Navy Lasers

According to reports, an Israeli Patriot missile shot down a Hamas drone.  If the report is accurate, consider the cost effectiveness of the engagement.  A $3M missile was used to shoot down a drone costing a few thousands of dollars.  No one knows the exact drone type but it was unlikely to have been too sophisticated.  This is not exactly an economical exchange rate.

The Navy has been pursuing laser weapons and possibly in a realistic manner.  While Navy laser development news is hard to come by, it appears that the Navy laser development is aimed not at Star Wars type technology but at a much more realistic and scaled back goal.  Reports suggest that the Navy is looking for a laser weapon that can engage small, slow objects such as mortar shells, small boats, and drones.  It is the latter goal, targeting drones, that offers a reasonable and effective use of a laser. 

As noted with the Israeli example cited above, shooting down cheap drones with expensive missiles is a waste.  A laser would offer a much more cost effective solution and presents a technical challenge that may well be achievable in a reasonable time frame.  Of course, power and effective range are among the technical obstacles that remain to be overcome.  Still, that level of performance may well be realistically achievable.

The US military is firmly committed to operating drones of all types over the battlefield and there is no reason to expect that our enemies won’t do the same.  We need a cost effective method for dealing with them.  If this type of use is the goal of the Navy’s laser program then they deserve praise.

To be fair, I have no explicit confirmation of the Navy’s goals for its laser program.  I’m ascribing a goal based on bits of information rather then hard documentation.  I’ll continue to look for confirmation.  For those of you who are interested in more information, CSBA put out an excellent report on the subject (1).

(1) Center For Strategic And Budgetary Assessments, “Changing The Game, The Promise of Directed Energy Weapons”, Gunzinger and Dougherty, 2012

Israeli Combat Lessons - Follow Up

Well, that was interesting.  The comments on the preceding post (see, "Israeli Combat Lessons") on combat lessons from the Israeli-Hamas conflict confirmed exactly the problem I highlighted in the lesson about aerial suppression and collateral damage.  [By the way, I’m not going to refer to it generically as suppression any more.  I’m going to call it reduction, instead. - “Aerial reduction of enemy assets”-  Some of you focused on the strict definition of the word as it related to supporting fires and thereby got sidetracked.] 

Most commenters started their comments, observations, and arguments from the premise that collateral damage was inherently bad – I would go so far as to say they believed that it was inherently prohibited.  This also confirms another of the lessons, that we’ve forgotten what war is.

If this had been WWII, do you honestly believe that the US Army (the Israelis in this example) would have held back on area bombardment when faced with taking a city (Gaza, in this example) containing 9000 German (Hamas, in this example) artillery pieces and thousands of German soldiers?  Do you think the US would have attempted to enter the city without thorough preparatory area bombardment?  Of course not! 

Now, why is the answer “Of course not!”?  It’s because the US Army understood what war was.  It was ugly, vicious, and destructive and the best thing that could be done was to end it as quickly and decisively as possible.  Added to that was the implicit belief that, since lives had to be lost, it was far better that they be German lives, both military and civilian, than US lives.  That’s ugly but that’s what war really is.  Area reduction of enemy assets is just common sense.

We’ve gotten so used to fighting limited police actions that we’ve forgotten what real war is.  If we have to fight Iran, N. Korea, or China we’ll quickly be reminded what war is.

Given the absolutely overwhelming technological superiority and numbers, the Israelis suffered an unwarranted number of casualties.  They should have suffered next to none.  Frankly, I don’t know how the Israeli government can justify to the families of the dead soldiers that they placed more value on enemy lives than the lives of their own soldiers. 

If your country is faced with a threat, you destroy it utterly, totally, and completely.  You don’t engage in a limited operation that has to be repeated every few years with never-ending casualties on both sides, year after year.

This is not a political issue, it’s a doctrinal issue.  I have the same problems with the way the US conducted its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The US was more concerned with preventing collateral damage than preventing US deaths. 

