Targets and Weapons - Mismatch?

The firepower rage in the US military is precision guided weapons (PGM).  It’s almost a religion.  Every target needs a PGM, the military would have us believe.  We’ve all but abandoned dumb bombs and area weapons.  Is this wise?  Let’s consider the type of targets we’ll encounter in war and peace and the types of weapons they require.

Broadly, there are two categories of targets:

Targets you can see – These are targets that can be sensed by some targeting-capable sensor.  This could be radar, optical, IR, or whatever.  The obvious caveat, here, is that the sensor has to be within sensing range of the target.  Those tanks that we know are moving around, exposed, somewhere in the enemy’s deep rear area may be ‘seeable’ but if we can’t get a sensor in range then they’re unseen, at least temporarily.

In a war, seeable targets will include fixed facilities such as buildings, factories, air bases, ports, missile silos, roads, bridges, and the like.  The notable feature of such targets is that most are far from the site of actual battles.  They tend to be more infrastructure and combat support facilities.  The remaining targets such as ships, aircraft, troops, vehicles, artillery, etc. will come and go – they’ll be seeable for brief periods and then vanish.  The challenge is to get a sensor and a weapon on them during the period they’re visible.

Targets you can’t see – No smart enemy is going to obligingly line up their forces out in the open for us to systematically destroy.  Instead, they’re going to hide their forces from our sensors as best they can.  This may include disguising targets, burying them, camouflaging them, using obscurants, etc.  Alternatively, making a target unseeable can also include destroying our sensors.  Again, we know there’s tanks moving around somewhere in front of us but all our targeting UAVs keep getting shot down before we can get actionable targeting data.

Let’s consider the characteristics of the two categories as they relate to weapon selection.

Targets you can see – If you can see the target then any weapon is a potentially viable choice and the specific selection will be decided on the basis of weapon availability, target ‘hardness’, range, etc.  In other words, the entire arsenal of weapons is possible and selection depends on fairly obvious factors.  This is where PGMs are useful and effective.

Cost, however, is a notable factor.  Using a multi-million dollar missile to destroy a thousand dollar mortar (I don’t know what mortars cost but this illustrates the concept) is not cost effective. 

Targets you can’t see – It is still possible to successfully engage targets you can’t see.  It’s called area bombardment.  If you place enough explosives in an area, you are statistically certain to kill troops and destroy equipment even if you can’t see them.  The important point, here, is that many/most of the weapons used in area bombardment will not hit anything.  While any weapon can be used for this, the obvious caveat is that PGMs are far too expensive and cost ineffective to be used in area bombardment.

Now, let’s take a graphical look at our target and weapon sets.

In the first graphic, shown below, we see a plot of the visibility of targets versus the likelihood of occurrence.

What this is telling us is that the most visible targets are the least likely (numerous) and, conversely, the most likely (numerous) targets are the least visible.  This is just common sense and is a graphical way of saying that the enemy is going to hide his assets in whatever manner he can.  This is not exactly a stunning revelation and yet so many military professionals seem to think the reverse will be true – that we’ll see and be able to target almost all the enemy’s assets.  Nothing could be further from the truth!

In the next graph, below, we see, simply, that unguided area bombardment weapons (effective area shown in yellow) are effective against ALL targets regardless of their visibility, or not.  Again, nothing new about this.

Finally, in the next graph, we see the subset of targets that PGMs are suited for (area in green).

As we see, PGMs are suited only for a small portion of the target set and yet, bizarrely, most of our weapon development and procurement is focused on PGMs.  We are most focused on the weapons that have the least general applicability!  Strange, isn’t it?

This is not to say that PGMs are not useful.  Of course they are!  The problem is that they are hideously expensive which leads to small inventories and they are of limited applicability.

Consider the Israeli situation.  They have access to PGMs in their fight against Palestine/Hamas/Hezbollah and yet their main problem is that they can’t find any targets to use their weapons against.  Since they’ve opted not to use area bombardment, they’ve created a situation for themselves in which their military is almost ineffective as witnessed by the fact that they keep fighting the same war over and over.

As we ponder what we’ve just learned, let’s take a glance at this table of typical weapons with cost and estimated inventories listed.  As you look at it, relate the costs and inventories to the target sets.

