7th Fleet and Deterrence

Despite having thoroughly discredited the notion of deterrence (see, “Forward Presence Deterrent EffectDisproved”), there is a faction of naval observers who continue to insist that deterrence is real and works despite the overwhelming evidence of China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea’s expansionism, terrorism, and general disregard for international laws, treaties, and norms which more than disproves the validity of deterrence.  In fact, many of these people believe that the only thing wrong with the Navy’s approach to deterrence – if there is anything wrong – is that we aren’t devoting enough ships to it.  If only we’d use even more ships our deterrence would be even more effective, they say.
 
Well, it’s time to take an analytical approach to the Navy and deterrence as regards our main enemy, China.  Is deterrence working?  What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  Do we need more? 
 
Is deterrence working?  -  Well, this one is easy to answer.  China has, for all practical purposes, annexed the entire South and East China Seas despite them being mainly international waters.  They’ve built illegal artificial islands and militarized them.  They’re continually encroaching on the territorial waters and air space of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in the region.  They’ve made public claims about ownership of Japanese territories and most or all of the second island chain.  There are even reports stating that China has made claims on a third island chain which includes Hawaii and most of the Pacific.[2]
 
In addition to territorial expansion, China has also engaged in the seizure of US military assets and ignores the UNCLOS treaty to which it is a signatory (demonstrating that China’s word is worthless).
 
 
What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  -   The US Navy’s entire 7^th Fleet is devoted to deterring China.  As a reminder, 
 

It is headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan. It is part of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines.[1]

Seventh Fleet includes a permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, currently the USS George Washington, CVN-73.  Yokosuka, alone, typically includes a command ship, an aircraft carrier, Ticonderoga class cruisers, and a dozen or so Burke class destroyers.
 
In addition to the 7^th Fleet, numerous other carriers, ARG/MEUs, and aircraft regularly rotate into the 7^th Fleet’s control.
 
We are devoting an enormous number of ships, aircraft, and personnel to deterring China.
 
 
Do we need more?  - 
 
The facts are crystal clear.  If the 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines aren’t deterring China, no additional forces will suddenly, magically alter the situation.  Think about it, though, that’s a lot of ships, aircraft, and personnel.  Why isn’t China deterred?  Why aren’t they behaving very cautiously, in not cowering?  The answer is simple and painfully obvious:  China does not believe we’ll use our forces.  If your enemy does not believe you have the will to act, no amount of forces in the region will alter their thinking.  We could pack the entire US Navy into the South China Sea and it wouldn’t deter China for one second.  They believe, correctly, that we won’t use our force so any gathering of naval forces is a hollow, empty gesture.
 
The only force we’ve ever used in peacetime is against third rate countries and China does not see themselves as a third rate country.  In fact, history proves their view of things is correct.  China has seized US military aircraft and drones while they were in use, disrupted naval operations, successfully threatened and chased away US ships in international waters, established and militarized illegal islands while the US Navy stood back and watched, enforced illegal territorial water claims, violated the air space of Taiwan, etc.  All the while, the US Navy did nothing.  Ironically, the only substantive action the US Navy has taken, Freedom of Navigation exercises according to the conditions of UNCLOS Innocent Passage, has only reinforced the validity of China’s illegal territorial water claims!
 
No will to act means no deterrence and no amount of additional forces will change that.
 
 
 
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[1]Wikipedia, “United States Seventh Fleet”, retrieved 18-Aug-2025,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Seventh_Fleet
 
[2]The National Interest website, “China’s Next Territorial Claim: Hawaii and Almost the Entire Pacific Ocean?”, Harry J. Kazianis, 10-Sep-2016,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-next-territorial-claim-hawaii-almost-the-entire-17658

Kirov Class Cruiser Begins Trials

It is reported that the Kirov class cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov (formerly Kalinin in the Soviet navy), has put to sea for trials after decades of modernization (can it really be called modernization if it takes decades?).  The ship last sailed in 1997 and has been undergoing repairs and modernization since 1999 with many stops and starts.
 
Details are sketchy but Naval News reports the following upgraded systems.
 

