Base Defense is a Joke

On this blog – and everywhere else except in the military – we’ve long recognized the vital strategic position of Guam and the need to defend it during war with China.  It couldn’t be more obvious.  We’ve also noted the apparent lack of urgency on the part of the military to institute any serious base defense plans.  Well, here’s a sad joke of an announcement about a first of its kind defense test for Guam.
 

The US military announced today the first-ever test intercept of a ballistic missile from its Guam-based missile defense system … [1]

Unbelievable.  We’ve been discussing the challenges and critical need for defense of Guam for years and only now have we conducted the first ever test of the ballistic missile defense?  What a joke.  Someone is not very serious about base defense.
 
But wait … it gets better.
 

The MDA described the event as a “pivotal step” towards a larger, more holistic Guam Defense System designed to take on multiple threats at once — a “persistent layered integrated air and missile defense capability.”[1]

Are you kidding me?  This implies we don’t currently have a layered defense capability for our most important base?  What has the military been doing for the last decade or two?
 
This seems to be saying that if China attacked, today, with more than one missile, we’d be helpless.  The reality is that we should be planning to defend against saturation attacks and, given the amount of time we’ve had, our base defense should be already prepared and thoroughly tested.
 

The Guam Defense System will ultimately integrate multiple independent fire control systems into something that can cope with complex and integrated attacks with salvos across the air and missile threat spectrum.[1]

“… will ultimately integrate …” ???!  What have they been waiting for?  This implies that a true, layered defense system is still years/decades away.
 
But wait … it gets still better.
 
Are we frantically (one presumes) building up our Guam defenses?  Of course we are, right?  We’d have to be utter morons not to be increasing our defenses.  Right? … Yeah, about that …
 

For several years, US military leaders from the Indo-Pacific region have emphasized the need to build up Guam as both a military staging point and an air-defense hub. However, the process hasn’t been easy, and in October, the MDA proposed scaling back the number of missile defense sites on the island from 22 to 16 due to environmental impact concerns.[1][emphasis added]

We’re decreasing our defenses?  Are you kidding me?  Since when is the defensive requirements of, arguably, our most important forward base determined by environmental concerns?  I’m all for reasonable environmental awareness in civilian communities and businesses but we cannot allow environmental concerns to dictate the defensive capability of our most important base.  If we need waivers or legislative action or whatever, we need to free the military from environmental concerns that negatively impact vital defense requirements.
 
You establish vital defense needs first and then make an honest effort to shoehorn whatever reasonable environmental concerns you can around the defenses.  We’re risking losing a war because of some isolated environmental concerns?  What kind of idiots are running the military?  Well, that was rhetorical because this blog has definitively established that blithering idiots are running the military.
 
We need to wake up and reassess our priorities and environmental concerns are not the number one priority.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Guam missile defenses conduct first-ever ballistic intercept in test”, Lee Ferran, 10-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/guam-missile-defenses-conduct-first-ever-ballistic-intercept/

Amphibious Shell Game

As we know, the Navy considers ship maintenance to be a low priority task and even that may be underestimating their disinterest in maintenance.  I truly believe that the Navy’s philosophy is that the quicker the ships wear out, the sooner the Navy can justify new ships to Congress thereby securing – or, dare they hope … increasing? – their budget slice.  The astounding part of this is that the demonstrated lack of interest includes ships the Navy actually wants: surface warships. 
 
Worse than the lack of interest in maintenance, there is a major chunk of the fleet that the Navy doesn’t really want and that is amphibious ships.  They offer nothing for the Navy; they’re purely to mollify the whining of the Marine Corps to Congress.  Thus, the Navy has even less interest in providing maintenance for amphibious ships.  Here’s some notes from a GAO report, as described in a Breaking Defense website article.[1]
 

Half of the Navy ships the Marine Corps would use to make amphibious assaults are in “poor condition,” and some of the vessels have been unavailable for operational or training use for years at a time, according to a pointed new watchdog report.[1]
 
… the report found that as of March this year, nine of the Navy’s 10 dock landing ships were in “poor material condition,” as were five of the seven amphibious assault ships and two of the 13 amphibious transport docks.[1]

Am I being fair and factual in suggesting that the Navy has little interest in amphibious ships and even less interest in maintaining them?  Well, let’s see what the report has to say.
 

The report notes several factors that contributed to the problem, including “challenges with spare parts.” But a summary of the report also noted that in order to “save money, the Navy proposed early retirement for some ships and cancelled critical maintenance on them.[1][emphasis added]

Here’s another damning tidbit.
 

