Battlefield Interdiction

What is the definition of the term “interdiction” as applied to amphibious assault combat?  It’s the act of preventing the movement of enemy troops to a point where they can mount a counterattack.

We recently discussed D-Day and noted that interdiction of German reinforcements and counterattacks was instrumental in the success of the assault.  In WWII, the enemy had to be pretty much within visual range to mount any kind of effective counterattack because most weapons had only a line of sight effective range.  Even artillery required that the enemy be within visual range to provide spotting.  Thus, if we could keep the enemy beyond visual range, their counterattack would be negated.  Further, counterattacks generally consisted of troops (in tanks or mounted, perhaps, but still troops).  On a practical basis that meant that interdiction could occur within a few to several miles of our forces and be effective although, of course, it could also occur much farther away than that.

Now, let’s consider the modern assault battlefield and the range and composition of today’s counterattack.

Today, counterattacks do not have to consist of troops, at all, but can consist of cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of hundreds or thousands of miles as well as artillery supported by UAVs in addition to conventional armored units and troops.  Interdiction has become a much more difficult proposition.  The enemy no longer has to move to within visual range.  Thus, our interdiction efforts must be able to occur at much longer ranges.  I’m not sure that “interdict” is even the right word anymore.  Regardless, we need to be able to stop cruise and ballistic missile counterattacks which means either shooting them down in the air (the hard way to do it) or disrupting and preventing their launch at greatly extended ranges (theoretically, the easier and more efficient way to do it).

The point is that our interdiction efforts must range much further than in WWII.  In fact, those ranges may take us within the heart of enemy defensive systems, further complicating the interdiction effort.

If you think about it, an opposed landing no longer needs to have enemy soldiers anywhere near the landing site to be considered “opposed”.  Opposition in the form of cruise and ballistic missiles and long range rockets and artillery can constitute an effective opposing force with absolutely no enemy troops in the immediate vicinity of the assault force.  This also casts doubt on the “land where they ain’t” concept.

So, as we contemplate amphibious assaults, we need to provide a means of interdicting enemy forces that may be hundreds of miles from the assault site and may have no need or desire to move closer.  Again, the term interdiction is probably no longer even valid so don’t get hung up on the terminology.

Now, how can we do this?  What forces can an amphibious assault group call on to accomplish this interdiction? 

Naval Gunfire?  It won’t be naval gunfire – that can’t even reach the beach! 

Marine Artillery?  It won’t be artillery since that doesn’t generally have the range and it won’t be available until later waves.  Worse, the Marines are cutting back on artillery as they pursue “lightness” of force.

Helicopters?  This is a viable option within relatively shorter ranges.  Attack helos are effective.  Unfortunately, amphibious assault groups don’t have sufficient numbers for effective long range interdiction of multiple targets.  Worse, every helo sent on interdiction missions is a helo unavailable to provide the crucial, initial support for the landing itself.  Still worse is the vulnerability of helos to modern shoulder launched surface to air missiles and gunfire (ZSU and the like).  Compounding this vulnerability is the probable need to move deeper within the enemy’s air defense systems in order to reach the counterattacking units.

Cruise Missiles?  Cruise missiles are viable and effective against fixed targets.  Moving targets are relatively impervious to cruise missile attack.  A further limitation is the limited inventory in an assault group.  Cost is also a factor.  At around $1.5M per missile, it’s an expensive way to provide explosions.

Fixed Wing Aviation?  This is the most effective and flexible option though it comes with the attendant risk of pilot losses and difficult rescue operations.  The problem is that the assault group will not likely have sufficient numbers of aircraft to handle the interdiction.  This is where Air Force support will be required.  Assuming there are bases close enough to the interdiction sites to allow a sufficient sortie rate, the Air Force can provide both the strike capability and the escort support needed to conduct successful interdiction.  However, the assumption of adequate basing is highly suspect.  Bases in likely regions of conflict are neither numerous nor secure from cruise and ballistic missile attack.

UAVs?  While viable, this is not currently an effective option due to the lack of aggregate payload relative to the need.  A handful of UAVs, each carrying a couple of Hellfires or bombs is just not sufficient for the task.

Of course, in the real world, we would use a combination of all of these assets.

