Counting Unmanned Vessels As Ships

Should unmanned surface vessels (USV) count as ships of the fleet?

 

Regardless of whatever policy the Navy may eventually settle on for counting unmanned vessels as ships of the fleet – or not - it is clear that the Navy already considers unmanned vessels to be fully qualified ships of the fleet.  Every recent fleet size proposal consists of regular ships plus unmanned ships with no functional distinction made between them despite there being a universe of functional difference.  Actually, I stand corrected.  The Navy does see a distinction between manned and unmanned vessels.  The Navy believes that unmanned vessels possess some kind of mystical, super-capabilities derived from their very ‘unmannedness’.  Every statement by every Navy spokesman about unmanned vessels claims that they will enhance our combat capabilities.

 

The problem with these kinds of claims is the failure to recognize that USVs are not ships.  They’re adjuncts, at best.

 

When carefully examined, recent fleet size proposals all call for increased total numbers and yet tend to result in smaller combat forces!  The increased total numbers are provided by unmanned and non-combat vessels (MUSV, LUSV, Light Amphibious Warfare transport, etc.).  Thus, actual warships are being replaced by non-warships which clearly demonstrates the Navy’s misguided view of the equality between manned and unmanned vessels.

 

 

Definitions and Distinctions

 

What is a ship from a practical, combat perspective?  It’s a vessel that is capable of independent behavior, action, judgment, and possesses a range of capabilities.

 

In comparison, what is an unmanned vessel?  It’s a vessel that has a single, very restricted function, has no ability to act independently, and cannot exercise judgment.  It’s the very antithesis of the definition of a combat ship.

 

When a task force goes into combat and ships are damaged or sunk, other ships – and ship commanders – will take their place.  Command will devolve, if necessary, so that someone is always in charge.  If a ship drops out of formation, another will take its place to the extent that numbers allow.  In addition, individual ship commanders will, in extremis, exercise initiative and take individual action which has, historically, often been key to victory.  What happens when the ‘next ship up’ is an unmanned vessel?  There won’t be any initiative.  There won’t be any independent action.  There won’t be any victory.  The ‘depth’ of our fleet will be diminished with every USV procured.

 

When that control link to the LUSV missile barge is severed – either by enemy electronic warfare or by damage/destruction of the controlling ship – that missile barge becomes simply a barge;  an inert, inoperable, nautical paperweight and hazard to navigation.  On a real WARship, the crew is the ‘local’ backup, able to take over and continue fighting in the event that command/control from higher authority is lost.  A USV with a severed command/control link is just a floating barge.  Does anyone realistically think we’ll be able to retain complete, unaffected communication links to an unmanned vessel?  I can’t maintain cell phone connections!

 

There is more to a ship than just the number of VLS cells it carries;  a ship – an effective WARship, that is – includes a commander, a crew, and a host of potentialities that an unmanned ship utterly lacks.  In other words, a WARship is more than just a missile launching barge (which is exactly what the LUSV is!).

 

Damage control by a manned ship can save a ship in circumstances that would sink an unmanned ship due to the absence of damage control capability.  Lacking the capacity for damage control, unmanned ships are one-hit kills;  not just mission kills but actual sinkings.  Do we really want a fleet that includes a significant number of one-hit kill vessels?

 

Today’s supposed combat ships are built very weak and with no armor other than, perhaps, a sprinkling of Kevlar shrapnel protection in a few spots.  The Burkes, for example, had to have additional strengthening strakes added just to withstand the stress of normal sailing![1]  Given the physical weakness of our front line warships, does anyone think we’re going to build unmanned vessels to a higher standard or even the same standard?  Of course not.  They’ll be built to a reduced standard which, again, makes them even easier one-hit kills.

 

Beyond survivability, we all recognize the old adage that no plan survives contact with the enemy.  With human crews and the clear pre-battle conveyance of commander’s intent, the task force can still function despite the disintegration of the battle plan.  Unmanned vessels have no capacity to adapt.  They’ll execute their instructions no matter how little sense those instructions may make after contact with the enemy.