The Navy partially concurred with the GAO recommendation that the Navy update its amphibious ship depot maintenance policy “to clarify that, absent operational needs, the Navy should not cancel depot maintenance for amphibious ships proposed for divestment that have yet to reach the end of their expected service life.”[1]

This demonstrates that the Navy has been cancelling depot maintenance for operational ships merely because they’ve been put forward for early retirement.  This is a self-fulfilling prophecy type of situation.  You propose a ship be retired early so you halt maintenance on it.  Then, after a few years you report that the ship needs to be retired early because it would cost too much to bring it up to maintenance standards.  Quite a racket, huh?
 
How does the Navy justify this blatant failure to properly maintain active ships?
 

… the Navy said it’s currently “prohibited by law” from modifying vessels destined for the boneyard, and waivers to do so have a narrow timeline. “However, the statute permits normal Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) work within the five-year window prior to a ship being removed from service. The Navy will schedule this work, including depot-level repair as necessary, to maintain the ship in operational condition.” It also noted the Navy Secretary may grant waivers for that statute in the “national security interests” of the US.[1]

Note the use of waivers?  Those keep cropping up in all types of deplorable situations, don’t they?  And yet we keep handing them out like candy.
 
The Navy clearly has no interest in amphibious ships and uses every machination they can think of to avoid spending maintenance money on them.  This is criminal mishandling of the taxpayer’s investment.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Half of Navy’s amphibious fleet in ‘poor condition,’ some ships out for years, GAO warns”, Lee Ferran, 3-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/half-of-navys-amphibious-fleet-in-poor-condition-some-ships-out-for-years-gao-warns/

Kill, Kill, Kill

I refrain from citing writings from around the Internet when I’m unable to offer much in the way of value-added analysis.  However, occasionally an article is of such immense interest and value that I can’t help but do so.  The Marine Corps Times website has such an article about a famous (and previously unknown to me) hand to hand combat instructor, Francois d’Eliscu, who revolutionized training and hand to hand combat mindsets during WWII.[1]
 
Please read the linked article and then come back for a few brief points to consider.
 
Welcome back.  That was a great article wasn’t it?
 
The article reminds us of just how brutal and barbaric war is.  It’s, literally, kill or be killed.  We’ve forgotten that in our quest to apply social niceties to the military instead of ruthlessly embracing and promoting the killer mindset.
 
The article drives home exactly why we want only the toughest, meanest, nastiest, most brutal soldiers who have the combat mindset that never gives up and will do anything to kill and survive. 
 
What does this mean for, say, women in the military?  Unfortunately, but realistically, this is not your typical woman or even your one in a thousand woman.  In addition to lacking the physical strength and quickness for combat, women simply don’t have the primitive, brutal mindset required for combat.  As an example, in ten years of coaching women’s basketball, the toughest, meanest female I ever encountered couldn’t match the bottom 5% of men for strength, speed, and mental toughness.
 
Heck, let’s be fair and acknowledge that not all men have the requisite characteristics.  We have far too many men in service who are ill-suited to combat and have no business in the military.
 
This same consideration applies to transgenders, overweight computer geeks, former drug users, and any other sub-par group of potential military service members.  The military is currently in the process of lowering their admission standards to include former drug users, high school dropouts, transgenders, women, etc.  That’s not how you develop an organization of effective killing machines. It is, however, how you wind up with a hollow military incapable of executing its primary function and lacking the combat mindset to even care.
 
I bet half of you reading this are squeamish about the post’s title let alone the reality of the subject matter.  Think about it and what that ought to mean about our recruiting efforts.
 

 
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[1]Marine Corps Times website, “Killer instinct: How one man taught US soldiers to fight dirty in WWII”, 30-Nov-2024,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-military/2024/11/30/killer-instinct-how-one-man-taught-us-soldiers-to-fight-dirty-in-wwii/

Trans Military Policy

It has been rumored in reports that Trump may ban transgender people from serving in the military.
 

Rep. Nancy Mace, R-S.C., applauded the report that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to — once again — reinstate a ban on transgender people in the military, telling Newsmax on Monday that the Biden administration's policy is "total hypocrisy."[1]
 
"We want killers. We want people who are meant for combat," Mace said. "If you're on these gender hormones, you're not deployable. So why are we bringing people into the military you can't deploy? I'm scratching my head. We're better than this, we're stronger than this."[1]

This issue encompasses political, sociological, psychological, and practical aspects.  I’m going to discuss the practical aspect of this which, assuming Mace is correct, is that people going down this path may not be deployable for significant periods of time.  It is mandatory to recognize that the military is not a medical service for people to change lifestyles and genders; it is a killing machine and that requires that all personnel be deployable at all times, barring unavoidable medical illness which is only a very temporary condition.
 