The vessel reportedly has over 176 vertical launch cells, capable of firing a wide array of anti-ship and air defense missiles. The cruiser reportedly has 10 universal shipborne firing systems (USFS), each capable of housing 8 missiles. This results in 80 launch cells reserved for launching Russia’s most modern missiles such as the subsonic Kalibr cruise missile, the supersonic Oniks anti-ship missile, and the hypersonic Tsirkon cruise missiles. In order to make room for these launch cells, the 20 angled Granit anti-ship missiles were removed.
 
An additional 96 launch cells are reserved for surface-to-air missiles to be used for air defense. It is unclear what missiles are installed on the cruiser with some reports stating that the cruiser operates the S-300Fort-M air defense systems with other sources stating that the S-400 air defense system is installed. Additional air defense systems for close to medium range engagement include six Pantsir-M air defense systems as well as a number of AK-630 close-in weapon systems.  The vessel is reportedly also equipped with the Paket-NK and Otvet anti-submarine and torpedo weapon systems.
 
The 130mm AK-130 dual purpose naval gun has been replaced by a modern 130mm AK-192M naval gun.[1]

Nakhimov heading out for trials

That makes for a large, powerful, expensive to operate ship which leads to the obvious question:  what’s its purpose?
 
The Russian navy is, for all practical purposes, a coastal defense force not an open ocean, globe spanning force.  For one thing, Russia has very limited overseas territories or commitments that would require the presence of a naval force, hence the emphasis on coastal or near coastal forces.  Thus, overseas naval operations would not seem to be a legitimate purpose.
 
Cost is another major factor.  Manning and operating a major warship like this is a very expensive proposition and Russia simply lacks the financial resources to comfortably do so which, again, leads one to question what the purpose of the ship is.
 
The key question, of course, is what combat purpose would this ship serve?  The original Kirovs were intended as anti-carrier strike assets with their twenty SS-N-19 (P-700) Granit supersonic missiles with 1600 lb warheads.  Today, a single Kirov would be no threat to a carrier group and, indeed, if the report is to be believed, the SS-N-19 missiles have been removed.
 
Of course, the ship can launch land attack missiles but against who?  Considering Russia’s likely enemies list, land attack missiles could be launched much more easily and cheaper from land sites or aircraft.
 
The Russian navy, today, consists primarily of frigates, corvettes, and various patrol vessels with a few surviving Soviet era destroyers.  In other words, it is a coastal defense force. 
 
The Russian navy has also demonstrated in the Ukraine war that they lack the equipment, doctrine, and training to survivably and effectively operate in contested waters so it’s hard to imagine they would risk their symbol of national pride in a naval battle that didn’t involve an existential threat.  That makes the Nakhimov a very limited use asset.
 
One obvious purpose, and perhaps the only real purpose, is international prestige and public relations.  Russia/Putin seems very big on trying to generate international prestige (a losing battle but Putin keeps trying) and there’s no denying that a large cruiser does generate a certain amount of attention if not any actual respect.  Of course, knowledgeable naval observers are not impressed by a ship with no naval purpose (hey, we have plenty of those!) but for Russia/Putin this would seem to be a valid purpose, perhaps the only real purpose.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News, “RFS Admiral Nakhimov commences sea and factory trials”, Frederik Van Lokeren, 21-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/rfs-admiral-nakhimov-commences-sea-and-factory-trials/

AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 

The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 

• Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
• Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
• Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
• Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
• Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
• Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
• Added Link 16
• Upgraded computers
• Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
• Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
• Added laser rangefinder.
• Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
• Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
• Added ALBATROS towed sonar
• Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
• Added additional decoy launchers

 

Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2

 
Taiwan
 

• Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
• Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
• Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns

 
 
Spain
 

• Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
• Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
• Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning

 
 
Pakistan
 

• overhaul of all four diesels
• replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
• new bridge and navigational suite
• composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array

 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
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[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

What’s A CNO To Do?

We have become an apologist society.  We excuse and rationalize every failure, often doing so even before the attempt is made.  For example, in past criticisms of CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations), I’ve encountered the apologists who say that the CNO can’t really do anything so I shouldn’t blame them.  ‘The System’ is at fault, not the individual. 
 
Nonsense!
 
From a comment I made a while ago to a reader who was apologizing for a specific CNO’s lack of accomplishments, comes this (note, I won’t identify the reader as I have no wish to embarrass them):
 
 
"is our current system such that even the best qualified CNO will be limited as to how much change they can affect?"
 
