Just Make a Decision

Naval News website reports that Japan is interested in co-producing SM-6 Standard missiles. 
 

Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani has announced that Tokyo proposed joint production of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) ship-to-air missile during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on March 30.[1]

Japan has previously agreed, to some nebulous extent, to co-produce AMRAAM and PAC-3 missiles although no action appears to have come of that, yet.
 

… the U.S. and Japan in Tokyo in July 2024, both governments had already agreed to “pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of AMRAAM and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE).
 
Nakatani’s [Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani] proposal this time will not only include joint production of AMRAAM and PAC-3 MSE missiles, which have been under consideration since the previous Joe Biden administration, but also include the long-range ship-to-air missile SM-6 … [1]

What is the US reaction/response?
 

… the U.S. side responded, by saying “We would like to continue to discuss the joint production of missiles that are mutually beneficial for both Japan and the United States, including the SM-6, as well as AMRAAM, and PAC3 that we have discussed so far, even at an administrative level. We understand the importance, so we would like to deepen the discussion at the administrative level in the future.”[1]

Good grief.  What a bunch of wishy washy nonsense.  Make a decision, already.  Endless studies and discussions benefit no one.  This is what’s wrong with modern government.  They’re incapable of acting, instead defaulting to never ending commissions, studies, reports, and discussions.  A major reason China is outproducing us their ability to make a rapid decision and then get about implementing it.  We, in the meantime, continue to study the issues to death.
 
I don’t have all the details on this particular issue but it certainly seems like a win-win proposition.  As the Ukraine war has demonstrated, we lack the weapon production capacity to meet our needs.  If Japan can help fill that need, where’s the downside?
 
Do it or don’t do it but make a damn decision!
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Japan proposes co-production of SM-6 missiles to the U.S.”, Kosuke Takahashi, 3-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/japan-proposes-co-production-of-sm-6-missiles-to-the-u-s/

SecNav Phelan

Businessman John Phelan has been confirmed as Secretary of the Navy and I have severe anxiety about this pick.
 
Phelan has no military experience or even exposure, as far as I can ascertain.  While I firmly believe that a non-military person can succeed in the position by leaning on the subject matter experts that are available to him, I have grave misgivings in this situation.  Who will Phelan look to for honest assessments of the Navy’s problems, needs, and possible solutions?  Will it be the admirals who created and continue all the current problems?  Will it be Congress who has abetted the current situation and refused to exercise effective oversight?  I’m concerned that Phelan has no subject expertise and, far worse, no one to turn to for guidance in the areas he is not knowledgeable about.
 
Beyond that, some of his public statements do not inspire confidence.  For example, here’s something he told the Senate Armed Services Committee about his plans: 

The Navy and the Marine Corps already possess extraordinary operational expertise within their ranks. My role is to utilize that expertise and strengthen it to step outside the status quo and take decisive action with a results-oriented approach.[1]

That’s just buzzword bingo gibberish.  That does not sound like a decisive, focused, knowledgeable Secretary of the Navy.  I hope I’m wrong but what’s the odds of that? 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Senate Confirms Phelan as Navy Secretary, Landau at State”, Mark Swanson, 24-Mar-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/senate-phelan-navy/2025/03/24/id/1204177/

USS Constellation to be Retired Early

In a move eerily reminiscent of the LCS, the Navy today announced the retirement of the not yet completed USS Constellation, first in its class of a new frigate.  Apparently, the Navy’s concurrency construction approach has resulted in so many unique modifications that the lead ship of the class has lost sufficient commonality with the subsequent class members to justify its retention. 

“Constellation has become such a unique, one-of-a-kind vessel that it would be cost prohibitive to operate and maintain the ship compared to its forthcoming sister ships”, explained Adm. Pete ‘Ketchum’ Inalie.  “In hindsight, we allowed too many change orders and had to make too many one-off modifications to accommodate the change requirements”, he went on to say.  “We now estimate that Constellation has only a 27% commonality with the subsequent ships of the class and that makes the ship unsustainable logistically.”
 
“We’ll complete Constellation’s construction as a means of finalizing the design and trying out new construction techniques but, ultimately, the only economically viable option is immediate retirement of the ship”, Inalie said.
 
“There is ample precedent for this move”, the Admiral stated.  “This is essentially what happened with the first LCS-1 and LCS-2 vessels.”

So much for the parent design eliminating problems, huh?  Another multi-billion dollar failure by the Navy.

 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval Industry News website, “Constellation to Retire Early”, Jacob S. Latter, 1-Apr-2025
https://navalindustryfakenews.com/constellation-pretend-retirement.com

Hypersonic Intercept … Well, Not Really

ComNavOps never ceases to be amazed at the deceptive spin (I’ll refrain from using the word fraud, in this case) put out by manufacturers, the Navy, and complicit ‘news’ sources.  As you know, the ability of defensive systems to intercept hypersonic attacking missiles is questionable.  Well here’s a headline from a Naval News website article that sounds like a piece of great news:
 
Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats[1]
 
A Burke class destroyer, USS Pinckney (DDG-91) conducted a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Well, that certainly sounds like good news.  Aegis performed a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Great!
 
