More [Unbelievable] LCS Incompetence

The Navy just announced a year’s delay in the LCS “frigate” program.

“The Navy has slowed its frigate procurement timeline, looking at awarding a detail design and construction contract in Fiscal Year 2020 to allow more time to understand what it needs the ship to do and how it might affordably meet those requirements.”

You’ll recall that the initial small surface combatant evaluation took place without appropriate analysis and in a very compressed time frame.  To the amazement of absolutely no one, the recommendation was to buy more LCS!  That process and decision triggered a firestorm of criticism and the Navy was roundly mocked for attempting to pass the LCS off as a frigate. 

Now, apparently, the situation has changed.

“Director of Surface Warfare Rear Adm. Ron Boxall told the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee in a hearing today that the Navy is working under time constraints but not cost constraints at the moment, as the current “Frigate Requirement Evaluation Team” works through what is now the second look at future frigate requirements.”

“…2014 SSC TF [Small Surface Combatant Task Force] and therefore didn’t want to criticize its work, he told lawmakers “the Small Surface Combatant Task Force, the environment when they created that task force was, I’ll call it reactive in nature. We were responding to criticisms and to get to a more capable, survivable ship as quickly as possible. And there was also fiscal guidance that was given to them at the time.”

So, the Navy admits to having selected and designed a ship, the LCS-frigate, in response to public criticisms and negative publicity.  Is that really the right reason to select and design a ship?  Further, the Navy now acknowledges that the prime selection criteria was financial rather than combat capability.  Again, is that the main criteria we want to use when designing WARships?

“This time, the Frigate Requirement Evaluation Team has not been given any cost guidance. Boxall told USNI News at the hearing that there wasn’t even a date yet for when the Navy would have a cost cap – rather, the surface warfare community is looking at what it needs …” [emphasis added]

Now?  Now?  Now, the surface warfare community is looking at what it needs?  Shouldn’t it have looked at needs in the original process?

“…the mission set [has] somewhat changed since 2014. Whereas the LCS and the frigate had been envisioned for primarily independent operations near the shore, the Navy now believes the LCS and frigate could be used by fleet commanders to support the carrier strike group out at sea.”

Littoral … out at sea … The Navy just can’t seem to decide what it wants the LCS/frigate to do.  Is this kind of dithering really the best our professional naval warriors can offer?  Apparently so.

“…Boxall said the Navy is assessing what self-protection systems, offensive weapons, strike group connectivity and more the frigate would need to be the right ship at the right price tag.”

Again, does the Navy really need to perform still more assessments?  Shouldn’t professional naval warriors pretty well know what’s needed?

“…Boxall said in 2014 the Navy discounted foreign frigate designs due to none of them exactly meeting its requirements, and the need to quickly begin work on a frigate that would quell LCS detractors. Today, Boxall said there still doesn’t appear to be any other small surface combatant design, foreign or domestic, that exactly meets its needs …”

Nothing foreign meets the Navy’s frigate needs?????  Good grief, what kind of frigate are they looking for – especially given the previous statement that the Navy is “assessing” what’s needed?  If they’re still assessing, how do they know that no foreign frigate meets their needs?  With all the amazing and varied frigate designs out there, none meet the Navy’s needs?  Does that really seem like a credible statement or does it seem more like setting the stage to choose, yet again, the LCS as the next frigate?

Okay, I’ve just suggested that this is all laying the groundwork to, yet again, select the LCS as the Navy’s next frigate.  Is there any proof other than my invariably correct opinion?  Well, consider this tidbit from a USNI News article.

“As the Navy reworks its frigate requirements in the hopes of fielding a more capable ship for a more dangerous world, the two current Littoral Combat Ship builders may still have a slight advantage due to their hot production lines, the acting secretary of the Navy [Sean Stackley] said last night.” (3)

That sure sounds like a pre-ordained conclusion in the making, doesn’t it?

  

“We have less data on the foreign designs than we do on most of the other designs in the U.S., but having said that, what we learned from the Small Surface Combatant Task Force was that we made some assumptions then that weren’t exactly right,” he said. “We don’t know if they can or can’t [meet the new frigate requirements] with a foreign design …”

Wait a minute!!!!!  You don’t know whether a foreign design can meet the requirements?  Didn’t you just say that no foreign design meets the requirements?  Which is it?  Do they or don’t they meet the requirements?  And remember, you’ve admitted that there are no requirements since you’re still “assessing”.