Weapon	Unit Cost	Inventorya
PGM Weapons:
Tomahawk	$2,000,000(1)	3,000
LRASM, AGM-158C	$3,500,000(1)	0
Hellfire, AGM-114	$45,000(1)	0
NSM (Naval Strike Missile)	$1,200,000(2)	200
ATACMS	$800,000(3)	1,000
JDAM Guidance Package	$22,000(1)	2,000
Small Diameter Bomb, GBU-53	$221,000(1)	3,000
Area Weapons:
5” Mk187 Mod 0 Shell	$4,631(6)	30,000
500 lb General Purpose Bomb, BLU-111	$6,000(4)	10,000
Unguided rockets, all types	$2,342(5)	10,000

^a Inventory numbers are my own slightly semi-informed guesstimates based on monitoring yearly purchases over time.  They should be used as indicative of relative numbers rather than actual inventory quantities.

Our weapons are out of alignment with our target sets, budgets, and inventories.  We need to correct this imbalance by recalling the value of area weapons.  We need to refocus our research and development efforts and start seriously improving our area weapons. 

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(1)The Drive website, “Here Is What Each Of The Pentagon's Air-Launched Missiles And Bombs Actually Cost”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Feb-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32277/here-is-what-each-of-the-pentagons-air-launched-missiles-and-bombs-actually-cost

(2)Wikipedia, “Naval Strike Missile”, retrieved 3-May-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Strike_Missile

(3)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Seek Anti-Ship HIMARS: High Cost, Hard Mission ”, Sydney J Freedberg, Jr., 14-Nov-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/marines-seek-anti-ship-himars-high-cost-hard-mission/

(4)Department of Defense FY2020 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammo, Navy & MC, page vol 1-8, eyeball average of several similar entries,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/20pres/PANMC_BOOK.pdf

(5)Department of Defense FY2020 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammo, Navy & MC, page vol 1-40, cost of rocket hardware (body) and HE warhead,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/20pres/PANMC_BOOK.pdf

(6)Department of Defense FY2020 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammo, Navy & MC, page vol 1-119, total of propellant charge plus projectile

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/20pres/PANMC_BOOK.pdf

Kirov Class Battlecruiser

During the Cold War, the Soviets built the Kirov, the largest and most powerful post-WWII surface ship in the world and it retains that distinction even today.

Commonly referred to as a ‘battlecruiser’, the Kirov would be classified as a battleship by today’s standards, with its very heavy offensive capability, but would not be a battleship by conventional standards as it lacks anything approaching the armor and ruggedness – the ability to stand and fight and keep fighting while taking damage – of a traditional battleship.  It more closely approximates a PT boat than a battleship – a heavy hitter that cannot, itself, take a hit.

Here’s is Frunze’s (2^nd ship of the class) armament, as built:

Function	No.		Designation
ASuW	20		SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit)
ASuW	1		AK-130 dual 130mm
AAW / SAM	96		SA-N-6 Grumble (S-300F)
AAW / SAM	44		SA-N-4 Gecko
AAW / SAM	128		SA-N-9 Gauntlet (3K95 Kinzhal)
AAW / Point Defense	8		AK-630 30 mm
ASW / ASuW	10		533 Torpedoes
ASW	2		RBU-1000
ASW	1		RBU-6000

For comparison, here is the updated Velikiy’s (4^th ship of the class) armament:

Function	No.		Designation
ASuW	20		SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit)
ASuW	1		AK-130 dual 130mm
AAW / SAM	48		SA-N-20 (S-300FM)
AAW / SAM	48		SA-N-6 Grumble
AAW / SAM	64		SA-N-9 Gauntlet (3K95 Kinzhal)
AAW / Point Defense	6		CADS-N-1
ASW / ASuW	10		533 Torpedoes
ASW	2		RBU-1000
ASW	2		RBU-12000

Let’s take a look at some characteristics of the Kirov class and, ultimately, how those characteristics relate to today’s naval force structure and ship design.

Mission.  Any discussion must begin with an understanding of its mission.  What was/is its mission?  What was/is its purpose?  Well, no one knows exactly what the Soviets had in mind when they built the ship but, by most accounts, its mission was to sink US carriers.  For this, it had 20 SS-N-19 Shipwreck missiles.  These were 15,000 lb, 33 ft long, Mach 1.6-2.5, ship killers with 1650 lb warheads. 

