Loyal Wingman

‘Littoral’ – the term was appropriated by the Navy to describe a form of warfare that was, supposedly, unique and beyond the capability of then current Navy platforms.  The only solution, said the Navy, was to buy lots of Littoral Combat Ships and so the LCS debacle was birthed. 

 

The defining characteristic of the ‘littoral’ fiasco was that the conversation jumped immediately from theoretical concept to implementation.  What was ignored was reality and validity.  There were no studies, no exercises, no concepts of operation … nothing to establish the validity, or lack thereof, of the concept.  We went straight from concept to implementation and, from the Navy’s perspective and goals (budget) this was quite understandable.  The Navy knew there was nothing unique about ‘littoral’ as a form of warfare.  Ships have fought in shallow water for hundreds of years.  Images of WWII destroyers standing barely offshore to provide fire support on D-Day are iconic.  What the Navy wanted was to get Congress to fund more ships before someone had the forethought to question the concept.  Thus, we committed to a production run of 55 LCS without ever establishing the validity of the concept, analyzing alternatives, or establishing concepts of operation.

 

This phenomenon of jumping straight from concept to implementation is not unique to the military world.  It is common throughout industry and society.  For example, diversity (whether gender or racial) burst upon the scene and we leapt immediately over validity and straight into implementation.  Diversity would have us believe that a man and a woman or a black and a white are somehow inherently superior to two women or two blacks.  A moment’s reasoned thought would reveal this as ridiculous.  Despite that, we’ve jumped immediately to implementation.  There is hardly a corporate board or governmental organization today that does not mandate (formally or informally) quotas to ensure diversity.  Whenever there’s a Supreme Court vacancy the cries immediately arise from all corners for the position to be filled by a woman or a black or a Leprechaun or whatever gender/racial characteristic the particular group is advocating for.  That’s ridiculous.  The only ‘cry’ should be to find the best possible person regardless of gender, race, or type of car they drive. 

 

Corporations have moved from finding the best people for their boardrooms to finding the most diverse people.  Presidential cabinets have gone from finding the best people to finding the most diverse.  Army Rangers and Navy SEALs have gone from finding the best people to mandating diversity.

 

The latest example of this phenomenon is the ‘loyal wingman’.  It is the latest craze and we have already jumped right over validity and straight into implementation.  No one is asking whether the concept makes sense, whether it can work, whether an already combat task-overloaded pilot can control multiple other aircraft while fighting for his own life, and whether pale imitations of manned aircraft can perform well enough to make a difference.  No one has asked how a loyal wingman will work, what it will do, under what circumstances it can be useful, and what situations are not appropriate for it?  No one is asking why, if a manned combat fighter aircraft costs $100M each, we think we’ll be able to build unmanned versions cheap enough to be expendable?

Loyal Wingman Concept Art

 

What will the loyal wingman aircraft do?  Try this description:

 

The cornerstone of the concept is a low-cost unmanned platform to work alongside traditional manned combat aircraft and operate as a force-multiplier, adding “mass” while also undertaking more hazardous tasks and missions when required. (3)

 

How’s that for some truly impressive buzzword bingo that says nothing?  It leaves us with no worked out concept, no proof of validity, no exercises demonstrating effectiveness, no nothing.

 

 

No one asked about the LCS and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the Zumwalt and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the Ford and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the F-35 and we see how that turned out.

 

Nope, it’s all about implementation.

 

Ignore the reality. 

 

Ignore the analysis.

 

Ignore validating exercises. 

 

Ignore the CONOPS. 

 

Ignore alternatives.

 

 

 

Just implement it.

 

 

 

 

Okay, that was the general warning about the loyal wingman concept.  Now, let’s look at some specific potential problems.

 

Communications – We don’t have artificial intelligence, yet, that even remotely approaches combat capability despite the public relations stunt put on by DARPA.  That means the wingman aircraft cannot perform on its own in any meaningful way.  It will need to be closely controlled by a human pilot/controller and that, in turn, requires constant communications.  Presumably, the comms will need to be omnidirectional because it will be impossible to maintain a direct, point to point comm link when both the transmitting control aircraft and the receiving wingman are engaged in high-g, violent maneuvers.

 

Situational Awareness – I’ve not heard of anyone talking about using two-seater aircraft to control the wingman aircraft so can a single pilot in the controlling aircraft establish and maintain situational awareness to direct the wingman aircraft while simultaneously engaging in aerial combat, himself, and fighting for his own life?  Can he do it for more than one aircraft?  There’s a reason why the F-14, EA-6B, and other aircraft have multiple crew.  The workload is too much for one pilot.

