Tuesday, May 27, 2025

Changing the Calculus

You’ve probably heard, by now, about the Navy’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile.  It’s a Standard SM-6 surface to air missile adapted to be air launched from F-18 Hornets.  The key characteristic of this missile, in this role, is its 200-300 mile range.  There is no exact published spec on the range, yet, but the ship launched version has a range of 150 – 290 miles, depending on the flight profile.  Various reports suggest that the air launched range is 300+ miles. 
 
Other performance characteristics of note include a weight of around 1,900 pounds, a length of more than 15 feet, a speed of up to Mach 3.5, and an impressive 140-pound blast-fragmentation warhead. In comparison, the Sidewinder has a 20 lb warhead and the AMRAAM has a 44 lb warhead.
 
Of course, this performance comes at a staggering cost of $4.3M per missile.[1]
 
AIM-174B

This missile is intended to be the very long range air to air missile (VLRAAM) that’s been missing from the inventory and is an answer to the very long range Chinese and Russian air to air missiles.  The Chinese have the PL-15 which is reported to have a range of 120-190 miles and a speed of Mach 5, the PL-17 which is reported to have a range of 250-310 miles and a speed of Mach 6, and the PL-21 which has a reported range of 190+ miles.  The Russians have the AA-13 (R-37) Arrow which has a reported range of up to 250 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  A similar, though shorter ranged US missile is the AIM-260, currently under development.  It is reported to have a range of 120 miles and a speed of Mach 5.
 
This category of very long range, very fast missile is a severe problem for high value units such as tankers and E-2 Hawkeyes.  We’ve discussed the impact of this missile and noted that it could force our Hawkeyes, in particular, to operate so far back from the aerial battle as to lose awareness and control which is, of course, the doctrinal key to US aerial combat.  This would, for example, cede aerial supremacy to the Chinese over Taiwan in the event of an invasion.  Our carrier aircraft would be unable to operate effectively in the area with each aircraft forced to operate independently instead of with the benefit of an all-seeing controller.  It would also force each aircraft to radiate instead of remaining emissions silent and allowing the E-2 to detect and designate targets.  The negative impact of Chinese very long range air to air missiles (VLRAAM) cannot be overstated.
 
 
Targeting
 
This is, as always, the crucial and limiting factor.  A 300+ mile missile is useless if we can’t generate targeting at that range.  No fighter radar is going to see modern enemy fighters at anything approaching that range and certainly not enemy stealth fighters.  My best semi-informed guess is that a fighter won’t see an enemy stealth fighter until 20 miles or less.
 
In a match up between the Navy’s F-18, the only plane currently designated to carry the AIM-174B, and an enemy stealth fighter, the enemy is going to get first detection every time.
 
A large radar plane (AWACS or E-2 Hawkeye) might be able to see enemy fighters at somewhat longer ranges but, still, nothing approaching 300+ miles.  So, where do we get targeting for these missiles?  There are a few viable options.
 
  • The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters).  HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected.  Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
  • A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
  • Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors.  It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.
 
The reverse case of the Chinese providing targeting for their VLRAAMs is interesting.  They would have their own stealth aircraft to provide targeting, land based over- the-horizon radars, and suicide aircraft.  The latter is concerning.  The Chinese do not have the same view of the value of the individual pilot that we do and the idea of sending throwaway fighter aircraft on semi-suicide runs straight at our HVUs, either to shoot them directly or to provide targeting for remote VLRAAM shooters, is viable and concerning.  From the Chinese perspective, if they can trade a handful of second tier fighters to kill a US HVU, that would be a win for them.  The Russians essentially had this as the cornerstone of their anti-carrier strategy during the Cold War.  They were doctrinally willing to sacrifice many Tu-95 Bear search aircraft to provide detection and targeting for their naval aviation bomber regiments.
 