SS-N-19 Shipwreck

Presumably, the Kirovs were intended to operate together, as a group.  Four Kirov class cruisers, operating together and able to generate a salvo of 80 Shipwrecks, would have been a frightening and nearly unstoppable force especially in the days prior to the widespread appearance of Aegis.  The first Aegis ship, the USS Ticonderoga entered service a few years after Kirov.

As a carrier-killer, the Kirovs would have had no choice but to encounter American carrier aircraft and the Soviets, therefore, provided the Kirovs with massive anti-air capability with around 160 SAMs of varying ranges plus multiple point defense weapons.  The Kirovs were well protected!

Considering their mission – to sink US carriers – and their incredible degree of AAW protection, the Kirovs were quite similar to WWII battleships in the sense that they were built to stand and fight.  Whereas the WWII battleship depended on armor for much of its protection, the Kirovs depended on massive AAW protection to prevent taking hits.  On the other hand, the Kirovs had no great armor protection that I’m aware of and if they did take hits they would have quickly been put out of action.  We see in this the difference in design philosophy between the WWII ship designer who believed in armor versus the modern ship designer who believes in AAW defense.

It is also possible that the Soviets intended the Kirovs to be battleship killers.  At the time, the US still maintained and operated battleships and persistent rumors suggest that the Soviets feared our battleships more than our carriers. 

Balance of Armament.  The Kirov represented the epitome of the ‘all or nothing’ philosophy of combat.  Alternatively, one could call it the ‘one shot’ philosophy.  Kirov had a massively heavy offensive punch but it was a punch that was very limited in number and good only for one shot.  There were no other anti-ship weapons other than the guns and there were no reloads for the anti-ship missiles.  Kirov would have one shot at the enemy, albeit a very heavy one, and then would be impotent as far as offensive capability was concerned.  This was not a balanced weapons load with a variety of offensive weapons and varying size/range missiles.  This was the equivalent of betting ‘all in’ in poker – one shot and you either succeeded brilliantly or you were finished as a threat.

The Kirovs were built for offense.  They were built to strike and strike hard, unlike the US Navy today which is mostly defensive in nature.

Sensors.  An interesting aspect of the Kirov design is the density and redundancy of sensors on the ship which goes far beyond Western ship designs.  While likely intended as compensation for reliability and construction quality issues, the sensors do provide a significant degree of battle resilience (assuming they work!) in the face of damage – an outstanding quality for any warship.

As the Kirov class entered service, the US was beginning to build Aegis ships.  It is interesting to speculate what a Kirov could have been with its enormous AAW capability coupled to an Aegis type system.  Such a ship would have been even more impressive than it already was and would have been as close to invulnerable to aerial threats as it was possible to be!

Arsenal Ship.  One could look at the Kirov class as arsenal ships, in a sense.  They contained a very heavy anti-ship missile load, much as the arsenal ship would have although the Kirov’s ‘heaviness’ stemmed from the size of the missiles more so than numbers.  The major difference between the Kirovs and the arsenal ship is that the Kirovs were capable of independent operations and self-defense whereas the arsenal ship was intended to be a missile ‘barge’, incapable of independent operation and requiring AAW protection from escort ships.

Armor.  This is the key aspect of the Kirov’s design.  As far as I know, the Kirovs had no particularly noteworthy degree of armor.  For a ship that was nearly as big as an Iowa class battleship and carried a massive amount of weapons and sensors, the lack of armor is striking and is what prevents the class from being classified as a battleship.  The Kirov’s displacement of 28,000 tons versus the Iowa’s 58,000 tons amply demonstrates the lack of armor.  One can’t help but wonder if placing the concentration of weapons that the Kirovs had into an unarmored hull was a wise decision.  As we noted, the Kirovs were a ‘one shot’ design.  If the enemy happened to get the first shot in, it is quite likely that the Kirovs would be rendered at least a mission kill, if not worse.  Thus, the lack of armor would prevent the Kirovs from taking a hit and continuing to fight.  Like the LCS of today, the Kirovs would likely have been a one-hit mission kill.  The Kirovs represented a lot of weapons, sensors, and money in an unprotected hull.  This potential vulnerability was exacerbated by the lack of aircraft carriers to provide an additional layer of protection.  US ships were, and still are, unarmored but have the benefit of carrier aircraft to provide additional defense.