My answer … Of course not! A properly motivated and directed (meaning focused on the proper priorities) CNO could turn the Navy around in a heartbeat. Here's a few day one items that could be implemented with no input from Congress or anyone else:
 
1. Eliminate the use of waivers. Period. No exceptions. That, alone, would immensely improve training, safety, new ship completion, ship quality, and readiness by forcing actions to be completed instead of waived.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
 
Day two items that might require some input from others:
 
1. Fire 80% of flag officers
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
 
I could go on endlessly but you get the idea. All it takes is a Trump-like CNO who has a clear, combat-focused mentality and has the courage to act.
 

A Realistic Exercise?

As you know, ComNavOps has often criticized Navy exercises as being absurdly unrealistic but does anyone do it better?  Well, the French have conducted  what they feel is a realistic combat exercise, Polaris 25, involving air, sea, and land forces.  How realistic was it?
 
Before we go any further, note that the details of the exercise were few and sketchy for obvious reasons.  Still, we’ll do the best we can with what we have to work with.
 
The French claim it was realistic and unscripted in terms of the actions of the participants.
 

… the POLARIS exercises seek to make naval combat as realistic as possible, … where almost any move is permitted within the constraints previously indicated.[1]
 
The two forces were ‘free’ in their tactical choices. The exercise therefore unfolded according to the decisions made.[2]

The exercise included electronic warfare, cyber, social, and other domains to an unknown degree.[2]
 
Okay, that sounds good but what public relations blurb doesn’t?  Let’s look closer.
 
The French blue force consisted of,
 

• 5 frigates
• 5 LHDs
• ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• Rafales Marine from the French Navy and the French Air and Space Force
• Special forces from the French Navy
• Helicopters and infantry from the French Army

 
The opposing red force consisted of,
 

• 6 ships reinforced by a French Suffren-class submarine

 
 
Hmm … does that sound like equal, balanced forces offering realistic capabilities and fostering a realistic free play exercise or does it begin to sound like a fairly one-sided, pre-ordained setpiece?  Let’s keep going.
 

If a ship was hit, its damaged systems remained out of service until the end of the exercise, or until it was repaired if possible. Similarly, if a vessel was sunk, it was permanently out of the exercise.[2]
 
In the scenario, ships sailed with their theoretical ammunition levels and other logistics. There were no “magic” reloads. The ship had to withdraw to reload with food or ammunition, either by refueling at sea or by reaching support points.[2]

Okay, that’s outstanding, if they actually held to that.
 

Aquitaine Class FREMM

 
Results
 
Little was offered publicly in the way of results but let’s look at what we do have.
 

During the second phase – phase of the naval combat, the officers suggested that a great deal of damage had been caused on both sides with water leaks, loss of communications, etc. More importantly, “several ships were sunk or torpedoed”,[1]

Given the extremely limited number of ships in the exercise, if several ships were sunk, what was left to carry out the mission/exercise?  This is where one begins to wonder about the realism of the exercise.  Were sunken ships really removed from the exercise or did they continue on?
 
What did losing several ships teach the French?  What was the major lesson learned?
 

… firepower is everything. When lethal weapons are used, which was the case for both forces, the damage is rapid and significant.[1]

Firepower is important??!!  Really?  You needed an exercise to tell you that?  If so, you’ve forgotten everything about warfare and naval combat … which, like the US Navy, you probably have.  Sad.
 
The landing portion of the exercise was decidedly unrealistic.
 

It should be pointed out that the coastal threats were relatively low, with only a few ‘red force’ air defence units in the way.[1]

So … no opposed landing.  That’s optimistic in the extreme and offers no potential for lessons learned.  At that point, it’s just an administrative unloading of troops.
 
More on the landing portion.
 

… the LHDs simulated the landing of US Marine units with their HIMARS on islands off the landing zone in order to create a A2/AD area and secure the operation … [1][emphasis added]

So, simulated HIMARS operations?  So much for realism.
 
And,
 

Another first was that the image stream captured by the S-100 could be transmitted directly to land units disembarking, enabling them to adapt their manoeuvres.[1]

So, unhindered broad bandwidth streaming data?  I guess electronic and cyber warfare wasn’t included in the realism, after all?
 
