LCS Module Update

The original LCS program called for 55 LCS and 62 (if I recall correctly) mission modules.  As the program was whittled down, the number and type of modules was left in limbo.  Now that the LCS program is down to around 32 ships, here’s the latest on the number of modules that will be procured, courtesy of a USNI summary of a government report (1).

• 10 SUW
• 10 ASW
• 24 MCM

This gives a total of 44 deployable mission modules.  Here’s a more detailed breakdown of where/how the modules will be assigned and used:

• 24 modules (8 SUW, 8 ASW, 8 MCM) to outfit the focused mission LCS ships that make up the LCS divisions of 3 deployable ships and l training ship

• 3 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, l MCM) in Mayport, FL to ensure high operational
  availability (Ao) of the training systems for the training ships in the LCS divisions
  and to provide spare systems for each focused mission area

• 4 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, 2 MCM) in San Diego, CA to outfit the test ships (LCS l-4) and provide additional spare capacity for training ships and deployers

• 4 modules (4 MCM) to outfit LCS 29-32 to mitigate warfighting capability needs across the MCM mission area

• 9 MCM modules for use on other Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) to meet the warfighting capability requirements and account for MCM maintenance cycles

There are a few interesting observations from this.

Note the 9 MCM modules that are for “Vessels of Opportunity”.  The Navy doesn’t actually need or want these modules and has no ships to use them but are required by law to procure 24 MCM modules.  From the article,

“An overall total of 24 MCM [modules] are required to comply with Section 1046 of the FY 2018 NDAA which prohibits the retirement of legacy MCM forces until the Navy has identified replacement capability and procured a quantity of such systems to meet combatant MCM operational requirements that are currently being met by legacy forces.”

Thus, the actual total of “wanted” modules is 35 for the 32 LCS seaframes.  This is the final, official nail in the coffin of swappable modules. 

Further, setting aside the 9 MCM modules that will be set aside on the Island of Misfit Weapons and discounting the MCM modules that are dedicated to the training ships, the total operationally deployable LCS mine countermeasure modules is 8 plus, potentially, 4 for LCS 29-32.

Let’s say that again because it’s incredibly important.  The total LCS MCM capability is 8 ships with an ultimate potential of 12.  That’s our total future U.S. military mine countermeasures capabiity.  We’re replacing 14 Avenger class minesweepers and two squadrons of MH-53E MCM helos (total inventory is 28 helos) with 8-12 LCS.

Does anyone really believe that’s adequate?  China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea each have hundreds of thousands of mines and we think 8-12 LCS are adequate to deal with that threat?  There goes any hope of conducting an amphibious assault.  On a larger scale, our Navy is going to be paralyzed by mine threats it can’t deal with.

I trust I’ve made my point about the inadequacy of our MCM force?

Moving on …

ASuW Module.  This module is currently a joke and consists of a couple of 30 mm machine guns and a helo.  The anticipated Longbow Hellfire missile which will provide some actual, though short ranged, firepower is scheduled for operation in 2019-20. 

Hellfire testing to date has demonstrated 83% success rate (1, full doc p.6) from 24 tests.  That’s surprisingly low given the scripted, simplistic, “designed to succeed” nature of such tests.  Real world performance is likely to be half that.

Current projected module purchase cost for the 30 mm guns, Hellfire, and RHIBs is $23.1M per module (1, full doc p.6).  The helo costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The ASuW performance is underwhelming, to say the least.  The Navy has established two levels of performance for the Key Performance Parameters (KPP):  a minimum threshold and a better, desired objective.  The ASuW module, even with the Hellfire missiles, will only barely meet the threshold requirements and will not even be remotely near the objective requirements.  The Navy’s graphic depiction of the actual and projected performance versus threshold and objective is so bad that they didn’t even include scales with actual values (1, full doc p.7).  Further, you know that the Navy’s projected performance is overly optimistic so the performance versus threshold/objective will be even worse than depicted.

ASW Module.  This module currently consists of,

• Continuously Active Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)
• Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA)
• Light Weight Tow Torpedo Defense (LWT)
• MH-60R Helo
• MQ-8 UAV

There is no realistic scheduled operational date for the module although the Navy is suggesting sometime around 2020-21.  As always, that will be delayed.

Current projected module purchase cost for the VDS, MFTA, and LWT is $19.8M per module (1, full doc p.14).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

As with the ASuW module, the performance when compared to the KPP threshold and objective requirements is barely adequate.  Further, the DOT&E testing demonstrates that the Navy’s reporting on performance results is “optimistic”, to put it politely.