 

Or, is this a case where we fantasize that the single pilot will cruise around the aerial battlefield, undetected and unhindered by any enemy actions and leisurely direct swarms of wingman aircraft?

 

Combat Effectiveness – I have yet to hear what, exactly, the wingman aircraft is going to do.  It can’t successfully engage in aerial combat on its own or even with a controller.  There is no unmanned aircraft that can do that.  It could be an aerial missile ‘barge’ for the controlling aircraft but, again, can a single pilot, fighting for his life make effective use of such an aircraft?  It could be a decoy or missile sponge but we already have a variety of much cheaper chaff, flares, and decoys (towed and flying) so I don’t see what would be gained there.  So, if the wingman can’t defeat an enemy aircraft, what will it do?  I’m failing to see the combat effectiveness.

 

Some articles suggest its role is ISR and early warning.(1)  If so, that’s a lot of hype and cost (see the next section on cost) for an extended sensor and nothing I’ve seen indicates they’ll be able to supply another aircraft with a real time combat picture (see the section on communications).

 

Another article suggests that the loyal wingman will be tasked with ‘absorbing enemy fire’.(2)  If so, that’s an incredibly expensive way to defend another aircraft.  Plus, how would that work?  In order to be physically close enough to ‘absorb fire’, the wingman aircraft would have to be almost flying a welded wing formation.  Do we really think we can formation fly in combat without collisions?  And with an unmanned aircraft?

 

Cost – If the wingman aircraft is going to attempt to engage in aerial combat, it will need the same performance, speed, range, weapons, and sensors as our best manned aircraft which means it will cost the same as a manned aircraft and that’s not cheap.  Are we going to use $100M wingman aircraft as throwaway expendables?  We’ll go broke real fast doing that.  So many people have the mistaken notion that unmanned somehow automatically means cheap and that’s just not the case.  If you want high performance fighter aircraft capability it’s going to cost what high performance fighter aircraft cost.

 

Attrition – As noted, we don’t have the AI to produce aerial ‘Terminators’.  That means that the wingman aircraft are going to suffer extreme attrition which brings us back to the cost issue.

 

 

Summary

 

So, in our pursuit of technology as the magical solution to all our problems, we’ve latched on to this wingman concept and jumped right over validation and straight into implementation.  We’ve got to learn some lessons from our past failures and start asking questions before it’s too late.  We need a CONOPS for this concept and we need extensive validation exercises.  Failing that, the loyal wingman concept will be just another example to add to the list of poorly conceived disasters.

 

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

(1)https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/loyal-wingman-unmanned-aircraft/

 

(2)https://militaryleak.com/2020/12/21/boeing-australia-loyal-wingman-stealth-ucav-conducts-first-high-speed-taxi-test/

 

(3)https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35806/australias-loyal-wingman-drone-its-developing-with-boeing-has-been-photographed-in-the-wild

Constellation Class Frigate - Success or Just Not Failure?

ComNavOps has often noted that the Navy, as an institution, seems utterly incapable of learning lessons regardless of how painful and obvious those lessons are.  For example, concurrency has been proven to be an unmitigated failure time after time and yet it continues to be a cornerstone of Navy acquisition programs ... which continue to fail.

 

Well, the Navy has managed to semi-learn one semi-lesson and that is to avoid bad press.  It would be much, much better if they learned one of the lessons related to warship design, firepower, project management, cost control, requirements creep, or any of a hundred other valuable lessons but they didn’t.  The only lesson they’ve learned is to avoid bad press. 

 

How do you avoid bad press, you ask?  Well, if you’re the Navy, you make sure that the next ship you build has already been built by someone else, in the past.  This both minimizes risk and allows you to blame some other builder/country if things go badly.

 

Let’s be honest and acknowledge that this approach does reduce the degree of programmatic risk and, therefore, increases the chances for apparent success.  Why do I use the qualifier ‘apparent’?  Well, it’s because the program won’t be an actual success, even if everything works perfectly - and it won’t!  It will be a success only in the sense that it may not generate bad press and be an out and out embarrassment.  Well, wait a minute, now.  The Fincantieri FREMM frigate that the Navy frigate will be based on is a proven success, isn’t it?  So, why wouldn’t the US Navy version also be a success?

 

Well, consider this … the FREMM design dates back to the early 2000’s, making the design nearly two decades old by now and it will be three decades old, or older, by the time the first few US Navy frigates will enter actual service (scheduled delivery 2026, IOC around 2030 – and schedules always slip).  Can a 30+ year old ship design really be called a success?

 

Consider the issue of stealth.  When the FREMM was first designed, it may have been considered stealthy but by today’s standards, its appearance would suggest that it is only marginally stealthy, like the Burke.  Is a brand new ship that will become our front line surface combat ship as the Burkes are replaced by unmanned vessels, really a success if it’s only marginally stealthy?