The starting point in this discussion is the recognition that the entire transgender issue in the military is predicated on a faulty basis as demonstrated with this statement:
 

Service members with a diagnosis from a military medical provider indicating that gender transition is medically necessary will be provided medical care and treatment for the diagnosed medical condition … [2]

This statement pre-supposes that gender transition is a medical necessity rather than a choice.  A medical necessity is, by definition, a procedure or treatment that, if not administered, will threaten the life of the patient.  A desire to change gender is not a medical necessity.  Failure to do so does not threaten the life of the patient.  Thus, again by definition, it is a choice and the military should not be in the business of providing elective procedures that are not medically necessary.
 
The following passage from a DoD handbook on the subject demonstrates some of the impacts of gender transitioning on military service.
 

Transitioning gender may have an impact on several different aspects of your career including deployability, assignment considerations, medical classification, and aspects of individual readiness (e.g., physical fitness, body composition assessment, and professional military education attendance). Since the impact to your career could be significant, it is strongly recommended you discuss this with your commander and/or mentor.[3]

There is no logical rationale for the military to assume the responsibility for a voluntary, life-changing medical process.  Service members wishing to undergo such a process should be given the choice of serving out their term and beginning the process in the civilian world upon discharge or taking a less than honorable discharge (for failure to serve out a contractual term) to begin the process in the civilian world immediately.  In no case should the military bear the financial brunt of an unnecessary medical procedure that results in a non-deployable service member for a period(s) of time.
 
____________________________ 
 
Note:  If you wish to comment, tread carefully.  I have limited the discussion to the practical aspects of the issue as it impacts military service.  We are not going to debate the sociological, mental, or emotional aspects.  There are other blogs for that.

 

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[1]Newsmax website, “Rep. Mace to Newsmax: Trans Military Policy Is 'Hypocrisy'”, Mark Swanson, 25-Nov-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/nancy-mace-transgender-military/2024/11/25/id/1189368/
 
[2] Transgender Service Member Policy Implementation Fact Sheet
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0616_policy/Transgender-Implementation-Fact-Sheet.pdf
 
[3] Transgender Service in the U.S. Military - An Implementation Handbook, 30-Sep-2016, p.21,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0616_policy/DoDTGHandbook_093016.pdf

NMESIS

The Marines have committed to becoming short range, island missile snipers in a poorly conceived and untested concept.  One of the missile-shooting systems is the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS – a contrived, convoluted, and ridiculous acronym if ever there was one) which will shoot Naval Strike Missiles from an unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) which will subsequently be called a Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE – oops!  I stand corrected;  this is an even more ridiculous and contrived acronym) vehicle (a glorified jeep). 

NMESIS batteries are composed of 18 launchers which are separated into two platoons of nine launchers each. The platoons are further subdivided into three sections of three launchers each. The USMC plans to field 14 batteries of which three batteries will be deployed to MLRs [ed. Marine Littoral Regiment] while 11 will be deployed to the CONUS in support of MEUs.[1]

Each launch vehicle can mount two missile launch cells giving an entire battery a capacity of 36 missiles.  Although I’ve seen no exact plan, my impression is that each Marine ‘hidden’ base will have perhaps 2-4 launch vehicles for a total capacity of 4-8 missiles.  Not exactly an overwhelming, saturation type striking power, is it?
 
As a mainstay of the Marine Corps’ new approach to warfare, the system has been thoroughly extensively robustly moderately somewhat barely tested. 

Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, conducted their first testing firing of a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). According to the press release, the test took place last month at Naval Air Station Point Mugu in California.[1]
 
This marks the third firing of the Raytheon-built NSM from the Oshkosh Defense’s Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires vehicle. The first live fire took place in November 2020, while the second took place in August of 2021 during Large Scale Exercise 21.[1]

Three test firings and we’re ready to make it “a centerpiece of the USMC’s Force Design 2030”[1]?  Anyone recall the WWII torpedo fiasco?  Let’s not extensively test the system;  let’s just anoint it as a mainstay of the Marines combat power and put our faith in manufacturer’s brochures and the Marine’s fantasy wishes.
 
Did you catch the part about just three batteries being assigned to the Marine Littoral Regiments?  That is a frightfully meager amount of firepower to base the entire Marine Corps combat concept on.

NMESIS

 

 
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[1]Naval News website, “US Marines Conduct First NMESIS Launch In Two Years”, Zach Abdi, 19-Jul-2023,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/07/us-marines-conduct-first-nmesis-launch-in-two-years/

Armor Against Missiles

There are a few naval topics that just seem to trigger controversy and argument (like battleships) and armor, for unfathomable reasons, is one of them.  Armor would seem to be something that no one could possibly object to.  At its very worst, it mitigates damage and improves survivability and yet some people seem to want to argue against it.
 