The MFTA is the only individual component that has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  Overall module IOC is scheduled for late 2019.  It is certain that will slip.

MCM Module.  This module uses a cobbled together collection of components that seem to change daily.  Current components include,

• Knifefish UUV for buried or bottom mine detection
• AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for near surface (top 30 ft) mine detection
• AQS-20 Sonar for suspended mine (volume) detection
• ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) – acoustic and magnetic
• DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) for beach and surf zone mine detection
• MH-60S helo
• MQ-8 Firescout
• EX64 Archerfish neutralizer

Additional components are being developed such as an unmanned surface tow drone for sonar and sweep components and the Barracuda system for near surface mine neutralization.

The various capabilities are expected to trickle in over the next several years.

The various module subsystems are not meeting their performance requirements and many are not even close (1, full doc p.22-23).

Current projected module purchase cost for the various non-helo components is $87M per module (1, full doc p.22).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The Annual Report lists module development costs as totaling $2.6B (1, full doc p.28).  Of course, those costs will increase well beyond that before all development is complete!

The report lists total anticipated module procurement costs, including the separate “common” category as (1, full doc p.29),

Module  Qty    Tot Cost   Mod Cost

ASuW     10      $319M     $ 32M

ASW      10      $267M     $ 27M

MCM      24      $2.5B     $100M

Common   44      $576M     $ 13M

Total    44      $3.6B     $ 82M

The key column is the Mod Cost  which is the unit cost for each module of the indicated type.  Note that the costs don’t agree with the individual component costs described above.  The costs listed here are likely to be more accurate.

It is worth noting that the modules have been under development since sometime around 2003/4.  Now, some 14 years later, not a single module exists in an operationally useful form.  Operational modules are not expected for another few to several years and then another few years will be required to actually manufacture the modules.  We are burning through LCS seaframe life spans without any modules to equip them.  It is possible, indeed likely, that some LCS vessels will retire without ever having had a functional, useful module equipped!

LCS module development has been an embarrassment of staggering proportions and the fiasco continues.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Annual Report”, February 2018 Annual Report to Congress for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules Program, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/littoral-combat-ship-mission-package-annual-report

Full document:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4429096-Mission-Package-RTC-February-2018.html#document/p9

Do The Hard Work

A child wants to build a birdhouse but instead of starting with hand saws, files, and sandpaper, he wants to start with a power saw, router, and power sander.  Instead of doing the hard work of mastering the fundamentals of woodworking and acquiring an appreciation for the craft, he wants to bypass all that and leap into the “easy” approach.

Now consider this,

“For the Navy in particular, with leadership looking for an exponential increase in fleet capability that comes faster and cheaper than the traditional approach of building more ships and planes, accelerated acquisition and innovative solutions to operational problems are an attractive approach.” (1)

Does that sound a lot like the birdhouse story?  Instead of doing the hard work of mastering the fundamentals of seamanship, discipline, maintenance, and readiness to increase capability, the Navy wants to bypass all that and leap into the “easy” approach of magical “innovation” and technology.

“Faster and cheaper”  -   Well, we’ve seen repeatedly that nothing is “faster and cheaper”.  The F-35 that was the cheap alternative to the F-22 wasn’t really cheaper, was it?  The promise of computer designed ships didn’t make the LCS construction time faster, did it (it takes longer to build a LCS than a Burke – we posted this!)?  Faster and cheaper didn’t work for the Ford or Zumwalt, did it? 

So, have we learned a lesson?  Nope.  The Navy is determined to repeat their mistakes in pursuit of the illusory “faster and cheaper”.

Unlike the child who, hopefully, has a father who will force them to learn the fundamentals, the Navy is unrestrained and darts off on any attractive path that glitters.

There is no short cut for the hard work of mastering the fundamentals.