The lack of armor strikes me as the key weakness in the Kirov design.

Modern Assessment.  For Russia, one Kirov is a relatively small threat when going up against Aegis or Aegis-equivalent AAW ships.  Aegis was designed to handle saturation missile attacks and one presumes that 20 Shipwreck missiles would not constitute a major threat.  It would require a group of at least four Kirovs to have any realistic hope of accomplishing anything significant.  On the other hand, a Kirov represents a dire threat to any non-Aegis type ship and there are a great many of those in the world!

So, what does Russia’s modernized Kirov, the Velikiy, do for the Russian navy?  Honestly, beyond prestige, not a lot.  While it’s a threat to small ships, it’s not a serious threat to the US Navy.  For the cost, Russia could have several smaller frigates/destroyers which would be much more useful.

All of this raises the obvious question, is there any need for a Kirov-like battlecruiser in the US Navy?

A Kirov-like ship would be attractive for one reason only: its heavy anti-ship missile capability.  The SS-N-19 Shipwreck is aptly named and the US Navy has nothing even remotely like it.  The rest of the ship offers nothing of value and nothing we don’t already have.  It’s a big ship that cannot stand in a fight and take damage while continuing to operate.  That’s simply too much money invested in a ship that is too fragile.

The missile, however, is well worth duplicating and would fit nicely into the US Navy’s offensive, anti-ship weapon portfolio which currently lacks a big, fast, hard hitting missile.  Of course, we currently have no ship that could launch such a missile but if we’d develop the missile, the launcher wouldn’t be all that difficult.

Having rejected a Kirov-type ship, other than its Shipwreck missile, one could easily imagine a use for a modified Kirov equipped with enough armor to stand and fight.  This would have to include armor on the order of a WWII battleship.  Such a ship, with a massive, supersonic anti-ship missile would be a formidable threat, indeed.  Unfortunately, the Navy seems to have totally rejected the very idea of armor.  Still, one can dream and hope.

Artificial Intelligence - Garbage In, Garbage Out

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the current fad sweeping the military.  The military is feverishly working on vast, interconnected, AI battle management systems.  AI will allow us to vanquish opponents who outgun and outnumber us, or so the fairy tale goes.

There’s just one small problem (aside from the utter lack of firepower in this vision!).  Who programs AI?  Idiots, that’s who!

There is a fundamental principle in computer programming that has been recognized since the first program was written:  GIGO, which stands for Garbage In, Garbage Out.  If you feed a computer garbage input, data, and instructions the computer will dutifully produce garbage output.  In other words, the output is only as good as the input.

Before we go any further, let’s consider an analogy.  Say I want to learn calculus.  No matter how many times I observe an idiot trying – and failing - to solve basic arithmetic, I can’t learn calculus because my ‘teacher’ didn’t know it and couldn’t demonstrate it.  Similarly, AI can’t learn something that isn’t there and what isn’t there is combat competency.  No one in the US military has it.

So, back to the problem of idiots programming military AI - this is the Garbage In portion. 

As we’ve thoroughly documented, our professional warriors are complete morons when it comes to strategy, doctrine, and tactics.  Unfortunately, these are the exact people who will be providing the input and instructions to the AI program.  No, they won’t be doing the actual programming – programmers will do that but the programmers know nothing about warfare.  They’ll be programming what our so-called military experts tell them.  They’ll be creating an AI that perfectly mimics the ineptitude of our admirals.  Thus, the AI will produce idiotic output.  GIGO.  It will just do it faster than the human idiots could.  Humans take a while to produce stupidity.  AI programs will produce stupidity in the blink of an eye!

Now, there’s a continuum of AI ranging from the simplistic, ‘if you see a certain set of conditions, take the following action’ to true, self-learning, nearly sentient artificial intelligence.

Unless we have true self-learning AI, which we don’t, the AI will be no better than the people programming it and the people programming it are the same people who are constantly demonstrating their complete ignorance of warfare.