If we’re not willing to engage in real war then we should seriously be asking ourselves whether we should be engaged at all.  Our tendency to jump into one nation building, limited conflict after another is highly suspect.  We’re getting US soldiers killed for little or no gain. 

If we do opt to engage in a conflict with total commitment then area bombardment and the acceptance of collateral damage is quite logical.  Of course, I’m not advocating indiscriminate destruction for its own sake.  However, if there’s reason to believe that enemy assets are in an area then the area is a target.

Most of us have been conditioned by the limited actions of the last couple decades to believe that combat can somehow be clean and precise and that no one but the enemy soldier will be killed and no property will be damaged.  We need to remember what war is, remember how to wage it, and engage in it only infrequently and as a last resort.

Israeli Combat Lessons

The Israeli-Hamas conflict offers some combat lessons for the US Navy and Marines.

This is not a political blog so I’m not going to address the political aspects of the conflict.  Further, I’m working only from publicly available information, most of which is based on propaganda from each side.  Nevertheless, there are patterns to be seen and lessons to be learned.

Interestingly, the conflict can be viewed from the perspective of an amphibious assault.  Gaza is, essentially, a port city – exactly the kind of assault target the Marines are supposed to be prepared for.  The Hamas rocket attacks simulate, to a degree, A2/AD attacks on an invading fleet while Israel’s Iron Dome mimics a fleet AAW defense.  The Israeli army can be thought of as an amphibious assault force that has managed to land and is moving to seize its objective.  Here, then are some observations and lessons.

Aerial Suppression.  A few Zumwalts notwithstanding, the Navy has given up its shore bombardment capability in favor of aerial suppression of enemy capabilities.  Marine amphibious assault doctrine depends heavily on aerial suppression during the early stages of an assault.  We see, though, that the Israelis, despite having absolute aerial supremacy, were totally unable to prevent frequent and regular rocket attacks (some 3000 rockets launched over the course of a couple weeks).  This is the most one-sided application of aerial force against an enemy with next to no AAW capability one could imagine and yet it produced no discernible suppression of Hamas strike capability.  Will Navy aviation be able to suppress enemy capabilities during an assault?  This suggests that suppression will be extremely problematic. 

If aviation can’t accomplish the task, what can?  This offers an argument for greater naval gun support and leads to the next two lessons.

AAW.  The Israeli Iron Dome system has performed well at what it was designed to do.  My best guess is that the system has achieved about a 50%-75% success rate, Israeli claims of 90+% notwithstanding.  That success rate is tempered by the fact that the attacking weapons are unsophisticated rockets unsupported by any electronic countermeasures or AAW suppression to aid penetration.  While nowhere near an apples-to-apples comparison, this still offers lessons for the Navy’s Aegis system.  While Aegis is far more sophisticated than the Iron Dome system, so too is the threat (supersonic cruise and ballistic missiles).  The conclusion is that AAW systems can provide a degree of protection but that the degree will be far less than hoped for.  This has implications for the Navy’s doctrine of vast stand-off distances from land and the number and types of weapons that should constitute a ship’s layered defense.  There is no need for the Navy to cower far from land – stand in and fight and let Aegis do its job.  Along with that, the Navy needs to re-evaluate the number and types of short range and close in weapons it uses.  We need far more short range AAW and CIWS weapons in recognition of the number of leakers that will be encountered.

Precision Versus Area Attack.  In keeping with Israeli doctrine, strikes were as precisely focused as possible so as to minimize collateral damage.  While the specific targets were, undoubtedly, largely neutralized, the flip side of such precision targeting is that no benefits accompanied the strikes beyond the immediate destruction of the specified targets.  Rockets, launchers, personnel, weapons, and munitions mere feet away from the intended targets were left untouched and available for use.  In other words, any target that the Israelis did not specifically know about gained a large degree of immunity from attack due to the Israeli’s unwillingness to use area bombardment.  A doctrine of area bombardment would, undoubtedly, have resulted in a significant degree of destruction of unknown targets.  Again, I’m not discussing the political aspects of such a doctrine, merely the tactical considerations.  Area bombardment would, undoubtedly, have suppressed the rocket attacks.  The degree of that suppression is, of course, a matter of speculation.