 
Taiwan Scenario
 
The problem with any contemplation of a Taiwan-centered war with China is that it presents a massive advantage for China due to physical proximity.  The skies over Taiwan can safely be assumed to be packed with Chinese aircraft and only occasionally challenged by US sorties from Guam, if it remains operational or carrier aircraft.  The advantage becomes all the greater for Chinese aviation through their uncontested use of AEW and EW aircraft supporting the aerial fight from a safe distance.  Until now, we simply didn’t have a VLRAAM of our own to threaten Chinese AEW and EW aircraft.
 
Conversely, Chinese VLRAAM missiles would be used to push US AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft back, thereby relinquishing control of the air battle.
 
For many decades, US military operations have assumed aerial supremacy.  Chinese VLRAAMs have upended that assumption.  Now, however, the AIM-174B offers the ability to regain control of the aerial battle or, at least, force an even contest (which is not how you want to fight but it’s better than fighting from a disadvantaged position!).
 
 
Summary
 
The AIM-174B VLRAAM offers the possibility of establishing aerial supremacy (or, at least, equality) in the Taiwan scenario.  The key, as always, is targeting.  As usual, the US military has focused on the weapon and ignored the sensor/targeting issue.  We should be working just as hard at solving the targeting issue.
 
We also need to be working on tactics for the Taiwan scenario and I guarantee that we have not addressed this in any realistic fashion.  We need to figure out how best to deploy the AIM-174B and how best to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.  Will this allow our F-18s to fight with a reasonable chance of success or is the F-18 simply outclassed by Chinese aircraft?  Are there tactics that can make the F-18 effective?  This, by the way, is why I’ve repeatedly called for a new, very long range, stealthy, air supremacy carrier fighter and end this idiotic combination strike-fighter nonsense that produces an aircraft that is neither a good strike asset nor a good fighter.
 
We can win the Taiwan aerial battle but it means focusing on what’s important and letting go of our paradigms.  We need new approaches, new tactics, and new aircraft optimized for the Chinese war.  The AIM-174B is one piece of the puzzle but we can’t stop there, as we are almost certain to do.  We need to develop the accompanying tactics and fighter aircraft that will take advantage of the AIM-174B.  And no, we can’t simply stand off and lob these missiles into the skies over Taiwan.  The missiles are far too expensive, complex, and time-consuming to produce to ever have that kind of inventory.
 
We’ve taken the first step.  Now, we need to finish the job.
 
 
 
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35 comments:

  1. AIM-174B is a stop gap product because AIM-260's R&D delay due R&D difficulties. There is no official information on AIM-174B's range but if you google, you can get different sources from 149 to 290 miles.

    Of course, long range missiles provide advantages (if target/guiding can match). In recent Pakistan/India air battle. Pakistan's J-10CE easily shot down India's Rafale with PL-15E. Rafale's SPECTRA electronic warfare suit (once blinded F-22 in drills) failed to give early warning. Likely, J-10CE's radar LPI technology is far superior to what West known.

    This month's India-Pakistan's air battle has become a research topic for BVR (long range reconnaissance and missile). Although it is not first, it is certainly the largest scale BVR so far.

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    1. Be very cautious about drawing conclusions from this. We have no confirmed data on the battle that I'm aware of. The 'best' reports I've been able to find suggest that India lost two aircraft. I've seen no reports on Pakistani losses. I've seen zero information on the number of aircraft, number of missiles fired by either side. It would be irresponsible to draw conclusions without any confirmed data.

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    2. While it seems to be a hot topic, and certainly the most modern example of air combat with some semblance of parity... Im not sure there's much to be "learned", much like the Ukraine war. Two nations, flying planes they didn't build. The levels of proper training on both sides unknown, maybe questionable, as well as material conditions of the planes and equipment on board. Even the militaries respective history's, and the nation's cultures could have parts to play. I don't think there's enough details to draw any solid major conclusions about anything, not anything applicable to a top tier fight such as a future US/China contest.

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    3. Just as an example: Western media keeps saying that it is a J-10C that shoot down the Rafale, most Pakistanis and their media insist it was a JF17 so yeah, we don't even know for sure what jet shot down who....as CNO also mentions, there's been really little to no official details, as far as I know, India or PAK hasn't put out a list of its losses, haven't looked recently but I don't think so.