 

Consider the Navy’s actual needs.  This one may be somewhat debatable but ComNavOps has laid out the very clear case that the Navy needs a small, dedicated ASW corvette (or minesweeper or any of a dozen other ship types) far more than a mini-Burke.  Is a brand new ship that is, at best, far down the needs list really a success?

 

Consider cost and performance.  We all (except the Navy) know that the frigate is going to cost $1B+ which pushes it into the conceptual ‘half the performance for two thirds the cost’ region.  Is that really a success?

 

Okay, all the above are legitimate reasons why the frigate program can’t be a success no matter how well it manages to avoid bad press but those are not the real reasons why it can’t be a success.  The real reason is because the design is already obsolete and fails to deliver the new capabilities that are needed to fight future wars. 

 

We’ve seen that technology – and, hence, future war – has changed radically just in the last few years and has changed even more so over the last three decades that will have elapsed by the time the first frigates enter service.  Consider the developments and advances in combat technology since 2000 with the advent of drones, swarms, artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced stealth, advanced stealth detection, advanced multi-sensor guidance systems for missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic projectiles and missiles, lasers, rail guns, advanced SSK submarines, and many dozens of other technologies.  In order to fight a future war with those technologies, either for us or against us or both, we need new ships designed from the start to use, or defend against, those technologies.  The FREMM design has none of those capabilities.  Why would it?  It was designed almost 20 some years ago when those technologies didn’t exist.

 

Here’s a list of the capabilities that a new ship - any type of new warship - ought to have to fight a future war, based on the threats we can reasonably anticipate:

 

• UAV - Extensive UAV capability is needed to provide organic surveillance.  I’m talking about many dozens of UAVs and the ability to operate at least a couple dozen simultaneously – far beyond the capabilities of any ship today.
  

• Stealth - Extreme Visby-level stealth to include radar, acoustic, IR, and visible signature reductions.  With the proliferation of EO guided imaging missiles, visible signature reduction will be just as important as radar and IR signature reduction.
  

• Emissions Control – Future ships will need total EMCON capability.  Any signal, no matter where in the electromagnetic spectrum, will be a vulnerability and allow the enemy a chance to detect and target the ship.  This is not only a communications and radar issue but also a stray radiation issue such as the giant, unshielded motors of EMALs.  The ships the Navy is building today are entirely incapable of achieving EMCON and this must change.
  

• Armor – Long neglected, it has to be recognized that ships will be detected, take hits, and have to keep fighting, unlike the Navy’s recent ship designs that are intended to be abandoned at the first hit (LCS, Light Amphibious Warfare ship, and likely the Zumwalt due to inadequate manning).  Advanced armors including, possibly, spaced armor, composite armor, ‘bubble’ armor, reactive armor, flexible armor, and the good old fashioned plate armor must be incorporated.  Ships cost far too much and take far too long to build to allow them to be one-hit kills.
  

• Acoustics – As submarines proliferate, ships need modified hull shaping to lower acoustic signatures.

• Explosive Resilience – Ships need modified hull shaping to enhance underwater explosion survivability (V-shaping to deflect pressure waves;  yes, this one needs to be proven and might not work as I anticipate).
  

• Cyber – Future ships must be as protected from cyber attack as from missile attack.  Ships need the ability to totally isolate and defend the cyber realm.
  

• Propulsion – Industry has made significant advances in propulsion technology.  Future ships need podded electric propulsion for enhanced reliability, repairability, efficiency, flexibility, and silence.
  

• Structure – Ships need totally revised structural design to absorb blasts rather than resist them (see, “Torpedo Lethality Myth”).
  

• Fire Control – Given that short range (horizon) AAW engagements will be the norm, enhanced radar and fire control is needed to manage the seconds-long engagement windows and the resulting aerial clutter.  See, “Cruise Missile Characteristics Related to Detection and Engagement Range” and See, “Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Characteristics – Follow Up”

 

 

Unfortunately, due to the obsolete FREMM design and the imposed requirement to use an existing ship design, few, if any, of these attributes can be included in the US Navy design.  Rather than building a ship purposely designed and optimized for the anticipated type of future combat, we’re building a nearly obsolete ship out of fear of bad press.

 

The Navy is using the exact same reasoning to continue building Burkes despite them being nearly obsolete and lacking the room, power, and utilities to even mount the required radar arrays, as well as lacking stealth, armor, etc.  We’re intentionally building sub-par Burkes as our future surface combatants not because they represent a good ship design any longer but because they’re a safe public relations build.