However, as we read a bit further into the article, we note the following: 

The USS Pinckney (DDG 91) successfully completed Flight Test Other 40 (FTX-40), also known as Stellar Banshee, using Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat System to detect, track and perform an engagement against a live advanced hypersonic Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target using a simulated SM-6 Block IAU.[1][emphasis added]

Wait, what now?  The intercept used a simulated SM-6 defensive missile????  So, in reality, all the destroyer’s Aegis system did was track the hypersonic target.  It didn’t engage.  No actual intercept occurred.
 
Well, that changes the tone of the article and essentially refutes the headline, doesn’t it?
 
So, what did the test actually accomplish?  I don’t know the test objectives but it certainly didn’t demonstrate a successful intercept.  At best, it demonstrated the ability to track a hypersonic target which we already knew we could do.  At worst, it was a purely theoretical, software exercise that proved nothing.
 
The main thing all of this demonstrates is the need for us to be very careful and diligent in our reading of articles.  Take nothing for granted.  Assume whatever you’re reading is deceptive and make sure you really understand what you’re reading.
 
Congratulations Lockheed and Navy.  You theoretically shot down a target drone with a theoretical missile.  Theoretically … good job.
 
Congratulations Naval News website.  You managed to parrot a Lockheed press release without adding any analysis or value whatsoever.  You’re a credit to news reporters everywhere.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats”, Carter Johnston, 25-Mar-2025, Lockheed Martin Press Release
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/u-s-navy-downs-maneuvering-hypersonic-missile-in-sm-6-block-iau-test/

Visby As The Model

ComNavOps has frequently cited the Swedish corvette Visby as the model for future WARship designs based on the extreme (compared to current standards) radar stealth of the ship.  Radar stealth, while not the be all and end all of WARship design, is, without a doubt, the minimum price of admission to the modern naval battlefield.  Stealth, alone, won’t guarantee success or survival but the absence of stealth will guarantee failure and destruction.  Visby is the only existing, functional high stealth WARship that I’m aware of.  Yes, there are other experimental prototypes that claim high stealth (Sea Shadow, for example) but they aren’t functional WARships – they’re experiments that emphasize one attribute not the entire WARship package.
 
What does it mean to call for Visby as the model for future US Navy WARship design?  Well, it doesn’t mean to make an exact copy and just add a hundred feet of length – though that would likely produce a much better ship than what we have now!  What it means is to take the conceptual attributes of the Visby and incorporate them into a clean sheet design.  However, even that is not the end of it.  Visby, while decently (not great) equipped and armed for a corvette, lacks many attributes that a high end WARship will need for the future naval battlefield.  So, what should we take from Visby and what do we need to add? 

 

Visby

Stealth – Visby’s radar stealth is due in large measure to its angular, uninterrupted shape with very few protuberances.  Compare Visby’s look to our latest Burkes and the Constellation and you’ll instantly see just how obsolete the Burkes and Constellations are in this regard.  They’re jokes and will stand out on the battlefield like the radar beacons they are.  Several decades ago, the Burke was notable for its stealth but that time is long since passed.
 
Electromagnetic Stealth – Radar stealth is not enough, by itself.  We need extreme emissions control across the entire spectrum.  Not a single stray electron can be emitted if a ship hopes to survive.  Visby may or may not have this – I suspect not.
 
Acoustic Stealth – This is how you gain a degree of immunity from submarines.  A ship cannot allow any avoidable noise to escape.  Note that this likely means downgrading other attributes such as speed (no giant waterjet trumpets – looking at you, LCS).  I have no idea to what extent, if any, Visby has this.
 
Visual Stealth – This is an ignored aspect and we need to incorporate modern coatings and processes (electrochemically reactive coatings, for example).  Old fashioned camouflage, adapted to disrupt optical seekers, is necessary and we’re not talking about the idiotic, crew-designed camo schemes on the LCS.  Visby does not have this, at all.
 
Infrared Stealth – Modern ships cannot emit a significant infrared signature.  Active cooling systems are mandatory and engine exhaust must be significantly cooled even is this means downgrading performance (underwater exhaust, for example, which creates backpressure and decreases engine performance).  The current nuclear washdown systems, adapted to infrared cooling, would be a good start towards heat signature management.  Non-heat absorbing coatings and materials should be developed.  Visby does not have this.
 
Weapons Density – We’ve talked at length about the extremely sparse weapons density on modern ships and Visby is as guilty of this as anyone.  We need to load the new ship with weapons appropriate for its size and purpose.  To offer one ballpark example, no major WARship should sail without a minimum of 8 close in weapon system (the Burkes have 1 – what a joke).
 
UAV – We’ve talked at length about ships needing to be able to operate many dozens of small, stealthy UAVs for situational awareness.  This means the ship needs a small catapult/launcher of some sort, a recovery mechanism, and storage for many dozens of UAVs.  Visby has no such capacity.
 
Electronic Warfare – Todays EW is a joke.  We need ten times the capacity, antennae, power, and sensitivity of existing SLQ-32/SEWIP systems.  We also need to emphasize offensive/active EW, not just detection and defensive.  Again, this means output power.  Visby does not have this.
 