 
Conclusion
 
Well, without more actual information it’s impossible to draw much in the way of valid conclusions but it sounds like aspects of the exercise were conducted with more realism than US Navy exercises (admittedly, a pretty low bar) but there are suggestions that they did not hold to the degree of realism they claimed.
 
The finding that firepower is paramount was absurdly hilarious.  What has this entire blog emphasized?  For that matter, what did WWII emphasize?  Do we really have to conduct exercises to learn the patently obvious?
 
All in all, it sounds like a better exercise than the US Navy conducts but still far short of being realistic and useful.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 2”, Martin Manaranche, 4-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-2/
 
[2]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 1”, Martin Manaranche, 16-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-1/

The Thousand Ship Navy

Do you remember the Thousand Ship Navy concept?[2]  To refresh your memory,
 

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that “the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”  He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:
 
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity. As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.[1]

Consider this excerpt from Mullen’s speech:
 

“…leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain …

What a bunch of verbal garbage!  No wonder this concept didn’t go anywhere or amount to anything.  Mullen’s Thousand Ship Navy proposal was just vague fantasy for the purposes of public relations.  It was tantamount to calling for world peace – a fine sentiment that is totally divorced from reality or action.
 
Okay, so is this post just a quick shot at Mullen and we’re done?  No!  While Mullen had nothing worthwhile to offer, the idea of an international, thousand ship navy has enormous potential though not in any way that Mullen would ever have imagined.  Let’s examine a better Thousand Ship Navy.
 
Consider the following truths:
 

• Reality is that the US Navy is the biggest and only truly significant friendly naval force in the world.
• Reality is that the US Navy, through its own incompetence and mismanagement, has glaring gaps and weaknesses in its force structure.

 
Now, let’s lean back in our chairs, close our eyes, and think fairy dust thoughts:
 

• Wouldn’t it be nice if we didn’t have those gaps and weaknesses? 
  
• Wouldn’t it be nice if those gaps and weaknesses could be magically filled without us having to spend any money or resources?

 
Opening our eyes, we realize that those things can’t happen, right?  I mean, the only way we could fill those gaps and weaknesses without spending money or resources would be if someone else built the missing assets and gave them to us and that’s not going to happen.  It can’t happen … could it?
 
Well … what if other navies around the world focused their efforts and force structures on the assets we’re missing.  What if they built the minesweepers and SSKs, among other needs, that could fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy and we could call on those assets as needed?
 
Think about it.  As an example, when the global war with China comes, and it will, will the UK’s one carrier with a couple dozen short-legged F-35Bs make any difference?  Not much.  However, a couple of squadrons of highly effective mine countermeasure ships would be invaluable to the war effort.
 
Will some country’s couple of underarmed frigates make any difference?  No, but large numbers of small ASW corvettes would be a big help.
 
And so on.
 
The idea is that other countries would partner with the US to fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy.
 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Consider the following challenges.
 
Command and Control – This is a challenge in peace and in war.  Who commands these fill-in assets?  No country wants to give up command and yet a single, central command, the US, is necessary.

Agendas – Every country has their own geopolitical agendas and, often, those don’t perfectly align with the US.  A fill-in force can’t be subject to the whims of each individual country.  A NATO-like imperative is needed that would compel every participating country to actively contribute their eligible assets to meeting certain defined needs such as mines in international waters, war with China (with the US required to formally declare war on China).  It is the defined nature of the compelling threats that allows countries to still pursue their own agendas outside the bounds of the defined threats and ensure that the assets are available in the face of the defined threats.  What can’t happen is, for example, a Spanish frigate pulling out of a task force because their country doesn’t perfectly agree with the task force’s mission.  If the mission is a response to a defined threat then the assets are in, pure and simple.

Force Structure – Which country would build which assets?  That can’t be left up to the individual countries.  The individual contributions must come from analysis of the US Navy’s needs and, ultimately, be subject to US dictation.  Otherwise, each country will build whatever suits them and the US gaps won’t be filled other than haphazardly, if at all.

Reciprocity – In return for, say, building mine warfare ships instead of frigates, participating countries must be supported by the US Navy for any legitimate defense needs.  In other words, the US becomes the participating country’s navy against defined threats.
 