It’s clear that if an attacker limits itself to only known targets, it will open itself to attack by all the unknown assets which will probably be quite substantial.  The US unwillingness to inflict collateral damage is quite literally akin to fighting handicapped.

Urban Combat.  Given the degree of technological superiority and prevalence of armored vehicles of various types, the Israelis have suffered a somewhat surprising number of casualties among their infantry.  Of course, not knowing what specific objectives the Israelis were pursuing and what tactics they were using, it is difficult to assess whether the number of casualties were acceptable or not.  Still, it is possible to make the general observation that urban combat is a messy and dangerous undertaking.  This is hardly a surprising finding as the Marine’s experience in Iraq has amply demonstrated.  Further, the presence of armor is no guarantee of safety or tactical success. 

I can offer no specific tactical lessons or suggestions but I can state that the Marines need to re-evaluate their approach to urban combat.  The rate of losses suffered by the US Marines in Iraq and the Israelis in Gaza are tactically unfounded.  Losses could be greatly reduced by a willingness to inflict greater collateral damage.  Further, I suggest that tactics need to be re-evaluated to better integrate infantry and armor in an urban setting.  The Marines tend to view urban combat as an infantry exercise and that view is just going to get soldiers killed unnecessarily. 

Finally, Marines need to recognize that urban combat is a unique environment.  As one small example, it may be that instead of tanks, a heavily armored and actively (think Israeli Trophy) protected vehicle equipped with a very short barreled cannon (for maneuverability in physically close quarters) capable of firing wide area munitions,  capable of extensive and sustained use of obscurants and debilitating agents, and capable of transporting and sheltering troops is needed.  Hey, I’m not a ground expert so this is just my own uniformed speculation.  I may be way off base.  The point is that the Marines are not currently equipped for effective urban combat nor do they possess the required doctrine for success in the urban environment.

Collateral Damage.  The Israelis have demonstrated an extreme unwillingness to inflict collateral damage even to the point of accepting additional casualties of their own.  While they have attacked schools and other targets that directly housed enemy weapons, a reluctance to inflict collateral damage has allowed Hamas to freely maneuver throughout the urban landscape and obtain shelter and respite as needed.  Historically, the US has largely shied away from attacking sensitive targets even if they contained enemy personnel and assets.  Unless the US is prepared to accept inordinate casualties, a re-evaluation of the collateral damage issue is called for.  Allowing an enemy safe refuge is tactically indefensible.

Nature of War.  Historically, the US has a tendency to try to fight with half-measures and more concern for public relations than sound tactics.  Israel is also doing that in Gaza.  War, in particular urban combat, is an ugly and vicious exercise.  The only good thing about war is ending it quickly and victoriously.  If that means area bombardment and infliction of collateral damage then the US needs to re-evaluate its doctrine.  Many will argue that the nature of our conflicts calls for more limited actions and “gentler” force to achieve nation building goals or something similar.  I would suggest that such limited conflicts have rarely succeeded long term and, indeed, often have unintended negative consequences.  It might be prudent for the US to give more thought to the wisdom of limited conflicts rather than just leaping into them too readily. 

ComNavOps’ personal philosophy is, “In it to win it, or don’t get in it.”

This is veering into the political realm so I’ll leave it at that. 

The point is that the US needs to remember what all out war is and what it entails.  We need to start equipping for high end war and revising or developing doctrine to deal with it.  War is ugly.  Trying to wage a limited, “gentle” war is only going to prolong the conflict and ultimately cause more deaths, both civilian and military.