This is NOT a WARship ! 

 

Conclusion

 

Is this discussion just about the issue of whether to count unmanned vessels as part of the fleet ship count?  Of course not!  That would just be a matter of definitions with no real world importance.  The real issue is that by counting unmanned vessels as fleet ships, we’re deluding ourselves into believing we have capability that we do not.  It’s human nature and it’s inevitable that, at some point, people will begin to believe that unmanned vessels are the equivalent of manned ships (we’re already seeing this) and this will lead to fatally flawed planning and doctrine.  It is vital that we clearly maintain the distinction between a WARship and an unmanned barge so that we can accurately and wisely factor them into our planning.

 

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Network World, “US Navy warships suffer serious structural defects”, Michael Cooney, 15-Oct-2007,

https://www.networkworld.com/article/2349234/us-navy-warships-suffer-serious-structural-defects.html

Recruiting and Standards

ComNavOps abhors this kind of post but today’s circumstances demand it.  I hope that I will not be forced to make this a regular occurrence.  The following post is largely Army based but the concepts apply equally to all the services.

 

We’re talking about recruiting and standards.  Redstate website offers an article on the subject[1] that is spot on.

 

Note:  In the interest of fairness, Redstate is a politically conservative news site and the article’s author is a former Army officer who commanded an infantry company and was an Inspector General investigator in US Army Recruiting Command so he has extensive, first hand knowledge.

 

The article is well worth the time for a complete read.  The author addresses recruiting standards, the rationale behind standards, the use of standardized recruiting assessment tests and how they’re interpreted.  The author also drops a couple of hysterically funny comments which are all the funnier for being true.  Read the article!

 

The author throws out gem after gem of wisdom.

 

Addressing the reason why dropping the diploma/GED requirement is a problem, the author states:

 

Quitting is a lifestyle choice. A kid that quits high school is exponentially less likely to complete a 3-year active-duty enlistment than an HSDG [High School Diploma Graduates], no matter the AFQT score.[1]

 

Any semi-intelligent person – meaning not a general officer – understands that a high school diploma, while hugely watered down in today’s world, still represents a demonstrated degree of determination and self-motivation.

 

The author goes on,

 

… if you are recruiting tens of thousands of soldiers each year, you have to focus on the profile of what makes a successful soldier and not on the high school dropout and convicted felon … [1]

 

We know what recruit profile makes for a successful soldier.  That we’ve chosen to jettison that wisdom and aggressively recruit from outside that profile is unbridled stupidity.

 

The author notes,

 

The Army’s willingness to fill a substantial portion of the 60% of the FY2022 recruiting goal with kids who they know will not complete their first term of enlistment shows the level of desperation.[1]

 

Indeed!

 

The author laments the current situation.

 

Now the Army seems hellbent on destroying 40 years of hard-earned reputation for the sake of being woke and dying its hair magenta.[1]

 

The author addresses the crux of the problem:

 

The reason for the Army failing to meet its recruiting goals is simple, it has essentially declared that it has no use for heterosexual males or integrity.

 

Over the past decade, Army leadership has decided that woke indoctrination is more important than the credo of Duty, Honor, Country.[1]

 

The young men who are attracted to concepts like duty, honor, and country have nothing in common with today’s military. Is it any wonder that recruiting has become a crisis?

 

Without explicitly stating it, the author notes the reality that the pool of people who make up the actual, fighting soldier is no longer valued or sought after by the military.

 

Ever since Obama Defense Secretary Ashton Carter issued his fiat that all combat arms are open to women, the Army has been engaged in a war on its history and on the culture and demographic that has historically provided it with recruits and young officers.[1]

 

Consider this unattributed and uncaptioned photo accompanying the article.

 

Seriously, do any of these people look remotely like soldiers?  For all I know, they could be actors in a recruiting ad.  Regardless of who/what they really are, they are the absolute worst representation of soldiers I have ever seen.  For starters, look at the stomach bulges.  None of them can possibly meet even the dumbed down fitness tests of today.  I can only pray that the photo is some type of spoof or satirical commentary.  God help us if the photo is real.