“In particular, Boxall said, the 2014 task force didn’t get as much information as desired on alternative foreign designs, something the new effort hopes to correct.”

Not to beat a dead horse, here, but, again, if you didn’t get as much information as desired on foreign designs, how do you know they don’t meet the Navy’s [still being assessed] requirements?????

And what was that bit about, “we made some assumptions then that weren’t exactly right”?  I’ve got news for you Adm. Boxall, you made a LOT of assumptions that weren’t exactly right – in fact, they were exactly wrong.  Still, I wonder which one he’s referring to?

Is this enough or do you want more incompetence?  Of course you want more incompetence!   Consider this confused and contradictory statement.

“If we choose to go with a vertically launched system that could take any other longer-ranged missile of the future, that would be a bonus if you will, it would increase the flexibility to adapt to future weapons, but from an anti-surface standpoint that is not one of the focuses of this team at this time,” Boxall told the subcommittee. (Emphasis ours). “Most of the efforts we’re looking at right now is focused on the survivability aspects, (especially) improving the air defense capability.” (What he didn’t mention was that the Navy’s most powerful air defense missiles are all fired from, you guessed it, VLS).” (2)

The Breaking Defense article that this came from got it exactly right with their imbedded comment.  If the Navy is looking at improving the air defense capability of the LCS, the VLS is the most flexible and powerful way to achieve it and yet, in the Navy’s mind, a VLS is not a focus.  How’s that for confused and contradictory?

The LCS has, from day one, been beset by incompetence on an unbelievable scale and this is just continuing that trend.  The Navy lacks even the slightest clue about how to run the LCS program.  This would be hysterically funny if we weren't talking about a ship that will make up a third of our future combat fleet.

Adm. Boxall is a blithering idiot attempting to justify and speak for a confused and utterly incompetent Navy. 

Are you getting the picture, here?  This is utter lunacy and rampant incompetence run amok.  This is the best our “professional” naval warriors can offer??  Crap, we’re in trouble!

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Slowing Frigate Procurement To Allow Careful Requirements Talks; Contract Award Set for FY2020”, Megan Eckstein, 3-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/03/navy-slowing-frigate-procurement-to-allow-careful-requirements-talks-contract-award-set-for-fy2020

(2)Breaking Defense website, “LCS: HASC Seapower Chair Praises Frigate Delay”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 4-May-2017,

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/lcs-seapower-chairman-praises-frigate-delay/?_ga=2.189871595.1515510137.1494008143-689266911.1437082743

(3)USNI News website, “Stackley: More Capable Frigate Requires Full and Open Competition, But LCS Builders May Have Cost Advantage”, Megan Eckstein, 12-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/12/stackley-capable-frigate-requires-full-open-competition-lcs-builders-may-cost-advantage

Aimless

I’m seeing more and more blind, aimless pushing for more Navy ships by a variety of people both in uniform and out.  So what’s wrong with that?  Don’t we all want a bigger Navy?  Don’t we all think the Navy is overstretched?  Well, there are several problems.

Relevance – One of the major, possibly the most important, themes on this blog is the need for a solid concept of operations (CONOPS) before leaping into ship construction.  CONOPS is, of course, ultimately derived from strategy of which we have neither geopolitical nor military.  So how can we possibly build useful, relevant ships if we have no idea how they will fit into our force structure and how they will be used?  Building ships just to put hulls in the water is a good way to waste enormous sums of money – witness the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford, to name a few.  The LCS, of course, is the poster boy for the bad results from the absence of a CONOPS.  We have a ship that has no military value and yet we’re building 40-50 of them!  Why would we want to give the Navy money to build more ships that offer no operational benefits?

Asset Responsibility – The Navy doesn’t take care of the ships and aircraft they have - quite the opposite, in fact.  The Navy is actively engaged in systematic deferral of maintenance intended to prematurely wear out platforms in order to justify new construction.  The Navy is attempting to early retire the entire Aegis cruiser class, the most advanced and powerful warship on the planet.  This is the farthest thing from responsible asset management and yet the Navy wants more assets?  Try taking care of what you have, first!