In summary, the Israeli-Hamas conflict has many of the characteristics of an amphibious assault on a port city – just the type of thing the Marines and Navy claim to want to be able to do.  Even for the casual observer, divorced from any intimate knowledge of the objectives and tactics of either side, there are readily apparent lessons to be learned.  For a Marine Corps that hasn’t conducted an opposed assault for quite some time, this conflict offers an opportunity to observe the realities of urban combat and adjust their doctrine accordingly.

Fat, Drunk, And Stupid Is No Way To Go Through Life

From the movie Animal House, "Fat, drunk, and stupid is no way to go through life ...".

While the LCS certainly seems to have been designed by drunk and stupid people, it now appears that the LCS is fat, also.

Weight growth margins have long been a known deficiency of the LCS.  While fairly well documented in the Freedom variant, the magnitude of the problem in the Independence variant has been less clear and many observers have assumed that the Independence variant had little or no weight problem.  Freedom, you may recall, had to have "water wings" (buoyancy tanks) welded on to the stern and they have been incorporated into subsequent ships of the class. 

Stability has also been a known problem for the Freedom class.  Module swap tests revealed that simply shifting normal container weights caused the ship to reach its allowable incline limits.

A new GAO report now sheds some light on the weight situation and provides some actual data (1).

The report notes that the ships have exceeded their expected weights with resulting impacts on performance.

"Weight growth occurred on the first four LCS seaframes, which affected the capabilities of both Freedom and Independence variant seaframes. This situation has led the Navy to accept lower than minimum requirements on two delivered seaframes (LCS 1 and 2) in endurance and sprint speeds, respectively."

From the report, affected performance parameters include,

• range

• sprint speed

• navigational draft

• service life allowance for weight

• stability

The report notes that range has already been significantly reduced,

"In 2009, the Navy received authorization from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to reduce LCS’s original endurance requirement, which was a 4,300-nautical-mile range when operated at a speed of 16 knots, to the current endurance requirement. [ed: 3,500 nm at 14 kts]"

The report states that the service life allowance (SLA) weight is specified as 50 tons.  This is the required weight growth margin for future equipment additions to the ship.  Only two of the first six ships have met their specifications and the rest have missed by a substantial margin.  Listed below are the individual ships, their target SLA (tons) and their actual margin (tons).

LCS-1  50  26

LCS-3  50 156

LCS-5  50  67

LCS-2  50 -16

LCS-4  50  16

LCS-6  50  31

Only LCS-3 and -5 have met their SLA margins.  The rest have missed by a substantial amount.  Interestingly, the Independence variant seems to be significantly worse than the Freedom, contrary to what most people thought.

The report also provides data on the ship's full load weights (crew, stores, module) compared to their naval architectural limits (max allowable weight).  Full load weights that exceed the naval architectural limit risk damaging the ship due to excessive strains and stresses imposed by the excess weight.  Here are the full load weights as a percentage of the naval architectural limits.  The closer the ship is to 100%, the more the strain and stress.  Values over 100% risk damage.

LCS-1  99%

LCS-3  96%

LCS-5  98%

LCS-2 101%

LCS-4  99%

LCS-6  99%

None of the ships have any significant operational weight margins and LCS-2 actually exceeds the allowable limit. 

The report indicates that the Navy will operate LCS-2 at reduced fuel loads so as to reduce the weight to acceptable levels.  As equipment or additional crew (remember that the Navy has increased the core crew from 40 to 50 and will probably add more) is added, the remaining ships may also have to be operated at reduced fuel loads.

Further, the Navy is addressing weight concerns in the Independence variant by designing reductions in fuel capacity (hence, range) in future ships of the class,

"... the Navy is developing design modifications for Independence variant seaframes to reduce fuel capacity—estimated to total over 100 metric tons—in order to restore service life allowances."

The report notes that various ships have failed to meet their range and speed requirements due to excess weight.  This, after the range spec was already substantially reduced!

The specification for sprint speed is 40 kts but the report notes,

"LCS 2 contractor officials told us that the calculated speed in the full load condition LCS 2 is 36.5 knots."