 

It should be noted that you recruit not only inductees but also – and primarily - parents.  Let’s face it, the biggest influence on children is their parents.  If you don’t – or can’t – successfully recruit the parents, you’ll have little success with the children when they come of age.  By abandoning the values that once made our military great, we’ve lost the parents and, therefore, their children.  There is no one with more [former] respect for the military and its traditional values than me and there is no way in hell I’d allow my children to consider entering the military.  That should scare military leadership to its core but it doesn’t.  They have become so focused on weeding out the recruits (and active duty personnel) who embody the traditional values that they can’t even see the broken reality they’ve created.

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Redstate website, “Army Backs off Enlisting High School Drop Outs but the Woke Cancer Killing Enlistments Remains Stronger Than Ever”, by streiff, 3-Jul-2022,

https://redstate.com/streiff/2022/07/03/army-backs-off-enlisting-high-school-drop-outs-but-the-woke-cancer-killing-enlistments-remains-stronger-than-ever-n588076

Navy Lays Down the LAW

The just-released CNO Navigation Plan 2022, aside from being a buzzword-filled, worthless piece of garbage, contains a piece of information that dooms Commandant Berger’s entire missile-shooting concept.  The document calls for 18 Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) to be built by 2045.[1, p.10]

 

Berger’s entire concept is predicated on the LAW which will transport his small units and their massive missiles, clandestinely, to hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.  The LAW will then relocate the Marines in the unlikely event they’re spotted and will conduct resupply on a regular basis, again, undetected.

 

Setting aside any mocking of the LAW or the concept, it is clear that the LAW is the foundation of the concept.  Without transport and logistics there is no concept, right?  The Navy appears to be providing only very limited support to the Marines.  Eighteen LAW is woefully insufficient to support the concept.

 

Even if a single LAW could fully transport, relocate, and indefinitely resupply a single unit, the maximum number of units deployed is, then, limited to eighteen.  Now, factor in the need for the LAWs, like any ship, to return to base regularly to repair, replenish, rest, etc. and you see that multiple LAWs are needed to support a single missile-shooting unit. 

 

Add in attrition – does anyone really think that 14 kt, non-stealthy, defenseless vessels trying to operate deep in enemy waters are not going to suffer significant attrition? – and 18 LAWs can only support a few Marine units for a short time;  and even that’s wildly optimistic.  With any realistic attrition factor, it is clear that the concept needs something north of forty LAWs for the concept to have even a small chance of working.

 

Light Amphibious Warship - Artist's Concept

Thus, it appears that the Navy is not on board with the Marine’s concept and is only paying token lip service to the concept. 

 

At best, the Marines may get a couple of LAWs per year over the next couple decades.  The Commandant will be retired in a year or so.  Will his concept still be around by the time the Navy gets around to building LAWs?  It seems unlikely.

 

If the Navy’s forecasted war with China occurs in the next several years, the Marines won’t have any transports and will be relegated to the sidelines.

 

Even if you think Commandant Berger is a genius whose concept will revolutionize warfare and bring China to its knees, it is clear that he has utterly failed to get buy-in from the Navy.  He has failed to convey and communicate the merits, as he sees it, of his concept.  Navy buy-in should have been one of the very first things he accomplished but it appears that was not the case.

 

Eighteen LAWs by 2045, Commandant?  The Navy is telling you what you can do with your concept.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

[1]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf

 

Floundering

The Navy is floundering.  They’re wandering aimlessly, throwing ideas against the wall to see if anything sticks.  Thus far, nothing has – or at least nothing worthwhile and supported by rigorous analysis, combat exercises, and experimentation.  The only two things that have ‘stuck’, in the Navy’s mind, are networks and unmanned vehicles and neither of those enjoy significant support outside the Navy.

 

As an example of the Navy’s floundering, consider the issue of fleet size.  That should be a simple, straightforward statement of fleet size based on a professional warrior assessment of our combat needs, right?  Any semi-competent, professional sailor should be able, off the top of his head, to put forth a required fleet size (and composition) based on years of expertise, experience, and study.  The Navy, however, seems utterly incapable of elucidating a fleet size as evidenced by study after study calling for seemingly random fleet sizes. 