One of the reasons for the reaction to armor is that many/most people have a couple of misconceptions which cloud their thinking.  Let’s examine those misconceptions and dispense with them.
 
 
Purpose – So many people seem to think that if armor can’t provide absolute and total invulnerability to every weapon past, present, and future that the armor has no value.  This is, of course, utter nonsense.  Armor does provide immunity to the types of weapons it’s designed to and it provides mitigation to the rest which improves survivability.  This was thoroughly covered in the post, “Armor for Dummies”, so I won’t belabor it further, here.
 
Note that no one has ever claimed that armor can provide total immunity against every threat ever conceived.  Thus, there is nothing to argue on this point and yet so many people illogically attempt to just that.
 
System vs Single Plate – So many people seem to think that armor is a single plate of steel welded onto the side of a ship.  While that has been done in the past, that is not what the majority of WWII armor schemes did.  Note the use of the word, ‘scheme’.  This means that armor was not (is not) a single plate of steel but is, instead, a system of various components acting in a layered effect to achieve mitigation of a weapon’s impact.  As an example, torpedo armor was not a single plate of steel under the waterline;  it was a system of layered bulkheads, voids, and plate that was designed to act as a whole to provide mitigation of the effects of torpedoes.  Thus, voids were ‘armor’.  Similarly, the deck armor of a ship was not a single layer of steel but was a layered system consisting of an upper decapping/trigger layer and one or more main layers to further contain and mitigate the blast effects.
 
In addition to physically separated layers, armor often consisted of layers of materials with different metallurgical properties so that the layers might be (to put it crudely) harder or softer, acting in concert to deplete, absorb, and deflect the missile’s energy effects.
 
We’ve also discussed the importance of transverse bulkheads as part of the overall armor scheme.
 
It should also be noted that every bulkhead in every compartment acts as another layer of armor to contain and mitigate damage effects.  Unlike a tank, which only has one compartment and if you penetrate that you’ve likely achieved a kill, a ship has dozens/hundreds of compartments, each acting as a containment unit to limit the extent of damage.
 
It should be obvious, at this point that simply pointing to a weapon and saying that it can penetrate xx inches of steel is completely missing the concept of an actual armor system.
 
WWII – Yet another misconception is the belief that if we apply armor to a ship today we’ll do it exactly like we did in WWII.  I see this argument repeatedly as people argue that modern missiles with diving or pop up maneuvers will easily defeat deck armor because, in WWII, deck armor was less extensive than side armor.  Well, duh!  In WWII, side penetration was the main threat. Don’t you think that if the main threat today is diving missiles that a modern armor designer would take that into account and design the armor scheme to deal with that?  Wouldn’t we put our emphasis on armoring against overhead threats?
 
Data – A final misconception is that there is any data on modern missile’s effectiveness versus armor.  There are only two data points that I’m aware of:  a long ago test of a ?Harpoon? missile against an unspecified battleship armor plate which resulted in nothing more than scratched plate and a widely repeated but wholly undocumented claim of a Soviet ‘shaped charge’ missile warhead that can penetrate xx inches of steel under unknown conditions.  I flat out don’t believe any Soviet claim.  The Soviet’s number one export was exaggerated propaganda.  Thus, there is no credible evidence to assess the effectiveness of missiles against armor and certainly nothing to assess the effectiveness of missiles against an actual system of armor, as we’ve discussed.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We now understand that armor is a system, or scheme, consisting of many components and that the system acts as a whole to protect the ship.  The ability of a missile to defeat or penetrate one component does not invalidate the overall scheme.  As we noted, the purpose of armor is to mitigate the degree of damage from a weapon.  If that mitigation is in the form of immunity (as in the WWII battleship zones of immunity to plunging fire), that’s great but even weapons that penetrate the ship are mitigated by the additional layers of armored bulkheads, void spaces, plates, etc.
 
Before we close out our discussion, it should also be noted that land armor has made immense strides since WWII.  Naval armor has made almost no strides.  There is no reason why some land armor advances couldn’t be adapted to naval use, resulting in even more effective armor.  Newer armor materials and arrangements such as ceramics, polymers, composites, electric armor, sloped armor, spall liners, spaced armor, reactive armor, etc. ought to be adaptable to naval use.  Again, focusing on the claimed ability of a missile to penetrate xx inches of steel is almost a pointless argument.
 
It should be obvious, now, that most anti-armor arguments are based on misconceptions.  There is absolutely no valid reason not to apply armor to every ship, as appropriate for its size, and every reason to do so.
 
