A Realistic Exercise?

As you know, ComNavOps has often criticized Navy exercises as being absurdly unrealistic but does anyone do it better?  Well, the French have conducted  what they feel is a realistic combat exercise, Polaris 25, involving air, sea, and land forces.  How realistic was it?
 
Before we go any further, note that the details of the exercise were few and sketchy for obvious reasons.  Still, we’ll do the best we can with what we have to work with.
 
The French claim it was realistic and unscripted in terms of the actions of the participants.
 

… the POLARIS exercises seek to make naval combat as realistic as possible, … where almost any move is permitted within the constraints previously indicated.[1]
 
The two forces were ‘free’ in their tactical choices. The exercise therefore unfolded according to the decisions made.[2]

The exercise included electronic warfare, cyber, social, and other domains to an unknown degree.[2]
 
Okay, that sounds good but what public relations blurb doesn’t?  Let’s look closer.
 
The French blue force consisted of,
 

• 5 frigates
• 5 LHDs
• ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• Rafales Marine from the French Navy and the French Air and Space Force
• Special forces from the French Navy
• Helicopters and infantry from the French Army

 
The opposing red force consisted of,
 

• 6 ships reinforced by a French Suffren-class submarine

 
 
Hmm … does that sound like equal, balanced forces offering realistic capabilities and fostering a realistic free play exercise or does it begin to sound like a fairly one-sided, pre-ordained setpiece?  Let’s keep going.
 

If a ship was hit, its damaged systems remained out of service until the end of the exercise, or until it was repaired if possible. Similarly, if a vessel was sunk, it was permanently out of the exercise.[2]
 
In the scenario, ships sailed with their theoretical ammunition levels and other logistics. There were no “magic” reloads. The ship had to withdraw to reload with food or ammunition, either by refueling at sea or by reaching support points.[2]

Okay, that’s outstanding, if they actually held to that.
 

Aquitaine Class FREMM

 
Results
 
Little was offered publicly in the way of results but let’s look at what we do have.
 

During the second phase – phase of the naval combat, the officers suggested that a great deal of damage had been caused on both sides with water leaks, loss of communications, etc. More importantly, “several ships were sunk or torpedoed”,[1]

Given the extremely limited number of ships in the exercise, if several ships were sunk, what was left to carry out the mission/exercise?  This is where one begins to wonder about the realism of the exercise.  Were sunken ships really removed from the exercise or did they continue on?
 
What did losing several ships teach the French?  What was the major lesson learned?
 

… firepower is everything. When lethal weapons are used, which was the case for both forces, the damage is rapid and significant.[1]

Firepower is important??!!  Really?  You needed an exercise to tell you that?  If so, you’ve forgotten everything about warfare and naval combat … which, like the US Navy, you probably have.  Sad.
 
The landing portion of the exercise was decidedly unrealistic.
 

It should be pointed out that the coastal threats were relatively low, with only a few ‘red force’ air defence units in the way.[1]

So … no opposed landing.  That’s optimistic in the extreme and offers no potential for lessons learned.  At that point, it’s just an administrative unloading of troops.
 
More on the landing portion.
 

… the LHDs simulated the landing of US Marine units with their HIMARS on islands off the landing zone in order to create a A2/AD area and secure the operation … [1][emphasis added]

So, simulated HIMARS operations?  So much for realism.
 
And,
 

Another first was that the image stream captured by the S-100 could be transmitted directly to land units disembarking, enabling them to adapt their manoeuvres.[1]

So, unhindered broad bandwidth streaming data?  I guess electronic and cyber warfare wasn’t included in the realism, after all?
 
 
Conclusion
 
Well, without more actual information it’s impossible to draw much in the way of valid conclusions but it sounds like aspects of the exercise were conducted with more realism than US Navy exercises (admittedly, a pretty low bar) but there are suggestions that they did not hold to the degree of realism they claimed.
 
The finding that firepower is paramount was absurdly hilarious.  What has this entire blog emphasized?  For that matter, what did WWII emphasize?  Do we really have to conduct exercises to learn the patently obvious?
 