 

Over the last few years we’ve seen plans calling for a fleet size anywhere from 300-500+.  As recently as April of this year, the Navy presented Congress with a 30 year shipbuilding plan that offered not one, but three different plans and fleet sizes!  The three fleet sizes ranged from 316 to 367.  The Navy couldn’t even muster enough professional expertise and analysis to come up with a single plan.  Instead, they offered three plans to cover their collective rear ends from any criticism and to circumvent the need to commit to something, thereby risking their reputations (such as they are).

 

To hammer home the randomness of the Navy’s ‘planning’, the following table presents some recent naval studies and the range of fleet sizes they called for.  Note the wildly varying numbers in a short span of time.  That’s a Navy that is floundering. 

 

 

 

Recent Navy Fleet Size Studies
Year	Study	Fleet Size
2016	Force Structure Assessment	355 manned
2020	Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment	390 manned 435 manned + unmanned
2020	Future Naval Force Study	337-404 manned 440-540 manned + unmanned
2020	Battle Force 2045 (SecDef Esper) [1]	500+  manned + unmanned
2021	PB22 Jun 2021 Ranges	321-372 manned 398-512 manned + unmanned
2022	30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 1	316 manned
2022	30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 2	327 manned
2022	30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 3	367 manned
2022	Future Navy Force Study	355 manned
2022	CNO Navigation Plan 2022 [2]	350+ manned

 

 

 

Despite this plethora of [random] fleet size studies, CNO Gilday has now released yet another plan with yet another fleet size goal, the Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022 [2] which calls for a fleet size of 350+ (he couldn’t even pick a fixed number !).[3]  This plan differs markedly from the one he sent to Congress only a few months ago and it differs from the several plans generated in the last couple of years. 

 

The Navy can’t seem to settle on a plan.  That’s called floundering.

 

Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., took to Twitter today to criticize the Navy for its constant number swapping following a POLITICO story that reported fierce in-fighting at the Pentagon over the Navy’s future fleet.

 

“The fact that Congress has received four different answers from the Navy in the past three months alone sparks confusion and ultimately, less effective advocacy,” he said.[3]

 

Exactly!  Why would Congress support and fund any plan since the Navy can’t seem to settle on a required fleet size and a rationale for that requirement?

 

Responding to Gallagher’s criticism, CNO Gilday couldn’t/wouldn’t even defend his nebulous goal.

 

Asked to comment on Gallagher’s criticism, Gilday said the NAVPLAN “is not a perpetual end state. It can’t be.”[3]

 

CNO Gilday is basically stating that the latest plan isn’t really a plan, that the desired fleet size isn’t really a requirement, and that the desired fleet size will certainly change, likely sooner than later.  Is that supposed to inspire confidence? 

 

A noteworthy aspect of this latest plan is the decision to sacrifice quantity for modernization.

 

Amid inflation pressure, Gilday says the Navy "will prioritize modernization over preserving force structure."[3]

 

Shrinking the fleet is not a good trade off especially when the quantity you’re giving up contains significant firepower and the modernization you’re attempting does not.  Modernization that does not increase firepower is a poor choice, indeed.

 

Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., had this to say,

 

“By any measure, China has much more capability than we have, we must modernize our Navy [and] we need to do it with a sense of urgency,” he said.[3]

 

Wrong Mr. Wittman!  We need quantity and firepower, not misguided modernization for the sake of modernization.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The Navy is hopelessly lost.  Fleet size and composition plans are a dime a dozen and none seem to last more than a few months.  Our joke of a Navy leadership would rather conduct study after study than commit to a plan.  That’s understandable because they recognize that they have no rationale for any plan.  They lack the professionalism and expertise to conceptualize a plan.

 

To a very small extent, this is understandable since no Navy leader has every seen naval combat or even a realistic exercise.  That being the case, why/how would they have any rationale or experience on which to base a fleet size/composition plan?  Worse, they exhibit absolutely no knowledge or grasp of history’s lessons which could provide the experience they lack and no desire to learn from history.