The point is that we need to anticipate the requirement for very long range interdiction and build forces to address that need.  We also need to consider the degree to which we can count on Air Force support.  While viable and effective at the task, the Air Force suffers from lack of basing in likely regions of conflict and susceptibility of those bases to attack by ballistic and cruise missiles with the result being a potentially significantly impact on sortie rate.  That being the case, we need to ask whether we need significantly more interdiction range firepower organic to the assault group.  At first blush, the answer would seem to be, yes.

Possible options to enhance the assault group long range interdiction capability include the following.

• UAV carrier and a large, strike-oriented UAV air wing.
• Arsenal ship and/or SSGN to greatly increase the on-scene inventory of cruise missiles without consuming the AAW escort ship’s VLS cells which will be needed for surface to air missiles.
• Short range ballistic missiles
• Significantly larger carrier air wings so that more aircraft are available for interdiction

In short, if we are serious about amphibious assaults we need to begin developing the necessary doctrine and procuring the necessary tools for a viable assault capability.

Swarm Reality

C'mon, people.  Think this swarm thing through.  If we are in an all out war with Iran which includes 20 mile free fire zones with no regard for civilian casualties and collateral damge, unlimited attacks on bases, ports, and small boat piers (again, with no concern for collateral damage), aerial sweeps for small boats, etc. then the swarm threat is no more than a minor nuisance - an afterthought.  A swarm attack won't even be able to get started.

Unfortunately, that's the least likely scenario.  Far more likely is that the US will either be ambushed with no warning or will allow itself to get sucked into a "limited" conflict with politically guided, proportionally graduated application of force coupled with extreme concern for collateral damage.  In these scenarios, we won't be identifying and engaging everything in a 20 mile radius - we'll be forced to wait for demonstration of hostile intent (we won't fire until fired upon) and we'll be forced to obtain unmistakable positive ID of enemy boats before firing.  Is that boat a civilian boat or does it have RPGs hidden under the usual piles of junk?  We won't know until someone shoots.  That swarm boat that we can see is beside a civilian boat - we won't shoot.

These are the circumstances in which swarm attacks will be effective.

I'm seeing way too many unrealistic assumptions about helos.  An LCS carries one helo (the -2 version may possibly carry two although that's highly questionable and has never been demonstrated to the best of my knowledge).  Helos are notorious for being down all the time for maintenance.  Even when operable, they're only airborne for a few hours each day.  The odds that a helo will be airborne, in the right position (not investigating something a hundred miles away), and appropriately armed at the moment of an attack is extremely poor.  

Further, a helo can carry 4-8 Hellfires.  So, a single LCS (or Burke) can, in theory, kill a maximum of 4-8 boats (realistically, probably only a couple) before it's out of weapons (assuming the boats have no shoulder launched SAMs which helos have been proven to be highly vulnerable to).  That still leaves the rest of the swarm to deal with.

Helos are not the answer.  At best, they may be useful as a small part of a layered defense.  Most likely, they won't be available.

Don't just match up individual weapons.  Instead, think through the overall scenario.  Yes, a helo can kill a boat but in a realistic scenario will not likely be all that effective or available.  Ask yourself what weapons the Navy actually has and what platforms would realistically be available.  There's nothing wrong with "what we ought to do" suggestions but recognize that those are different from "what we can do".  

Don't just spit out individual weapons.  Think through the scenario.  Reader GAB had a great comment about the perils of exposed personnel trying to operate anti-tank-ish weapons while receiving incoming rockets and shrapnel.  Yes, in isolation, a Javelin or TOW or whatever can destroy a boat but what is the reality of the overall scenario?  Can exposed personnel effectively aim a weapon from a high speed, pitching, rolling ship being showered with rockets and shrapnel?  Can you even target a boat that is hidden in the waves or spray half the time?  Sure, a weapon can pitch up to get a clearer view but it still needs an initial target lock.  What is the effective target lock range under those circumstances versus the Wiki specifications for weapon range?

Circumstances, rules of engagement, and practicalities are going to have far more impact than weapon specifications so let's think along those lines.  What I'm asking is that we think this through from a realistic perspective.

Iranian Swarm Craft and Weapons

We've discussed swarm attacks so it might be fun to see what some of the swarm craft look like and what kind of weapons they carry.  I'm not even remotely an expert on Iranian weapons so forgive me if I misidentify some equipment.

Here's a picture of several small craft presumably training as a swarm.  

Next, we see a nasty little craft, the Zolfaghar class, that carries two small Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles in cannisters and two torpedoes in the small bulges on either side of the cabin.

Here's a picture of a boat with what might be a ZU-23-2, twin cannon 23 mm gun.