All in all, it sounds like a better exercise than the US Navy conducts but still far short of being realistic and useful.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 2”, Martin Manaranche, 4-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-2/
 
[2]Naval News website, “POLARIS 25 – Feedback on the French Navy’s largest exercise – Part 1”, Martin Manaranche, 16-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/polaris-25-feedback-on-the-french-navys-largest-exercise-part-1/

The Thousand Ship Navy

Do you remember the Thousand Ship Navy concept?[2]  To refresh your memory,
 

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that “the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”  He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:
 
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity. As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.[1]

Consider this excerpt from Mullen’s speech:
 

“…leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain …

What a bunch of verbal garbage!  No wonder this concept didn’t go anywhere or amount to anything.  Mullen’s Thousand Ship Navy proposal was just vague fantasy for the purposes of public relations.  It was tantamount to calling for world peace – a fine sentiment that is totally divorced from reality or action.
 
Okay, so is this post just a quick shot at Mullen and we’re done?  No!  While Mullen had nothing worthwhile to offer, the idea of an international, thousand ship navy has enormous potential though not in any way that Mullen would ever have imagined.  Let’s examine a better Thousand Ship Navy.
 
Consider the following truths:
 

• Reality is that the US Navy is the biggest and only truly significant friendly naval force in the world.
• Reality is that the US Navy, through its own incompetence and mismanagement, has glaring gaps and weaknesses in its force structure.

 
Now, let’s lean back in our chairs, close our eyes, and think fairy dust thoughts:
 

• Wouldn’t it be nice if we didn’t have those gaps and weaknesses? 
  
• Wouldn’t it be nice if those gaps and weaknesses could be magically filled without us having to spend any money or resources?

 
Opening our eyes, we realize that those things can’t happen, right?  I mean, the only way we could fill those gaps and weaknesses without spending money or resources would be if someone else built the missing assets and gave them to us and that’s not going to happen.  It can’t happen … could it?
 
Well … what if other navies around the world focused their efforts and force structures on the assets we’re missing.  What if they built the minesweepers and SSKs, among other needs, that could fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy and we could call on those assets as needed?
 
Think about it.  As an example, when the global war with China comes, and it will, will the UK’s one carrier with a couple dozen short-legged F-35Bs make any difference?  Not much.  However, a couple of squadrons of highly effective mine countermeasure ships would be invaluable to the war effort.
 
Will some country’s couple of underarmed frigates make any difference?  No, but large numbers of small ASW corvettes would be a big help.
 
And so on.
 
The idea is that other countries would partner with the US to fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy.
 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Consider the following challenges.
 
Command and Control – This is a challenge in peace and in war.  Who commands these fill-in assets?  No country wants to give up command and yet a single, central command, the US, is necessary.

Agendas – Every country has their own geopolitical agendas and, often, those don’t perfectly align with the US.  A fill-in force can’t be subject to the whims of each individual country.  A NATO-like imperative is needed that would compel every participating country to actively contribute their eligible assets to meeting certain defined needs such as mines in international waters, war with China (with the US required to formally declare war on China).  It is the defined nature of the compelling threats that allows countries to still pursue their own agendas outside the bounds of the defined threats and ensure that the assets are available in the face of the defined threats.  What can’t happen is, for example, a Spanish frigate pulling out of a task force because their country doesn’t perfectly agree with the task force’s mission.  If the mission is a response to a defined threat then the assets are in, pure and simple.

Force Structure – Which country would build which assets?  That can’t be left up to the individual countries.  The individual contributions must come from analysis of the US Navy’s needs and, ultimately, be subject to US dictation.  Otherwise, each country will build whatever suits them and the US gaps won’t be filled other than haphazardly, if at all.

Reciprocity – In return for, say, building mine warfare ships instead of frigates, participating countries must be supported by the US Navy for any legitimate defense needs.  In other words, the US becomes the participating country’s navy against defined threats.
 
 
Discussion
 
Ideally, this shouldn’t be necessary.  The US Navy is big enough and well funded enough that it should be able to build its own complete naval force without any gaps or weaknesses.  However, until we clean house and fire every flag officer, that won’t happen.  We’ll continue to obsolete Burkes for the next two hundred years and bigger carriers as our air wings shrink ever smaller.  This NATO-ish concept at least provides a work around to the Navy’s abject stupidity for the foreseeable future.
 
The key to making this work is a set of very specific, well defined, major international threats that would trigger the combining of assets.  This precludes, as an example, other countries being forced to go along with, say, a US strike on an aspirin factory in the middle of nowhere for political messaging purposes.
 
It should be made crystal clear that any country that opts not to participate is on their own if they find themselves threatened by an enemy.  Participate and share or stand alone.  A simple choice.
 