Optical/Passive Sensors – To emit is to die.  The modern WARship’s sensors must be optical/passive and incorporate automated search/tracking and fire control … in other words, an optical/passive Aegis system.  Visby does not have this.
 
Range of Weapons – The modern trend towards nothing but VLS missiles is idiotic.  Naval warfare demands flexibility which demands a wide range of weapons.  The modern ship needs missiles, of course, but it also needs large caliber guns (appropriate for its size and role), medium caliber guns, and small caliber guns, heavy torpedoes, ASW RBUs, small anti-drone weapons, lasers (because, they’re just around the corner of being ready, right??), etc.  Visby does not have this to an effective degree.
 
 
Conclusion
 
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that Visby is the only logical starting point for modern WARship design but it is not the end point.  It lacks many of the required attributes for a survivable, effective WARship.  Think of the Visby as the USS Monitor - it’s a great first step towards a truly modern WARship but nowhere near the end product of the required development.

USS Constellation Update

The Navy’s new frigate, the USS Constellation, is now expected to deliver 3 years late, or more (spoiler alert!  It will be more!).  What’s going wrong?  Let’s get an update.
 
 
Design
 
The Constellation contract was awarded in April 2020 which means the design work began more than 5 years ago and is still nowhere near complete.  That’s astounding.  Over 5 years to generate a design and it still isn’t complete.
 

… the U.S. Navy had to significantly modify the design to meet U.S. survivability and growth margin standards.
 
Speaking at the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington event, Fincantieri Marinette Marine CEO Mark Vandroff said the Navy and the shipyard underestimated the complexity of altering the design.[2]

The entire point of the so-called parent design approach was exactly to avoid significant design changes and yet the Navy ignored that philosophy and instituted extensive changes.
 
Concurrency and Schedule
 
As we’ve seen with every acquisition program in recent years, concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) always causes cost and schedule havoc.  Despite this repeated, soul-deep lesson, the Navy opted for concurrency, yet again, beginning construction with only partial design plans.  Predictably (well … predictable by everyone except the Navy), this has caused schedule problems among other issues, with the ship now scheduled to deliver more than three years late.
 

The Navy’s decision to commence construction before completing the design has led to significant schedule slippages.[1]

Cost
 
As always, the Navy’s cost estimates have proven fraudulently underestimated.
 

Initially, the estimated cost for the first ship was around $1.28 billion, with subsequent ships expected to cost approximately $1.05 billion each. However, these estimates have proven to be overly optimistic. The actual costs have increased significantly, with some estimates suggesting that the final cost per ship could be as high as $1.6 billion. This 40% increase in costs has raised concerns about the program’s affordability and sustainability.[1]

Actually, those costs aren’t even true.  The Congressional Research Service Feb 2021 report notes,
 

The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimated that subsequent ships in the class will cost roughly $940 million each in then-year dollars.[emphasis added][2]

Weight
 

The weight of the ships has increased by over 10% from the initial estimates. This weight growth is attributed to design decisions and the challenges of adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. Navy requirements.[1]

Unfortunately, the Navy is now looking at reducing or eliminating other capabilities in order to compensate for the weight increase.  It is almost certain that the range and speed requirements will be downgraded among other detrimental changes.
 
Workforce
 

The shipyard is reportedly a “few hundred” workers short, which has contributed to delays in the construction schedule.[1]

Come on, now.  It’s not as if the builder didn’t know how many workers they had when the bid the project.  If they’re short of workers now, they certainly knew they were short of workers when they bid.  This is, again, fraud on the part of the builder and willful complicity on the part of the Navy who also knew the builder’s workforce compared to the project requirements.
 
Risks
 

The Navy has yet to demonstrate the full capabilities of the propulsion and machinery control systems … [1]
 
The Navy is considering additional land-based testing to mitigate these risks and ensure the reliability of the systems before the ships are deployed.[1]

When have we ever seen ‘risks’ not become problems?  The point of land based testing is to find problems and solutions before beginning construction.
 
Second Yard
 
Given the inability of Fincantieri to meet the contracted schedule, the Navy has begun looking at a second source shipyard.  Possibilities include:
 

… specifically mentioned Austal USA, Bollinger, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works as potential second yards.[2]

 
Conclusion
 
The Navy’s absolute refusal to design and build a ship the proper way (complete the design and then begin construction) is, after so many demonstrated failures using this approach, a near criminal act of fraud and negligence perpetrated against the American taxpayer.
 
As we all knew, with 100% certainty, concurrency has, once again, caused schedule slippage and cost overruns.
 
The Constellation class is now in the process of having its requirements downgraded to compensate for weight increases.  So much for the supposed benefits of a parent design.  The Navy never had any intention of building the parent design.  That was just a ploy to evade additional Congressional oversight.
 
It bears noting that the yard’s manpower shortages are not exactly a new problem that suddenly reared its head.  Both the yard and the Navy knew they couldn’t build the ship in the required time frame with the workforce they had.  Essentially, the yard and the Navy conspired to hide the inability to meet the contract.
 
Worse than all the listed problems is the fact that even if there were no problems, it would only produce an obsolete design unsuited for modern combat.
 
There is no other way to describe this program than as a massive fraud and failure. 
 