 

So, we see that a truly successful new warship needs to be built to the requirements of future combat, not combat from 20+ years ago but, instead, we’re building to avoid a failure.

 

We’re not building for success, we’re building for ‘not failure’.

 

The new frigate will not and, indeed, cannot, be a success.  At best, it can be a ‘not failure’.

 

The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates

I’m sure you all recall the memo issued by then Secretary of Defense Mattis in Sep 2018 that mandated that F-35 and F-18 aircraft would achieve readiness rates of 80% or greater by the end of 2019 (see, “You Will Comply”)?  How did that work out?  Well, in a miracle for the ages, less than 6 months after that memo was issued the Navy reported that Super Hornet readiness had jumped from the 50% mark, where it had been mired for several years due to parts shortages, personnel shortages, and other systemic problems, to as high as 76% despite all the same problems still existing.  Did that seem plausible?  Of course not.  Systemic problems don’t disappear in less than 6 months and huge backlogs of idled aircraft don’t suddenly become ready.  It was obvious that someone was playing reporting games and manipulating the data.

 

Still, the Navy continued to report high readiness rates, claiming to have exceeded the 80% mark.(2)

 

Here’s what I posted when the Navy announced their miraculous improvement:

 

Years of maintenance manpower shortages, higher than expected corrosion and problems, chronic spare parts shortages, depot backlogs, funding shortages, etc., all cured in less than 6 months by a single memo. 

 

Do you think readiness is unchanged and we’re just pencil-whipping and gun-decking the readiness reports?  Before you answer, consider all the Navy fraudulent statements and practices (lapsed certifications, acceptance trial waivers, fraudulent shock trial success claims, and hundreds of other examples) that we’ve exposed on this blog alone.  Now, let me repeat the question … Do you really think readiness surged that much in 5 months or less or is it unchanged and the Navy is just pencil-whipping the readiness reports? (1)

 

 

The GAO has now come out with a report on military aircraft readiness and it confirms what ComNavOps knew to be true – that the Navy was falsifying readiness reports.

 

The table below shows the GAO’s data for readiness of Navy aircraft during the 9 year period FY2011 - FY2019, inclusive.  GAO assessed readiness by comparing the aircraft’s mission capable rate (MCR) to the MCR goal established by the Navy.  Unfortunately, the MCR goals for each aircraft have been withheld from the GAO report as the information is considered sensitive.  Typically, MCR goals are on the order of 70%.

 

Note:  Mission Capable is the ability to perform any one of the aircraft’s notional missions.  This is the lowest possible form of readiness.  Fully Mission Capable is the highest level of readiness and the only one that we should be using – an aircraft is either ready to fly any mission or it is not ready.  MCR is often little more than the ability to take off and is of no use in assessing true combat readiness.

 

 

Aircraft	Number of Years Readiness Goal Was Met
F/A-18A-D (Navy)	1 of 9
F/A-18E-F (Navy)	0 of 9
F-35C (Navy)	2 of 7
F-35B (Marine)	1 of 7
F/A-18A-D (Marine)	0 of 9

 

 

 

 

Note that the Navy claimed that the Super Hornet readiness had exceeded 80% for the Super Hornet which would have likely easily surpassed whatever its readiness goal is.  Despite this, GAO, with access to real data, found that the Super Hornet never exceeded its goal. 

 

From the GAO report which addressed the SecDef Mattis memo and the Super Hornet and F-35 readiness,

 

We found that none of these aircraft had achieved the 80 percent mission capable  goal … (3, p.11)

 

The Navy publicly reported in late September 2019 that it had met the Secretary’s 80 percent mission capable goal for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler. Our analysis showed that mission capable rates generally did improve for these Navy systems over the course of fiscal year 2019, including meeting the 80 percent mission capable rate at particular points of time in fiscal year 2019. However, we found that none

of these aircraft achieved the mission capable goal when mission capable rate data were averaged for each day in fiscal year 2019. (3, p.12)

 

 

There you have it, the real readiness rates and they’re the same as they’ve always been – not ready!

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)Navy Matters blog, “You Will Comply”, 10-Apr-2020

 

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Surpasses 80% Aircraft Readiness Goal, Reaches Stretch Goal of 341 Up Fighters”, Megan Eckstein, 25-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/25/navy-surpasses-80-aircraft-readiness-goal-reaches-stretch-goal-of-341-up-fighters

(3)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon System Sustainment”, GAO-21-101SP, Nov 2020

Jeffersonian Gunboats

Here’s an interesting topic that was suggested during the last open comment post and I thank the anonymous reader for the idea.  I encourage anonymous readers to include a username with their comment.  No need to formally establish a sign-in ID but a name at the end of a comment allows me to give credit! 