Here is a boat firing a 107 mm rocket from a launcher atop the cabin and mounting a machine gun on the bow.  The rocket reportedly has a range of around 5 miles although in unguided mode against a relatively small target like a warship (compared to trying to hit somewhere in a city), the effective range is presumably much less.

Next we see an RPG being fired from a small boat.

For a bit more variety, small craft can also be used to lay mines.

Here's a Seraj class boat.  Note the rocket launcher atop the cabin.

Here's a nicely armed boat with rocket launcher, bow cannon, and stern machine gun.

Here's the same boat type shown launching a rocket from the launcher atop the cabin.

Here's a British made, very fast Bladerunner reportedly being reverse engineered for swarm attacks.

And, lastly, here's a Ya Mahdi high speed, unmanned boat.  Iran claims that it's radar evading due to its high speed.  I'm not sure they understand how radar works.

That gives you a feel for the variety of swarm craft and their weapons.  This is not meant to be comprehensive and I'm quite likely wrong about some of the identifications.  Feel free to jump in and correct me.

Bear in mind that these are the smaller swarm craft.  Iran, and other countries, also operate somewhat larger missile boats that would attack from much longer distances.  As one might expect, there is some overlap between the two broad categories of boats.  Of course, the problem with missile boats is that the missiles generally outrange the boat's sensors, requiring the boat to approach much closer than strictly necessary.  

Still, the variety of boats and weapons coupled with the purported numbers has to give a naval force pause for thought especially in the confined waters of the Gulf.

Swarm Attack

We often talk about how effective various guns or missile systems will be against a swarm attack but we never look at a swarm attack from the attacker’s perspective in order to get a more realistic idea of what a swarm attack will be like.  If we had a better idea of the characteristics of the attack, we’d be better able to evaluate our defensive systems.  That said, let’s take a closer look at how a swarm attack will be conducted.

I have to preface this discussion with the disclaimer that I have no inside information about swarm attacks.  The ideas put forth here are strictly my own based on what I might do.  Iran practices swarm attacks, to some degree, but I’ve never seen an authoritative write up on the methodology.

The entire crux of the swarm problem is one of dwell time.  Dwell is the time that a weapon must remain focused on a single boat before it can move to the next target.  Until the target can be definitely observed to be killed, the weapon must continue firing.  Otherwise, the target continues to close.

The problem is that a kill may occur without being obvious.  Consider a boat coming straight at us.  Suppose the first shot (be it gun or missile) kills everyone on board, thus rendering the boat mission killed, but the boat continues on its course, at speed.  How will we know that the boat has been killed?  The answer is we won’t.  To all appearances, the boat is undamaged and continuing its attack.  Thus, we’ll have to fire a second shot.  And a third.  And so on, until it becomes obvious that the target is killed.

How do we know a target is killed?  When it’s dead in the water it can be assumed dead.  Ideally, this would occur catastrophically – the boat would blow up leaving just a partial hulk floating motionless on the water.  More likely, the boat will gradually slow down and eventually come to a stop due to accumulated hits and holes from shrapnel.  The problem is that this can take several minutes per target.  Meanwhile the remaining boats are approaching at high speed.   The math on this is grim.  Take a reasonable number of attacking boats, apply a reasonable dwell time of several minutes per boat, and do the math of approaching speeds versus dwell time and you’ll see the problem.  It doesn’t end well for us.

For those of you who doubt the concept of dwell and believe that one shot will equal one kill, please take a look at the videos that are available of gunnery target practice against small drone boats.  There are only a few videos available that I know of but they are consistent in showing the lack of effects from the gun rounds.  The typical drone boat motors back and forth in front of the guns (always at very close range and on calm seas) and over the course of several minutes eventually slows down and comes to a stop.  That’s dwell time.  Fragmentation munitions, which is what almost all the guns fire, just aren’t effective at instantaneously stopping a boat.  A multitude of small shrapnel holes just won’t sink a boat in a tactically useful time frame.

Similarly, the idea of a gun firing a contact explosive munition is unappealing and unlikely to succeed.  For starters, the odds of achieving a hit on a small, fast, bouncing target that is frequently obscured in waves from a bouncing, high speed, maneuvering firing platform is very low.  Recall the Vincennes incident in which many dozens of 5” rounds were fired at boats and no hits were achieved.  Let’s face it, hitting a small, fast, moving target from a another moving target is a very difficult thing to do.