Fiscal Responsibility – The Navy has consistently demonstrated an almost incomprehensible inability to manage construction funding and stay on budget.  To be fair, the Navy knowingly lies about the estimated costs just to entice Congress into signing up for new construction and then when the real costs appear, of course they’re way over budget – a budget that was never realistic to begin with.  Either way, the Navy is fiscally inept at managing projects whether by lying up front, failing to meet stated budgets, or both.  How many billions (billions!!!!) of dollars is the Ford over budget, now, and it’s still not done?  Why should we give an organization with the Navy’s track record of fiscal mismanagement more money?

Readiness – The Navy has become a largely hollow shell of what it once was.  Readiness is at an all-time low.  Claims of readiness are a joke.  INSURV inspections were classified because they were too embarrassing.  Since the Navy can’t maintain the readiness of the ships they have, more ships will just mean more ships that are not combat ready.  Why would we want to compound the readiness problem by adding more non-functional ships and a greater maintenance burden to the fleet?

Here’s an example of the kind of the kind of blind, aimless push for more ships that I’m talking about.

“Eight Senators sent a letter Friday to Defense Secretary James Mattis, urging him to request all three Littoral Combat Ships originally planned for the 2018 budget.” (1)

Just out of idle curiosity, who were the 8 Senators who courageously stood up and advocated for the Navy?  Well, six of them were,

Richard Shelby – Alabama

Luther Strange – Alabama

Ron Johnson – Wisconsin

Tammy Baldwin - Wisconsin

Marco Rubio – Florida

Bill Nelson - Florida

On a seemingly unrelated note, do any of you remember what states the two LCS variants are manufactured in?  That’s right, Alabama and Wisconsin!  Now, do you happen to remember what state the east coast LCS’s are based in?  Right again, Florida!  It’s probably just coincidence that six of the eight Senators who want more LCS’s are from Alabama, Wisconsin, and Florida where the LCS’s are manufactured and based.  United States Senators would not use the LCS as a jobs program at the expense of the welfare of the country and the Navy, right?

The other two Senators are from Michigan.  I’m sure there’s a jobs related connection there but I’m not seeing it at the moment.  Perhaps Michigan manufactures some key LCS component?  Moving on …

You see what’s happening, here?  We’re seeing a demand for Navy ships that is not based on strategic and operational needs but on crass and petty reasons like jobs and the Navy is happy to go along with it.

Now, understand that I’m not opposed to increasing the size of the Navy.  In fact, I’m strongly in favor of it but only if it’s done responsibly and in a way that supports our strategic and operational needs.  More LCS’s aren’t going to accomplish that.  Zumwalts aren’t going to accomplish that.  Hideously expensive Fords that offer little improvement over Nimitzes aren’t going to accomplish that.

With all that in mind, I’m dead set against giving the Navy any more money until they can convince me that they’ll spend it wisely, spend it with an eye on operational requirements, prove they’ll maintain the assets they’re given, and can convince me that they’ll be good stewards of my taxpayer dollars.  Until then, not a penny!

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Key SASC, SAC-D Senators Push More LCS”, Sydney J Freedberg, Jr., 29-Apr-2017,

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/key-sasc-sac-d-senators-push-more-lcs/?_ga=1.103317127.689266911.1437082743

Aegis Cruiser Gets Lucky

You’ve probably already read that a South Korean fishing boat collided with the Aegis cruiser Lake Champlain.  Apparently, damage was minimal to both vessels. 

“Guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and a South Korean fishing vessel collided in international waters east of the Korean Peninsula, the Navy said in a statement this morning. That fishing vessel lacked functioning radio or GPS and did not heed audio warnings, a defense official told USNI News.” (1)

How can a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  Did we learn nothing from the Cole attack?  Do we not recall that North Korean forces have torpedoed a South Korean ship?  Have we forgotten that North Korean small boats and mini-subs have been found in South Korean waters?  While there may have been no overt reason to believe this was a suicide/attack attempt, there was also no reason to believe that it wasn’t given North Korea’s history and erratic and unpredictable behavior.  In fact, blowing up a US cruiser would have been something quite appealing to North Korea.

I repeat, how did a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  That’s a huge risk of a multi-billion dollar ship.  That’s gross incompetence.  The Captain should be relieved and court-martialed. 