Most importantly in the missile versus armor discussion is the recognition that no one has ever tried to design a naval armor system against modern missiles and yet so many people seem convinced that it can’t be done.  Let’s give it a try!  I see no reason why it can’t be successfully done.  Given the staggering, multi-billion dollar cost of even destroyer size ships, it is mind-bending that we don’t armor our ships.
 

Book Review – Sailing Warships of the US Navy

Here’s a book for anyone who is a fan of the age of sail.  Donald Canney’s Sailing Warships of the US Navy[1] presents a description and history of every sailing warship the US built.  The 200+ page, large format (10” x 12”) book is organized into chapters that address specific time periods and trends such as “The Frigates”, which covers the Constitution and her five sisters, “The Ships of the Line”, which covers the larger ships, and “American Sloops of War”, among many others.
 
The individual ships are presented in a roughly chronological order with context that places them within national and world events so that the justification comes through clearly.  Each ship write up includes a detailed service history, contemporary artwork of the vessel, where available, and large photos of the builder’s plans for those that exist and speculative plans for those that lack surviving builder’s plans.  The plans are the highlight of the book, for me, as I love to study the evolution of sailing ships through the sequential changes in their designs.  It is interesting to compare the attractive, curved, flowing lines of British ships with the harsher, more angular and horizontal lines of American vessels.
 

The section on ships of the line was especially fascinating.  We’re all familiar with the Constitution and her sisters but few are familiar with the American ships of the line.  The USS Franklin, for example, built in 1815 was a stunningly attractive ship with magnificent lines and the detailed plans bring it to life.
 
The ship histories are well written and informative without being dry and offer a glimpse into the times and the challenges of building and operating a navy.  Even then, cost, Congressional approval, material availability, production time lines, and fitting out were concerns no less important or different than today.
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the chapters on the smaller sloops, brigs, and schooners are equally fascinating.
 
The author even includes a chapter on “Vessels of the Northern Lakes”.  We forget that a robust naval war occurred on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.  Remember Oliver Hazard Perry?  It is interesting to see the how the ship designs were modified for shallow draft operations on the lakes.
 
It is interesting to note some of the trends that manifest throughout the various ship histories.  The American emphasis on armor (in the form of much heavier and stronger framing than British counterparts) and firepower (overgunning) compared to standard British practices stands out and one can’t help but believe that those trends contributed to American naval successes.  These trends continued through WWII before being abandoned, unwisely, by the Navy.
 
While the book is, admittedly, a niche book, I highly recommend it for the naval historian.  Potential model makers will especially find the book to be a treasure trove of information.
 

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[1]Canney, Donald L., Sailing Warships of the US Navy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, ISBN 1-55750-990-5

Age and Armor

Battleship armor was not a constant.  It was an ever evolving concept that saw continuous changes in metallurgy, manufacturing, and structural arrangement.  In other words, armor was continuously improving … at least until the post-WWII years at which point it was fairly abruptly abandoned for reasons that remain a mystery (though not for lack of undocumented speculation!).  As such, it is reasonable to expect that the more modern the ship, the better the armor protection.  Given that a ship’s design is locked in at the moment it is laid down, the following list shows the dates that various representative battleships were laid down.  This chronological list suggests that the effectiveness of the ship’s armor scheme was greatest on the latter ships and least effective on the earlier ships.  Thus, the Iowa class would have been the ultimate in battleship armor development both in terms of metallurgy and structural arrangement.  Of course, we’ll never know for sure.
 

 
 

There’s no particular point to this post, just an interesting observation and speculation. 
 

Iowa Class Armor Scheme Cross Section - 
note the internal main belt and incline

 

Goes Boom!

Here’s some tidbits of good news about restoring our industrial ‘boom’ capacity.
 
How much TNT explosive does the United States produce?  None. 

TNT is used to produce an array of explosive weapons including ammunition, bombs and 155-millimeter artillery rounds, but the military has been reliant on overseas sources.[1]

In a bit of good news, the Army is going to resume TNT production by building a new facility. 

As part of the Army’s quest to boost weapons production, it is reestablishing TNT production on US soil, inking a deal to build out a new facility in Graham, Ky.
 
“For the first time in decades, America will produce TNT on its own soil, manufacturing the explosive material our military uses for everything from hand grenades to 155mm artillery,” outgoing Sen. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said in a press release.[1]

Boom!

As Army acquisition head Douglas Bush notes, control over our own explosives supply chain is vital. 

