they're individually weak physically and mentally but that they bring the entire culture down by lowering standards, reducing cultural aggressiveness, changing the focus from fighting to gender equity, etc. They destroy the culture of a combat organization. Of course, you could prevent that by treating them exactly the same as men but then you wouldn't have any women in your military, would you?
"The problem with women is not that they're individually weak physically and mentally but that they bring the entire culture down by lowering standards, reducing cultural aggressiveness, changing the focus from fighting to gender equity, etc. They destroy the culture of a combat organization. Of course, you could prevent that by treating them exactly the same as men but then you wouldn't have any women in your military, would you?"
DeleteI'm not sure it's women per se who have destroyed the culture of the organization as much as men in positions of leadership who have become milquetoast wimps leaning over backwards to make accommodations for women. I don't think we want milquetoast wimps, male or female.
You have identified the right solution. Treat them the way you treat men. Hold them to the same standards. You wouldn't have no women, but you would have fewer. I've had two former women rugby players join the military, the AO one and one in the Army who has done a tour in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. I wouldn't want to tangle with either of them. The Army one holds state records for women's powerlifting in several categories. I'm pretty sure neither of them would have trouble meeting men's standards and both would prefer it that way. I frankly don't see how the AO or any woman can make it through BUD/S. But if any woman can, she can. And I would not want the standards lowered one iota to accommodate her or any other woman.
The military is a combat organization, not a social club. What matters about women (and men) is not how many you have but how well the ones you do have can perform their combat mission. I'm all for having those who can perform in combat, and none others. And if you clarified those expectations, you would get fewer women but the right women.
As for what to do about the milquetoast wimp men, that's another issue. We can use women who are warriors. We don't need men who are not.
I agree on the old Marines recruiting pitch.
Conspiracy theory...
ReplyDeleteThe FREMM will slowly replace the Burke class.
I have no evidence to support this claim.
It does however, "fit" better with the concept of distributed lethality.
"It does however, "fit" better with the concept of distributed lethality."
DeleteCertainly the "distributed" part. There is some question about the "lethality" part.
At least its better then the LCS's.
DeleteI wonder what will become of those lcs hulls now.