In order for this concept to work, it has to be divorced from any of the political maneuverings of the type that prioritized the F-35 as an international jobs program rather than a lean, focused production program.  Ship types can’t be assigned based on politics or jobs or whatever.  Of course, the individual countries can build their assigned vessels any way they like but the assignments have to be based strictly on naval combat needs.
 
Finally, note that none of the above precludes any country from still building their own ships of whatever type as long as they meet their assigned gap-filling quota.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=2029&context=nwc-review
 
[2]USNI Proceedings, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network”, Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, November 2005, Proceedings Vol. 131/11/1,233
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/1000-ship-navy-global-maritime-network

Large, Slow, And Non-Stealthy Is No Way To Go Through Life

There are many naval observers who espouse the idea of balloons of some type (aerostats, for example) as a means of providing long range surveillance.  ComNavOps has scoffed at those ideas as being devoid of realistic usefulness and, worse, a detriment to surrounding forces due to being easily detected.  Well, here’s further evidence of the impracticality of such aerostats.  Israel, who famously implemented the Sky Dew aerostat system amid much fanfare and proclamations of miraculous capabilities, is now leaning towards abandoning the entire concept due to unaffordable repair costs, questionable usefulness, and demonstrated vulnerabilities following a Hezbollah suicide drone strike that hit the balloon and rendered it inoperable (see, “You Had One Job”).
 

Israeli defense officials are reevaluating the future of the military’s Sky Dew project, a high-altitude balloon system designed for aerial threat detection, following a series of setbacks including weather damage and an attack by the Hezbollah terror group.[1]
 
In light of these repeated setbacks, defense officials are now seriously considering terminating the project. The vulnerability of the system, its high costs, and the excessive time required for repairs have all factored into this revaluation of a program that has already consumed millions in defense spending.[1]

It’s not just enemy actions that threaten the aerostat;  weather is also a threat.
 

… severe weather had rendered the system inoperable months earlier.  After a protracted repair process, the balloon was redeployed in January [2024] … [1]

Setting aside the actual performance failure of Sky Dew in failing to detect a drone which was its exact intended function, the aerostat has been found to be vulnerable to weather and highly susceptible to enemy attack.  Is this surprising?  No!  Any large, slow (non-mobile, in this case), non-stealthy object is easily detected and simply waiting for the enemy to get around to it on their ‘items to destroy at leisure’ checklist.
 
So, what does this mean for us?
 
This is yet another example demonstrating that large, slow, and non-stealthy aircraft such as AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, P-8 Poseidon, all large non-stealthy UAVs (Predator, Global Hawk, Reaper and the like), etc. are simply not survivable on the modern battlefield.  It doesn’t matter whether it’s a balloon tethered to a ship or a P-8 Poseidon lumbering around looking for things, large, slow, and non-stealthy is simply not viable.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]JNS website, “Israel weighs shutting down multi-million-dollar ‘Sky Dew’ project”, Lilach Shoval, 29-Aug-2024,
https://www.jns.org/israel-weighs-shutting-down-multi-million-dollar-sky-dew-project/

UK’s Commercial Mine Countermeasures Ship

The UK’s Royal Navy just commissioned a former commercial offshore support vessel (OSV) into the fleet as HMS Stirling Castle, a mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership. 

The ship – previously named MV Island Crown – was acquired from the commercial market for £39.8 million at the start of 2023 to provide a UK host platform for autonomous MCM payloads … [1]

So, for the sum of around $51M(US), the Royal Navy acquired a mine countermeasures ship.  Of course, there had to have been additional expenses in converting it from its commercial role to a naval MCM ship although one cannot imagine the scope of work or the cost would be too significant since the roles are not all that different.  Compare that cost to the cost of a new, purpose built MCM ship and the Royal Navy likely saved something on the order of $300M.

 

HMS Stirling Castle

The salient question, though, is how well suited is the vessel for its new role?  The ship’s duties are described as:

 

Stirling Castle…will now take her place on front-line duties, carrying high-tech equipment, including autonomous surface and underwater vehicles, for specialist mine hunting operations, primarily in UK waters.[1]

This is not a terribly demanding role and consists primarily of launching and recovering unmanned MCM assets, not too dissimilar from its previous role of loading and unloading supplies.  Is the ship exquisitely optimized for the role?  Of course not but is it adequate?  Almost certainly … and for a substantial savings.