___________________________________ 

 

In the very early 1800’s, President Thomas Jefferson was faced with an aggressive British movement against American merchant shipping. 

 

From 1800 to 1805, fifty-nine American merchant ships had fallen captive to Britain; from 1805 through 1807, four hundred and sixty-nine ships, or approximately half the merchant fleet, fell into British hands. (1)

 

In 1807 alone, the British impressment of American sailors resulted in the loss of 6,000 men.(1)

 

Jefferson’s solution was to abandon any offensive action against the British and instead to fall back on a home waters defensive force.  He recognized that the US could not take on the might of the British navy and he opted, instead, for a defensive force of small gunboats.  The specific means of defense that he chose was a fleet of small gunboats designed for coastal defense and for use on the western rivers and lakes.  Later, several served in the Mediterranean and other areas outside the US home waters.

 

First authorized in 1803, a couple of hundred gunboats were built in many port cities until at least as late as 1811.  The gunboats were 50-75 ft long, 18 ft wide, shallow draft, variously rigged, and could sail under wind or oar.  Armament consisted of two or three 18-24 pound swivel mounted guns or 32 pound traversing guns.(1)

 

Jefferson Gunboat Model - Note cannon in bow and two offset

cannon amidships, one to port and one to starboard

Jefferson’s gunboat concept was based, in part, on the effectiveness of gunboats in the defense of Tripoli.(1)  In his letter to Congress, Jefferson cites evidence of the effectiveness of gunboats using historical and contemporary examples:

 

Algiers is particulary known to have owed to a great provision of these vessels the safety of its city since the epoch of their construction. Before that it had been repeatedly insulted and injured. The effect of gunboats at present In the neighborhood of Gibraltar is well known, and how much they were used both in the attack and defense of that place during a former war. The extensive resort to them by the two greatest naval powers in the world on an enterprise of invasion not long since in prospect shews their confidence in their efficacy for the purposes for which they are suited. By the northern powers of Europe, whose seas are particularly adapted to them, they are still more used. The remarkable action between the Russian flotilla of gunboats and galleys and a Turkish fleet of ships of the line and frigates in the Uman Sea in 1788 Will be readily recollected. The latter, commanded by their most celebrated admiral, were completely defeated, and several of their ships of the line destroyed. (2)

 

The Mariner’s Museum provides an explanation of the general theory about the gunboats.

 

Jefferson and other Republicans knew that gunboats posed no threat to the British navy and thus would not provoke a preemptive strike. Gunboats could be distributed to many American ports and provide defense to a larger territory for less money than a frigate navy. Jefferson envisioned gunboats used in conjunction with land batteries, movable fortifications, and floating batteries to repulse attacks. (1)

 

Jefferson, himself, explained his theory about gunboats in a Feb 10, 1807 letter to Congress:

 

Under present circumstances, and governed by the intentions of the Legislature as manifested by their annual appropriations of money for the purposes of defense, it has been concluded to combine, first, land batteries furnished with heavy cannon and mortars, and established on all the points around the place favorable for preventing vessels from lying before it; second, movable artillery, which may be carried, as occasion may require, to points unprovided with fixed batteries; third, floating batteries, and fourth, gunboats which may oppose an enemy at his entrance and cooperate with the batteries for his expulsion. (2)

 

Thus, the gunboats, individually weak as naval vessels, were intended to operate as part of a combined (we would call it joint) defense utilizing land fortifications and artillery.

 

The Museum also offers thoughts on the weaknesses of the concept.

 

A passive defense was useless against an invader with a strong navy like Britain. One frigate had the gun power of forty gunboats, and with their thin planking and low decks exposed to gunfire, gunboats stood little chance of survival. Invasion points were never known, and the few gunboats stationed at various American ports could provide only minimal defense.  Furthermore, a gunboat was useless at sea and thus could not defend U.S. commerce. (1)

 

Jefferson acknowledges the limitations of the gunboats in his letter:

 

It must be supenduous to observe that this species of naval armament is proposed merely for defensive operation; that it can have but little effect toward protecting our commerce in the open seas, even on our own coast; and still less can it become an excitement to engage in offensive maritime war, toward which it would furnish no means. (2)

 

Cost was also an issue.  Congress authorized 25 gunboats in 1805, 50 in 1806, and 188 in 1807 with construction occurring at ports all around the country.(1)

 

First estimates put a gunboat's cost at $5,000; in actuality, costs totaled over $10,000. (1)

 

Apparently, the Navy had difficulty estimating costs even back then!

 

One of the consequences of the gunboat program was a cessation of major naval construction which left the nation ill-prepared for the War of 1812.  In 1809, Jefferson’s successor, James Madison, began to remove the gunboats from active service and by the end of 1811 only 63 gunboats remained in service.