_________________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy Prioritizes Boosting Capability Above Growing Fleet Capacity; Stresses Innovation”, Megan Eckstein, 11-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/11/navy-prioritizes-boosting-capability-growing-fleet-capacity-stresses-innovation

AFSB - Looking For Something To Do

How many times have I said it?  Before you build a ship you spell out a concept of operations (CONOPS).  Well, the Navy has violated that simple requirement yet again and now we’re seeing the Navy flounder yet again, trying to figure out how to use a ship.  This time it’s the Afloat Forward Staging Base, USNS Lewis B. Puller, which is replacing the USS Ponce – yes, I know, the Navy is resorting to another of their gimmicks to try to make the size of the fleet appear larger by commissioning the Puller into the Navy instead of residing in the Military Sealift Command where all other similar ships and, in fact, its sister ship reside.  That aside …

The floundering is highlighted in what was, no doubt, intended to be a celebratory article on the USNI News website (1) about the arrival of Puller to the 5th Fleet.  Read the following snippets and you’ll get a sense that the Navy has a ship with no pre-defined role and is desperately searching for something it can do.  The ship’s Captain appears to have been tasked with trying to “sell” the ship to the rest of the Navy/Marines and find something for it to do.

“… Femino [Capt. Joseph Femino, commanding officer of Puller’s gold crew] said the ship has been busy working with Marines, special operations forces (SOF) and even French amphibious forces to learn how Puller could best support other naval platforms.”

“… Marines put a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon on the ship to start learning their way around the ESB.”

“The U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) force surgeon has visited the ship to look into possible medical applications.”

“In October, a SOF team came out to practice fast-rope drills from their helicopters onto the flight deck and to learn how to bring their small boats onto the Puller mission bay with the ship’s crane.”

“Work with the mine countermeasures community is moving a bit more slowly – even though the Ponce and then Puller were initially requested by 5th Fleet specifically to support the MCM mission – but the crew have been aboard to assess the mission planning spaces and other assets Puller could provide.”

“This ship is a blank canvas. Whoever wants to come assess what they want, develop what they want, we’ll work to try and get that,” Femino said …”

A “blank canvas”???  Seriously?  It’s not supposed to be.  You’re supposed to have a detailed CONOPS and be working on implementing it – not looking around for something to do.

“Femino said there has also been an element of just trying something and seeing if it works.  “People bring their things and let’s see how they fit. And then if we need to modify then we’ll modify,” he said.”

There’s an element “of just trying something”????  This is a ship looking for something to do because it didn’t have a CONOPS.

“[Femino] made clear, “we are not an amphib. … The question is, how can we enable the amphibs to do things better?”

Question?  There aren’t supposed to be any questions about the function of the ship.  The CONOPS is supposed to have spelled that all out.

When asked what they needed to do to better utilize the ship, Capt. Femino responded

“… address the mine countermeasures mission in a more meaningful way; figure out how to work alongside an Amphibious Ready Group and embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, rather than bringing smaller groups of Marines onboard Puller itself … “

AFSB Puller - Does Anyone Need Me?

Mine countermeasures (MCM) was supposedly the main function of the vessel and yet the Navy is trying to figure out what to do with the ship in that role????  This is what a CONOPS is for!  You’re supposed to already know what you want to do and how you’re going to do it.  Sure, you’ll still have to figure out which line to throw over which pulley but the basic concept is supposed to have been worked out years ago!  Instead, MCM is “moving a bit more slowly” and the ship’s Captain is trying to address MCM “in a more meaningful way”.  The Navy hasn’t got a clue what to do with this.  There was, clearly, no CONOPS and no one was prepared to do anything with the vessel.  Didn’t we learn a thing from the LCS debacle which lacked a CONOPS and now no one knows what to do with them?  Apparently not!

“On the MCM mission, “we’ve done a little bit of work with mine warfare, but quite frankly we haven’t really [fleshed] out all of the mine warfare,” Femino said …”

Again, MCM was supposed to be the main function!

“The reason there was an RFF, the reason they created Ponce was I believe for a request for forces (RFF) to support the mine countermeasures process,” he said …”

The Captain of the ship isn’t completely sure what the purpose of the ship is although he “believes” it was to support MCM.  If there was a CONOPS, he’d know what the ship’s purpose is.

“Also on the to-do list, though, is working with the Avenger-class MCM ships in 5th Fleet to see if Puller could help refuel them or support them in any other way.”

It’s on the to-do list to see if the ship can support MCM Avengers?  Again, that should have been spelled out, one way or the other, in the CONOPS!

It gets even more unbelievable.

“The skipper said he’d also like to work with a carrier at some point, but that overall he has to balance working with a lot of different potential customers versus becoming proficient at working with some of them.”

So, the Captain wants to work with everyone even if that means not becoming proficient at any one thing?  Wasn’t the ship, like every other ship, built to be extremely proficient at one main function?  I guess not.  That’s what happens when you don’t have a CONOPS.