      As for AIM-260, it's classified so we have no clue what's the program about......

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    4. Pakistan Air Force gave a somewhat detailed brief on the air battle. It was J-10CE, not JF-17 used to shot down Rafale. Even US officials have confirmed at least two Rafale shot down while a French intelligent officer said at least one. Stock prices also confirm Rafale's loss. Giving India behaved in 2019 after its Mig-21 was shot down and pilot captured, there is no surprise on Modi's behavior today.

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    5. I think that this war provide a very important lesson for Pentagon - will BVR air battle be new norm in future? How important information sharing (network) in future? If dog fight is no longer important, do we still focus subsonic maneuverability in future fighter jet design? Is top gun become a yesterday's hero, not in future.

      Another important lesson is - unfortunately, Chinese weapons have been confirmed. Technologies play far more important role than ever. China's two new 6th generation fighter prototypes cannot be treated lightly.

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    6. "will BVR air battle be new norm in future?"

      You've posed several questions. Why don't you offer your answers to those questions? That would be interesting and helpful.

      You've also drawn conclusions that are not warranted based on the almost total lack of data.

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    7. "Rafale shot down"

      Oh no! A Rafale (or two?!!!) was shot down! The Western military has been defeated and has no hope in a future war with China! We should surrender now! A Rafale has been shot down!

      Good grief, get a grip. Did you think that if dozens of missiles (no one knows how many) were launched at a flock of aircraft there wouldn't be a loss or two? If I remember correctly, we lost a Hellcat in WWII and somehow won the war.

      Until we get some actual data, any conclusion is irresponsible. For example, if a hundred missiles were fired and one aircraft was shot down, that's pretty poor performance by the missiles and the conclusion might be that Chinese weapons are ineffective jokes.

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    8. Apparently on lost PL15 missile has been found in an Indian village, see the article (in French) https://air-cosmos.com/article/defense-l-inde-a-reussi-a-mettre-la-main-sur-le-missile-chinois-air-air-pl-15e-70252
      Here is the Google translation below :

      Defense: India Succeed in Get Machine on Chinese Air-Air MissiUS PL-15E

      Residents of Kamahi Devi village, Hoshiarpur district, Punjab, found a Pakistani Air Force long-range air-to-air missile in China, manufactured in almost intact state.
      Chinese air-to-air PL-15E missile: an "important finding" for India, the United States and Europe

      Residents of the village of Kamahi Devi, Hoshiarpur district, Punjab State, northern India, have made an "important finding not only for India and its armed forces but also for the United States and Europe. They found a long-range air-to-air PL-15E missile of the Pakistan Air Force, manufactured in China, in an almost intact state. "The images of the scene show that most of the body of the missile is intact, with the rudder and blades of the complete elevator. The nose cone of the missile was broken, and parts that might be the guiding system were nearby,' says Vietnam.vn.

      He continued: "The missile bears the serial number P15E12203039 and the words 'China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, 55th Institute' are clearly visible on the missile's body. The PL-15E missile, by design, will self-destruct if it misses its target after missing its fuel. But due to a faulty self-destruction mechanism, the missile accidentally "fairly landed" in an Indian field. This relatively intact PL-15E missile is therefore a unique opportunity to study the technical and tactical characteristics of the missile as well as its limitations, thus finding technical and tactical solutions to deal with an air-to-air missile to which observers lend virtues.
      Unraveling the secrets of the PL-15E missile

      Then, Vietnam.vn goes on the basis of the Indian press, which has obviously 'phosphorified' the 'bench' and its consequences. 'To protect the missile's secret, China has created a special alloy mixed with a silicon carbide composite material, which will create false signals during X-ray scanning. Can the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Laboratory analyse the materials used to manufacture the PL-15 missile guidance radar?... India still has to import 60% of the components of Tejas combat aircraft. Can India therefore produce the three main components of the missile: the AESA radar, the dual-pulse motor and the anti-jamming data link?"