 
 
____________________________

[1]1945 website, “The U.S. Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Big Trouble”, Isaac Seitz, 25-Feb-2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-u-s-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate-is-in-big-trouble/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy: Constellation Frigate Design Will be Ready in May, Second Yard Could Come in FY 2027”, Mallory Shelbourne & Sam LaGrone, 13-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/13/navy-constellation-frigate-design-will-be-ready-in-may-second-yard-could-come-in-fy-2027

USNS Wally Schirra Maintenance

Here’s an interesting piece of potential good news.  According to a press release, the Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship, USNS Wally Schirra, T-AKE-8, completed a several month maintenance overhaul in Korea at the Hanwha Ocean Co. (previously Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering) facility.[1]  If this turns out to be a viable option, the flexibility to obtain maintenance at a foreign yard increases our maintenance capacity and improves fleet availability.
 
What wasn’t spelled out in the press release was the actual cost compared to budget or the adherence to the planned schedule.  The work was originally supposed to be completed in Dec 2024 but ran into March 2025 when the scope of the work was increased due to additional maintenance requirements discovered during the course of the project.  Thus, it appears that the schedule overrun was an add-on approved by the Navy rather than an inability to meet the original schedule.  It was also not revealed whether all of the maintenance items were addressed within the allotted time frame – typically, US ships in US yards leave their maintenance periods with significant work unaddressed due to time pressures – a practice that simply kicks the maintenance can down the road and causes worse problems in the future.  For example, the USS Port Royal grounding was, in part, directly attributable to the failure to complete work on a faulty navigation system.
 

USNS Wally Schirra Entering Hanwha - that is
one beat up looking ship!

 
A Navy press release gives a hint of the scope of the work: 

ROH [Regular OverHaul] conducted aboard Wally Schirra in the Republic of Korea included dry docking, and more than 300 work items that addressed hull corrosion and a full rudder replacement.
 
“Hanwha addressed extensive deterioration and damage to the hull, propeller, rudder, and rudder post/steering gear,” said Cmdr. Patrick J. Moore, commanding officer, MSC [Military Sealift Command] Office-Korea. “Notably, Hanwha engineers reverse-engineered the damaged rudder, completely replacing the unit when blueprint were not available.[2]

A concerning item is the replacement of the rudder and the lack of a blueprint to do so.  How is it possible for the Navy to not have a blueprint for the ship’s rudder?  That’s mind-boggling.
 
That aside, if the work was completed on time and on budget, that’s a tremendous accomplishment both for the Korean company and for the general Navy maintenance effort.
 

USNS Wally Schirra Leaving Hanwha - that's what
a ship should look like!

 

Hanwha Ocean is currently executing an overhaul on USNS Yukon.
 
If obtaining maintenance from a foreign company turns out to be a viable and effective option, the beneficial impact on Navy readiness cannot be overstated.  This would increase our maintenance capacity, increase ship availability, increase readiness, and improve overall ship quality. 
 
Of course, there is always the issue of sensitive/secret equipment and how to ensure the security of that equipment while in a foreign yard.  It’s probably not that significant an issue for logistics ships but warships are crammed with sensitive/secret equipment.  Still, even being able to obtain additional maintenance on the logistics fleet would be a tremendous help.  I love to be able to say this:  well done, Navy!
 
If nothing else, maybe we can pull into a foreign dock and get the rust removed from our rotting ships!
 
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Hanwha Ocean completed its first MRO on US Navy ship”, staff, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/hanwha-ocean-completed-its-first-mro-on-us-navy-ship/
 
[2]Navy website, “USNS Wally Schirra Completes Major Maintenance at South Korean Shipyard”, Grady Fontana, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/4118860/usns-wally-schirra-completes-major-maintenance-at-south-korean-shipyard/
 

Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

USS Stark Lessons

We have often examined battles to glean lessons learned.  Along a slightly different line, let’s take a look, now, at a single incident, as opposed to a full battle.  The incident is the attack on the USS Stark which saw an Iraqi aircraft launch two Exocet missiles, both of which hit the Stark, one exploding and the other may not have exploded but did spew hundreds of gallons of flaming fuel.
 
The information that follows is taken mainly from the excellent book, Missile Inbound [1].
 
Here are some points of interest to keep in mind as you review the timeline presented further down the page:
 

• The electronic warfare (EW) SLQ-32 unit on the Stark was a passive-only signal detection device.  It could detect signals and identify them by comparing to a signals library.  The ultimate output of the SLQ-32 to the operator was a signal source/type and bearing.[1, p.67]  It did not provide range.
• The CIWS on the Stark was capable of detecting, tracking, and notifying the operator that it was tracking a target.[1, p.68]  The Stark’s CIWS was in ‘Standby’ mode at the time of the attack.
• Stark had both the SPS-55 and SPS-49 operating.  The SPS-49 operator was inexperienced and did not have the proper range setting on the radar and failed to see the attacking aircraft.  In fact, the Stark’s radar never detected the aircraft but were aware of the aircraft’s movements via data link from an AWACS.
• Ship was in Battle Condition III (BC III) which required a third of the crew to be on duty and all weapon stations manned.[1, p.69]

 
As a brief review, here is the timeline of the event.  I’ve used generic descriptions of a person’s position, listed in block parentheses [xxx], instead of names to avoid confusion.
 
2050 hr – One of the two required fire controlmen was allowed to leave CIC, in violation of BC III, for a bathroom break and never returned before the missiles hit.
 
2055 hr – Stark establishes its first radar contact when an officer changes the radar range mode to the correct setting.
 
2102 hr – SLQ-32 operator detects the aircraft’s search radar emissions.
 
2104 hr – Aircraft is 39 nm from Stark.
 
2105 hr – At 32.5 nm, Mirage turns directly towards Stark but no one in CIC notices.
 
2107 hr – At 22.5 nm, F-1 Mirage launches first missile.
 
2108 hr – Stark CIC notices Mirage has changed course directly towards them and decides to issue standard radio warning to aircraft.  At 15.5 nm, Mirage launches second missile.  SLQ-32 detects a momentary radar fire control lock from what the CIC crew believes is the Mirage.  The signal reverts to routine search mode in a couple of seconds.
 
2109 hr – Crew is dispatched to arm the port and starboard chaff launchers and launchers are switched from ‘safe’ to ‘on’.  Lookout spots first missile but verbal warning is not relayed to CIC in time.  SLQ-32 operator reports second radar lock signal.  CIC officer orders the Mk92 STIR (fire control radar) to track the Mirage but is told that the Mirage is in the STIR blind zone.
 
2110 hr – First missile impacts.
 
2111 hr – Second missile impacts.
 
 
Discussion
 
The Stark incident has been reported and analyzed many times so I won’t belabor the more obvious points.  There are, however, a few points that are particularly pertinent.
 
1. Officers later testified that they never detected a ‘terminal homing’ signal from the Mirage.  This indicates a glaring lack of knowledge about the Mirage which had a track-while-scan radar and did not generate anything approximating a ‘terminal homing’ signal.  What the SLQ-32 operator momentarily noticed was likely the first missile’s seeker signal.  Had CIC recognized what the SLQ-32 actually detected, they would have had time to switch the CIWS into automatic mode.
 
This reveals that the crew was poorly trained.  They should have been well versed in both the capabilities of the SLQ-32 and the characteristics of all the aircraft in the region.  This is just elementary logic.  The failure to learn about the aircraft and weapons in the region would suggest that either the captain and crew were negligent in the extreme (fatally so) or were too busy with ancillary work to make time for the study of regional aircraft and weapons.  Indeed, the book points out that the crew's top priority leading up to the moment of attack was an upcoming high speed engineering test (OPPE).  Crews in a war zone should never have a higher priority than combat.  This is a failure of leadership at higher levels than the ship and crew.
 
2. The CIWS was never placed in automatic mode which would have allowed it to fire at the incoming missiles.  The officers testified that they left the CIWS in manual mode because they didn’t want to risk an accidental shoot down of the aircraft, believing it not to be a threat.  How they thought a CIWS with a range of some 1500 yds would shoot down an aircraft 15-20+ nm away was never explained.  Again, this demonstrates the officer's lack of familiarity with their own equipment.
 
The default mindset in a war zone should have been the opposite:  CIWS should always be in automatic mode in a war zone and switched to manual only when a verified friendly aircraft receives permission to approach.  If the price of saving a billion dollar ship is the occasional loss of a friendly pilot and aircraft due to the pilot’s stupidity, so be it.  I think such an approach would see a very rapid increase in pilot awareness and discipline – which is a good thing!
 
3. Allowing crew to leave their stations during BC III reveals the lackadaisical approach of the ship’s leadership and the absence of a combat mentality.  The ship’s captain, Capt. Glenn Brindel, testified that the absence of the fire controlman was a major contributing factor.  Regarding the inability of the STIR to track the Mirage due to the blind zone, Brindel said, 

[The CIC officer] did not know of the blind zone, Brindel said it was because [the fire controlman] had left the CIC for a head call without [the CIC officer’s] knowledge.  That fact, Brindel said, was key to the CIC’s inability to defend the ship.[1, p.80]

Brindel claimed not to know that leaving CIC without qualified replacement was a common practice by his crew.  If true, that speaks poorly about Brindel’s awareness of his crew’s behavior and his own failure to properly train his crew.
 
 
Lessons
 
Mindset.  The preceding points offer an overall lesson for us, today, about combat and combat mindsets.  Ultimately, the Stark tragedy can be traced back to the lack of a combat mindset by both the captain/crew and higher level fleet leadership.  No one in the entire chain of command was mentally prepared for combat.  They were lulled into complacency by the multitude of previous attacks that were directed against Iranian shipping.  In today’s world, where terrorism can strike anywhere and anytime, combat must be the default mindset.
 
Technology versus Knowledge.  Technology is not the answer to combat;  knowledge is.  Highly advanced equipment that is not fully understood (looking at you, Aegis) is worse than useless as it leads to incorrect assumptions (recall the training drone strike on the Tico cruiser), misinterpretations, and failure to grasp the reality of a situation.  Better to have simpler equipment that is completely understood.
 
__________________________
 
History keeps telling us exactly what we should be doing and we keep ignoring it.
 

__________________________

 
(1) Missile Inbound, Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 1-55750-517-9
 

2023 DOT&E Quick Hits

Following are some quick hits from the 2023 (released 2024) DOT&E annual report.  Again, I cannot stress the near-uselessness of the DOT&E reports since Dr. Gilmore left.  Nevertheless, consider these items:
 
 
CH-53K
 
The DOT&E report assess the CH-53K as not operationally suitable.
 

In the December 2022 IOT&E report, DOT&E determined that the CH-53K is not operationally suitable. The aircraft demonstrated acceptable results for all reliability and maintainability metrics.
 
However, the demonstrated low aircraft availability does not support sustained operations.  Additionally, the low probability of success of the automatic blade fold system will result in mission aborts and extended deck cycles that could hamper amphibious operations. The aircraft demonstrated its sortie generation rate requirement.  Unexpected main and tail rotor blade erosion damage was observed on aircraft operating in the desert environment during IOT&E. Extended time was needed to repair blade erosion damage because of the lack of a structural repair manual. Battle damage assessment and repair also requires a structural repair manual that has yet to be delivered.[1, p.161]

CMV-22B COD
 

As reported in the combined FOT&E and LFT&E report of June 2022, DOT&E found that CMV-22B was not operationally suitable due to failures of many subsystems … [1, p.164]

The miraculous V-22 is less than miraculous?
 
 
F-18 Software
 

The Navy stopped SCS [Software Configuration Set] H16 operational testing during 4QFY22 due to severe software deficiencies, but still fielded the system to the operational fleet in FY23 without completing the DOT&E-approved FOT&E test plan.[1, p.195]

So, severe deficiencies identified in testing but the Navy fielded the system anyway?  I don’t see any way that can go wrong.
 
 
Constellation
 
From the DOT&E operational effectiveness assessment, 

Unclassified risks to operational effectiveness include that the FFG 62 design does not have a tracker illuminator system, which is typically installed on other Aegis platforms, and that the design crew size will be highly reliant on currently unproven system automation and human system interfaces. The Navy acknowledges the risk of the current crewing strategy for FFG 62 … [1, p.201]

Independence LCS-MCM
 
Here’s the operational suitability assessment of the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) that is the actual sweep portion of the MCM module as opposed to the one-at-a-time hunting systems.  Doesn’t look good. 

UISS is not operationally suitable, as documented in the UISS IOT&E report dated June 2022. UISS’s reliability and availability do not support sustained mine sweeping operations.[1, p.207]

MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Tanker
 
How’s that tanker coming along? 

DOT&E has not approved any operational test plans for MQ-25.[1, p.217]

Not even testing, yet???

SEWIP 

…preliminary data indicate SEWIP Block 2 fails to meet its reliability and operational availability requirements.[1, p.242]

John Lewis Class Replenishment Oiler 

USNS John Lewis could not support scheduled test events on five occasions due to equipment failures.[1, p.245]

Discussion
 
A few common themes jump out from the DOT&E report.
 
While it is perfectly normal for every new project to encounter problems, many of the systems being reported on are far from being new and the degree of problems encountered is not acceptable.
 
The number of scheduled test events that were cancelled due to equipment failure – often not of the test item, itself! – is disappointing especially when one considers that the tests were scheduled and the equipment presumably underwent meticulous tweaking prior to the test period.  The failures paint a picture of a Navy that is physically failing and is incapable of performing rapid, on-site repairs.  This speaks worlds – and poorly - to the specter of battle damage and our ability to ‘stay in the fight’ when damaged.
 
As noted many times in the past, the Navy lacks suitable, enemy-representative, target drones for realistic testing.  To paraphrase, ‘millions for new construction, not a penny for testing!’  The Navy’s priorities are beyond badly screwed up.

Stop Talking, Start Doing

 
This from SecDef Pete Hegseth during an interview with Shannon Bream,
 

“We won World War II with seven four star generals, Shannon. We have 44 today … Has it created better outcomes or not? We’re challenging a lot of assumptions at the Pentagon to streamline what we do so that we get as many resources as possible to the warfighter.”[1]

So, stop talking, Pete, and start firing people.  Arithmetic says, 44-7 = 37.  I’m waiting to see 37 generals fired.  Otherwise, it’s all just talk and you’re no different from your predecessors. 
 
Stop talking and start doing.  What are you waiting for?  Don’t disappoint me.
 
 
 
… and then do the Navy.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Daily Caller website, “‘The Status Quo Hasn’t Worked’: Hegseth Breaks Down Why Pentagon Needs Major Shake Up”, Hailey Gomez, 23-Feb-2025,
https://dailycaller.com/2025/02/23/pete-hegseth-pentagon-trump-administration/
 

CNO Franchetti Fired

In a not entirely unexpected, and very welcome move, SecDef Hegseth has fired CNO Franchetti.  During her tenure, she accomplished nothing, perpetuated the problems she inherited, and solved no existing problems (see, "CNO Franchetti - Another Failed CNO in the Making").  She had a notably undistinguished resume for the position and, I suspect, was a DEI hire.
 

Good riddance.
 
Of course, it remains to be seen who the replacement will be and whether they’ll be any better.  Still, this is a possible first step towards fixing the Navy.  Well done, SecDef.

Asymmetric Warfare Against the Chinese

A reader recently offered his opinion that the US has no hope of achieving victory in a war with China due to China’s overwhelming superiority in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  I’m not going to cite the reader’s comment as I have no wish to embarrass him.  Besides, his view is shared, to varying degrees, by many people so he’s hardly unique.  Is he correct?  Is America doomed?  Let’s examine this view.
 
For starters, the reader’s assumption of China’s overwhelming superiority is incorrect, in many ways, but for the sake of this discussion, let’s stipulate that he’s exactly right – that China does, indeed, have overwhelming superiority of technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  It would seem, then, that the US, indeed, has no hope of victory.  After all, those are the main determinants of victory in any war, right?
 
Or are they?
 
Let’s start where we always do … history.  Let’s look at some recent examples.
 
Vietnam – The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (US) - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (Soviet Union) - The Soviet Union enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Korea - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers (at least until the Chinese entered the war), and industrial capacity and yet could only achieve a stalemate.
 
Without a doubt, technology, numbers and industrial capacity are important, especially in a conventional war, but, clearly, history proves that there are other, more important, factors that can overcome technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  What are those factors? 
 
 

• Will – First and foremost is will.  Determination.  The absolute unwavering desire for victory and nothing less.
• Victory Conditions – One sure way to lose a war is to enter into it without a clear idea of the end state (total victory, one assumes).  The US has violated this requirement repeatedly since WWII.  Indeed, a very strong case can be made that the US has not had a clear idea of victory conditions in any conflict it’s entered since WWII.
• Commitment – Hand in hand with will is the willingness to do whatever is required to win.  This means not allowing the enemy sanctuary across some border, not holding back out of fear of collateral damage or casualties, not scrubbing target lists to see which ones will play well on the public relations stage, and not giving a damn what the rest of the world thinks.  If you’re serious enough to enter a war, the only ‘good’ outcome is total victory as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary.
• Training - Training can overcome a lot of other disadvantages.  A properly trained man with a knife can beat a man with a machine gun.  We have hollow forces, currently; China's level of training is unknown.  We need to be trained to the peak of effectiveness. 
  
• Brutality – Part of the commitment to war is the commitment to the brutality of war.  The US has been far too squeamish about war since WWII and, thus, unable to wage war efficiently, meaning brutally effective.  I recall a small uproar of protest amongst the population during Desert Storm when it was revealed that the US bulldozed trenches and buried Iraqi soldiers alive.  Killing is killing.  It’s not our job to gently cradle enemy soldiers while we wait for them to die of old age.  Our job is to kill as efficiently as possible.
• Simplicity - Simplicity trumps complexity in battle.  Complex equipment that won’t function in the stress of combat, can’t be maintained, and can’t be repaired is of no use.
• Decentralization – A decentralized command and control structure can only help during war.  It reduces confusion and eliminates a vulnerable center of gravity.

 
 
In every example conflict cited above, the loser violated one or more (generally all!) of the factors just described.
 
So, can the US win a war with China even with the stipulation that China possesses superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity?  Of course we can!  However, it requires unwavering determination, crystal clear victory conditions, and total commitment. 
 
There is yet another factor that can offset superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and that is unconventional strategy and tactics.  Ukraine has amply demonstrated this with their unmanned assets, among other developments.  The Chinese used human wave attacks.  The North Vietnamese / Viet Cong used all manner of unconventional tactics.  The Taliban used IEDs and hid amongst the civilian population.  And so on.
 
Some people refer to this as asymmetric warfare and often use it as an excuse as to why a seemingly superior country lost to an inferior one.  Is asymmetric warfare some kind of magic solution?  Let’s consider it.
 
Let's start by dispensing with the silly notion that asymmetric war is somehow a different kind of war. It's not. War is war. Asymmetric simply means the enemy used different tactics than you did and, more often than not, asymmetric is used to try to explain away how you managed to lose to an inferior force.
 
So, recognizing that war is war, we now note that technology is not only NOT a guarantee of victory, it is often a detriment. For example, Germany's focus on ever more exquisite tanks to the detriment of just plain good tanks produced in large quantities cost them valuable time and resources. Thus, Vietnam and Afghanistan are not some kind of special war for whom the constants of war do not apply. They are war and the enemy conducted their war better than we did.
 
As an aside, readers, you might benefit from reviewing Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and more and try to identify which factors were truly deciding in the outcomes. You'll be surprised.  Ours is not the only way to wage war and, arguably, might be the least effective, depending on circumstances! Figure out why.
 
During a discussion of asymmetric war, and in response to the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and others, an anonymous reader made the comment,
 
"Afghanistan and Vietnam were asymmetrical, counterinsurgency operations, so are not analogies to what we would face with China."
 
Again, sticking with our stipulation of China possessing superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity, and keeping in mind the other factors that impact victory, what does that suggest for a US strategy? A student of warfare, might look to history and postulate that the US could and should fight exactly the kind of asymmetric war that the reader dismissed as not being applicable! Perhaps the US should identify asymmetric operations and tactics that would enable it to succeed despite being hopelessly outclassed by the Chinese in every conceivable way?
 
How could the US do this? What kinds of asymmetric tactics could the US use that might succeed? Well, for example, instead of attempting a toe-to-toe slugfest of army against army, perhaps the US should emphasize the use of small, special forces units to destroy Chinese oil and gas pipelines in Russia (*gasp* we can't put troops inside Russia! that would violate international law! ... well, that's why they call it asymmetric; you'll recall that the NVietnamese used Laos and the Taliban didn’t hesitate to cross into Pakistan?) thereby imposing a total sea AND LAND blockade of a critical resource.
 
Another example might be that instead of going toe-to-toe with the magnificent, all-powerful, Chinese navy, perhaps we could emphasize our still formidable advantage in submarines to destroy their fleet and systematically launch cruise missile attacks on every Chinese port, airfield, and base on the Chinese mainland - basically, guerilla warfare using sub-launched cruise missiles! Done correctly, this kind of attack would be almost undetectable and unstoppable.
 
And so on.
 
Asymmetric is not a special category of war that transcends the constants of war.  It is merely a set of tactics and operations that your/our military doesn’t normally use.  If we think China truly has superiority of technology, numbers, and industry then perhaps we should be looking at implementing asymmetric tactics ourselves.  If we took this approach, it would, of course, require a different force structure, doctrine, and tactics and would require intense training to become proficient … none of which we’re doing.
 
China is beatable.  What we need to do is decide how we want to go about it and start getting serious about equipping and training for it.

Perception Is Reality

An anonymous reader (please, people, include a username at the end your comments so I can offer proper credit!) offered an interesting thought regarding lessons that could be learned from the Royal Navy (RN).  He observed,
 

… once naval forces stop generating usefulness and relevance to the countries [sic] population.... you soon stop having a navy big enough to matter..[1]

I understand this to mean that he believes that a citizenry will direct their resources (taxes and popular opinion) to those endeavors and organizations that it sees the greatest benefit from.  This is not terribly surprising, it’s just basic human nature and quite reasonable.  In this specific case, the population of the UK sees value in ‘things’ other than the RN or, at least, the RN ranks fairly low on the priority list in the minds of the citizens.
 
Most of the readers of this blog, almost by definition, would see a great value in a navy for their country, whatever country that is.  You wouldn’t be reading the blog if you didn’t, right?  So, how is it that the citizenry of the UK sees so little value in the RN?  Does the Royal Navy really offer no value to the people?
 
There are two factors at play, here.
 
1. True value
2. Perceived value
 
Among other purposes, a navy, any navy, ensures the security of its country’s shipping, provides persistent surveillance, presence, and confrontation against unfriendly encroachments, and stands as a ready force against enemy attack.  This ensures unhindered trade and enhanced economic fortune for the population.  This is the true value.
 
How could any population not see that as valuable and gladly provide resources for the establishment and maintenance of a naval force?
 
Well, that brings us to the perceived value.  There’s an old saying:  perception is reality.  That means that whatever someone believes to be real is what’s real to them.  If you believe that your navy isn’t doing anything worthwhile then that’s your reality regardless of the true reality.
 
Where does perception come from, if not from reality?  How is someone’s perception formed?  Well, it comes from many sources: one’s own experiences, media news sources (you can instantly see, here, the danger posed by a biased media that presents an altered reality as true reality, but, I digress), social networks, etc.  If those various sources are not constantly presenting and explaining the true value of a navy then the perception quickly becomes that the navy has no value.
 
I can’t address the UK situation specifically but I can note that the US Navy makes almost no effort to talk to the citizenry and present its accomplishments and value in terms that the average person can understand and relate to.  Instead, the Navy resorts to blocking the media, circling the wagons, hiding behind bogus classification labels, misleading Congress and, generally, looking down at the general population. 
 
The Navy’s actions off Yemen involving missile attacks and defense should be made into near-movie type adventures to be presented to the public.  The exploits of our fearless sailors, fighting off relentless missile attacks so that Americans can get their oil and goods should be the stuff of growing legend.  It almost doesn’t matter how precisely true the accounts are.  That’s not the point.  The point is to present the Navy’s value to the public.
 
Once upon a time, moviegoers were routinely treated to newsreel highlights of our armed forces.  We need to bring back the updated version of that on TV, streaming channels, social media, podcasts, influencers, etc.  We need to continuously show the public the value of the Navy.  If we do that, the Navy won’t have to beg Congress for ships, the people will do it for them.  If we do that, the recruiting problem will solve itself.
 
On the other hand, if we persist in hiding information, the people will have no idea what the value of the Navy is and the people’s attention and resources will be directed elsewhere … which is exactly what’s been happening for years, now.
 
On a related note, if the US is providing the security for global shipping, then what true value does the RN offer?  Why should the UK citizenry pay for a navy when the US is providing their security for free?  One could see this as a powerful argument for the US to stop providing global security which would, in turn force other countries to increase their naval forces to fill the gap and result in an increase in their true (and perceived?) value.  Thus, one could make the argument, it is in the UK’s best interest for the US to stop providing international shipping security.  Interesting perspective, huh?
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/12/open-post.html?showComment=1735387686167#c4809056757800113041

MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15^th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 

Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 

Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 

But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 

… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”

There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 

ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?

Another disturbing note was this,
 

The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 

At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 

The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/