 

Our Navy and our nation are being well and truly screwed by Navy leadership.  The horrifying reality is that, barring the emergence of a Rickover or Halsey, only a combat disaster can alter the failed path we’re on.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]https://www.csis.org/analysis/secretary-esper-previews-future-navy

 

[2]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf

 

[3]Breaking Defense, “‘More than 350 manned ships’: CNO lays out de facto Navy shipbuilding request in new NAVPLAN”, Justin Katz, 26-Jul-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/more-than-350-manned-ships-cno-lays-out-de-facto-navy-shipbuilding-request-in-new-navplan/

Lessons From The HSV-2 Swift Attack

The former US Navy high speed vessel (HSV) Swift (HSV-2) was returned to the manufacturer, Incat, in July 2013 and then subsequently wound up in UAE service.  The ship was attacked by Houthi rebels off Yemen on 1-Oct-2016.  Reports vary as to what weapon struck the ship with some citing four RPGs and some citing a single C-802 anti-ship cruise missile which seems more likely.

 

Examine the following damage photos and then we’ll discuss them.

 

 

Damage Analysis

 

I am not a combat damage, photo interpretation expert but I’ll offer a few observations about the damage that seem fairly apparent.  The weapon, whatever it was, appears to have struck the starboard bow as evidenced by the inward bent holes.  The port side bow holes seem to mainly be bent outward, suggesting damage from an internal explosion (the missile warhead, presumably). 

 

There is also a large, outwardly bent hole on the underside of the bow, presumably due to the internal explosion of the weapon, which suggests that the weapon did not penetrate to any significant degree before exploding.

 

A large section of the upper bow surface is missing.  Whether that is from the weapon explosion or the subsequent fire, I’m unsure.

 

My novice interpretation is that a weapon struck the starboard bow, resulting in an immediate explosion (contact fuzed?) just inside the bow and producing exit holes downward and to port.  Other photos show the entire forward section engulfed in flames after the attack and fire accounts for the damage to the superstructure and damage aft of the bow.

 

 

Lessons

 

Unmanned Vessels – The Navy is planning on having small, unmanned vessels make up a significant portion of the fleet.  Presumably, these unmanned vessels will be lightly constructed of thin aluminum.  The Navy is unlikely to spend money on thick steel for small unmanned vessels.  The Swift is a good model for an unmanned vessel in terms of combat damage resistance (none) and susceptibility to damaging fire (total).  The obvious conclusion is that lightly built, unmanned vessels will be totally destroyed by single, relatively light hits.  If the vessels are cheap enough, this may be an acceptable situation.  What this tells us is that cost control for small unmanned vessels is paramount as attrition rates will be high.  We cannot afford to allow small vessels to assume large costs, as the Navy is prone to do.

 

Damage Control – Ships will get hit and the ship and crew’s survival depends on damage control.  As history has shown, repeatedly, the number one factor in successful damage control is large numbers of crew.  There’s no getting around it, damage control is physically brutal work and the more live bodies that are available, the better the chance of success.  This also argues strenuously against women on ships.  Women simply haven’t got the physical strength or endurance to conduct effective damage control.

 

Aluminum – Swift’s damage once again demonstrates the foolishness of using aluminum in the construction of WARships.  Recall that the Independence variant of the LCS is all aluminum construction and the Freedom variant has a steel hull with aluminum superstructure.

 

Armor – The damage pattern shown on the Swift indicates that the initial hit occurred at the forward end of the bow (nearly missing!).  The subsequent damage pattern shows that there was no containment or mitigation of the explosive effects.  Armor would have reduced the ‘spread’, extent, and severity of the damage.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The Navy is being presented with multiple, actual, highly relevant, combat damage examples from which to draw lessons (Port Royal, McCain, Fitzgerald, Norwegian Helge, Guardian, Bonhomme Richard, Miami, ex-Swift, Russian Slava class, and others).  Bafflingly, the Navy seems determined to ignore the lessons.  The Navy continues to design ships that are poorly designed for combat and damage resilience and they continue to embrace minimal manning which all but ensures the loss of billion dollar ships to minor damage.