 

This is exactly the kind of pragmatic, responsible action that the US Navy should be engaged in.  At the moment, we have no viable MCM ships.  The LCS remains a joke both in terms of its non-existent capabilities and inadequate numbers.  Wouldn’t some US Navy $50M MCM motherships look pretty good about now?

 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “UK Royal Navy commissions HMS Stirling Castle as first MHC mother ship”, Richard Scott, 25-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/uk-royal-navy-commissions-hms-stirling-castle-as-first-mhc-mother-ship/

Satellite Imagery Dispersal

There is a significant faction of military/naval observers who have the mistaken belief that satellites can see every vessel sailing on the ocean and that the satellites have some sort of direct link to the firing controls on ships and aircraft thus rendering every ship a kill waiting to happen.  This is nonsense, as ComNavOps has repeatedly pointed out.  The resolution of satellite imagery precludes that kind of omnipotent detection and tracking.  If you have sufficient resolution then you give up breadth of field.  If you have breadth of field then you give up resolution.
 
All this is compounded by the fact that satellite imagery is in high demand and the raw image must be processed and analyzed.  After that, it has to be dispersed to the hundreds of offices wanting access to it.  In the case of fire control, you have to add in layers of command (bureaucracy) before any useful detection/tracking imagery can reach a ship or aircraft where it can be put to actual firing use. 
 
The entire process takes hours or days.  We simply don’t have the kind of instantaneous, raw image-to-the-missile-launch-button that so many imagine.
 
Many of you still doubt that reality.  Well, here’s more proof. 
 

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is working with US Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to operationally test an early version of its Joint Regional Edge Node (J-REN) system designed to speed satellite-based intelligence to the battlefield, according to NGA officials.
 
NGA began development of J-REN — a modernization of NGA’s current information technology “pipe” to more rapidly fulfil commanders’ requests for urgent access to remote sensing imagery and analysis — just last year.[1]

The lack of timeliness of satellite imagery has been a known and on-going issue for many years and even recent advances have been insufficient.
 

The ever-increasing calls from COCOMS for more timely imagery and analysis from remote sensing satellites has been the subject of a tug-of-war between NGA and the Space Force — an issue the two agencies have been struggling to work out for more than a year.
 
The concept is to avoid clogging up limited communications bandwidth with overly-dense data packages, while still ensuring that military operators have good enough information to work with …[1]

There you have it.  If satellites were the omnipotent, all-seeing miracles with direct links to firing controls, this entire effort wouldn’t even be happening, would it?  The blindingly obvious conclusion is that the image-to-fire-control process is a slow one, as ComNavOps has repeatedly stated.
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “NGA field testing new processor to speed imagery to US regional commands”, Theresa Hitchens, 18-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/nga-field-testing-new-processor-to-speed-imagery-to-us-regional-commands/

Five Tons of Unmanned Stupidity

I just read yet another article extolling the wonders of unmanned surface vessels for logistics and/or attack.[1][3]  This one was singing the praises of the Leidos Sea Specter slow, low profile boat which Leidos claims can carry a 2-5 ton payload for 1000-2200 nm at 8 kts in sea state 3.[2]   The manufacturer’s original concept was for this craft to be used as a logistics delivery platform.  A recent article suggested it could be used to attack Chinese carrier or surface groups using a containerized torpedo.

Let's consider a couple of important aspects to this concept.
 
Speed – This craft, like most unmanned craft, is appallingly slow;  it can’t get anywhere useful in any tactically relevant time frame.  While the manufacturer claims the craft can sail from Guam to any point in the first island chain on a single tank of gas, it would, as a relevant example, take 5+ days, best case, to make a 1000 nm journey.  This demonstrates the idiotic nature of a combat use for this craft.  Say a Chinese surface group was spotted transiting past an island, it would take around a week for the craft to carry its single containerized torpedo to that point.  Of course, the target group would be long gone.  People are making this stuff up without thinking it through.
 
Payload – The payload is very small with severe volumetric limitations which will reduce the effective payload substantially.  The cargo area is limited in volumetric size to a maximum payload storage area of 29’ x 4’ x 4’ which, essentially, means just small boxes as opposed to any sizable equipment.
After seeing the tiny cargo area in a manufacturer’s video, it is obvious that the claimed payload of 2-5 tons would only be for bricks stacked in the area with no space.  Any realistic cargo, with packaging and space will be far less.  One ton might be optimistic.
 