Again, you get the distinct impression that the Captain was told to go find a mission.

The Navy is incapable of learning any lessons and this – to develop a CONOPS before designing and building a ship – is one of the most basic.  We have absolute idiots leading the Navy.

_______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “USNI News Video: Sea Base USS Lewis B. Puller Finding Its Way in 5th Fleet”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/usni-news-video-sea-base-uss-lewis-b-puller-finding-way-5th-fleet

Alternative Survivability

We just discussed alternative methods of achieving stealth (see, "Alternative Stealth").  Well, survivability follows along similar lines.  For this discussion, note that I’m referring to survivability as the ability to avoid taking a hit rather than the ability to recover from a hit which is damage mitigation and control.

Many people consider survivability to be all or nothing, meaning armor or nothing.  When we consider survivability, we tend to think of, for example, a single ship versus a single enemy ship, sub, missile, torpedo, mine, or whatever and if that match up produces an unfavorable result we all too often conclude that there is nothing we can do to enhance survivability short of adding massive amounts of armor which many people erroneously believe is not feasible, having completely forgotten that we did this routinely in WWII ship design and construction.  But, I digress …    

The “torpedo is instant doom” crowd exemplifies this thought process.  They look at, say, a destroyer and observe, correctly, that it cannot completely shrug off a torpedo so they conclude that the destroyer is not survivable and there is nothing we can do to make it so.  In fact, many of these “thinkers” go a step further and conclude that since we can’t make the destroyer invulnerable to a torpedo, there’s no reason to apply any armor or protective measures whatsoever!  Of course, we’ve already disproven that notion (see, "Armor For Dummies" and "Torpedo Lethality Myth"). 

Now, for a one-on-one scenario, that view of survivability is not totally unreasonable, however, ships and aircraft do not fight in one-on-one scenarios.  Thus, their survivability can be provided by means other than their inherent survivability characteristics.  Survivability, like stealth, can be achieved by alternate means.

For example, an amphibious naval gun support vessel's survivability can be provided by a combination of tactics and "jointness" rather than armor. The WWII rocket equipped landing ship, LSM(R) (see, "LSM(R) - Fire Support Ship"), was an example of an unarmored, thin-skinned, slow, naval fire support vessel that was tactically protected in that it was not committed (exposed) until after battleships and cruisers had thoroughly softened up the defenses and, even then, only when the assault waves were on the way in and a curtain of large caliber shelling was in place and aircraft were systematically bombing the assault site. No effective return fire was possible so the ship was protected and its survivability was reasonably ensured even though the ship, itself, had no special survivability characteristics.

Stealth and Alternative Stealth (includes EW/ECM) – Stealth is certainly a major aspect of survivability and we discussed it in the previous post.

Suppressive Fire – As described in the preceding example about the LSM(R), there’s nothing like the ability to keep an enemy’s head down and preoccupied to ensure one’s own survivability.  While the obvious example is suppressive barrage fire during an amphibious assault (setting aside the fact that we don’t actually have that capability!) the concept can be readily applied to any operation.  A task force attacking an enemy base can use a constant barrage of cruise missiles to keep the enemy from assembling and executing a counterattack.  An enemy submarine base can be subjected to attack to damage subs and delay/preclude their deployment while they undergo repair.  The damage doesn’t even have to be particularly serious – it just has to delay deployment which enhances the survivability of our ships.  The same applies to suppressing the aerial operations at an airbase.

Area AAW – Not every ship has to be able to singlehandedly fight off entire aircraft and missile attack waves.  We have specialized Aegis ships to provide area anti-air defense.  Many/most ships only need medium range (out to 20 miles) air defense to deal with leakers.

Enhanced Close In Defensive Fire – Our current ship design philosophy decidedly minimizes the close range defensive AAW capability.  The Burke class destroyer, our major surface ship and the backbone of the Navy, has 0-2 CIWS.  This is woefully inadequate.  Every ship should have at least 2 CIWS and major classes should have a minimum of 4 along with multiple SeaRAM close range missile launchers.

Size – Submarines are loathe to give away their position by wasting a torpedo against a small corvette.  They’d rather wait for a larger, more valuable target.  Thus, small size can confer a degree of invulnerability under certain circumstances.  Conversely, larger size makes a more attractive target and an easier one to locate and “lock” on to.  No matter how much stealth we apply to a ship, the fact remains that larger ships are easier to detect than smaller ones.  We should carefully factor this realization into our unending pursuit of ever larger, ever more multi-purpose ships. 