      And Vietnam.vn continued: "The manufacturing components of the AEAS radar are made of gallium nitride (GaN T/R), which requires a wafer substrate with a purity of 99999%; but the most advanced semiconductor plants in India still use processes of 28 nanometers, and the quality of their wafers is one third lower than that of China. The fuel formula used for the dual-pulse engine can be called “chemical code”. While the problem of fuel stability of the Astra rocket remains unresolved and there is no solution after three laboratory explosions."

      And so on.....

      Let's hope that India shares the information ...

      The Jacques Cassard Fan Club

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    9. "cannot but admit Chinese "

      Comment deleted. This is not a Chinese propaganda site.

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  2. If it ever comes to pass... the Battle of the China Sea, the air portion especially, is going to be fascinating to look back on and study- how the stealthy and non- will be utilized, how passive and active sensors will be toggled between, how the radar horizon will be utilized... so many variables.
    Of course, we should already be studying it now. The -174B shows that at least someone is taking a look. Whether it's by accident (we built somthing else with no clear CONOP) or design, I guess we just have to wait and see

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    1. One major factor in a Taiwan aerial battle scenario is the topography of Taiwan. It has a central mountain range with peaks up to 13,000 ft. That will case a radar shadow both ways, east and west of the mountains, that presents tactical challenges and opportunities for the combatants.

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  3. I think some kind of stealth AWACS or similar capability really needs to be developed if it hasn't already....or USA needs to develop very cheap drones to send forward that you can afford to lose.

    Also, how many are we buying? Rumor is just like the AIM54 Phoenix, they are moving them from carrier to carrier since we only have a limited number of war shots, we need to be buying a heck of lot more missiles if Yemen is anything to go by....

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  4. RE: Targeting.

    Main target for these missiles is high value units like tankers and AEW/battle management aircraft at long ranges. Let's focus for the moment on AEW/battle management aircraft. In order for these aircraft to do their job, they need to radiate (either radar for AEW or radio for battle management). Those emissions can probably be detected at long range by passive sensors. How about something like the electronic reconnaissance version of the S-3 Viking (I believe it was called the ES-3A Shadow). Would something like that be able to target these aircraft using its passive sensors? And still stay far enough away to avoid detection by radar?

    I believe there are still some S-3's sitting in storage in the boneyard. Perhaps we could upgrade them to this capability fairly quickly.

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    1. Any S-3's sitting in AMARG will stay there, no way they are being brought back for anything more than a test/decoy type of airframe.

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    2. They should build new S-3s. They could be used for ASW, tankers, ELINT, and ass and trash. And just one basic airframe for a logistics tail.

      Lutefisk

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    3. "They should build new S-3s. "

      I agree in concept but not in actuality. The airframe certainly more than proved its value in multiple roles, however, an S-3 reproduction on today's aerial battlefield would not be effective (having to hang to far back) nor survivable. What we need is a stealthy S-3; not a gold-plated, function-crammed, typical Navy aircraft but a simple, basic 'S-3' with stealth shaping. Again, no exotic, impossible to maintain stealth coatings. No, adaptive, multi-regime, combination engine - just a basic, proven engine. No unmanned wingman collaborative control scheme with data linking to every weapon and sensor ever built or ever to come, just a basic ASW function with ELINT and tanker adaptations built in. Not an exquisite aircraft, just a good aircraft with enough stealth to have a reasonable chance of being effective and survivable.

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    4. ^ That seems perfect, wish they would actually do it (and put a tailhook on an F-22).

      Lutefisk

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  5. Just another opinionMay 28, 2025 at 4:54 AM

    Honest question as I have no idea, are there possibly any better active countermeasures that an aircraft like the E-2 or its escort could potentially carry?