This is far too small a payload to be logistically significant for any but, perhaps, a lone coastwatcher on an island mountain.  For example, an infantry division in combat consumes some 1000 tons of various supplies per day and that’s probably unrealistically low!  An armored division uses some 600,000 gal (2000 tons) of fuel per day in combat and, again, that’s probably ridiculously optimistic.
 
If someone thinks we’re going to resupply Guam or some far flung, hidden Marine missile shooting outpost using these tiny boats, they’re sadly mistaken.
 

Leidos Sea Scepter

 
Conclusion
 
The only thing this craft can deliver is five tons of stupidity.  I understand why industry keeps producing these kinds of nonsense products … they make profits for the company because the military is so enamored with unmanned technology that they’ll buy anything, regardless of whether it has any viable use.  It is up to us to recognize stupidity because, clearly, the military can’t.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Marine Corps Trials Unmanned Logistics Concepts in the Indo-Pacific”, Carter Johnson, 25-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/u-s-marine-corps-trials-unmanned-logistics-concepts-in-the-indo-pacific/
 
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-xNZwlH8sM
 
[3]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Pairs Heavyweight Torpedo with USV in a New Program Effort”, Carter Johnson, 15-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-pairs-heavyweight-torpedo-with-usv-in-a-new-program-effort/

2025 GAO Annual Weapon Assessments Tidbits

Following are some tidbits from the current June 2025 GAO annual weapon systems report.
 
 
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) – Radars are being produced and delivered while testing is ongoing.  This kind of concurrency is what’s behind so many development and production cost overruns and schedule delays as problems are uncovered during production and reworks have to be performed.  I simply don’t understand what’s so hard about grasping this concept but the Navy seems absolutely unable to get it.  In this case, it’s even worse because we’re producing the radars faster than the ships they’re intended for and the Navy is having to warehouse the radars until there’s a ship ready for them.  Why produce untested, undeveloped systems when we don’t even have a use for them?
 
 
Ford Class – GAO reports the unit cost for the four Ford class carriers as $16.3B.  Yikes!  CVN-79 is struggling with weapon elevator installation (what a stunning surprise!) which will delay delivery.  The Navy may defer ‘non-critical’ work like painting until post-delivery … yet another example of accepting an incomplete product.
 
 
F-18 IRST – Remember back in 2007 when the Navy came up with the bright idea of attaching an IRST sensor to the front of a fuel tank for the F-18?  A simple, if less than optimal approach, right?  Well, 8 years later and they’re still working at it and it’s still not ready.  From the GAO report,
 

… while the IRST pods demonstrated capability at tactically significant ranges during operational testing, the pods were extremely unreliable. …  only managed to achieve 14 hours mean time between operational mission failures—short of the 40 hours required.

The rest of the world has had functional IRST systems for decades.
 
 
Constellation – Remember how the Navy has been saying for a year or more that the design of the ship is over 90% complete?  Well, they’re now revised that down to 70% after GAO previously called them out for, essentially, fraudulent reporting.  The program is going backward!  Only the Navy could start with a 90% design and, after years, regress to 70% … and you have to believe even that number is probably less than honest.
 
Weight growth is also an issue.
 

In October 2024, the Navy reported 759 metric tons of weight growth from initial estimates—nearly a 13 percent increase …

 
Medium Landing Ship (LSM) – The LSM is the key to the Marine’s concept of forward, hidden bases of missile shooters but the Navy has yet to really embrace the idea of buying the ship.  Initial cost estimates from industry apparently shocked Navy officials and they’ve been forced to start over.
 

Program officials said the offers they received were hundreds of millions of dollars higher than budgeted.

That’s surprising given how accurate Navy cost estimates usually are.
 
 
Mk 54 Torpedo – The Mk 54 Mod 2 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo has run into cost and development issues.
 

Program officials stated that contractors’ estimated costs to complete system development and testing were significantly higher than expected.

 
MQ-25 Stingray UAV – The unmanned tanker has run into lots of problems.
 

The MQ-25 Stingray program continues to report cost and schedule challenges that have led to a funding shortfall of $291 million. The program’s decision to delay the low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to September 2025, and its efforts to accelerate testing replacements for at least seven components with obsolescence and other issues, contributed to a significant increase in development costs since our last report.