 
Discussion
 
Ideally, this shouldn’t be necessary.  The US Navy is big enough and well funded enough that it should be able to build its own complete naval force without any gaps or weaknesses.  However, until we clean house and fire every flag officer, that won’t happen.  We’ll continue to obsolete Burkes for the next two hundred years and bigger carriers as our air wings shrink ever smaller.  This NATO-ish concept at least provides a work around to the Navy’s abject stupidity for the foreseeable future.
 
The key to making this work is a set of very specific, well defined, major international threats that would trigger the combining of assets.  This precludes, as an example, other countries being forced to go along with, say, a US strike on an aspirin factory in the middle of nowhere for political messaging purposes.
 
It should be made crystal clear that any country that opts not to participate is on their own if they find themselves threatened by an enemy.  Participate and share or stand alone.  A simple choice.
 
In order for this concept to work, it has to be divorced from any of the political maneuverings of the type that prioritized the F-35 as an international jobs program rather than a lean, focused production program.  Ship types can’t be assigned based on politics or jobs or whatever.  Of course, the individual countries can build their assigned vessels any way they like but the assignments have to be based strictly on naval combat needs.
 
Finally, note that none of the above precludes any country from still building their own ships of whatever type as long as they meet their assigned gap-filling quota.
 
 
 
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[1]https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=2029&context=nwc-review
 
[2]USNI Proceedings, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network”, Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, November 2005, Proceedings Vol. 131/11/1,233
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/1000-ship-navy-global-maritime-network

Large, Slow, And Non-Stealthy Is No Way To Go Through Life

There are many naval observers who espouse the idea of balloons of some type (aerostats, for example) as a means of providing long range surveillance.  ComNavOps has scoffed at those ideas as being devoid of realistic usefulness and, worse, a detriment to surrounding forces due to being easily detected.  Well, here’s further evidence of the impracticality of such aerostats.  Israel, who famously implemented the Sky Dew aerostat system amid much fanfare and proclamations of miraculous capabilities, is now leaning towards abandoning the entire concept due to unaffordable repair costs, questionable usefulness, and demonstrated vulnerabilities following a Hezbollah suicide drone strike that hit the balloon and rendered it inoperable (see, “You Had One Job”).
 

Israeli defense officials are reevaluating the future of the military’s Sky Dew project, a high-altitude balloon system designed for aerial threat detection, following a series of setbacks including weather damage and an attack by the Hezbollah terror group.[1]
 
In light of these repeated setbacks, defense officials are now seriously considering terminating the project. The vulnerability of the system, its high costs, and the excessive time required for repairs have all factored into this revaluation of a program that has already consumed millions in defense spending.[1]

It’s not just enemy actions that threaten the aerostat;  weather is also a threat.
 

… severe weather had rendered the system inoperable months earlier.  After a protracted repair process, the balloon was redeployed in January [2024] … [1]

Setting aside the actual performance failure of Sky Dew in failing to detect a drone which was its exact intended function, the aerostat has been found to be vulnerable to weather and highly susceptible to enemy attack.  Is this surprising?  No!  Any large, slow (non-mobile, in this case), non-stealthy object is easily detected and simply waiting for the enemy to get around to it on their ‘items to destroy at leisure’ checklist.
 
So, what does this mean for us?
 
This is yet another example demonstrating that large, slow, and non-stealthy aircraft such as AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, P-8 Poseidon, all large non-stealthy UAVs (Predator, Global Hawk, Reaper and the like), etc. are simply not survivable on the modern battlefield.  It doesn’t matter whether it’s a balloon tethered to a ship or a P-8 Poseidon lumbering around looking for things, large, slow, and non-stealthy is simply not viable.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]JNS website, “Israel weighs shutting down multi-million-dollar ‘Sky Dew’ project”, Lilach Shoval, 29-Aug-2024,
https://www.jns.org/israel-weighs-shutting-down-multi-million-dollar-sky-dew-project/

UK’s Commercial Mine Countermeasures Ship

The UK’s Royal Navy just commissioned a former commercial offshore support vessel (OSV) into the fleet as HMS Stirling Castle, a mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership. 