A true, self-learning AI in the field of warfare can only learn by conducting warfare and observing the results.  Unless we plan to engage in a series of real wars just so our AI can learn, this is a non-starter.

Sure, we can conduct table-top wargames for the AI to observe but the wargames are conducted by idiots with unrealistic constraints and premises.  We’ve seen plenty of examples of that.  Look what our Marine Commandant learned from the wargames he observed.  Is that what we want an AI to learn from?  An AI raised on what passes for wargames in our military will be an idiot AI.  I can’t watch someone attempt basic arithmetic and magically learn calculus.  Neither can an AI watch idiots conduct fundamentally flawed wargames and learn warfare.  The AI will simply hone in on, and optimize for, what we tell it is ‘good’.  The problem is that what we tell it is ‘good’ is horribly flawed.

If I want to program an AI to conduct combat, I need to find a good warrior for the AI to learn from.  This is where it all falls apart.  We don’t have any good warriors!

Garbage In, Garbage Out

The Illogic Abounds!

By now, we’re all familiar with the nonsensical fantasy of small units, deep in enemy territory, wreaking havoc, and winning wars.  Of course, the key to this (well, one of the keys, at any rate) is the ability to resupply these units deep inside enemy territory.  No one has yet explained how this would occur.  Defense News website, however, has an article describing the general concept and the article perfectly illustrates the degree of wishful thinking and hand-waving away of problems that has to occur to even begin to contemplate this kind of resupply.

… delivery of logistical payloads to Marines on a beachhead can be done completely with unmanned platforms. For example, small to medium robotic ground vehicles loaded with supplies could be carried by one of these unmanned logistical craft. Rather than Marines exposing themselves to hostile fire while unloading supplies on the beach, robotic ground vehicles or aerial drones disembark from the vessels and deliver cargo directly to the Marines in a more secure location. (1)

Let’s break those sentences down and analyze them.

‘delivery … can be done completely with unmanned platforms’  -  This assumes the ability of a small, non-stealthy, unarmed vessel to self-navigate hundreds or a thousands of miles through enemy controlled waters and skies without being detected and attacked – and to do so on a regular, recurring basis.  Does this seem even remotely realistic?

Wait, it gets better!

‘Rather than Marines exposing themselves to hostile fire while unloading supplies on the beach, robotic ground vehicles or aerial drones disembark from the vessels and deliver cargo directly to the Marines’  -  So, if Marines were to try to unload supplies they’d be exposed to hostile fire and killed but robotic ground vehicles will, somehow, be immune to destruction by that same hostile fire?  Does this seem like anything but pure fantasy?

Still better … !

Further, if Marines trying to unload supplies would be exposed to hostile fire, wouldn’t the supply vessel, itself, beached on the shore for unloading, also be exposed to hostile fire and, being small and having no defensive armament or armor, be quickly destroyed along with its entire cargo?  Are you beginning to grasp the degree of fantasy and delusion that goes into this concept?

Finally, we note from the article that the authors are described thusly,

Wayne Prender and David Phillips are senior vice presidents at Textron Systems.

Hmm …  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what Textron Systems makes?  A quick check shows that, among other things, it makes …     military robotic vehicles.  That’s right, they make the very robotic vehicles that are at the core of this idiotic concept!  Who’d have guessed?!  This sounds like Textron executives contriving a poorly thought out marketing pitch to try to sell their product regardless of the degree of insanity associated with the entire concept.  If they can make sales, who cares whether it works or not, right?  The really unfortunate part of all this is that the Marines seem to have bought into this nonsensical scheme hook, line, and sinker.

I’m also disappointed in Defense News for even printing such an idiotic article.

_________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Use existing and planned craft for unmanned logistical resupply”, Wayne Prender and David Phillips, 9-Jun-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/09/use-existing-and-planned-craft-for-unmanned-logistical-resupply/

Airborne Laser Test Delayed

Airborne lasers have been perpetually just a few years away for many decades, now.  ComNavOps has read articles declaring airborne lasers to be just around the corner as far back as the 1980’s and there are probably reports and articles older than that, proclaiming the same thing.  So, other than just a few years away from fruition, where are we now?