Obsolescence????  How do you run into obsolescence problems for a brand new aircraft that hasn’t even been delivered yet?  You do it by having a program take forever to get fielded.  Development started in 2018 and here we are, seven years later with nothing to show for it.  So, yeah, you screw around for years and you wind up with obsolescence issues before you’ve fielded the first unit. 
 
FYI … first flight has not yet occurred … seven years later.  What’s happened to us?
 
You may recall that, in a first in recent times, the Navy opted to act as the program integrator instead of industry.  Well, they failed.
 

… the program’s software costs increased substantially since last year. Program officials attributed this increase to their 2021 decision to switch from a government-furnished ground control station to one provided by another contractor …

 
ORCA XLUUV – The unmanned submersible program is sinking.
 

It is now unclear whether the Navy will transition the XLUUV to a program of record because there are no clear requirements that the XLUUV can meet ...

This is what happens when you develop something without a CONOPS.
 
 
Ship to Shore Connector – This is a near duplicate replacement for the LCAC.  It should have been a simple and quick project.
 

… the program delayed its IOC date in each of our annual assessments since its originally scheduled IOC in August 2020—a total delay of more than 5 years.

Well, that’s not good but at least we aren’t building these things without having solved the problems … right?  Right?
 

As the program continues to delay key events in its schedule, it continues to construct and deliver craft—with 25 craft either under construction or delivered to date.

I was afraid of that.  So, each problem we encounter and each solution that’s implemented will require all the previously built and delivered craft to undergo rework.
 
 
Columbia SSBN – The price tag now sites at $10.5B each.  The delivery schedule has slipped by a full year and is likely to slip another year, according to the Navy.
 

The program attributed particularly slow periods of construction to out-of-sequence work that significantly disrupted planned construction events and led to large amounts of rework. According to program officials, the out-of-sequence work resulted from missing instructions in some design products that detail how to build the submarine.

Concurrency rears its head again.
 
 
Virginia SSN – The construction rate is woefully short of what we need.
 

The program’s 2024 construction rate fell to 1.15 submarines per year from 1.2 per year in 2023, short of the Navy’s goal of 1.5, according to program officials. …The Navy has a goal to deliver 2.3 submarines per year by the early 2030s.

A goal of 2.3 subs per year versus the current reality of 1.1?  Hmm … doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen.
 

Construction continues to cost more than planned.

Costs are higher than the Navy estimated?  The Navy has underestimated every project it’s ever embarked on.  At some point, don’t you have to admit that you’re incompetent to generate cost estimates and start applying something like a 100% fudge factor?  Before anyone tries to defend the Navy by saying that it’s very difficult to estimate costs, note that other agencies seem to routinely estimate Navy project costs pretty accurately.  Further note that ComNavOps also estimates Navy project costs pretty accurately (Constellation, for example;  you can check it in the archives).
 
 
T-AGOS Surveillance Ship – Scheduling and design issues, again.
 

… the program will likely miss its goal for fielding T-AGOS 25 in 2027 by several years.

Several years????  It’s essentially a commercial ship!
 
 
 
Conclusion
 
Who’s running these clown shows and why haven’t they been fired yet?  Wake up, Hegseth!  The GAO report is telling you, loud and clear, who to fire.  Quit screwing around and start firing people.

Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache

The Wrong Criteria

I continue to see the Navy’s fascination with unmanned craft despite them being completely divorced from any relevant Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  In the latest example, the Navy is diligently evaluating various unmanned vessels.
 

The commander [Rear Adm. Michael Mattis] of a US Navy task force [ed. Task Force 66] focused on employing unmanned systems said his team is making decisions about which can be “operationalized,” and which will be sidelined for further development.
 
The task force, which was established in May 2024, participated in Baltic Operations 2025 (BALTOPS), a reoccurring major international maritime exercise featuring the US and NATO countries. That exercise, which took place throughout June, played an integral role in helping the service evaluate various USVs on the commercial market.[1]

Well, that’s good, isn’t it?  The Navy is carefully evaluating various craft in order to make the best decisions, right?
 
Let me ask you this: what criteria are being used in the evaluation?  Different criteria will lead to different results.  What might be ideal for one task might be useless for another.
 
Of course, there’s only one criteria for any weapon system and that’s combat.  How will the item being evaluated contribute to high end combat?  If it can’t or won’t, then it has no value.
 
What is the Navy trying to accomplish with unmanned craft?
 