The ship – previously named MV Island Crown – was acquired from the commercial market for £39.8 million at the start of 2023 to provide a UK host platform for autonomous MCM payloads … [1]

So, for the sum of around $51M(US), the Royal Navy acquired a mine countermeasures ship.  Of course, there had to have been additional expenses in converting it from its commercial role to a naval MCM ship although one cannot imagine the scope of work or the cost would be too significant since the roles are not all that different.  Compare that cost to the cost of a new, purpose built MCM ship and the Royal Navy likely saved something on the order of $300M.

 

HMS Stirling Castle

The salient question, though, is how well suited is the vessel for its new role?  The ship’s duties are described as:

 

Stirling Castle…will now take her place on front-line duties, carrying high-tech equipment, including autonomous surface and underwater vehicles, for specialist mine hunting operations, primarily in UK waters.[1]

This is not a terribly demanding role and consists primarily of launching and recovering unmanned MCM assets, not too dissimilar from its previous role of loading and unloading supplies.  Is the ship exquisitely optimized for the role?  Of course not but is it adequate?  Almost certainly … and for a substantial savings.

 

This is exactly the kind of pragmatic, responsible action that the US Navy should be engaged in.  At the moment, we have no viable MCM ships.  The LCS remains a joke both in terms of its non-existent capabilities and inadequate numbers.  Wouldn’t some US Navy $50M MCM motherships look pretty good about now?

 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “UK Royal Navy commissions HMS Stirling Castle as first MHC mother ship”, Richard Scott, 25-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/uk-royal-navy-commissions-hms-stirling-castle-as-first-mhc-mother-ship/

Satellite Imagery Dispersal

There is a significant faction of military/naval observers who have the mistaken belief that satellites can see every vessel sailing on the ocean and that the satellites have some sort of direct link to the firing controls on ships and aircraft thus rendering every ship a kill waiting to happen.  This is nonsense, as ComNavOps has repeatedly pointed out.  The resolution of satellite imagery precludes that kind of omnipotent detection and tracking.  If you have sufficient resolution then you give up breadth of field.  If you have breadth of field then you give up resolution.
 
All this is compounded by the fact that satellite imagery is in high demand and the raw image must be processed and analyzed.  After that, it has to be dispersed to the hundreds of offices wanting access to it.  In the case of fire control, you have to add in layers of command (bureaucracy) before any useful detection/tracking imagery can reach a ship or aircraft where it can be put to actual firing use. 
 
The entire process takes hours or days.  We simply don’t have the kind of instantaneous, raw image-to-the-missile-launch-button that so many imagine.
 
Many of you still doubt that reality.  Well, here’s more proof. 
 

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is working with US Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to operationally test an early version of its Joint Regional Edge Node (J-REN) system designed to speed satellite-based intelligence to the battlefield, according to NGA officials.
 
NGA began development of J-REN — a modernization of NGA’s current information technology “pipe” to more rapidly fulfil commanders’ requests for urgent access to remote sensing imagery and analysis — just last year.[1]

The lack of timeliness of satellite imagery has been a known and on-going issue for many years and even recent advances have been insufficient.
 

The ever-increasing calls from COCOMS for more timely imagery and analysis from remote sensing satellites has been the subject of a tug-of-war between NGA and the Space Force — an issue the two agencies have been struggling to work out for more than a year.
 
The concept is to avoid clogging up limited communications bandwidth with overly-dense data packages, while still ensuring that military operators have good enough information to work with …[1]

There you have it.  If satellites were the omnipotent, all-seeing miracles with direct links to firing controls, this entire effort wouldn’t even be happening, would it?  The blindingly obvious conclusion is that the image-to-fire-control process is a slow one, as ComNavOps has repeatedly stated.
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “NGA field testing new processor to speed imagery to US regional commands”, Theresa Hitchens, 18-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/nga-field-testing-new-processor-to-speed-imagery-to-us-regional-commands/

Five Tons of Unmanned Stupidity

I just read yet another article extolling the wonders of unmanned surface vessels for logistics and/or attack.[1][3]  This one was singing the praises of the Leidos Sea Specter slow, low profile boat which Leidos claims can carry a 2-5 ton payload for 1000-2200 nm at 8 kts in sea state 3.[2]   The manufacturer’s original concept was for this craft to be used as a logistics delivery platform.  A recent article suggested it could be used to attack Chinese carrier or surface groups using a containerized torpedo.

Let's consider a couple of important aspects to this concept.
 