 

Jefferson's theory of naval defense would lead to the loss of much of the naval strength the United States had gained since the Barbary War of 1805, leaving the nation with an inadequate naval force when it needed it most. (1)

 

The Mariner’s Museum sums up the situation at the start of the War of 1812 quite nicely:

 

The U.S. Navy had seven frigates, four schooners, four ketches, and 170 gunboats to pit against the greatest naval power the world had ever seen. (1)

 

 

Lessons

 

So, what can we learn from Jefferson’s gunboat program?  Some of the similarities to today’s currently vogue concepts are remarkable.  Here are some noteworthy points of consideration:

 

Distributed Lethality – Each gunboat carried 2-3 guns which epitomizes the modern US Navy concept of distributed lethality.  A 40 gun frigate or 100 gun ship of the line was, essentially, broken down into 20-50 individual ships each carrying a couple of guns.  The problem, as noted by the Mariner’s Museum description, is that the individual gunboats, while carrying a weapon equal to a frigate or ship of the line, was an incredibly weak, non-survivable vessel.  Thinly and weakly built, with no ‘armor’ (meaning thick protective strakes of wood on the hull), the vessels were easy kills and would be lucky to get off a single shot in combat.  They might be useful as peacetime patrol vessels but they were utterly useless in high end combat.  Jefferson built a navy that could not fight.

 

Today, we are headed down the same path of building small, individually weak vessels that are incapable of contributing to high end combat.  Replacing Burkes with small, weak, unmanned vessels is a repeat of Jefferson’s concept with the same attendant flaws.

 

It should be noted, however, that the gunboat concept did not call for the gunboats to operate as standalone naval forces but, rather, as one aspect of a multi-faceted defense that relied on combined land-sea forces.  In other words, the gunboats were intended to operate under the close protection and cooperation of a heavy land artillery force.  In contrast, the US Navy’s distributed lethality concept has the individual vessels operating in enemy controlled or contested waters with no other support.  This glaring difference, alone, should give pause to the US Navy’s proponents of distributed lethality and force a consideration of where and how our individual ships will be supported and, if they cannot be supported, why we are exposing them, individually to certain loss.  Simply using the word ‘lethality’ in the phrase ‘distributed lethality’ does not actually make it lethal any more than the word ‘combat’ in ‘Littoral Combat Ship’ makes the LCS a warship.

 

Massing – One of the foundations of modern military theory is the massing of localized force (conceptually accomplished by maneuver) to achieve victory even against overall superior forces.  In contrast, Jefferson’s gunboat concept scattered the gunboat force all over the coastal US, preventing any massing of force.  Any enemy attack would, by definition, be met by only a small fraction of the total force and would be inadequate for defense against all but the smallest of enemy forces.  This automatically granted the enemy the achievement of localized mass and assured their victory.  The gunboats would be subject to defeat in detail against any enemy that wished to make the effort.  Similarly, our distributed lethality concept, our push for disaggregated ARG/MEUs, and our trend towards scattered unmanned vessels exposes our entire force to defeat in detail.  Just as naval leaders in WWII recognized the value of massing of ships (convoys, task forces, escorts) for mutual defense, so too, should we recognize that same value and yet we’re knowingly proceeding in the opposite direction.  We are scattering our naval force like a Jeffersonian gunboat fleet.

 

Combat Resilience – Throughout history, naval warfare has been characterized by the ability of ships to stand and fight.  Damage is absorbed while the ship continues to fight effectively until the enemy is subdued.  In the age of sail, ships were generally not sunk but were, instead, slowly pounded into submission.  This required the ships to be able to maintain constant volleys while absorbing constant damage.  In WWII, the same behavior occurred.  As an example, the naval battles of Guadalcanal saw Japanese and American ships absorb dozens or hundreds of shell hits while maintaining effective fire of their own.

 

Gunboats, as we have noted, had absolutely no ability to absorb damage.  They were completely unable to stand and fight.  One or two hits and the gunboats would be mission killed, if not destroyed.

 

Today, we’re building ships that are actually designed to be abandoned at the first hit (LCS, LAW, and, by virtue of its minimal crew, the Zumwalt).  This is not combat-effective and represents very poor combat value for the money.

 

Armament – The gunboats were the epitome of heavy but extremely limited armament.  Most gunboats had 2-3 guns which were, as individual guns, considered heavy armament, equal to a frigate or ship of the line.  However, as a fighting unit, the gunboats were very weakly armed with, as noted, only 2-3 guns.  Thus, a single gunboat was, essentially, combat-useless.  It was capable of successfully engaging only weaker armed ships which, from a naval perspective, meant that it had no use in naval combat.  Only if operating in massed squadrons – what we would refer to as a swarm, today – could they apply enough collective firepower to have a chance to be effective.  Unfortunately, being scattered across dozens/hundreds of port locations, they had no chance to ever mass.