Thus, the shining characteristic of the LCS, speed, which negatively impacts so much of he ship's design, is not even being met.  Yikes!  That's a double hit.

As if all this isn't bad enough, the service life allowances not only aren't being met but it turns out that the allowances aren't even up to industry standard.  As stated in the report,

"Complicating the weight growth on early LCS seaframes is the fact that LCS requirements for service life allowances already fall short of the growth margins called for under Navy and industry recommended practice."

Standards for other ship classes range from a low of 5% margin for amphibious ships to 10% for surface combatants.  The LCS target margin is only 1.5% to begin with.  So, in addition to not meeting the margin, the margin was ridiculously low to begin with.

Excessive weight also affects stability as demonstrated with the Freedom module swap tests.  Other ship classes have stability margins (distance the vertical center of gravity can shift in response to weight growth before stability is compromised) of 0.3 m for amphibious ships to 0.8 m for carriers.  The LCS stability margin is 0.15 m - again, a very low value compared to other classes.

Note that the current weights are with the very stripped down version of modules currently being procured.  As the modules gear up to their target requirements, the module weights will increase and this is already impacting module design and will get worse with time.  As noted,

"According to Navy officials, future additions to mission packages ... will be offset by removing existing systems ..."

Module weight limits may result in modules being developed in variations.  For example, the MCM module may not have all its equipment in a single module.  Instead, it may have to field variations of the module which have subsets of MCM equipment to meet weight limits.

What does all of this mean?  Well, beyond the obvious conclusion that the LCS design is a poor one, one of the major selling points of the LCS was that it would represent the ultimate in flexibility and adaptability over its service life.  This would be the ship that could be adapted and modified to accommodate future needs, thus keeping it relevant over its entire life.  Unfortunately, the reality is that the ship is severely constrained by weight issues and has little or no room for growth.  Module improvements - and let's be honest, improvements always mean bigger and heavier - will have to be severely restricted by weight limits.  Anything added to the ship will have to compensated by the removal of an equivalent amount.  This pretty much eliminates flexibility as a characteristic of this class.

Amazingly, the Navy is about to embark on this same weight limited path with the Burke Flt III.  Talk about an inability to learn a lesson!

(1) Governement Accountability Office, "LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP - Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments", GAO-14-749, July 2014

What It Is

It never hurts to take a pause and remind ourselves of reality as we discuss the merits and flaws of the various platforms and systems we examine.  For example, the LCS is either condemned as a colossal failure or hailed as the warship of the future.  Likewise for the F-35 and so many other programs.  It’s easy to get caught up in one extreme view or the other.  The reality, though, is that almost every one of these programs will ultimately achieve a degree of success though far less than promised.  Over time we may even come to appreciate some of these platforms for what they will do rather than what they won’t. 

Consider the Perry FFG.  At its introduction it was heavily criticized for a variety of reasons.  Today, however, we look fondly at them as examples of a plentiful, inexpensive, competent ship class.

The F/A-18 Hornet was castigated for its short range, inadequacy as a dogfighter, and lack of payload as an attack aircraft.  Today, after a series of improvements, we hold it up as an example of an effective, affordable strike fighter and even a possible alternative to the F-35.

The Spruance class was criticized for a lack of weaponry among other perceived flaws.  Now, we look fondly back at the Spruance as one of the most capable ship classes ever built and wish we still had them around.

And so on …

These programs were initially criticized for what they weren’t rather than recognized for what they were.  Over time, however, these programs matured and eventually delivered some useful capabilities that we came to appreciate.  Did they deliver all of their promised capabilities?  Not by a long shot!  Most of them, not even close.  And not necessarily right away.  Many required time and subsequent development to maximize their potential.

The problem is that, today, the typical program is so oversold and overhyped that discussions become focused on what it isn’t and what overhyped capabilities it can’t deliver than on what it can do. 

Now, that doesn’t mean that every program will eventually be a success.  Will the LCS deliver all of its promised capabilities?  Not even remotely close!  Will it come to be appreciated for what it can do?  Unlikely.  It is a badly flawed program that has little to build on.  