 

Eventually, somehow, some way, we’ve got to embrace the combat damage lessons that are piling up and begging to be applied.  We’ve got to stop designing peacetime cruise ships and start designing WARships.  Unfortunately, the Ford class and the new Constellation do not appear to be WARships and the Navy’s obsession with unmanned vessels certainly does not embrace any combat lessons.

 

Wake up Navy and embrace the combat lessons.

Navy SUPSHIP and Waivers

Congress has recently been exercising their mandated oversight responsibilities over the military.  This is all for the good and I commend them, as a group, while noting that they should be much more vigorous, rigorous, and punitive in their actions.  Still, it’s an improvement. 

 

Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review the Navy’s Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) organization which functions under NAVSEA (which I have previously stated should be eliminated as a completely worthless organization).  To that end, GAO has released a report examining the role of SUPSHIP.  As the report notes, SUPSHIP

 

… serve as the Navy’s on-site technical, contractual, and business authority for the construction of Navy vessels at major private shipyards.[1]

 

These are the people who should be ensuring that ships are built properly and to specification.  The reality, however, is that ships are routinely delivered significantly incomplete, non-functional, and, in some cases, damaged.  Clearly, SUPSHIP is failing and failing badly.  For example, GAO

 

… found in 2018 that the lead ships for six Navy programs experienced delays in providing the ships to the fleet, ranging from 6 months to 6 years, and cost growth as high as 154 percent.[1]

 

As the report states,

 

Collectively, these results have raised questions about the Navy’s ability to effectively oversee shipbuilder performance throughout the construction of new ships.[1]

 

GAO was commissioned to find out why.

 

Think about the concept embodied in SUPSHIP. 

 

While prime contractors are responsible for controlling the quality of their work, the Navy relies on the SUPSHIPs, as the government’s primary on-site representatives, to perform quality assurance oversight during ship construction at private shipyards.[1]

 

These are supposed experts in ship construction and they are emplaced in the shipyards that the Navy contracts with.  They see the ships being built on a daily basis.  There should be no surprises, no quality issues, no incomplete ships, and no construction failures  …  and yet there are.  In fact, failure is the norm.  How can that be?  Well, peruse the following quotes from the report that point at various SUPSHIP issues. 

 

Note, in the following quotes, ‘we’ refers to GAO.

 

… we found in 2013 that, while the number of significant deficiencies generally had dropped, the Navy continued to accept the delivery of ships with open deficiencies that lingered after ship delivery.

 

We recommended in 2013, among other things, that the Navy clarify in its policy when contractor-responsible deficiencies should be fully corrected during the acquisition process for shipbuilding programs and ensure the policy is followed. In response, DOD indicated that it would monitor whether additional guidance was necessary but took no further action to implement our recommendation. [emphasis added]

 

In July 2017, we found that problems with quality, completeness, and reliability persisted when ships were turned over to the Navy’s fleet.  Although a certain number of deficiencies can be expected for something as complex as a Navy ship, we found that the Navy’s routine acceptance of ships with significant unresolved deficiencies and reliability problems consumed limited resources, diminished ship performance, and added to sailors’ workloads.

 

… we recommended that the Secretary of the Navy revise the service’s ship delivery policy to clarify what types of Supervisors of Shipbuilding deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability must be achieved at acceptance of ship delivery from the shipbuilder and when the ship is provided to the fleet. DOD did not agree with this 2017 recommendation and has yet to take action to implement it. [emphasis added]

 

We found that the Navy infrequently uses specific quality incentives in contracts, and that, when used, they have minimal effect on the SUPSHIPs’ quality assurance activities …

 

… SUPSHIPs traditionally perform limited or no on-site quality assurance of the ship systems and components developed and produced away from the shipyards.

 

… for key complex systems that must be integrated into the ships, the SUPSHIPs’ lack of involvement prior to the [Government Furnished Equipment’s] arrival at the shipyard reduces opportunities to leverage their expertise to address known problems.