 

As an example of the typical armanent, gunboat #5 carried, at various times (3):

 

1805:  2x 32-pounder guns

1812:  1x 24-pounder + 2x 6-pounder

1813:  1x 24-pounder + 4x 6-pounder

1814:  1x 24-pounder + 4x 12-pounder

 

This is exactly the situation the Navy is creating with the LCS, each of which will be armed with 4-8 Naval Strike Missiles as its entire anti-ship weaponry.  Thus, a single LCS is capable of successfully engaging only corvette size ships or smaller, if even that.  An LCS’ 4-8 anti-ship missiles constitute no threat to, say, a Chinese 052 or 055 Burke-type destroyer.

 

This should also serve as a warning to the Navy about their plans to arm amphibious and logistics ships.  A very limited capability of 4-8 missiles offers no useful combat capability.

 

 

Summary

 

As noted, the parallels between Jefferson’s gunboat concept and today’s distributed lethality concept are striking and today’s concept contains all the same flaws as the gunboat concept.  History constantly screams its lessons at us and we resolutely cover our ears and refuse to listen.  History has judged the gunboat program an abject failure and yet we seem determined to repeat it. 

 

The one theoretical strength of the gunboat concept was its link with land based fortifications and artillery.  Thus, the gunboats and the land fortifications were intended to operate as a single defensive entity.  This emphasizes two aspects of the program:  the ‘joint’ nature of the concept and the purely defensive nature.  Our modern distributed lethality concept abandons both of those aspects by operating the individual ships without support and in an offensive role which, by definition, places them forward, in higher risk situations.

 

If we are determined to repeat the gunboat concept, we need to study the gunboat program and explain how/why our version will succeed gloriously despite containing all the same flaws (and none of the few strengths!) as Jefferson’s program.

 

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)The Mariner’s Museum website, “Jefferson’s Gunboat Navy”, retrieved 12-Dec-2020,

https://www.marinersmuseum.org/sites/micro/usnavy/07.htm

 

(2)History Central website,

https://www.historycentral.com/documents/NEWNATION/Gunboats.htm

 

(3)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Ambush_(1814)

Merry Christmas

Merry Christmas to all and best wishes to you and your loved ones!

Ford Update

The Navy has, essentially, stopped releasing any data or information on the Ford, even to DOT&E which has noted that the Navy is no longer providing EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) and AAG (Advanced Arresting Gear) performance and reliability data.

 

That leaves us to infer the state of the Ford so …  let’s do some inferring!

 

EMALS

 

How is EMALS coming along?  Well, you’ll recall that the last data we had from DOT&E, before the Navy stopped providing data – which should, itself, infer something negative about the system - , showed that the system was failing at a staggering rate.

 

Out of 747 shipboard launches performed with the EMALS, ten had suffered critical failures. The target reliability average was one critical failure per 4,166 launch cycles. The launch system is over 50 times less reliable than the target failure rate. Every time they try to launch the full complement of airplanes they will have a critical failure.

 

The landing system also fails every 70-75 times it is used. This is over 200 times less reliable than planned. General Atomics engineers made it impossible to repair the AAG landing failures without shutting down flight operations. The AAG power supply can’t be disconnected from the high-voltage supply while flights continue. (3)

 

Is the EMALs doing any better, now?

 

Ford’s EMALS experienced a crash over the summer [June 2020], prohibiting the carrier from performing flight operations for five days. (1)

 

… the ship’s Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) suffered a failure that prevented the carrier from launching planes for five days …

 

On June 2, the crew discovered a fault in the power handling system that connects the ship’s energy-generating turbines to the EMALS power system.

…

 

 “After several days of troubleshooting and assessing a fault in the launch system’s power handling elements, embarked EMALS experts and Ford’s crew restored the system to enable the safe fly-off of the air wing on Sunday morning, June 7… (2)

 

As we have previously noted, the interconnected nature of the catapults assures that if one goes down, they all go down and this was case in this incident.  It is also noteworthy that it required several days of troubleshooting to restore the system enough to fly off the air wing.  The wording seems to suggest that the restoration was a temporary fix although that is far from clear. 