There are perfectly valid reasons for large platforms.  For example, a very long range, very heavy payload, air supremacy fighter can’t help but be big.  That’s fine.  On the other hand, the Burke class, which tries to combine every function the Navy can think of into a single vessel doesn’t need to be that big.  The Burkes should be broken up into smaller “chunks” as we discussed in a previous post (see, "Break Up The Burkes").  “Chunk” ships make poor business cases but good combat survivability and effectiveness cases.

Escorts & Numbers – Simple statistics assures us that greater numbers of ships or aircraft translates to enhanced survivability for any individual unit.  Let’s be honest, though, that’s not an actual increase in survivability, that’s just more favorable statistics.  Where numbers do enhance survivability is in sheer presence.  For example, if a submarine is stalking a carrier and only has to elude a single escort to make the attack, the sub’s job is a lot easier than if it has to account for a dozen escorts.  Or, another example, four Aegis escorts can provide better AAW protection than three, or two, or one.  Numbers matter and the more escorts we can provide, the greater the survivability of the ships being escorted.

Air Cover – This is an obvious means of enhancing survivability.  If we can provide sufficient air cover then the survivability of the entire fleet increases.  This suggests that our current level of half-strength air wings and only nine functional carriers is misguided in the extreme.  The carrier not only provides strike capability but survivability for the fleet.  We desperately need more air cover and that can only come from larger air wings and more carriers.

The conclusion is that protection doesn't have to come from armor or special construction which is costly and has to be repeated for every ship. With good tactics and proper fleet force structure we can provide protection to all ships without having to build it into every ship.  However, don’t misinterpret that as a statement that armor has no place in ship design.  ComNavOps believes that armor is vital and should be part of every ship, to the degree appropriate for its role, as was done in WWII.  The point is that armor does not have to be the sole provider of survivability and that survivability can be greatly enhanced through alternative means that can complement and supplement armor.

When we discuss ship designs we almost invariably do so in isolation.  If the proposed ship can’t fend off every threat known to exist by itself then we conclude that it’s a poor design.  How many times have I heard people state that a small, cheap ASW corvette must have short range and close in AAW protection plus anti-ship missiles?  These people consider the corvette in isolation and want to make it capable of handling every known threat instead of recognizing that the corvette’s survivability can be ensured by alternative means.

It’s somewhat ironic that our WWII fathers understood the value of smaller, individual ships with unique, specialized functions and built those ships in appropriate numbers while we, today, with the benefit of all that institutional knowledge, have chosen to build only one type of surface warship that attempts to combine every surface warship function into a single, large, expensive hull.  Similarly, we’ve chosen to build only one type of carrier (how many types did we have in WWII?).  And so on.

We are deliberately decreasing our survivability.  This is just stunningly stupid.

Alternative Stealth

How do you make an aircraft stealthy?  We all know the answer to that, right?  You carefully shape the aircraft and then apply low observability (LO) coatings.  The only problem with that answer is that today’s radars are becoming more and more capable of detecting stealth aircraft.  The radars operate at different frequencies and networked radars can compare returns and scatter (to put it simplistically) to pick out stealth aircraft.  Add to that the improvements in infrared detection (IRST) and stealth aircraft are becoming less and less stealthy all the time.

For ships, it’s a similar case of stealth being achieved by shaping and, to a lesser extent, coatings.

We’ve invested huge amounts of money into stealth and we’ve based our entire military on it.  For a relatively brief period in the 1990’s we had a monopoly on effective stealth and a major battlefield advantage.  Today, however, everyone has stealth and everyone is developing stealth detection capability.  Our advantage is disappearing.

In the near future war, two stealth aircraft are going to meet and their air-to-air weapons, having only small, relatively simple radars, will be unable to lock on to their opposite number.  At that point the engagement becomes a dogfight, no different than our WWI forefathers and the better aerodynamic aircraft will win (hmm… that F-35 isn’t looking so good now, is it?  But, I digress …).

So, is our stealth advantage permanently gone?

No.  There are alternate means of achieving stealth – something the military seems slow to recognize.  Here are some alternate means.