“[Restoring] TNT production gives us the ability to control and secure our supply chain for this vital component, especially in an era of increasing global challenges.”[1]

How could we ever have allowed such a vital industrial capability to vanish from our shores?  The military and civilian leadership that allowed this were derelict in their duty, if not treasonous for knowingly and willfully endangering America’s national security.  The military leadership should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Setting that aside, the good news gets better … 

By fiscal 2026, the service is aiming to have the capacity to produce 100,000 rounds each month. To get there, Bush previously said the Army plans to spend $4.2 billion to build up the industrial base across various initiatives, to include commissioning three new domestic facilities to support 155mm production and a new metal parts production facility in Canada.[1]

Admittedly, I’m praising something that should never have been necessary and that's sad.  A country/military that doesn’t have its own explosives production capability is a fool and that’s exactly what we’ve been.  Still, it’s refreshing to see us begin to restore what we lost. 
 
I love being able to present positive posts.  It’s a shame that there are so few opportunities to do so, so enjoy this one!
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Army inks $435 million deal for new TNT production facility”, Ashley Roque, 11-Nov-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/11/army-inks-435-million-deal-for-new-tnt-production-facility/

The Next Secretary of Defense

Fox’s TV commentary show, ‘Outnumbered’, had a discussion about President-elect Trump’s cabinet picks and had a brief discussion about the Secretary of Defense position and the type of person needed to fill the role.  Fox News contributor, Steve Hilton, offered some very interesting perspective, saying,
 

… at the Defense Department, you need a really good manager there who will sort out the corrupt mess of our defense procurement.  I think Elon Musk would be brilliant in that role, actually.[1]

 
Asked for more specifics about the type of person needed, Mr. Hilton offered this:
 

Someone who knows how to run things.  I mean, it’s no good putting in some General, right?  That place is a absolute cesspit of corruption.  You’ve got to have someone who can deal with that and get the modernization of our defense forces going.  It’s a management role we need there.[1]

Mr. Hilton could not be more correct.  We have a badly broken defense department that appears to be irredeemably corrupt.  The procurement process, in particular, stands out as an example of fraud, corruption, and incompetence.  Hilton’s suggestion that a strong businessman is required, as opposed to a former military officer, is worth serious consideration.
 
Without offering an opinion one way or the other, the suggestion that Elon Musk would make a good Secretary of Defense merits serious contemplation not so much for the idea of Musk, personally, but for the idea of a strong, successful businessman.
 
President-elect Trump has an opportunity to make a good start at reforming the Defense Department.  No one can completely fix it in just four years but a good start could be made by selecting the right SecDef and, if I might add a personal suggestion, firing every flag officer and starting over with the uniformed leadership.  Trump had an opportunity to do this his first term and failed by failing to recognize the depth of corruption and taking ruthless action.  Hopefully, he’s learned lessons and will do better this time around.
 
 
Update:
 
As of this moment, it’s being reported that Trump has selected Pete Hegseth as his nominee for Secretary of Defense.  If so, and if confirmed, Mr. Hegseth would be the polar opposite of the type of person described by Mr. Hilton.  Hegseth is a former National Guard officer who has served in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan while rising to the rank of Major.  He has been heavily involved in politics and veteran’s affairs.
 
He has demonstrated a dedication to the welfare of veterans and the good of the service.  What he lacks is any experience running a massive organization like the DoD.  The key will be whether he recognizes this and can surround himself with people who can run an organization.  If so, his job will be to steer them in the right direction.
 
I have to be honest, this is a disappointing pick although the potential for success is certainly present.  Firing every flag officer would be a good start for him!
 
 
 
Note:  This is a military leadership discussion.  I will not allow political comments.  Fair warning.


 
________________________________

 
[1]Steve Hilton speaking on Fox Outnumbered, 12-Nov-2024, transcribed by ComNavOps

Chinese Prototype

Naval News website has an article about a Chinese experimental (prototype) unmanned, or optionally manned, small combatant surface vessel.  Here’s a description of the vessel:
 

The new imagery confirms a substantial vessel in trimaran configuration. The ship is armed with at least four vertical launch cells, equipped with multiple sensor panels likely for an electronically scanned array and additional sensors, and a sizeable aviation pad at the rear supporting a VTOL UAV. An organic UAV capability could support the USV particularly in over the horizon (OTH) -targeting for maritime and land attack-roles.
 
If previously shown models of a slightly different configuration are indicative, the design may contain further weapons in recessed bays, including an autocannon on the bow, and torpedo launchers at the sides. Forward of the four missile cells is a notable square area which may incorporate further missile cells.[1]

The vessel is an evolution or refinement of a previous version built in 2019. 
 
The article indicates that the manufacturer currently retains ownership of the craft and that the Chinese navy has not yet expressed any interest in procuring the design.
 
It is possible that the main purpose of the prototype is to assist in international marketing but, regardless, there is no better way to persuade your own government to buy your product than by building a prototype.
 