Will the LPD-17 San Antonio class come to be appreciated?  Maybe not.  It’s a flawed design with an undersized well deck and not much can be done about that.  On the other hand, if the Marines move in the direction of small Company sized landing teams (setting aside the wisdom of that) perhaps the LPD-17 will prove useful.

The point is that the vast majority of programs eventually produce useful products once the initial hype is forgotten, realistic expectations settle in, and some further development occurs.

As we discuss and evaluate new programs, there is the very real danger of dismissing all of them for their real or perceived flaws.  If we had terminated every program that encountered initial criticism we’d have very few ships, aircraft, and weapons today.  On the other hand, we can’t simply grant every new program a free pass which is what so many supporters want to do.  There have been, and currently are, some badly flawed programs that deserve to be terminated.  The trick is to filter out both the unrealistic hype and the initial criticisms that are nothing more than expected growing pains and see the fundamental characteristics of the program.  If the program has a solid core that can be built on, it will probably deliver some useful capabilities and it will benefit from continued development.  On the other hand, if the core is flawed, no amount of patience or development will help.

The LCS is an example of a program that has no solid core of fundamental attributes that can be built on.

Conversely, the P-8 has a solid foundation and will become a useful and effective platform.

The F-35 is a somewhat unique case in that it has a technical core that could produce a useful product if the expectations were scaled back.  The fatal flaw of this program is the cost or, more accurately, the cost relative to the value.  Had the F-35 been sold as a somewhat stealthier Hornet at a cost just a bit more than a Hornet, we’d all be reasonably happy.  Unfortunately, it’s a platform with game changer costs and mediocre capabilities.  The cost to value ratio is all out of whack.  For this reason, it needs to be terminated before it fiscally guts the rest of the military.  Alternatively, as I’ve suggested, it can be dropped back to a limited R&D program until such time, if ever, that it produces a useful product.

We need to temper our views and discussions with a constant awareness of historical reality.  No program is as good as claimed or as bad as criticized.  When we discuss a program we need to see it for what it is rather than what it is not.

Ouch! That Had To Hurt.

The Air Force just released a document describing its vision for the future (1) and it contains an amazing statement that warrants our attention.

I’m not an AF expert and this isn’t an AF blog so I won’t go into any great detail about this document beyond the one statement that has meaning for DoD in general and the Navy, in particular. 

As a lead-in to the statement, the document defines agility as an organizational characteristic.

"... the term “agility” is meant to capture the attributes of flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness."

It then describes the purpose of agility.

"Agility is the counterweight to the uncertainty of the future ..."

That’s a fascinating statement that borders on profound, if applied properly.  I’ll leave it at that.

Now, the statement of interest.

"Huge, long-term programs limit our options; we are too often left with “all or nothing” outcomes and “double or nothing” budget decisions."

Ouch!!!  That had to hurt.  I don’t think there can be any doubt that the statement is a direct and scathing indictment of the F-35 program.  That the AF would be the organization to make this statement is amazing.  That the AF would appear to have learned this lesson is amazing.  Of course, it remains to be seen how the AF will pursue its next generation bomber and other programs without falling prey to yet another long term, big budget program.

I wonder what the AF’s industry partners think about this?

If the AF recognizes the severe handicaps imposed by the F-35 program, such as the loss of institutional agility and handcuffed budgets, then why don’t they cut their losses and terminate the program before it does further damage?  The F-35 could be terminated and redesigned, programmatically, as a much smaller effort without forfeiting any of the sunk costs of R&D.

The Navy needs to read this statement and re-evaluate their F-35C/B commitments.  Further, the Navy would do well to take this lesson to heart regarding the rest of their programs.

(1) America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future, July 2014

http://airman.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/AF_30_Year_Strategy_2.pdf

LCS Operating Costs and Lessons Learned

GAO just issued a report on the operating costs of the LCS and some operational lessons learned from the Freedom’s Singapore deployment (1).  Here are some of the main points.