Well, in May 2020, Mike Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering, had this to say,

“I’m extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.” (1)

Why was Mr. Griffin skeptical?  Here’s what he had to say,

“It has been done as an experiment, but as a weapon system — to equip an airplane with the kinds of lasers we think necessary, in terms of their power level, and all their support requirements, and get the airplane to altitudes where atmospheric turbulence can be mitigated appropriately — that combination of things doesn’t go on one platform.” (1)

Now, we learn that the Air Force is pushing a planned test of an airborne laser on a fighter back to at least 2023.

The U.S. Air Force’s long-planned test of an airborne laser weapon aboard a fighter jet has been delayed until 2023 due to technical challenges and complications spurred by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, its program head [Jeff Heggemeier, SHiELD program manager for the Air Force Research Laboratory] said.

More,

… Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper acknowledged that the service is rethinking how it could best use directed-energy technologies. Perhaps the most optimal use for SHiELD wasn’t onboard a fighter, he said.

While I am not a laser expert, by any means, it is clear that the challenges involved in mounting a laser on an airplane are far more challenging than anyone cares to admit.  It is also clear that a practical, fighter-mounted laser is not in the foreseeable future.

Not Happening!

Now, let’s delve into a bit of nearly unfounded speculation – isn’t that always the best kind?!

If airborne lasers have zero hope of successful missile defense, what does that suggest for the prospect of using lasers for missile defense on board ships?  To me, reading the blurry, out of focus tea leaves, I see no hope of an effective missile defense for shipboard lasers in the next, say, twenty years.  The combination of extremely fast and maneuverable missiles plus the pitching and rolling of the firing platform (the ship) suggests that maintaining a precise, fixed ‘burn’ point for a sufficiently long time to produce a catastrophic effect on an incoming missile will not be possible.

Now, toss in other mitigating factors like turbulence, humidity, weather, clouds, temperature, and whatever else (remember, I’m not a laser guy!) and the chance of producing a catastrophic effect is even further reduced.

Finally, what happens when the first successful anti-ship missile laser actually works?  You’ve got it, of course … the enemy will begin to incorporate anti-laser measures into their missiles.  One can easily imagine incorporating thicker ‘noses’ to increase burn time, inducing a continuous rolling action by the missile (Rolling Airframe Missile, anyone?), making the missile body more reflective, and many more measures that I, a barely informed amateur in the field, can’t even begin to imagine.  This will set practical laser development back another decade or two.

Of course, for less demanding applications like destroying a low, slow drone, lasers could prove practical and effective in the moderately near future.  Therefore, continued development effort is certainly warranted but to believe high end combat lasers are just around the corner is to believe in fairy tales.

The short of it is that lasers are, and will always remain, just a few years from practical application for many more decades to come.

__________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense”, Aaron Mehta, May-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/

Wasted Resource

The Navy announced the conclusion of a deployment by USS Preble to the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South’s enhanced counter-narcotics operations missions in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean.  During the deployment, the Preble assisted in the seizure of “100 bales of suspected cocaine totaling an estimated 2,000 kilograms, worth over an estimated wholesale value of $40 million”. (1)

Cocaine Seized By Preble - An Aegis Destroyer To Do This?

This is a perfect example of what’s wrong with the Navy.  Our focus should be on high end, AAW combat training along with fundamental navigation skills and other basic seamanship tasks.  Instead, we’re using our top end, front line Aegis ship to track drug smugglers.

Don’t misunderstand me – I’m all for the mission but not at all for the asset used for it.  This is a Coast Guard mission, pure and simple.  If you really want to involve the Navy then let’s acquire some very cheap, very low end boats to conduct this very simple, very low end mission.

Not only is using an Aegis destroyer a waste of resources, it’s worse than that because it causes an actual decline in combat readiness.  Every minute spent chasing down drug smugglers is a minute of decaying skills and lost opportunity to enhance combat skills.

The Navy is crying out that they don’t have the resources to meet the Combatant Commanders tasking requests but then they do this – assigning a precious combat asset to a non-naval combat task.

By all means, do the anti-drug smuggling mission but use an appropriate asset.

_________________________________

(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet website, “USS Preble returns after successful counter-narcotics deployment”, 25-Jun-2020,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130660