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(1)USNI News website, “UPDATED: Cruiser Lake Champlain Collides With South Korean Fishing Vessel That Lacked Radio, GPS”, Megan Eckstein, 9-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/09/cruiser

Dual Band Radar Review

Before it passes into a mere historical footnote, let’s take a closer look at the once vaunted Dual Band Radar (DBR) that was to equip the Ford and Zumwalt classes.  The DBR combines an X-Band and S-Band radar in array panels versus the old style rotating radars. 

Let’s take a moment and recall what the old, mechanical, rotating radars were.  There were two main ones:

• SPS-40/49 - Two dimensional (bearing and range), long range (256 nm), air search, L-band (851-942 MHz)

• SPS-48 – Three dimensional (bearing, range, and height), long range (250 nm), air search, 7.5 – 15 rpm, mechanically rotated, electronically steered beams for elevation, 4500 lb, E & F-band (2-4 GHz)

There were also additional radars for navigation, air traffic control, fire control illumination, etc.

By comparison, the DBR consists of several flat panel arrays of two types:

• SPY-3 – X-band (8-12 GHz), low altitude targeting and horizon search, target illumination and datalink for SM-2 and ESSM (2)

• SPY-4 Volume Search Radar (VSR) – S-band, 3-face, long range search/track and cueing for the SPY-3 (2)

There is a great deal of overlap between the two systems, as described by Raytheon,

“Many search and track functions, such as cued acquisition and precision track (providing high update rate, fire control quality data) can be allocated to either or both frequencies, automatically or through command and control direction.” (2)

This provides a measure of redundancy and resilience to damage in combat.  Along the same lines, the presence of two overlapping radars allows the degrading effects of weather to be minimized by being able to switch between them as conditions warrant (2).

The system uses a total of six array faces, three for each band.  Each of the arrays covers 120 deg with three of them combining to provide 360 deg coverage.

The total DBR system is reported to cost $500M (1).

The DBR was originally intended to outfit the Zumwalt and Ford classes but will now only be installed on the first Ford carrier (3).  For Zumwalt, the SPY-4 has been deleted as a cost savings measure.  Deletion of the SPY-4 from the Zumwalt DBR will reportedly save $180M (1).

The Navy concluded, correctly, that a carrier just doesn’t need a radar system this capable since the carrier has no long range AAW missiles and would be unlikely to radiate in combat, depending instead on shared data pictures provided by Aegis escorts and E-2 Hawkeye aircraft.  This was acknowledged by RAdm. Thomas Moore, PEO Carriers, in an article presented by Defense News website,

“… analysis showed the carrier didn't need all the system's capabilities.” (3)

Related side note:  wouldn’t it have been nice (and logical) to perform the analysis prior to designing the carrier?  But, I digress …

DBR was slated to replace several different legacy radar systems that performed air traffic control, air search, navigation, and fire-control, etc.  This offers a potentially significant increase in efficiency and reduction in maintenance and personnel.  However, by combining the functions of several legacy radars into one system, a single point of multiple failures is created.  A single failure can potentially cost the ship its detection, tracking, targeting, navigation, air traffic control, and fire control functions.  That’s a steep price to pay for a single failure.  This is a case where efficiency is trumped by separation and redundancy, the foundations of survivability.  In other words, combat resilience trumps cost effectiveness.  This is yet another example of how trying to run a combat organization like a business is a flawed concept.

Another key aspect of the DBR system, just as with Aegis, is complexity and maintainability.  Aegis suffered from a fleet wide degradation serious enough to cause the Navy to form one of its infamous Admiral chaired panels.  I have seen no public documentation regarding the results of that remediation effort.  I do not know what state the Aegis system is in, today.  Having seen no grand pronouncements of success, I have to assume that the system still suffers from systemic degradation. 

DBR will be even more complex and common sense suggests that it, too, will suffer from maintenance and reliability problems.  Even worse, DBR is almost a one-of-a-kind system.  The Navy is highly unlikely to incur the cost of setting up technician schools and creating a technician training program adequate to maintain the system.  Similarly, the spare parts logistical train necessary to support the system is unlikely to be adequately established.  We saw exactly this phenomenon play out with the nearly one-of-a-kind Enterprise/Long Beach radar systems which suffered from a lack of trained technicians and support and were, in relatively short order, abandoned.