 

It is also worth noting the presence of ‘embarked EMALS experts’ which would not normally be present during routine operations.  This has two implications:

 

• That the troubleshooting and repair was likely beyond the capabilities of the Navy crew.  This does not bode well for combat damage repair efforts.
• That the presence of embarked experts absolutely indicates that the EMALS is still not working correctly and reliably or else the experts would not need to be on the ship three years into its commissioning and during pre-deployment workups and trials which should be about training for naval operations rather than still struggling to get the EMALS system to perform at basic, contract-mandated levels of reliability.

 

The inference from the above is that EMALS is still woefully short of contract-mandated levels of performance and reliability.

 

AAG

 

Okay, what about the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system?

 

Capt. Josh Sager, the commanding officer of Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8), said Nov. 17 that Ford had all three of its AAG wires operating with no issues for the preceding four to six days. (1)

 

Cummings [Commanding Officer Capt. J.J. Cummings] described the reliability for both the Dual Band Radar and AAG as getting better throughout every at-sea period. (1)

 

The fact that Capt. Sager thought it noteworthy enough to publicly state that the AAG had worked for ‘the preceding four to six days’ suggests that this level of performance is exceptional and should be noted.  Proudly noting that the landing gear worked for a few days in a row is extremely worrisome.  It suggests that this is not the norm.

 

That Capt. Cummings described the reliability of the AAG as ‘getting better throughout every at-sea period’ again strongly suggests that the AAG is a major problem, though slowly improving.

 

The inference, here, is that the AAG is still woefully short of contract-mandated reliability levels and is at a barely functional level. 

 

Overall, how is the Ford doing with launches and recoveries?

 

Since the beginning of 2020, Ford has conducted 5,000 launches and recoveries of aircraft – most of which the crew has done in the last eight months — and is slated to achieve 6,000 by the end of this calendar year, Cummings said. (1)

 

The question, of course, is not how many total launches and recoveries have been performed but how many have been done between catapult and arresting system failures.  What is the failure rate?  The evidence suggests that the failure rate is still far greater than specified and is likely to continue to be a problem for a few more years, at least.  This is extremely worrisome if the Ford should ever be called to combat.

 

The evidence suggests that the Ford is not capable of reliable, sustained open ocean launch/recoveries, meaning that the ship has to stay within reach of land divert bases so as not to lose aircraft when EMALS and AAG failures occur.  Three years into commissioning, this is inexcusable and everyone associated with this program should be fired.

 

Weapon Elevators

 

So much for launch and recover.  What about those disastrous weapon elevators?

 

With the seventh of 11 weapons elevators slated for certification before the end of this calendar year, … the remaining four will be completed by the end of April 2021. Newport News Shipbuilding has 200 shipyard workers aboard the carrier to aid in finishing the elevators … (1)

 

How bad are these elevators that 200 specialist workers are working on them 24/7 and the best projection is that they’ll be ready by the middle of 2021?  What does this suggest for battle damage repair when the Ford doesn’t have 200 weapon elevator engineers on board?

 

 

 

Summary

 

Ford is in bad shape with major systems failing to meet specification.  The worst aspect of the Ford’s launch and recovery issues is that the design is fundamentally and irrevocably flawed from a maintenance perspective.  The individual catapults and arresting gear cannot be electrically isolated and worked on.  The entire carrier must be powered down to work on any single component.

 

The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters on board CVN 78. The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations. (4)

 

The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations. (4)

 

This issue will continue to plague Ford throughout its service life since it is not correctable.  This also renders the Ford highly suspect as a viable combat unit.  If this design flaw has been continued into the subsequent ships of the class, we are building a class of carriers that has very poor damage repair capability and can be rendered combat incapable by minor battle damage or even simple, routine electrical or mechanical failures.

 

Absent any information from the Navy, we are left to quite reasonably infer that the Ford is a floating pile of hot, steaming excrement.  If the Navy would have us believe otherwise then they need to resume releasing performance and reliability data to DOT&E and the public.  The clamp down on data pretty much tells us just how bad the situation is and is reminiscent of the Navy’s response to the epidemic of INSURV failures which led to the Navy classifying the results instead of fixing them.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “USS Gerald R. Ford Making Steady Progress Ahead of Deployment”, Mallory Shelbourne, 24-Nov-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/24/uss-gerald-r-ford-making-steady-progress-ahead-of-deployment

 

(2)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford EMALS Launching System Suffers Fault During Testing Period”, Sam LaGrone, 8-Jun-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/06/08/uss-gerald-ford-emals-launching-system-suffers-fault-during-testing-period

 

(3)Next Big Future website, “Ford Carrier is a Failure With Huge Radar, Elevator, Launch and Landing Problems”, Brian Wang, 31-Oct-2019,

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2019/10/ford-carrier-is-a-failure-with-huge-radar-elevator-launch-and-landing-problems.html

 

(4)DOT&E FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019