Speed – This craft, like most unmanned craft, is appallingly slow;  it can’t get anywhere useful in any tactically relevant time frame.  While the manufacturer claims the craft can sail from Guam to any point in the first island chain on a single tank of gas, it would, as a relevant example, take 5+ days, best case, to make a 1000 nm journey.  This demonstrates the idiotic nature of a combat use for this craft.  Say a Chinese surface group was spotted transiting past an island, it would take around a week for the craft to carry its single containerized torpedo to that point.  Of course, the target group would be long gone.  People are making this stuff up without thinking it through.
 
Payload – The payload is very small with severe volumetric limitations which will reduce the effective payload substantially.  The cargo area is limited in volumetric size to a maximum payload storage area of 29’ x 4’ x 4’ which, essentially, means just small boxes as opposed to any sizable equipment.
After seeing the tiny cargo area in a manufacturer’s video, it is obvious that the claimed payload of 2-5 tons would only be for bricks stacked in the area with no space.  Any realistic cargo, with packaging and space will be far less.  One ton might be optimistic.
 
This is far too small a payload to be logistically significant for any but, perhaps, a lone coastwatcher on an island mountain.  For example, an infantry division in combat consumes some 1000 tons of various supplies per day and that’s probably unrealistically low!  An armored division uses some 600,000 gal (2000 tons) of fuel per day in combat and, again, that’s probably ridiculously optimistic.
 
If someone thinks we’re going to resupply Guam or some far flung, hidden Marine missile shooting outpost using these tiny boats, they’re sadly mistaken.
 

Leidos Sea Scepter

 
Conclusion
 
The only thing this craft can deliver is five tons of stupidity.  I understand why industry keeps producing these kinds of nonsense products … they make profits for the company because the military is so enamored with unmanned technology that they’ll buy anything, regardless of whether it has any viable use.  It is up to us to recognize stupidity because, clearly, the military can’t.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Marine Corps Trials Unmanned Logistics Concepts in the Indo-Pacific”, Carter Johnson, 25-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/u-s-marine-corps-trials-unmanned-logistics-concepts-in-the-indo-pacific/
 
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-xNZwlH8sM
 
[3]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Pairs Heavyweight Torpedo with USV in a New Program Effort”, Carter Johnson, 15-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-pairs-heavyweight-torpedo-with-usv-in-a-new-program-effort/

2025 GAO Annual Weapon Assessments Tidbits

Following are some tidbits from the current June 2025 GAO annual weapon systems report.
 
 
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) – Radars are being produced and delivered while testing is ongoing.  This kind of concurrency is what’s behind so many development and production cost overruns and schedule delays as problems are uncovered during production and reworks have to be performed.  I simply don’t understand what’s so hard about grasping this concept but the Navy seems absolutely unable to get it.  In this case, it’s even worse because we’re producing the radars faster than the ships they’re intended for and the Navy is having to warehouse the radars until there’s a ship ready for them.  Why produce untested, undeveloped systems when we don’t even have a use for them?
 
 
Ford Class – GAO reports the unit cost for the four Ford class carriers as $16.3B.  Yikes!  CVN-79 is struggling with weapon elevator installation (what a stunning surprise!) which will delay delivery.  The Navy may defer ‘non-critical’ work like painting until post-delivery … yet another example of accepting an incomplete product.
 
 
F-18 IRST – Remember back in 2007 when the Navy came up with the bright idea of attaching an IRST sensor to the front of a fuel tank for the F-18?  A simple, if less than optimal approach, right?  Well, 8 years later and they’re still working at it and it’s still not ready.  From the GAO report,
 

… while the IRST pods demonstrated capability at tactically significant ranges during operational testing, the pods were extremely unreliable. …  only managed to achieve 14 hours mean time between operational mission failures—short of the 40 hours required.

The rest of the world has had functional IRST systems for decades.
 
 
Constellation – Remember how the Navy has been saying for a year or more that the design of the ship is over 90% complete?  Well, they’re now revised that down to 70% after GAO previously called them out for, essentially, fraudulent reporting.  The program is going backward!  Only the Navy could start with a 90% design and, after years, regress to 70% … and you have to believe even that number is probably less than honest.
 
Weight growth is also an issue.
 