It is a near certainty that the Ford’s radar system will never work as intended and will, in relatively short order, be abandoned and replaced.

On a closely related side note, the complexity and support issues lead, inexorably, to the question, is it better to have a bleeding edge radar system that can’t be maintained and never achieves its intended performance or to have a more basic system (like a mechanical, rotating system) that is utterly reliable, can be maintained at sea, and provides its maximum performance at all times?

In any event, there are lessons to be learned from the DBR program. 

• Carriers don’t need highly capable radar systems since they don’t have highly capable weapons that require highly capable radars

• Carriers don’t radiate in combat;  instead, they rely on data links from other aircraft and ships so, again, they don’t need sophisticated radars

• Performance analyses must be performed prior to ship design

• One of a kind systems are not sustainable

• Cost and operational efficiency do not trump combat effectiveness

The DBR is fated to pass into the footnotes of history but we would do well to learn its lessons before it does.

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(1)USNI News website, “PEO Carriers: CVN-79 Will Have a New Radar, Save $180M Compared to Dual Band Radar”, Megan Eckstein, March 17, 2015,

https://news.usni.org/2015/03/17/peo-carriers-cvn-79-will-have-a-new-radar-save-180m-compared-to-dual-band-radar

(2)Raytheon website, What We Do > Products > Dual Band Radar,

http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/dbr/

(3)Defense News website, “Dual Band Radar Swapped Out In New Carriers”, Christopher P. Cavas, 17-Mar-2015,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/03/17/navy-aircraft-carrier-ford-kennedy-dual-band-radar-dbr-easr-raytheon-huntington-ingalls-newport-news-lockheed-aegis-shipbuilding/24924511/

Harpoon Drops Out of OTH Competition

Defense New website reports that Boeing is pulling its Harpoon missile out of the running for the Navy’s over-the-horizon (OTH) weapon system intended for the LCS and, possibly, other Navy ships (1).  The bizarre aspect of this is that Boeing’s stated reason for doing so is that the Navy has dumbed down the requirements to the point that Boeing believes the Harpoon is overqualified and that the opportunity is, therefore, not worth pursuing.

Digest that, for a moment.

Here are the relevant quotes.

“Troy Rutherford, director of cruise missile systems at Boeing Defense, said the company had long planned to adapt the Block II Plus Extended Range Harpoon being developed for Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to support the needs of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

“We felt we were well-positioned when the RFP dropped” in February, Rutherford said, but subsequent Navy changes -- in Boeing’s opinion – devalued a lot of what the company felt it could offer.”

“But, he said, “in every iteration of the RFP amendments we see a decrease in the top-level requirements document and changes in the top-level requirements document. We’ve taken a hard look at that and said that at this point it doesn’t make sense for the Boeing Company to bid on this.” 

We just recently reviewed the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) (see, "Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile") and we’ve previously looked at the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) (see, for example, "LRASM Update").  Both of those appear to have many more features and capabilities than the Harpoon and yet they're not dropping out of the competition.

Harpoon Test Launch From LCS

Something is not right about this.  Is Boeing pulling out because they’ve realized or been told that their Harpoon is technologically non-competitive and they just want to put a positive spin on it – a spin intended to support and reassure less demanding foreign sales?  Is Boeing nervous about having a unilateral – and non-profitable – cost imposed on them by the government, as was done to Lockheed?  Has Boeing concluded that their ship version of the Harpoon would be too expensive to compete?  Something else?

By all accounts, the ship launched version of Harpoon essentially already exists.  If the Navy has dumbed down requirements, Boeing could simply omit the various affected bits and pieces and price the missile accordingly.  What would they have to lose by placing a bid for a dumbed down version?

Here’s a puzzling and potentially disturbing statement from the article.

“Among the differences between the NAVAIR and NAVSEA requirements, Rutherford noted, are all-weather and net-enabled capabilities for the air-launched weapon – capabilities deleted or not given in the surface ship requirements.”

This is saying that the ship launched OTH missile will not be all-weather capable?!  So, we’re only going to fight during good weather?  Nothing about that sounds right, does it? 

Also, the OTH missile won’t be network enabled?  The entire premise of the Navy’s much ballyhooed distributed lethality is that every sensor, every platform, and every weapon ARE networked.  Again, this does not sound right.