The Singapore deployment gave the Navy an opportunity to collect operating cost and methodology data for the Freedom variant in a real world setting.  In contrast, the Navy still has no data on the Independence variant.

The report addressed maintenance problems as they impacted time at sea.

“… mechanical issues reduced time at sea with 55 total mission days lost, limiting the operational lessons learned. The operational effect of these lost mission days was that the ship had to cut short its participation in two joint exercises and did not complete at least two of its planned presence operations.  … mechanical failures contributed to limiting the ship’s underway time to 35 percent of its deployment …”

That’s 65% of the deployment spent in port!  In comparison,

“… other ships deployed to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility typically spend about 20 percent of their time in port.”

The maintenance problems resulted in Freedom being limited to 93 underway days out of 265 days deployed.  The underway figure includes the transition time to and from the Singapore area.  Subtracting out the transit times, Freedom was only able to spend 53 days underway on assigned missions.

The report noted Navy official’s partial explanation for the low underway figures,

“LCS program officials explained that the unique LCS maintenance concept—USS Freedom returned to port every 25 days to undergo a 5-day preventative maintenance availability and every 120 days for more-intensive 2-week intermediate maintenance—resulted in a rigid deployment schedule with more port time than other deployed Navy ships.”

The report also noted the Independence variant’s underway figures.

“While the Navy deployed a Freedom variant LCS to Singapore for nearly all of 2013, our analysis found that, over the same period, USS Independence spent about 8 months, or 65 percent, of 2013 in port or dry dock maintenance periods, limiting any operational data that the Navy could obtain when operating the ship out of its homeport in California. In addition, according to Navy officials, from October 2012 to December 2013, USS Independence spent only 44 days under way.”

The report addressed the manning level issue.  Sailors averaged six hours of sleep or less per day.  Further, the ASuW module crew and onboard contractors were co-opted into routine watchstanding in order to meet operational requirements, contrary to the manning concept.  The core crew manning was inadequate for routine daily operations and will, undoubtedly, be increased over time.

The Navy calculated LCS lifetime operational costs at around $49M per ship per year (FY2010 dollars).  The GAO report now puts the costs at $79M per ship per year.  Of course, this number is subject to change as the class settles in to routine operations.  By comparison, the GAO offers the following operational costs for other ship classes,

Cyclone PC-1             $8M

Avenger MCM-1        $24M

Perry FFG-7             $54M

Burke DDG-51 (IIa)    $88M

Ticonderoga CG-47  $126M

So, the LCS costs are greater than the Perry and approaching the Burke costs despite being a smaller ship with a significantly smaller crew.  This is disturbing in that the LCS was intended as a lower operational cost (mainly due to decreased manning) vessel of the future.

Regarding maintenance and manning,

“Flyaway maintenance teams of about 30 contractors were flown to Singapore for the 5-day maintenance periods, and about 60-70 contractors for the 2-week periods.”

Further,

“The number of shore personnel to support the ship has more than tripled—from 271 to 862—since the estimate was developed in 2011.”

The impact of the frequent maintenance was noted,

“Because of the regular returns to Singapore for maintenance availabilities, the USS Freedom had a somewhat limited range in theater, and Navy officials noted that this rigid maintenance periodicity limited operational flexibility.”

The report noted that a lack of host nation shore support facilities and capabilities caused issues including lack of Internet support, substandard routine cleaning services, and inadequate warehousing of tools and parts.  Additional, expanded permanent facilities will have to be constructed to support the planned four LCS basing in Singapore.

Well, now we have some real world data and lessons learned.  The Navy has long claimed that the LCS would be cheap to operate, flexible, forward, and max deployed.  As with every other LCS claim, that appears to have been incorrect.

(1) Government Accountability Office , “Littoral Combat Ship - Deployment of USS Revealed Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs”,  GAO-14-447, July 2014