    We have missiles like the SM-2 which can provide missile defense for ships, they aren't cheap, but can that concept be applied to the air? Could smaller and cheaper (perhaps sidewinder-size) missiles be used as interceptors? Range wouldn't need to be very large, as intercepting a missile 5-10 miles out would be sufficient, and unlike aircraft, enemy missiles won't turn and run after you fire.

    What about drone radiators? Perhaps build a prop driven drone that also has long range radar but perhaps something older and cheaper than a modern E-2D's radar, it would still provide decent detection value but due to lower cost and no pilot be more expendable in high threat environments. Losing any AWAC-type platform to a several million dollar missile is a bad exchange, but if you entered the war with 200+ naval AWACs platforms you could lose several each week early in the war without excessive pressure.

    Lastly, would it be possible for advanced EW to spoof dozens of large radiators?

    My guess is that the answer to these questions are likely no, if these were possibilities we'd already be looking into them, but hey, it is the Navy.

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    1. Your questions are good but the answers, as you've already surmised, are, generally, no.

      For example, yes, we already have cheap, short range air-to-air rockets which are currently being used in the Red Sea (I forget the rocket designation). However, there is a world of difference between intercepting a slow drone (nearly stationary, on a relative basis) and a hypersonic missile. If you aren't, through pure luck, directly sitting on the missile's path then you have no hope of achieving an intercept geometry.

      There are similar type answers to your other questions.

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    2. Probably the Laser-guided 70mm/Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) ?

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    3. APKWS. Yes, that's it. Thanks for jogging the memory!

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  6. Agree.....This 174B is at best, a stopgap missile. I can't see more than 50-75 SM-6 ever being modified into the 174B. And, 50-75 might even be a stretch.

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    1. Not to quibble, overly, but the 174B is not a stopgap, per se, it's a niche weapon intended for the anti-HVU role. The 260 is hoped to be the standard long range missile but it is facing development, schedule, and cost challenges so it may or may not succeed.

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    2. Id read that it was going into 'full production', but absolutely nowhere could I find any production numbers, planned or otherwise.

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    3. AIM-260 remains right way to go. Pentagon has not cancelled the project despite difficulties. Hopefully, both Air Force and Navy tell us truth than "they will be deployed this year" again and again.

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    4. "AIM-260 remains right way to go."

      Why?

      What little information there is seems to suggest that it has a significantly shorter range than the 174B or similar VLRAAM Chinese/Russian missiles.

      It is not at all clear to me that this is the way to go. Of course, it depends on what the role of the missile is.

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  7. Taiwan has a north to south mountain range (250km long, 2000-3000m height) that shoots from sea level to peak in no time (in fighter), which makes it a radar barrier and a defilade for surface hugging fighters zoom up to launch ambush. Taiwan hollowed out a granite mountain and built an airbase inside with tunnel taxiway/runway facing east, with the idea in war time a squadron, or two, of F-16s can shoot out of tunnel, turn around, climb the mountain and zoom up to launch their missiles. If F-16s can be paired with aim-174b, Chinese AWACS have to stay further back(4-500 km). This way Taiwan gets to counterpunch couple times.

    Otoh, defensively, Chinese solution to AWACS vulnerability is its HALE drone such as WZ-9 (25km ceiling, 10 hours flight time, AESA looking out to 500km+ at sea level incomings due to earth curvature). Offensively, their tail-less prototypes are probably foretelling their versions of stealth AWACS and PL-17 or other antiship missile hauler (to 2nd island chain).

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  8. Jjabatie, I’m assuming the weapon (or network/distributed lethality) will work as designed (in 100% certainty EW environment). (side point: Chinese are talking to its backside-of-moon rover quarter of million miles away thru relay SATs…I mean, how much more difficult can it be talking to a much closer/slower missile in terms of technology envelope).
    Also, look up the article “aim120c5 performance assessment for digital combat simulation enhancement”, it has graphs showing initial missile speed at max (Mach 4) in under 10 seconds, depending on target altitude but generally speaking at half way point the missile speed was halved, at its terminal range its speed dropped to mach 1. 174B is single staged like 120C, so if target is at 120km, it probably has more than 100 sec to escape. Otoh, PL15/17 are two staged, at 30km its 2nd stage will boost it up to its max speed ( mach 4-5). Btw, that Russian Su-34 (or its awacs) detected Patriot firing at about 80-100km, and that video recording lasted about 3 min with the plane notching the missile(s) several times. So, long warning time is bad.