You don’t need me to tell you that something is fishy about this.  Something is not right about this story but I don’t know what.  I’ll keep an eye on this.

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(1)Defense News website, “Boeing Pulls Harpoon From US Navy Missile Competition”, Christopher Cavas, 2-May-2017,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/boeing-pulls-harpoon-from-us-navy-missile-competition

Only A War Can Save Us From Ourselves

We’ve thoroughly documented the disjointed thinking of Navy leadership, the hollowness of the fleet, and myriad other problems.  Of all the Navy’s problems, social engineering is, arguably, the biggest and worst.  The other problems can be fixed in relatively short order.  Maintenance could be drastically improved almost overnight if the Navy suddenly wanted to.  Better aircraft and ship designs could be implemented within five years, as we’ve proposed.  Weapon systems could be brought up to the level of the rest of the world in a heartbeat.

The problem that can’t be fixed, once it takes hold, is social engineering.  Social engineering is the artificial manipulation of the military’s personnel with the goal of reflecting the demographic trends seen in society at large.  Well, what’s wrong with that?  Shouldn’t our military reflect the society it serves?  Even if it doesn’t quite reflect society’s makeup, setting that composition as a goal is admirable, isn’t it?  No, it isn’t.  It’s stupid, demeaning to those involved, and produces effects exactly contrary to those desired.  Let’s look a bit closer at the very concept.

Forcing an organization or group’s demographics to conform to society’s demographics ignores choice and human nature.  It assumes, naively, that all members of society want to be members of sub-groups in ratios exactly equal to society’s demographics.

Further, it assumes that all members of society are exactly equal in all respects - physical, mental, and emotional - and this is just utter nonsense.

Did you know that nearly 100% of live births are produced by women?  This is an outrage and must be stopped.  Men should be allowed to produce 50% of the births and, if necessary, the courts should step in to break the stranglehold that women currently have on this practice.  Women are practicing systematic oppression of men by keeping this important function to themselves.  Are not all people, men and women, exactly equal and exactly equally capable of all things?

Some of you, a few misguided souls, probably believe that there is an obvious physical reason for this discrepancy and that physical differences should excuse performance differences and be the justification for this abhorrent discrimination against men.  We know, however, that physical differences are not a reason for differences in performance.  How do we know this?  Because our senior military leadership has assured us that women are exactly equal to men even in jobs that require superior strength and stamina.  Men are not inherently stronger than women – women have just not been given the same opportunity to train to the required strength.  The pictures you’ve seen of troops marching while women have no packs and men carry their packs for them are not a sign of any inherent physical weakness on the part of women.  Instead, those pictures make clear the gender-malicious lack of training opportunity imposed on women and preventing them from easily carrying the same weight that a man can carry.

I had a little fun with that example but it demonstrates, to anyone stupid enough to require the demonstration, that men and women are not equal.  They have physical differences that manifest themselves as performance differences.

OB/GYN doctors are 75% female.  Why?  Who knows?  Women just seem to prefer that medical specialty and men do not.  Should we mandate 50% men and 50% women OB/GYN doctors?  That would be absurd.  Let men and women choose what they prefer and enjoy.  And yet, mandating choice is exactly what the military is engaging in. 

“The proposal, sent to Defense Secretary Ash Carter for approval, would require the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to consider minority candidates for key jobs such as aide-de-camp and military assistant to senior leaders. “

Well, what’s wrong with that?  Forcing the military to “consider” minorities can’t be a bad thing, can it?  Of course not.  However, it’s a very thin line between “considering” and a quota system premised on reverse discrimination.  In the civilian world, when dealing with race, society was unable to avoid mere removal of barriers and leapt enthusiastically into quotas which set the civil rights movement back significantly by making all minority hires suspect.  Did they get the job because they earned it or because they were part of a quota? 

The point is that the military, even more than the civilian world, must have the best in every position.  If that results in an all black, or all Asian, or all male, or all female, or all white officer corps (or SEAL Team or infantry unit or whatever), or any mix thereof, then so be it. 

Here’s some interesting data.

“Overall, the active duty force of more than 1 million troops is about 69% white, 17% black and 4% Asian, according to Pentagon figures.”

The article did not include data for Hispanics.