ECM – This is an easy one to implement and can be highly effective.  Electronic countermeasures (ECM) such as jamming, disrupting, creating false signals, etc., for the enemy’s sensors is effective and efficient.  If the sensor is disrupted, our asset gains a measure of stealth – in this case a bestowed stealth rather than an inherent one.  The challenge lies in staying current, given the pace at which the electronic signals world changes, and covering the massively broad range of signals.  Even more challenging, many weapons are built with frequency agility meaning that the ECM has to be able to counter almost the entire spectrum!  On the plus side, ECM is easily upgraded in terms of hardware and software and is small enough to be carried by almost any platform.  If the threat changes, we can upgrade the ECM of the entire force with relatively simple software changes.

IR – One of the ways stealth is being countered is through alternate detection methods like IR.  IRST sensors are one of the “hot” technologies, at the moment.  Thus, IR signature suppression offers another form of stealth.  Of course, like radar stealth, this is difficult to achieve and nearly impossible to upgrade over time.  Still, it is well worth the initial effort.  Ships, especially, need more attention paid to IR signature reduction.  The ubiquitous gas turbines that power ships generate immense IR signatures and while they offer obvious operating benefits they also impose survivability disadvantages.  Thought should be given to alternative power sources and to minimizing their IR signatures through careful design.  Measures such as utilizing the washdown systems can provide a degree of IR signature reduction.

Decoys – Simple decoys create stealth, too. Decoys can take the form of chaff, flares, floating radar-reflective targets, towed aerial decoys, towed Nixie anti-torpedo decoys, submarine noisemakers, dummy visual targets (fake tanks or aircraft, for example).  If incoming missiles "see" dozens or hundreds of fake targets (decoys) then the real ones have become stealthy, barring the bad luck to be the one "fake" target that a missile zeroes in on.  Decoys are generally cheap and easily deployed.

Obscurants – Smoke is a great visual obscurant but today there are multi-spectral obscurants – multi-spectral smoke, if you will.  We now have obscurants that can cover the spectral range of visual, near/mid/far infrared, centimeter/millimeter wave, and ultra high frequency. (1)  Laser weapons, laser ranging, laser spotting, and laser imaging can all be disrupted thereby providing “laser stealth” protection.

And so on.

We see, then, that stealth can be provided by means other than the shaping and exotic coating of the individual ship or aircraft. With the foregoing in mind, consider a giant commercial 747 or a commercial cruise ship. They're about as unstealthy as possible - easy detections and kills in a war zone, right? But, they can be made stealthy by other means. For example, if we could disrupt the terminal guidance of incoming missiles (ECM, IR signature suppression, frequency obscurants, etc.) or supply alternate targets in the form of decoys then the 747/cruise ship would be "unseeable" to the missiles and, thus, stealthy even though it contains no inherent stealth characteristics of its own.  Thus, a “stealthy” 747/cruise ship is achieved via other means!

The point is that there are multiple ways to achieve "stealth". We don't have to always go for the most expensive method. In fact, stealth shaping/coating is becoming less and less effective as technology develops multi-frequency radars, back-scatter analysis, multi-node radar networking, IRST, and other technologies designed to defeat stealth shaping.

The alternative methods of enhancing stealth also allow easier upgrades over time. It's very difficult/impossible to "upgrade" the shape of a ship or aircraft but it's easy to change the electronic warfare or decoy capability. We need to rethink where we're putting our "stealth" emphasis. This is not to say we shouldn't build stealth shaped platforms - we should because that's the minimal price of entry onto the modern battlefield - but that we should be emphasizing other approaches as opposed to the ever more expensive stealth shaping/coating path that produces less and less benefit and requires more and more exquisite care in manufacturing and maintenance.

At one point, I thought the Navy might be grasping this concept because they were looking at acquiring more electronic warfare aircraft (EA-18G Growlers) which could have been used to escort other aircraft and bestow stealth.  However, this does not seem to have happened.

Perhaps, in addition to our frantic effort to develop deep penetrating strike and aerial combat UAVs, we should be looking at developing basic, auxiliary electronic warfare UAVs – essentially, flying jamming pods controlled by EA-18G Growlers.  This would greatly extend the capabilities of the Growlers without requiring new, hideously expensive aircraft. 

I’ve mentioned in previous posts that it would be interesting to build a prototype, pure electronic warfare ship with, essentially, unlimited power and unlimited antenna size and numbers and see what it can do to provide area stealth just as Aegis provides area air defense.

We have been myopic about our stealth focus on shaping and coatings and we need to broaden our approach and recognize that there are alternative means of achieving stealth.