Chinese Prototype Combat USV

 

I’m not going to discuss the actual combat capabilities because that’s pointless without a CONOPS to reference against.  Still, there are a few noteworthy aspects to this.
 
Manufacturer’s Dime.  All indications are that the vessel was built by the manufacturer, at their cost.  This was once routine in the aviation industry and should be revived as standard practice.  Of course, there’s a limit to how much prototype cost a manufacturer can absorb.  A $20B prototype aircraft carrier, for example, is simply not feasible.  However, producing aspects of a $20B prototype carrier is perfectly reasonable.  For example, that new gravimetric warp launch catapult that is planned to replace the non-functional EMALS should be built and installed on a second hand cargo ship for at sea testing under realistic operating conditions.  That gravity-nullifying, instantaneous, matter transporter that will replace the finicky Ford weapon elevators should be installed on a used, throwaway cargo ship to prove it works before including it in a production design.  Those kinds of prototype costs are within the financial capacity of a builder who is steadily producing $20B+ carriers and, if they aren’t, that alone should be a giant red flag about cost, reliability, and scheduling. 
 
Testing.  It should go without saying but I’ll say it anyway since the Navy seems oblivious: prototypes are invaluable for both demonstration purposes and as a developmental aid.  Build, test, and feed the results back into the design before you commit to production.  China gets to see what works and what doesn’t without committing to something like a massive 55 LCS program before the first ship was even designed.  If/when the Chinese navy wants to build the vessel, both they and the builder will know what the strengths and weaknesses of the design are and can incorporate modifications into the design, as needed.  The LCS, by comparison, was already deep into the production run before the first lessons learned had a chance to feed back into the design process and the result is half a dozen or so LCSes have already been retired and several more are on the chopping block.
 
Cost Estimates.  A prototype hugely reduces the uncertainty about the cost of a new ship.  It should!  You just built it!  You now know exactly what it costs.  Now you can realistically work on cost reductions.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Again, it seems blindingly obvious but I’ll say it anyway.  There is nothing but good that can come from the routine construction of prototypes.  As noted, the use of prototypes provides the ability to wring out the problems from a design and develop very accurate cost estimates.  The manufacturer benefits from an increased likelihood of obtaining a production contract for an existing vessel.  The mere fact that the vessel already exists is a major selling point.  Manufacturers should be eager to build prototypes.
 
Of course, as noted, there is a limit to the amount of money a manufacturer can spend on a prototype with no guarantee of a production contract.  When a prototype gets too big and too expensive for the manufacturer to absorb the total cost, the government can provide partial payment (not full payment!).  The key is to force the manufacturer to put skin in the game.  This encourages higher quality to increase the likelihood of sales and reduce the cost of quality related reworks.  It also motivates the manufacturer to engage in ruthlessly efficient cost cutting and eliminates the practice of continuous change orders.  When you’re building a ship on your own dime, you suddenly become intensely interested in minimizing costs and getting the most bang for your buck as opposed to the perverse, reverse incentives we now have where the manufacturer gets paid more money for poor quality (via reworks) than they do for good quality (no reworks).
 
We should do this for every new ship class.  Build a single prototype, test it thoroughly, and then, and only then, consider a production contract.  The Navy will never do this so Congress should mandate this approach by law.with criminal penalties associated for failure to comply.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Chinese Experimental Aviation Platform And Combat USV Emerge In Detailed New Imagery”, Alex Luck, 7-Nov-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/11/chinese-experimental-aviation-platform-and-combat-usv-emerge-in-detailed-new-imagery/

Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 

• Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
• Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
• Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
• Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
• Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
• Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
• Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
• Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
• Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
• Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!

 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.

Blast from the Past

In the sidebar ‘Blast from the Past’ you'll see a post from July 2012 which discusses the relative merits of new construction versus upgrades.  The post also calls for a moratorium on new construction!  What?!  Stop new construction?  Wouldn't that be a disaster?  Find out.

Enjoy!

What’s a Navy To Do?

In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the seas.  However, there is another, larger factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ... or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
 
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how they relate to Russia.
 
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
 
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
 
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no land strike capability.  Early in the conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
 
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea.  The one exception is the 70-some mile strip of land centered around Odesa.  This would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
 
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied by overland supply routes.  Some degree of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
 
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations.  Of course, the Russians possess no carriers so this is a moot consideration.
 
 
Discussion
 
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of successfully executing.
 
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect naval force structure.  The Russian navy lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
 
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s invade Ukraine today”.  The Russian navy knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014 Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously.  It had to be in the planning stage for years.  So, the Russian navy had ten to twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
 
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense.  Indeed, various Russian ships have been pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately designed and fitted.
 