Compare that to the overall US racial demographics, according to Wiki, which has the US at 64% white, 16% Hispanic, 12% black, and 5% Asian.

Thus, the military is pretty close to the US societal makeup.  So, what problem are we solving?  But, I digress …

Our leadership is concerned.

“Carter believes that emphasizing diversity is essential for the military to attract and retain the troops it needs for the future, …”

Again, what problem are we solving?  Perhaps Carter is unaware of the actual data?  But, I digress …

To be fair and clear, the military appears more concerned with subsets in the military that don’t reflect society at large.  Thus, while the overall makeup is virtually identical to society, certain groups such as officers, SEALs, or whatever, may not be and this is what the military leadership apparently wants to address.

For example,

“The Pentagon’s most elite forces, including Navy SEALs, are virtually all-white. Last year, the paper reported that eight of 753 SEAL officers were black, or 1%.”

So, how does the military plan to address the imbalances?

“The plan before Carter would direct each of the services to establish goals for race, ethnicity and gender among the officers it commissions to “reflect the diverse population in the United States eligible to serve in our military. Undertaking the additional effort to identify and recruit a diverse candidate pool will help us build a stronger force and expose more Americans to the opportunity to serve in our military.”

“The proposal calls on the services to report to Carter by May 1 on how they will incorporate the policy into their diversity initiatives.”

We earlier mentioned the fine line between goals and quotas and this sounds like a hair’s breadth from being a quota.  We’ve seen that women will be placed in units on a quota basis, performance be damned, and now this.

Now, for the main point of this post which is that not everyone wants to be part of every subset in proportions exactly equal to society’s makeup.  We’ve seen that females constitute a greater than demographically expected portion of OB/Gyn doctors.  Why?  It’s just personal preferences.  Should we force doctors who don’t want to be OB/Gyns to become one in order to satisfy demographic equality while artificially excluding female doctors who do want to be OB/Gyns just because women are over represented in that field?  Most of us would probably think not – that personal preference is fine even if it leads to “imbalanced” demographics relative to society.

“Expanding the pool of minority candidates for combat leadership has proved challenging for the Pentagon. Young black men, for decades, have opted for other fields, including logistics.”

What about qualifications?  If not enough men are choosing OB/Gyn, should we grab people off the street and pronounce them OB/Gyn doctors?  Of course not – they’re not qualified.  Why, then, would we force service men and women into roles they don’t want or are not qualified for?

Of course, there’s a larger issue when we talk about qualifications and that is societal background.  A young white male may enter the military more qualified than a young black male due to their individual histories of education, family life, experience, etc.  That, however, is an issue largely outside the control of the military.  Addressing the issue by forcing people into quota spots is not the answer, as society has discovered.  Quotas will simply ensure that unqualified people are set up for failure and that bias, to the extent it exists, and resentment among those who are qualified but excluded due to quotas will only increase.

The result of social engineering in the military will, inevitably, be units that are poorly suited for their tasks.  During peacetime, we can get away with poor performance and combat inefficiencies.  When war comes, however, our enemies will quickly make clear the idiocy of our social engineering policies.  Combat does not care about demographics.  Combat is the ultimate form of blind justice.  The competent will survive and the unqualified will die.  At that point, and only then, will we begin to revise our policies and implement common sense measures.  Only a war can save us from ourselves.

Note: Before you jump in with a comment about what you think I wrote, go back and reread the post and be sure that I actually wrote what you think I wrote.  I will be merciless on comments that are not based on what was actually written.  You've been warned.

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(1)Military Times website, “Pentagon proposal on 'Rooney Rule' for minority officers raising internal concerns”, Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today, April 14, 2016,

http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/04/13/pentagon-proposal-rooney-rule-minority-officers-raising-internal-concerns/83004196/

North Korean Artillery Exercise

North Korea just carried out a live fire artillery drill involving up to 400 self-propelled artillery vehicles.  The vehicles were lined up, side by side, in neat rows while NKorea’s dictator, Kim Jong-Un observed.  If the US was ever interested in a pre-emptive strike, this had to be the opportunity of a lifetime!  Look at those vehicles line up.  You could kill the dictator and wipe out a huge chunk of military capability in one strike and all on an isolated beach with little chance for collateral damage.

A Target Rich Environment!

It had to be tempting.  Just saying …