________________________________________

(1)http://www.wood.army.mil/chmdsd/images/pdfs/Winter%202011/Chapman-Reichert.pdf

UAV Manning 7x Manned Aircraft !

One of the arguments for unmanned vehicles is that fewer people are required.  However, not only is that not true, it appears that the opposite is true by a wide margin!

 “The [remotely piloted aircraft] … requires much more architecture than, say, an F-16 squadron,” Kwast [Lt. Gen. Steven L. Kwast, the commander of Air Education and Training Command] said. While the ratio of people to aircraft in manned aviation is roughly 1.5 to 1, he said, it takes about 10 people to operate one UAV at any given time.” (1)

According to the Air Force, it requires 7x more people to operate a UAV !!!!!!!!!!

I’m stunned.  I knew there was no manpower savings but I had no idea that it required that big an increase in manning.  I’d love to know what it is the extra people do.

So much for the manpower savings argument.

____________________________________

(1)Military.com website, “Air Force Wants to Decrease Manning for Its UAVs”, Oriana Pawlyk, 24-Feb-2018,

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/24/air-force-wants-decrease-manning-its-unmanned-vehicles.html

New Mission For Zumwalt Gun

As you recall, the Zumwalt Advanced Gun System (AGS) was rendered inoperative when the Navy cancelled the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), the only munition that the gun was able to launch.  Since then, the Navy examined the possibility of adapting an existing munition to fit the AGS but concluded that none would provide the performance that could justify the cost and, instead, opted to do nothing and monitor industrial developments in the hope that a suitable munition might spontaneously emerge – a prospect that ComNavOps viewed as wishful thinking, at best.

Now, though, a combined industrial and State Department government initiative has provided a mission and an unconventional munition for the Zumwalt’s AGS.  The LRLAP canisters are being adapted to accommodate a non-lethal, humanitarian aid payload in support of the State Department’s Global Outreach - Total Care Humanitarian Aid program which provides a complete range of humanitarian aid to natural disaster areas.  The initial payload will be an adaptation of the military’s standard field rations, the MRE.  In an exclusive interview with Navy Matters Blog, Navy spokesman Adm. Harriman Nelson explained the new AGS non-lethal round.

“The Navy has always supported deterrence and a major part of that effort is humanitarian aid.  The problem in the past has been the logistics of supplying that aid.  During a natural disaster, bridges, roads, ports, and airfields are often unusable and that greatly hinders delivery of supplies.  By packaging MRE’s into the LRLAP canisters, we’ve solved the distribution issue.  The AGS-LRLAP-MRE canister system provides a means of launching and delivering individual MRE’s 70-100 miles with pinpoint GPS accuracy.  We can literally drop an MRE onto a family’s dinner table and we can do this at a sustained rate of 10 meals per minute for an indefinite period.”

Adm. Nelson went on to explain that MRE’s were just the first of many payloads that the LRLAP canisters could deliver.  Plans are already underway to provide payloads of medical supplies, fresh water, tools and building materials, and emergency communication cell phones among other possibilities.

While such a non-lethal use of a $8B warship may seem unusual to many observers, Adm. Nelson explained the Navy’s position.

“Yes, traditionally, warships have been focused on combat but the modern Navy recognizes that promoting peace and goodwill is the preferred approach to ensuring world peace.  In fact, although we haven’t particularly advertised it, for the last couple of decades the Navy has been deemphasizing combat capabilities in our warships in favor of enhanced non-lethal capabilities.  We want to be viewed as a non-threatening ‘peace fleet’ rather than a ‘war fleet’ and the Zumwalt’s AGS with LRLAP-MRE is a major step toward that goal.”

Both the Navy and State Department spokespersons noted that if this effort proved successful, the concept could be adapted to the Navy’s ubiquitous 5” gun thereby enabling massive disaster relief supply efforts with fleets of Burke class destroyers providing massed salvos of MRE’s to disaster areas (1).

Adm. Nelson concluded by stating,

“When the State Department approached us last April with this concept, we recognized the value in a non-lethal AGS immediately and knew we would be fools not to support this effort.”

Initial test firings are scheduled to begin this month and, if successful, the Zumwalt is tentatively scheduled to make its first humanitarian aid deployment by the end of the summer.

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(1)State Department, Global Outreach – Total Care Humanitarian Aid (G.O.T.C.H.A.) website,  retrieved 1-Apr-2018