So much for the problem.  Now, the enemy can figure this out, too, so what are they likely to do that would enhance their chance of success?  What can they do to increase the dwell time?

Armor.  The most obvious tactic would be to add some simple Kevlar type armor around the cockpit to help protect the crew and increase their survival time.  We’re not talking about battleship armor that can shrug off 5” shells but, rather, simple flak armor to lessen the effect of shrapnel.  Flak vests for the crew would be another obvious addition.  Depending on weight, some simple armor could be placed around the engine and throttle linkages to minimize shrapnel damage.  Remember, the goal is not to make an invulnerable boat but to increase the dwell time to the point where some boats are assured to reach firing range.

Decoy Boat.  A lead, unmanned, decoy boat is another obvious tactic.  A heavily armored, remote controlled boat or two placed in the front of an attack specifically to absorb incoming fire for several crucial minutes while the remaining boats are closing would be very effective.  We would have no way of knowing whether the boat is a decoy or not and would have to honor the threat by engaging it until it is dead.

Remote Control.  Along the lines of a decoy boat, an entire attack consisting of several unmanned, remote control boats equipped as “suicide” boats would be effective and expendable.  Shrapnel would have no effect on the crew since there wouldn’t be a crew and sinking a boat via tiny shrapnel holes is a very time consuming exercise.  Such high speed drone boats already exist for very little cost. 

Obscurants.  Infrared, visual, and radar obscurants exist which could be dispensed by launchers and provide protection against missiles, in particular.  This would be a cheap capability and one readily deployed from small boats.

Active Protection.  Active protection involves destroying incoming missiles by automatic, point defense systems.  The best known example of this on a small scale is the Israeli Trophy system that is mounted on their tanks.  A system small enough to be mounted on tanks can certainly be mounted on a small boat.  On the other hand, this is a more complex and costly option and is probably less likely.

Flares/Chaff.  They work for planes and there is no reason they couldn’t be mounted on small boats and be effective.

Multiple Angles.  Attacking from around the clock is still an effective tactic, especially against smaller ships that may only have one or two weapons and have blind spots masked by the ship’s superstructure.  This would be challenging to achieve against an alerted ship but would be effective.

These are just a handful of ideas off the top of my head that could enhance the effectiveness of a swarm attack.  I’m sure Iran can think of others.  The point is that with some idea of how a swarm attack might occur, we can begin to intelligently assess the effectiveness of our defensive systems.  Here are a couple of obvious conclusions.

Catastrophic kills are required to minimize dwell time.  This strongly suggests the need for missiles.  Guns, especially with fragmentation munitions, are ineffective in the swarm scenario.

Fire and forget missiles are needed to allow rapid, multiple engagements and avoid the one-at-a-time engagement scenario which leads to high dwell times.

Missing Parts

We’ve discussed the Navy’s disturbing and increasing practice of deferring portions of ship construction until post-delivery in order to evade Congressional cost caps and make construction costs look better than they are.  The Navy is accepting incomplete ships and then adding the missing portions at some later date … in theory.  The problem is that once a ship has been delivered the urgency, and the money, to complete it drop off drastically. 

Next Navy website reported on this scheme for the Ford class carrier Kennedy, CVN-79 (1).

“The Navy also expects to reduce the CVN-79 cost by as much as $250 million by deferring installation of a number of systems, including the MK 53 Electronic Warfare (EW) Decoy Launching System (DLS), also known as NULKA, built by Lititz, PA-based Sechan Electronics; Surface Ship Torpedo Defense System; and the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program Block 3, a technology-development program that is intended to provide electronic attack capability.”

Note:  The quote appears in the article but is sourced from an insidedefense.com website report which is behind a paywall. 

I note this development because it is part of the Navy’s pattern of focusing on new construction to the detriment of maintenance and readiness.  Partially completed ships simply contribute to the hollowing of the fleet.  The Navy receives shiny new ships that make the fleet count look good but are missing significant portions of their combat capability.  You’ll recall that the LPD-17’s were delivered with millions of man-hours of work left incomplete.  The LCS’s were delivered with entire compartments left incomplete.  If the missing portions were quickly added back after delivery that would be OK (neglecting the accounting fraud and disdain for Congressional cost caps) but fragmentary reports that I get suggest that the missing work is not being promptly completed.  I have seen indications that the LPD-17 class and at least the earlier LCS have remained incomplete for long periods or may still be incomplete.  I cannot document the degree of lingering incompleteness so consider this a cautionary note rather than a fully documented issue.  I will continue to keep an eye out for more information about deferred construction issues.