Mattis, whose office falls under the Navy’s three-star operational command, US 6th Fleet, described Task Force 66 as being focused on using low-cost systems, such as commercial-off-the-shelf USVs, to “impose costs on the adversary.”[1]

Ah … I see.  We’re going to “impose costs” on the enemy.  That’s great!  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what these mythical costs are that small, unmanned craft will impose?  It certainly won’t have anything to do with firepower since none of these craft have any firepower.  It won’t be near-invincibility causing the enemy to use vast amounts of their anti-ship missile inventory trying to kill them since none could survive anything more than a 0.50 cal bullet and the enemy would just use the unmanned craft as training aids for their ship’s crews to have target practice.  It won’t be sowing panic and confusion on the enemy’s command and control because I doubt the enemy will even care that much about them, assuming they don’t just laugh.
 
What are the “imposed costs”?
 
How are the unmanned craft being evaluated?
 

Mattis said the event included “red versus blue scrimmages” where sailors were tasked with participating in either side of an engagement featuring several unmanned surface vessels staging an attack on a warship.[1]

Wow, a free form, red versus blue scrimmage (I guess that’s what battles are called now?) !  That’s great for evaluating unmanned craft.  Although … the thought occurs to me, where/when would we expect a [Chinese] warship to present itself conveniently close to several small, unmanned craft, obligingly allowing the unmanned craft to approach, assemble for an attack, and then attack without hindrance?  How would these small unmanned craft get anywhere near a warship on alert?
 
We’re evaluating unmanned craft but we’re using the wrong criteria for the evaluation.  It’s as if we think the Chinese will behave like the oblivious Russian ships.
 
You know what the Navy should do?  They should skip any kind of focus on a combat CONOPS and instead leap right over that and get into the technology of controlling, networking, and interfacing small, unmanned craft.  Well, …
 

Tangential to operating individual USVs, Mattis said TF-66 is working on controlling numerous autonomous vessels through a “single pane of glass,” referring to the notion of commanding multiple vehicles through a singular command-and-control station. And beyond controlling multiple American vessels, Mattis said his team is also working to integrate that capability with NATO allies.[1]

You can see from this that we’re caught up in the technology and ignoring the CONOPS.
 
At this point, you might be wondering what type of unmanned craft we’re talking about?
 

Mattis said the Navy was using at least 10 Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft USVs during BALTOPS.[1]

Here’s a photo of the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft.
 

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft
This is what we're going to war with ?

I’m not sure where the “Global” comes from because the range of these tiny motorboats is probably once around the harbor.  “Reconnaissance”????  Whatever sensor they put on it will have a field of view of a few hundred yards.  Is that really reconnaissance?  How would something like this be of any possible use in a high end combat scenario?

 
Anyway … ignore everything I’ve just written.  Hail, unmanned!  Damn the logic, full technology speed ahead!
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Navy uses European exercise to help evaluate unmanned vessels”, Justin Katz, 23-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/navy-uses-european-exercise-to-help-evaluate-unmanned-vessels/

Chinese Ports in Latin America

Just a quick note documenting the expansion of Chinese influence.
 

Chinese companies are now involved in the construction or operation of 31 active ports in Latin America and the Caribbean — a significantly higher number than previously reported, according to new findings from the Center for Strategic and International Studies …
 
This includes ports built by companies such as CK Hutchison and state‑backed entities such as China Merchants Port.
 
U.S. analysts warn that key ports - especially Kingston, Jamaica, and Manzanillo and Veracruz, Mexico - present strategic vulnerabilities.[1]

Regarding Kingston, Jamaica,
 

The Chinese firm China Merchants Port Holdings is now in complete control of Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited (KFTL), the entity responsible for managing the Port of Kingston under a concession agreement made with Jamaica’s government. The agreement has a duration of 30 years.[2]

Regarding Mexico,
 

China is funding the expansion of the port of Veracruz Medico through China Harbour Engineering company. The expansion project will make Veracruz the second largest port in Mexico. In addition, the Port of Manzanillo is undergoing a $2.7 billion expansion project that will make it Latin America’s largest maritime gateway. Chinese companies like Hutchinson Whampoa have control over piers in several Mexican states, including Baja California, Colima, Michoacán, and Morelia.
 