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    1. "I mean, how much more difficult can it be talking to a much closer/slower missile"

      This is an absurd comparison. They're two entirely different scenarios. A moon communication is just a matter of alignment between transmitter and receiver. There's no cyber attacks, no electronic warfare, no weather effects, no broad spectrum interference, no attacks on the transmitting station, etc.

      Do you have any specific point to make?

      If you're the same Anon who's made several previous comments, you need to drastically improve the quality of your comments, starting with having a specific point to make.

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    2. "it's the same anon (Tim)"

      I encourage you to at least add a username to the end of your comments. That will go a long way towards minimizing confusion.

      "educated guesses"

      I have no problem with speculation (I do it all the time!) as long as it's clearly indicated as such. However, it needs to be founded on some level of fact and logic.

      "rumor"

      Unless you can supply a source that's at least a little bit reputable, this is speculation that is founded on nothing.

      "might be insufficient against PLA"

      Again, unless you care to offer specific data or observations that support your speculation, this is completely unfounded. One could equally, and just as unsupported, say that Chinese EW is insufficient against the US. Now, if you want to point to documented EW performance under some relevant conditions and then go from that to a broader speculation, that would be fine. Of course, given that neither China nor the US publicize their EW capabilities, I'm pretty sure that you have no basis for an assessment. I know I don't! I also know that US forces are highly constrained in their peacetime use of electronic measures for fear of giving away actual performance capabilities so even if you heard of an actual incident, it is highly likely that the US actions were strictly constrained, rendering any conclusion useless.

      On a related note, US forces are reportedly not allowed to use electronic measures even in exercises with/against friendly nations, again for fear of giving away actual capabilities.

      So, speculate ... if there's a basis for it but don't make things up. Thank you.

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    3. Do you have any idea how much of what you quoted was utter nonsense?

      The US Navy relieves around 30-40 commanders per year and none are ever relieved because an enemy's capabilities are greater than ours. Being relieved because a Chinese ship saw a carrier on radar is utter nonsense.

      Video cannot provide any indication that electronic warfare is being conducted. That's just making stuff up.

      US carrier groups are not 'blocked' from anywhere in international waters.

      And so on.

      Pure propaganda garbage. I'm going to leave this here for a short while so you can see it and then I'm going to delete your comment.

      Speculation based on data and logic is fine. Repeating propaganda is not. Don't do it again.

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    4. Well, fwiw, I used my iPad and did a little digging, and found the Chinese academic journal “ Radar and ECM” and the article (my translation) “EA-18G combat capability and its radar counter measures strategy analysis “. Below is its link
      (Should be safe enough, anyway Im using a non-important iPad)

      https://sns.wanfangdata.com.cn/sns/perio/ldydk/?tabId=article&publishYear=2024&issueNum=02&isSync=0&page=1

      It’s in Chinese, and to read the journal….didn’t bother to register and all that ( beside I’m not EE, and radar/ECM is way beyond me). But just on the surface, the journal is a wonky repository of everything related to radar/emc, and “EA-18G” or “growler” key word is peppered through out. Im sure we have guys who are dual Radar/ECM and Chinese language expert who eats it up like candy….my point: just because we don’t read Chinese/Russian/Greek, the technology/reference/data are not out there.

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    5. Darn it, it’s me Tim again

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    6. You need to understand that China allows nothing to be published that directly describes military capabilities unless it is pure propaganda.

      In the world, in general, there is a great deal of theoretical academic papers about radar and even some work on electronic warfare but NONE of it contains any actual military performance data. The actual performance data of all militaries is held as classified information. Thus, there is NO actual performance data in the public domain which means that no one has any definitive idea about this stuff.

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