In October 2024, the Navy reported 759 metric tons of weight growth from initial estimates—nearly a 13 percent increase …

 
Medium Landing Ship (LSM) – The LSM is the key to the Marine’s concept of forward, hidden bases of missile shooters but the Navy has yet to really embrace the idea of buying the ship.  Initial cost estimates from industry apparently shocked Navy officials and they’ve been forced to start over.
 

Program officials said the offers they received were hundreds of millions of dollars higher than budgeted.

That’s surprising given how accurate Navy cost estimates usually are.
 
 
Mk 54 Torpedo – The Mk 54 Mod 2 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo has run into cost and development issues.
 

Program officials stated that contractors’ estimated costs to complete system development and testing were significantly higher than expected.

 
MQ-25 Stingray UAV – The unmanned tanker has run into lots of problems.
 

The MQ-25 Stingray program continues to report cost and schedule challenges that have led to a funding shortfall of $291 million. The program’s decision to delay the low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to September 2025, and its efforts to accelerate testing replacements for at least seven components with obsolescence and other issues, contributed to a significant increase in development costs since our last report.

Obsolescence????  How do you run into obsolescence problems for a brand new aircraft that hasn’t even been delivered yet?  You do it by having a program take forever to get fielded.  Development started in 2018 and here we are, seven years later with nothing to show for it.  So, yeah, you screw around for years and you wind up with obsolescence issues before you’ve fielded the first unit. 
 
FYI … first flight has not yet occurred … seven years later.  What’s happened to us?
 
You may recall that, in a first in recent times, the Navy opted to act as the program integrator instead of industry.  Well, they failed.
 

… the program’s software costs increased substantially since last year. Program officials attributed this increase to their 2021 decision to switch from a government-furnished ground control station to one provided by another contractor …

 
ORCA XLUUV – The unmanned submersible program is sinking.
 

It is now unclear whether the Navy will transition the XLUUV to a program of record because there are no clear requirements that the XLUUV can meet ...

This is what happens when you develop something without a CONOPS.
 
 
Ship to Shore Connector – This is a near duplicate replacement for the LCAC.  It should have been a simple and quick project.
 

… the program delayed its IOC date in each of our annual assessments since its originally scheduled IOC in August 2020—a total delay of more than 5 years.

Well, that’s not good but at least we aren’t building these things without having solved the problems … right?  Right?
 

As the program continues to delay key events in its schedule, it continues to construct and deliver craft—with 25 craft either under construction or delivered to date.

I was afraid of that.  So, each problem we encounter and each solution that’s implemented will require all the previously built and delivered craft to undergo rework.
 
 
Columbia SSBN – The price tag now sites at $10.5B each.  The delivery schedule has slipped by a full year and is likely to slip another year, according to the Navy.
 

The program attributed particularly slow periods of construction to out-of-sequence work that significantly disrupted planned construction events and led to large amounts of rework. According to program officials, the out-of-sequence work resulted from missing instructions in some design products that detail how to build the submarine.

Concurrency rears its head again.
 
 
Virginia SSN – The construction rate is woefully short of what we need.
 

The program’s 2024 construction rate fell to 1.15 submarines per year from 1.2 per year in 2023, short of the Navy’s goal of 1.5, according to program officials. …The Navy has a goal to deliver 2.3 submarines per year by the early 2030s.

A goal of 2.3 subs per year versus the current reality of 1.1?  Hmm … doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen.
 

Construction continues to cost more than planned.

Costs are higher than the Navy estimated?  The Navy has underestimated every project it’s ever embarked on.  At some point, don’t you have to admit that you’re incompetent to generate cost estimates and start applying something like a 100% fudge factor?  Before anyone tries to defend the Navy by saying that it’s very difficult to estimate costs, note that other agencies seem to routinely estimate Navy project costs pretty accurately.  Further note that ComNavOps also estimates Navy project costs pretty accurately (Constellation, for example;  you can check it in the archives).
 
 
T-AGOS Surveillance Ship – Scheduling and design issues, again.
 

… the program will likely miss its goal for fielding T-AGOS 25 in 2027 by several years.

Several years????  It’s essentially a commercial ship!
 
 
 
Conclusion
 
Who’s running these clown shows and why haven’t they been fired yet?  Wake up, Hegseth!  The GAO report is telling you, loud and clear, who to fire.  Quit screwing around and start firing people.

Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache