Red Sea Weapon Expenditure

The War Zone website has an article offering the first glimpse into weapon expenditures in the Red Sea against the Houthis.  As stated by head of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, here are the weapon expenditures:
 

• 120 SM-2 missiles
• 80 SM-6 missiles
• 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and SM-3 missiles (combined, for some unknown reason)
• 160 rounds from five-inch guns

 
Total = 220 missiles
Total = 160 shells
 
CIWS was not mentioned although at least one example of CIWS use has been documented and acknowledged by the Navy.
 
Against this expenditure, the Admiral claims “more than 400” targets were engaged.
 
 
Elementary arithmetic shows that if the Navy’s 380 total munitions fired destroyed “more than 400 targets”, that’s a kill ratio (pK) of greater than 1.0 !!!!!  In other words, every Navy munition killed its target and many killed more than one target.  That’s amazing.  That’s incredible.  That’s unbelievable.  No, seriously, that’s not believable.  In fact, it’s blatantly wrong.
 
The admiral continues his unbelievable statements with,
 

“We’ve done the analysis with what we used to shoot in World War II, and we’re at about two rounds per incoming missile,” McLane said.[1]

We didn’t engage missiles in WWII so I have no idea what he’s talking about.  Aerial targets in WWII required thousands of rounds per hit so, again, I have no idea what he’s referring to.
 
Further, the good admiral undoubtedly is not including 5” shells in his statement of analysis as 5” guns have a near-zero chance of hitting a missile.  So, subtracting out the 5” shells, that means the Navy’s 220 missiles destroyed more than 400 targets for a pK of 1.8 or almost two targets destroyed by each defensive missile fired.  That’s just totally absurd, of course.
 
Setting all that aside, the admiral claims that two ‘rounds’ (which I assume to mean missiles) were used per engagement which would conform to the Navy’s standard ‘shoot, shoot, look’ tactic.  That means that the 220 missiles could have engaged only a maximum of 110 targets not more than 400.  That also assumes that every engagement worked and that would so greatly fly in the face of all historical defensive missile performance as to be flat out unbelievable.  The pK’s throughout history have been uniformly in the 0.01-0.25 range not 1.0-2.0.
 
Now, to be fair, the admiral wasn’t offering a detailed engagement analysis;  he was just providing weapon expenditures and likely threw out a ballpark number of targets just to provide context.  I don’t think he was lying or even being intentionally misleading.
 
I can readily imagine that some of the 400 targets were engaged by aircraft whose weapons (Sidewinders, presumably) weren’t included in the Navy’s ship weapons expenditure although that would mean that even fewer targets were actually engaged by ship missiles and that would significantly lower the pK.
 
We know that 5” guns are notoriously inaccurate (recall the Vincennes incident where some one hundred rounds were fired with zero hits) so the 160 shells fired were probably directed at just a few targets.
 
Clearly, this scant bit of information the admiral provided is not useful in analyzing weapon performance, only total expenditure and even that has gaps in the information since Sidewinders, CIWS, and RAM, among others, were not mentioned.  While the presumed pathetically poor quality and performance of the attacking missiles would result in better pK’s than historically found, I’m certain that the pK is nowhere near 1.0 and, indeed, the admiral’s own claim of two rounds per engagement disproves the apparent pK.  Unfortunately, until the Navy provides some detailed performance data, we can only speculate.
 
The only valid conclusion from the admiral’s statements is that we are on the wrong side of the cost curve … big time!  We’re using $2M-$4M missiles (two at a time!) to shoot down thousand dollar drones and cheap missiles.
 
This simply reinforces the common sense conclusion that you deal with attacks not by defending but by destroying the source of the attacks.  Perhaps the new administration will take a different view of the Red Sea actions than the previous administration.  We’ll have to wait and see and, in the meantime, we’ll continue to bleed money, deplete our missile inventories, and risk our ships while waiting for the inevitable leaker that gets through.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]The War Zone website, “Navy Just Revealed Tally Of Surface-To-Air Missiles Fired In Ongoing Red Sea Fight”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 14-Jan-2025,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-just-disclosed-how-many-of-each-of-its-surface-to-air-missiles-it-fired-during-red-sea-fight

2025 Shipbuilding Plan

China is building warships faster than we can keep track of them with dozens of new ships every year.  How is the US Navy doing, by comparison?  Let's take a look at the Navy's most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan and, more importantly, the five year portion of that plan (everything beyond five years is just made up guesses).

 
New Construction
 
According to the Navy’s most recent 2025 30 Year shipbuilding plan [1], over the next five years the Navy plans to build 33 combat ships (average 6.6 per year) which break down as follows:
 
Carriers CVN           0
Burke DDG            10
Constellation FFG   7
Virginia SSN            9
San Antonio LPD    3
Columbia SSBN      4
 
In comparison, China went from around 190 to 250 (+60) in the four years 2020-2023 inclusive for an average of 15 new ships per year which is twice the build rate of the US.
 
In addition, the Navy plans to build 24 assorted auxiliaries and logistics vessels.
 
 
Retirements
 
Balanced against the build plans, the Navy plans to decommission 64 ships as indicated below and broken down by year.
 
2025 19
2026 17
2027 12
2028   7
2029   9
 
2025 CG 4, SSN 3, LCS 2, LSD 1, other 9
2026 CVN 1, CG 3, LCS 1, SSN 3, SSGN 2, LSD 2, other 5
2027 CG 2, SSN 1, SSBN 1, other 8
2028 DDG 2, SSN 1, SSGN 2, SSBN 1, LSD 1
2029 DDG 3, SSN 1, LSD 1, LHD 1, other 3
 
Total retirements by type:
 
CVN     1
CG       9
DDG    5
SSN     9
SSGN  4
SSBN  2
LCS     3
LSD     5
LHD     1
other  25
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that in the five year plan (beyond five years is just pure made up guesses), the Navy is planning to retire 39 combat ships and 25 auxiliaries while building 33 combat ships and 24 auxiliaries for a net decrease of 6 combat ships and 1 auxiliary … while we’re supposedly gearing up for a near term war with China.  What’s wrong with this picture?
 
Other notable findings:
 

• The entire MCM force will be retired
• All SSGNs will be retired
• Nimitz class retirements will begin
• Burke class retirements will begin
• No new carriers are scheduled in the period
• No Burke/Tico replacement is planned

 
The MCM capability is of major concern.  The entire current MCM force of Avenger class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters will be retired with only a half dozen or so Independence variant LCS-MCM to take over mine countermeasures for the entire world.  Worse, the LCS MCM module is not yet functional and is entirely ineffective.  For all practical purposes, we no longer have any mine countermeasure capability.
 
The SSGN is far and away our most stealthy and effective land attack naval asset and will be retired without direct replacement.  The Virginia class, even with the VPM, simply cannot equal the SSGN in effectiveness and operational usefulness.
 
The lack of a Burke/Tico replacement is a major weakness.  We’ll be losing VLS (strike and AAW) capacity from the fleet while replacing them, numerically, with small, unmanned vessels with a fraction of the VLS.  The Burke Flt III is obsolete even before the first joins the fleet and is emphatically not the solution to future naval warfare due to the lack of stealth, armor, firepower, weight/stability margins, combat resilience, effective damage control, and a sub-optimal radar system.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ” Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025”, Mar 2024

MQ-8 Fire Scout Status

Remember when the Navy was claiming that the unmanned helicopter, the MQ-8 Fire Scout, was going to revolutionize naval warfare, providing area wide surveillance, total situational awareness, target detection and tracking, fire control for remote weapons, anti-surface capability, mine countermeasures, and … well … total battlefield dominance?  Let’s check in and see how that’s coming along.
 

The Future of Naval Warfare ... bye, bye

For starters, the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout.

 

The current inventory is 36 aircraft with no additional procurement planned.[1]
 
President’s Budget 2023 included a significant divestment within the MQ-8 program, resulting in the removal of all MQ-8B AVs [ed. AV = Air Vehicle] from inventory and reduction of the MQ-8C AV active operational inventory. Currently there are 11 aircraft dedicated to operational employment with 3 allocated to test and training, an increase of 1 from last year’s Annual Report. Projections for FY24 will increase the operational employment number to 15. The remainder are in a preservation status and are planned to be used for maintenance parts as necessary to support the pool of operational aircraft.[1]

Budget documents from 2024 indicate that the Fire Scout is being phased out completely.
 

Operational employment of the MQ-8C will end in Q4 FY2024 and sundown will be completed by Q4 FY2026.[2]

Instead of having hundreds of Fire Scouts roaming the battlefield and dominating our enemies, as promised, the Navy is down to around a dozen, which are being phased out, and appears to have lost interest in the platform.
 
With the near abandonment of the Fire Scout as context, there are, nominally, three variations (increments, as the Navy terms it) of Fire Scout in the works:
 

• Endurance Baseline Increment – imaging EO/IR sensor and laser range finder and designator
• SUW Increment – maritime search radar
• Mine Countermeasure Increment – COBRA near shore mine detection

 
How is testing coming along?  DOT&E states,
 

The Navy has yet to complete land-based testing necessary to characterize radar performance against maritime targets.[1]

Conclusion
 
It seems that the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout, presumably having realized that it has no effective use case in combat.  Of course, ComNavOps has been saying this since the first MQ-8 appeared.  Nice of the Navy to finally catch up.
 
Like the LCS, Zumwalt, and others, the Fire Scout platform has gone from being the future of naval warfare to an afterthought in a remarkably short period of time.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, Jan 2024,
 
[2]Flight Global website, “US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service”, Jan Tegler, 29-May-2024,
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/us-navys-mq-8c-fire-scouts-fly-into-retirement-just-two-years-after-entering-operational-service/158500.article

Destroyer Modernization

ComNavOps loves to report good news out of the Navy but seldom has the opportunity.  Here is a possible positive development regarding modernization of Burke Flt IIA destroyers.
 
A handful of ships have been designated for modernization under the Navy’s Destroyer Modernization 2.0 program.  Upgrades involve installation of :
 

• SEWIP Block III SLQ-32(V)7
• SPY-6 V4 air and missile defense radar
• Baseline 10 Aegis Weapon System.
• 350t high efficiency super capability chiller that provides the extra cooling needed when adding both the SLQ and SPY array to the legacy hulls

 
The initial set of destroyers chosen for modernization are:
 

• USS Pinckney (DDG-91)
• USS James E. Williams (DDG-95)
• USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93)
• USS Halsey (DDG-97)

 
These ships will receive upgrades incrementally rather than in a single availability.  The intent is for these ships to act as lessons learned prior to implementing fleet wide upgrades beginning in 2029.
 

In the first modernization period, destroyers will receive the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP Block III. According to Moore, these vessels will serve in the fleet “for some time” before returning for a second depot modernization period to receive a modified AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar.[1]

The Navy has also announced that USS Sterett (DDG-104) will be the first ship to receive the entire upgrade set in a single availability sometime in the next five years.
 
The Navy’s explanation for the modernization effort is,
 

“The bottom line here, the real takeaway that I want you to take here, is that we are bridging the gap between our legacy destroyers and the Flight III by delivering decisive combat power to the Flight IIA DDGs,” said Moore [DDG 2.0 modernization program manager Capt. Tim Moore].
 
The $17 billion modernization program aims to bring the fleet’s Flight IIA destroyers up to “Flight III-like capabilities” … [1]

Somewhat puzzlingly, the Navy has also identified some ships to receive only fragmentary upgrades.
 

… the Navy has also identified USS Kidd (DDG-100) to be the first of a “handful of ships” to receive only a SEWIP Block III upgrade and no SPY-6 back fit.[1]

Why the Navy wouldn’t fully upgrade these ships is unknown.  It is also unknown whether they would be included in the eventual fleet wide upgrade effort.
 
It is good that ships are being modernized rather than retired early, as the Navy is so often prone to do.  The question, now, is whether the Navy will follow through on this plan.  One of the concerns is the extended time period for this modernization.  Given that the main effort will not begin until 2029, will it still be a modernization?  In other words, will current equipment still constitute a modernization four-plus years from now?  One can easily envision the Navy, some four to ten years from now, telling Congress that the modernization is no longer adequate and the ships are too worn out to be financially worth upgrading and, therefore, they want new ships, instead.  Why do I think this?  Because that’s exactly what they’ve done in the past, repeatedly.
 
Despite the obvious dangers and doubts, I’ll view this as good news until the Navy proves otherwise.  Now, if they’d just drop the idiotic unmanned vessel nonsense and focus on firepower, I’d have some real positive news to write about!
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Identifies First Destroyer to Receive Full Set of DDG MOD 2.0 Upgrades”, Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, 16-Jan-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/01/16/navy-identifies-first-destroyer-to-receive-full-set-of-ddg-mod-2-0-upgrades

Get the US Out of NATO

NATO once served a valid purpose and did so admirably.  That purpose, however, is long gone and with it NATO’s reason for existence or, at least, the US’ reason for remaining a member of NATO.  Unfortunately, the mere mention of the faintest possibility of the US exiting NATO seems to trigger angst and panic among so many observers in Europe and the US.
 
Panic among European observers is especially ironic given that so many in Europe despise the US to begin with and work to actively undermine and obstruct any US action or desire.
 
Let’s examine some of the arguments against the US pulling out of NATO.
 
Isolation.  Many seem to feel that pulling out of NATO would automatically lead to the US being isolationists on the world stage.  This is ridiculous.  Aside from erasing our name from a piece of paper, we’re just talking about removing our military presence from Europe.  We would still have extensive and intimate financial, trade, cultural, and scientific interactions.
 
Russian Threat.  This argument has been forever laid to rest by the Ukraine war.  If a single, small country with almost no military to begin the war and a population a quarter the size of Russia can fight Russia to a standstill, albeit with significant munitions resupply help from the West, then the Russian threat is overblown to the point of irrelevance.
 
Political Balance.  Some suggest that the US presence balances political and territorial ambitions among the European countries as if our absence from NATO would trigger all out wars between European countries.  This seems patently absurd if for no other reason than the European countries don’t have much in the way of extensive or effective militaries, as evidenced by their very low defense expenditure levels and nearly non-existent munitions inventories (remember Libya?)!
 
Mutual Military Support.  The contention is that the US would lose the military cooperation and support of European countries and access to bases.  Well, any country can assist the US at any time and in any way they choose without the US needing to be part of NATO.  The reality, however, is that all too often European countries already refuse to assist the US militarily.  Overflight permissions have been refused during US actions and foreign ships have pulled out of US naval task forces when the possibility of US action has arisen.  Sometimes foreign countries assist us and sometimes they don’t.  They have their political objectives and we have ours.  Short of invoking Article 5 of the NATO agreement, nothing would change the degree of cooperation with the US.
 
Defense of Europe.  Some seem to think that if the US is not a member of NATO, that precludes the US from helping to defend Europe.  This is absurd.   If Europe is threatened, the US will most certainly step in to help, treaty or no treaty.  It’s in our best interest.
 
 
Options
 
An option, for those too queasy about the US formally pulling out of NATO, is that the US could simply pull out of Europe while remaining a member of NATO.  Nothing that I’m aware of obligates us to be physically present on the continent.  This would allow all the resources currently devoted to Europe to be redirected at the real threat which is China.
 
Another option would be to use US withdrawal from NATO as a major bargaining chip in a Ukraine-Russia peace settlement.  For example, the US might agree to withdraw from NATO if Russia returns Crimea and returns to pre-war borders and Ukraine is granted NATO membership.
 
 
Conclusion
 
In summary, there is no valid argument for the US remaining in NATO and every reason for the US to leave NATO.  The world faces an extreme threat from China and US resources need to be focused on that threat not babysitting a Europe that faces no realistic threat.  It is past time for Europe to stand on its own.

Beckoning Beacon

Over the last several years ComNavOps has, quite rightly and wisely, criticized and mocked the Navy’s many absurd, ill-considered, individual plans and acquisitions.  It’s time, now, to look at the Navy’s overall fleet concept and see how it holds up to analysis.  Of course, given the failure and poor performance of the many individual elements, it’s probably not too hard to anticipate the result of this analysis but we’ll go through the exercise anyway in the hopes that it can offer some guidance about what not to do.
 
When I talk about the Navy’s overall plan, I’m referring to the Navy’s vision of the ideal task force.  Again, we’ve discussed the individual components but let’s bring them together, now.
 
HVU (High Value Unit).  The ideal task force will have a HVU(s) which could be a carrier(s), amphibious ships, or vitally important cargo ships surrounded by escorts. 
 
Escorts.  The escorts are envisioned to be a few (2-3?) Burke class destroyers for AAW and control of unmanned assets.  The Burkes will be in constant two-way communication with the unmanned assets as well as the other Burkes and HVUs.
 
The unmanned assets will consist of:
 
LUSV (Large Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Sailing near the Burkes will be these small (by ship standards and large relative only to the smaller unmanned vessels), missile-carrying, unmanned vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Essentially, these are unmanned, mini-arsenal ships whose purpose is to supplement the missile magazines of the Burkes.  They have no weapons or sensors, themselves, and are wholly dependent on the Burkes for control.  These vessels will be in constant communication with the controlling Burkes who will provide them with remote operation and fire control solutions.
 
MUSV (Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Forming an outer ring around the Burkes will be these small, sensor vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Their function is to provide detection and situational awareness for the task force.  They will have no significant weapons or fire control.  Essentially, these are very large floating sensor barges.  These vessels will be in constant two-way communication with the controlling Burkes, continuously broadcasting high bandwidth, large volume data streams for analysis by the computers and analysts on the Burkes as well as receiving operational remote control.
 
UAV.  Ranging out beyond the task force ships, these small UAVs will conduct surveillance.  An example would be the MQ-8B/C Fire Scout.  These UAVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and continuously streaming transmission of sensor data.
 
USV.  Farthest out from the task force will be these tiny, free roaming, unmanned surface vessels that will operate way out in front of the task force, detecting and tracking enemy submarines and providing situational awareness.  Sea Hunter and the tiny sailboats we’ve seen are examples of these assets.  These USVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and will continuously stream sensor data back to the controlling ship.
 
P-8/Triton (BAMS – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  When available, the P-8 Poseidon/Triton combination, the pairing being referred to as BAMS, will provide overwatch and far distant surveillance, situational awareness, and, in their spare time, anti-submarine detection and prosecution.
 
 
Discussion
 
There you have it – the ideal Navy task force.  Of course, I’ve ignored a multitude of problems which would render the individual components ineffective but, setting that aside, did you notice the one, overriding characteristic of every element of the task force?  That’s right, it’s the requirement for constant, high bandwidth, streaming communications between the various elements.  We don’t have Terminator level AI yet so constant control communications are required.  None of the unmanned assets have any significant degree of on-board computer analysis so all data must be streamed back to the control vessel for analysis, interpretation, and decision making.
 
What we’ve just described is, in reality, a large task force sized, floating electromagnetic beacon continuously shouting, “Here I am!”, while some enemy surveillance technician tasked with finding the American running dogs smiles and says, “Well, that was easy.”.
 
Having handed the enemy our exact location, the only remaining unknown is the exact amount of time it will take for final ship of the task force to be sunk.
 
One of the constants of warfare throughout the ages has been EMCON.  This is beyond elementary.  You stay silent while, hopefully, tracking the enemy who is oblivious to your presence.  This allows you to choose the time and conditions of battle, - an enormous advantage!  The ideal task force not only violates the very concept of EMCON, it is directly the opposite.  It is a continuous electromagnetic beacon, pinpointing your location for the enemy. 
 
To believe that the degree of required communication can escape notice by the enemy is simply delusional.  If anyone has conducted a wargame about this (I doubt they have or they would have recoiled in horror at the idiocy of the concept), I’d love to see how they hand-waved away the free detection advantage for the enemy … and I’m sure their wrists were sore from all the waving!
 
What about the special case of a carrier as the HVU?  Wouldn’t this change things?
 
Carrier.  Of course, if the HVU is a carrier, this changes things a bit but, disappointingly, not all that much.  A carrier’s air wing will add another layer to the task force’s defense, which is good, but it comes at the price of additional communications.  The E-2 must communicate with the aircraft it controls and must transmit its sensor data to the ships of the task force.  The individual aircraft must communicate with the E-2 and the carrier for air traffic control.  The carrier must communicate with the aircraft.  And, of course, the Ford class EMALS is just the world’s largest electromagnetic beacon all by itself!
 
So, what has this analysis taught us?  It has demonstrated that we are violating the oldest principle of warfare by not concealing our location.  We need to be structuring the fleet to operate with the least amount of communication possible – none, being the ideal condition. 
 
Every asset we design and procure that requires communication is a step along the path to defeat.  The path to victory is silence (and firepower!).  During the Cold War, we practiced EMCON operations (we learned how to launch an entire carrier strike without transmitting!).  Unfortunately, the situation has gotten worse since every new piece of electronics seems to require even more power and communications. 
 

• We need to reverse this trend. 
  
• We need to restore the requirement that every piece of equipment (I’m looking at you, EMALS) be shielded and EMCON-capable.
• We need to halt the rush down the unmanned path.
• We need to realistically exercise our communications in a combat setting and see how bad the problem is.
• We need to begin designing equipment with minimal communications as a mandatory requirement.
• We need to rethink our command and control concept and eliminate the top down control bias.
• We need start thinking in terms of combat operations rather than technological fixation.

 
In combat, you talk, you die.  Stop talking!

LCS Mine Countermeasures Module Ready? Not Really

The LCS modules have been under development for something on the order of two decades, now, and none are yet ready at anything approaching the original specifications or concepts.  In fact, the anti-submarine (ASW) module has been terminated.  The anti-surface (ASuW) module is a joke, having little capability and what there is, is a faint shadow of the original intent and specifications.  The mine countermeasures (MCM) module is ready in the sense that there are a group of individual components that kind of perform limited mine clearance.  Even those components are constrained in their performance, as a Naval News website article documents.[1]
 
For starters, the entire MCM module doesn’t fit in the LCS!
 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[1]

The unmanned tow vessel is also causing performance problems.
 

According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[1]

Communications are another issue.
 

Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites.[1]

The original intent was to keep the host LCS well away from the actual minefield but the communication issues are causing the ship to operate near the minefield, nullifying the original intended benefit of unmanned operations.
 
The Navy is looking to incorporate some kind of UAV as a communications relay.
 

“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs …[1]

The MCM module is becoming a real ‘Rube Goldberg’ collection of increasingly ridiculous, mismatched, and constrained components attempting to meet a bare minimum capability.
 
A reminder … Even if all this works perfectly, it’s still a failure in that it’s predominantly a one-at-a-time hunting method which is operationally useless in a combat situation.  Yes, the Navy claims to have an influence sweep capability but, to the best of my knowledge, that has never been tested and certainly not realistically.  I have severe doubts that the sweeping method will work against modern smart mines.
 
Two decades or more of work and we have a cobbled together collection of misfit, limited capability MCM components.  Well done, Navy!  You’ve made us proud.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Update On The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnston, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

No More Russian Subs in the Med

It is being reported that the last Russian submarine has left the Mediterranean due to the loss of the Tartus naval base in Syria.  This is a good thing, in case anyone is confused.  You may recall that we recently discussed the idea of the US seizing Syria or, in some other fashion, denying the base to Russia.  This is pretty compelling evidence as to the desirability such actions.

Bye, bye!

NATO Spending

ComNavOps has opined that it is long past time for the US to pull out of Europe, militarily, and that Europe/NATO can more than stand on its own.  The bogeyman specter of the Russian bear has been shown to be an illusion, thwarted by the tiny state of Ukraine.
 
Here’s some interesting data on NATO spending for 2023.
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for defense spending as a percentage of GDP.[1]
 
Poland              3.9%
United States    3.5%
Greece              3.0%
Estonia              2.7%
Lithuania           2.5%
Finland              2.4%
Romania           2.4%
Hungary            2.4%
Latvia                2.3%
UK                     2.1%
 
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for total defense spending (million USD).[1]
 
United States   $860,000
Germany            $68,080
UK                      $65,763
France                $56,649
Italy                    $31,585
Poland               $29,105
Canada              $28,950
Spain                 $19,179
Netherlands       $16,741
Turkey                $15,842
 
 
 
The US spent $860B.  The rest of NATO spent $400B combined.
 
 
The reason for NATO’s existence has ended.  It’s past time to leave NATO and let Europe take care of itself.
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country

Cable Cutting – Act of War

You may or may not have heard of the most recent cable cutting incident involving a cable connecting Finland and Estonia in the Gulf of Finland, off the Baltic Sea.  A Russian tanker is believed to have been responsible for the act, as described in a Redstate website article.[1]
 

Finnish commandos boarded and seized an oil tanker Thursday that is believed to have temporarily disabled the Estlink-2 power line connecting Finland and Estonia. The vessel in question, the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S,  was traveling from St. Petersburg to Port Said, Egypt. The Eagle S is thought to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" that smuggles Russian crude oil to market.[1]

The proof of sabotage is pretty convincing as shown in the photo below which tracks the ship’s path as it crosses back and forth over the cable.
 

Track of Russian ship showing back and forth
movement over cable

This was a deliberate act of sabotage against the infrastructure of Finland and the world at large, arguably an act of war, and it was not a one time accident. 
 

This is the fourth time power or telecom cables crossing the Baltic have been damaged by deliberate actions. In October 2023, a Chinese container ship damaged a gas pipeline and two telecom cables between Finland and Estonia by dragging an anchor across them … In November 2024, a Chinese ship disabled a 745-mile cable linking Germany and Finland and a 135-mile cable linking Lithuania and the Swedish island of Gotland, again by dragging an anchor across them.[1]

In each case, the Chinese have refused to cooperate in any investigation.  Russia and China are at war with us, and the West, only we refuse to pull out heads out of the sand and see it.  As a result, we’re losing the war.
 
I like that, in this case, Finland finally took some moderately decisive action by quickly boarding the ship.
 
This also refutes the legion of Chicken Littles out there who are terrified that sneezing in the direction of Russia or China will bring nuclear escalation down upon us.  Finland seized the offending vessel and, shockingly, did not immediately get attacked with nuclear weapons.
 

The Finnish customs service said it had seized the vessel's cargo.[1]

What is the lesson in all this?  As the article’s author opines,
 

The obvious collaboration of Russian-controlled and Chinese-registered vessels to damage the telecom and power grid running beneath the Baltic Sea threatens NATO and the EU. NATO must take this hybrid war being waged underwater seriously and develop equally serious strategies for combatting it. What can't be tolerated is China stepping in to block investigations and legal actions by affected countries.[1]

We are at war but it’s a one-sided war.  We refuse to engage.  That must change.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Finland Boards Russian 'Shadow Fleet' Tanker in Connection With Damage of Undersea Electric Cables”, streiff, 26-Dec-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/12/26/finland-boards-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-connection-with-damage-of-undersea-electric-cables-n2183645