 

We found that the Navy largely limits the SUPSHIPs’ involvement in key decision-making activities for shipbuilding programs prior to contract awards.

 

 

 

Waivers

 

As regular readers know, ComNavOps is death on waivers, believing they are unjustified, regardless of circumstances, during peacetime.  Indeed, the report repeatedly addresses the use of waivers as a detriment to successful ship construction and delivery as evidenced by the following quotes.

 

Prior to the [Ford] acceptance trials, the CNO also approved a waiver for the advanced arresting gear that excluded the system from inspection during the trials.

 

We found that five of 12 case study ships used deficiency waivers approved by the CNO—50 waivers in total—to proceed with acceptance trials.  Additionally, the Navy’s subsequent acceptance of ship deliveries for five of the ships was supported by 59 waivers for starred card deficiencies identified by INSURV during the trials.

 

… we found that the Navy has received standing waivers for some deficiencies with Virginia class submarines that will never meet Navy specifications or cannot be completed prior to acceptance trials due to time restrictions.

 

… waiving incomplete or deficient equipment through trials and delivery reduces the SUPSHIPs’ ability to hold the shipbuilder accountable for timely correction of deficiencies by allowing shipbuilders to deliver ships that have yet to meet requirements.

 

The Navy’s use of waivers and the corresponding limits to the SUPSHIPs’ shareable knowledge of the condition of waived systems also have the potential to mask construction problems with longer-term quality and performance consequences.

 

 

 

 

Here’s a table showing a couple examples of the use of waivers in Acceptance Trials and Delivery (table adapted from report [1]).

 

	Acceptance Trial Waivers	Delivery Waivers
CVN-78	15	36
DDG-1001	29	18

 

 

Waivers are tossed around like confetti.  Is it any wonder that ships are delivered incomplete, non-functional, and damaged?  All waivers must be personally approved by the CNO.  That makes this entire mess solely and personally his fault.  Congress needs to immediately fire SecNav and CNO.  Of course, if either had an ounce of integrity, they’d resign in shame.

 

NAVSEA and SUPSHIP need to be eliminated since neither perform an effective, useful function.

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

[1]Government Accountability Office, “Navy Shipbuilding, Increasing Supervisors of Shipbuilding Responsibility Could Help Improve Program Outcomes”, April 2022

! ! ! !

This is not a Navy issue but it warrants a notice.  The Boeing KC-46 tanker program has had lots of problems and the manufacturer has taken massive losses.

... KC-46 losses now total more than $5 billion on a $4.9 billion contract ... [1]

Boeing has lost more than the contract was worth !

KC-46 Tanker [1]

Sooner or later, the various military and industrial contracting parties have got to learn some lessons such as:

• Don't design products that are more complicated than they need to be.  Seriously, it's a tanker.  It's a flying fuel tank with a pump for transferring the fuel.  We've been doing this for how many decades?  But no ... we had to make the new tanker an all-digital, remote vision, automated, fly-by-wire boom, with super glass panoramic displays.  In addition, we couldn't just have it dispense gas.  No, that would be too simple and cheap.  We had to make it a multi-function, combination tanker, passenger transport with seating for 58, cargo transport with capacity for 18 pallets, and medevac with room for 54 patients.[2]
• Don't low ball bids[1]
• Don't accept bids that are obviously unrealistic.  The Air Force is just as much to blame as Boeing.
• Don't ask for and don't offer fixed price bids for unproven products.
• Demand prototypes and test them thoroughly before issuing contracts.

The Air Force may think they were clever by using a fixed price contract but what did they gain?  The program began in 2001 and Boeing was selected in 2011.  Now, 11 years later, the Air Force has yet to receive new functional tankers.  The Air Force may not be footing the bill for the problem fixes and schedule delays but they aren't receiving any product, either.  So, what did they really gain?

[1]https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/new-boeing-defense-ceo-signals-different-approach-in-future-fixed-price-contracts/

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_KC-46_Pegasus