  

(1)Next Navy, “Navy Strips CVN-79 Of Close-In AAW Enablers”, Admin, 5-Dec-2014,

http://nextnavy.com/navy-strips-cvn-79-of-close-in-aaw-enablers/

Implicit Recognition

We've noted the Chinese annexation activities in the South and East China Seas and strongly suggested that the US do something about it before it becomes a fait accompli.  Well, of all the possible options, the US opted for arguably the worst one.

As reported by USNI News website, a Navy destroyer made an Innocent Passage near Subi Reef (1).  As a reminder, Innocent Passage is a formal procedure which allows a foreign country to pass through the territorial waters of another country in a prescribed, non-threatening manner.  Thus, the Innocent Passage procedure is, at the very least, implicit, if not explicit, recognition of the other country’s territorial rights and claims.  Therefore, the Navy’s Innocent Passage near Subi Reef was implicit, if not explicit, recognition of China’s ownership and territorial rights to the reef.

Alternatively, the Navy could have done nothing which would have continued the status quo and preserved the US’ position that China does not own the artificial islands. 

Or, the Navy could have conducted a passage that did not conform with the Innocent Passage procedure thereby explicitly denying China’s claims.  This would have required nothing more than operating a radar, pointing a gun, performing some other extremely mildly threatening act, or simply stopping for a period of time.

Not only did we just acknowledge China’s claims thereby cutting the legs out from under our allies who also claim the features, but we set a precedent that China can now use against us in future actions.  In the court of public opinion, how can the US take any aggressive action in the future after having acknowledged China’s claims, without looking like the aggressor?  We just severely limited our options.

China started the process of illegal annexation of the area and we just backed their play.  You’ve got to hand it to the Chinese.  They’re playing hardball and we’re just fumbling around.

(1)USNI, “U.S. Destroyer Made an ‘Innocent Passage’ Near Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island in Recent Mission”, Sam LaGrone, November 2, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/u-s-destroyer-made-an-innocent-passage-near-chinese-south-chia-sea-artificial-island-in-recent-mission

F-35 Tidbits

Here’s a quick update on the F-35, courtesy of GAO (1).

Software.  First, a refresher on the F-35 software development.  Software is being developed and delivered in blocks with each block adding new capabilities and moving the aircraft closer to full operation.

1&2     A  Training

2B       Initial Warfighting Capability;           Marine IOC

3i         Extension of 2B;                                Air Force IOC

3F       Full Warfighting Capability;              Navy IOC

Engines.  Engine reliability is still a major issue.

“Data provided by Pratt & Whitney indicate that the mean flight hours between failure for the F-35A engine is about 21 percent of where the engine was expected to be at this point in the program. The F-35B engine is about 52 percent of where the engine was expected to be at this point.”

Look at those percentages.  That is some awful reliability!  Who’d have thought that the B version would have the more reliable engine?

Cost.  As of Dec 2014, GAO reports the total program cost estimate as,

Development             54.9B

Procurement              331.6B

Unit Cost                    $159M per aircraft

So there you have it.  With all the proclamations about $80M aircraft, the actual unit cost is $159M.  That’s a little different than what the program managers and LM are telling us, huh?

Concurrency.  This is a stunning bit.  We’ve thoroughly documented that the practice of concurrency (production of an item while it’s still being designed and tested) inevitably adds cost as products have to be reworked multiple times to fix and modify problems uncovered during testing.

“As of June 2014, DOD estimated that at that point about $1.7 billion in funding was needed to rework and retrofit aircraft with design changes needed as a result of test discoveries.”

$1.7B required for concurrency corrections??!!  The report doesn’t state how many aircraft are affected but let’s say there are 100-200 that have been produced or are in production at this point that are affected, so that works out to around $9M - $17M per aircraft for concurrency fixes.

Is that the end of the concurrency costs?  Well, no.

“… with more complex and demanding testing ahead and engine reliability improvements needed, it is almost certain that the program will encounter more discoveries.”

So, the concurrency costs will continue to add up.  I hope the F-35 supporters add these costs into the production costs as they make their claims about how cheap the F-35 is.

Finally, bear in mind that this aircraft hasn’t even come close to working through all its test points.  There are lots more problems to come.

(1)GAO, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”, Apr 2015, GAO-15-364