In recent years, direct investment from Chinese companies into Mexico has experienced significant growth. This surge is evident in the figures, rising from $38m in 2011 to $386m in 2021. Notably, Chinese companies now represent the fastest-growing source of foreign investment in Mexico.[3]

Aside from the obvious concerns about China establishing control over ports and, eventually, shipping, Chinese influence on the political actions of cash and investment starved countries bodes ill for the US.  Again, China is not doing anything the US couldn’t have done.  We need to engage.  You can’t win a war if you don’t engage.
 
All of this demonstrates just one of the many ways that the Chinese are conducting their war of global domination:  control the ports and you control the global economy while simultaneously establishing strategic strongholds and gaining influence over the host countries.  We talk about all-domain warfare in our pathetic, limited understanding of the term while the Chinese are practicing true all-domain warfare, as we speak.
 
The US and the Western world need to recognize that a war is happening, now, and engage with urgency.  There is no reason that the US couldn’t have done what China did.  We were just too geopolitically lazy.  We’re losing the war.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Think Tank: China's Reach Goes to Latin American Ports”, Solange Reyner, 25-Jun-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-latin-america-caribbean/2025/06/24/id/1216332/
 
[2]Jamaicans.com website, “Chinese Company Takes Total Control Of Kingston Freeport Management Firm”, staff, 1-May-2020,
https://jamaicans.com/chinese-company-takes-total-control-of-kingston-freeport-management-firm/
 
[3]Jeff Newman Law website, “China funding port constructions in Mexico to shorten shipping routes to U.S. back door”, Jeff Newman, 23-Jan-2025
https://jeffnewmanlaw.com/china-funding-port-constructions-in-mexico-to-shorten-shipping-routes-to-the-u-s-back-door/

The Scale of War

ComNavOps has often stated that we’ve forgotten what war is and just how much of everything is required to wage it.  One glaring example is the shrinkage of our carrier air wings from a WWII high of 90+ combat aircraft to a Cold War level of 90+ total aircraft (including non-direct-combat helos, tankers, etc.) to the current level of around 35-40 direct-combat aircraft. 
 
The just concluded US strike by seven B-2 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites gives us a brief reminder of what’s required for a single strike.  The strike ultimately delivered 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) across two targets as well as dozens of missiles at other targets.[1]  However, many more assets were involved in the delivery than just the B-2s.
 

… involved more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and firing approximately 75 precision guided weapons.[1]

All for a single strike against an essentially undefended target and with complete control of the sky.  The following gives us a reminder of the types of actions required to support a strike.
 

“As the Operation Midnight Hammer strike package entered Iranian airspace, the US employed several deception tactics, including decoys, as the fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface to air missile threats,” Caine [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] explained.[1]

Recall WWII carrier raids which, later in the war, involved hundreds of aircraft per strike.
 
We need to remember the scale of war and begin planning and training accordingly.
 
 
 __________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Operation Midnight Hammer: How the US conducted surprise strikes on Iran”, Ashley Roque, 22-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/

Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

China Defeats US in Trade Deal

News has just come out that Trump has reached a trade deal with China and, at first glance, it appears to be a strategic defeat for the US.
 
Note:  We’re not going to discuss the political or financial aspects of the deal, only the military implications.
 
With regard to the military, the two key elements of the deal are:
 
1. US will continue to receive magnets and rare earths
2. US will continue to accept Chinese students
 
The magnets and rare earths aspect only furthers our vulnerability to this strategically vital resource.  China has never met a treaty or deal that it wasn’t willing to break (UNCLOS tribunal, for example) when it suited them so why would we think that China won’t threaten to cut off our supply the next time some disagreement or crisis arises?  We are continuing our dependency on our enemy.  That’s insane.  It would be far better to quit, cold turkey, and initiate a crash program to produce our own materials.
 
If this deal were just a stopgap while we frantically established our own strategic materials supply, I might be able to accept it but I see no evidence that we’re engaged in any massively accelerated program to do so.  Human nature, being what it is, we’ll just continue to depend on China without really addressing our vulnerability in any useful time frame.
 
We should be waiving every permit and review requirement in order to establish our supply as quickly as possible.  If necessary, we should be subsidizing construction and production;  after all, it’s a strategic necessity!
 
Every Chinese student we educate is both a technological spy and a future scientific asset to be used against us.  We are educating our enemy and giving them a look at cutting edge university research.  That’s insane.
 
From a military perspective, I can’t understand what Trump was thinking.  If I’m China, I’m extremely happy with the deal.

The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/