 
Conclusion/Warning

Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role.  The proof of this is the fact that, having ‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall.  This is a land war, pure and simple.  Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
 
What this tells us is that you had better know your enemy and your own strategy against that enemy as you build your force structure.  Failure to do so will guarantee that you have an inappropriate and ineffective naval force.  We need to keep this lesson firmly in mind as we build toward the inevitable war with China.  Currently, we have substituted technology for strategy and, as a result, have produced ships with no useful purpose in a China war (Zumwalt, LCS, AFSB, MLP, every amphibious ship, etc.).

PT Gunboat Reaction

Wow!  I mean … wow!  The almost universal reaction to the last post on a PT gunboat was to hugely upgrade it by doubling the size and adding large guns (up to 76 mm), anti-ship missiles, radar fire control, UAV aviation, mines, etc.  No one was content to let the gunboat be a simple, small gunboat with the missions listed in the post.
 
Speaking of missions, no one really objected to the mission list nor did they amend the list to account for their proposed changes in weaponry and sensors.  Instead, they instantly jumped to more and bigger hulls and weapons.
 
Does this sound familiar?  It should.  It’s exactly how the Navy designs ships.  They start with a potentially focused, common sense idea and then instantly double the size, add every thing  and every function they can think of, and gold plate the entire design.
 
Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against discussing a large patrol ship (corvette) which is what almost everyone was describing (even the ‘you should look at xxxx’ references were, invariably much larger vessels), however, none of the proposed ships retained any real relationship to the original PT gunboat subject of the post.
 
Don’t understand why the Navy designs are always so bad?  This is why.  We did it, ourselves!
 
Re-read the post and then the comments and note the instant upsizing.  Not a single person stuck with the scope and missions of the PT gunboat.  Hey, maybe you didn’t like the gunboat idea.  That’s fine but to start designing a vastly increased substitute without modifying the mission list and CONOPS is exactly how the Navy gets it wrong.
 
This was an eye opener!  I honestly didn’t expect that.  I guess I have more work to do to hammer home the proper design principles.

PT Gunboat

As we have previously discussed, the gunboat version of the WWII PT boat was the most effective form of the PT Boat (“PTboat”) and, along with its surveillance (ISR) duties, were the most useful functions.  Interestingly, we have modern PT boat equivalents in the Mk VI and, in a larger form, the Cyclone class, although both are being eliminated from service.  There have been other small boats, as well, in recent decades.  The Navy, although it has toyed with small boats from time to time, has rejected all attempts at establishing a persistent small boat naval component within the fleet.
 
Pivoting our thinking away from the ship-sinking role for the PT-ish boat (we’ll use the term ‘PT boat’ in a generic sense for the rest of the article) and keeping in mind that the most effective use was as barge-busting gunboats and ISR, we could easily imagine a very useful PT boat component in the Navy, today.  For example, we could flood the Persian Gulf with PT boats to monitor and eliminate Iran’s maritime harassment, ship seizures, and ship mining.  Of course, that would require us to have the will to use force, as necessary, otherwise there would be no point.
 
 
Weapons
 
Consider the impressive density and types of weapons on PT gunboats.  As an example, listed below is the weapons fit on PT-596 later in the war:
 
PT 596

• 4x torpedo
• 1x M4 37 mm autocannon
• 2x Mk50 5” Rocket Launcher
• 2x Twin .50 cal MG
• 1x 20 mm single
• 1x 40 mm single

 
In addition, many PT boats added various types of weapons as desired and as availability allowed.  Such ad hoc weapons included the 37 mm anti-tank gun, depth charges, mounted bazooka, .30 cal MG, 40 mm dual, 20 mm dual, 81 mm mortar, and so forth.
 
All that weaponry was packed on an 80 ft boat!  We struggle, today, to mount one CIWS on a 500+ ft Burke.
 
Now, consider modern equivalent PT boat weapons on a small boat.  With such a boat, what kinds of missions could we effectively perform?
 
 
Missions
 
Here’s a partial list of missions that could be performed by a modern PT gunboat:
 

• Persian Gulf anti-Iranian maritime harassment
• Philippines anti-Chinese patrol
• Fishery anti-Chinese incursion patrol
• Africa and South America riverine patrol and raid
• Anti-terrorism

 
Note:  None of the above missions are major war missions.  The PT boat is simply not suited for major combat, today.  It would, however, offer benefits in the pseudo-peacetime role as long as we’re willing to use them forcefully, when necessary.
 
It’s also noteworthy that the missions we’ve discussed generally occur at a useful level, meaning at the source of problems rather than at the high end, geopolitical level where we wind up having Burkes standing by watching bad actors instead of taking action because we’re too afraid of escalation or international hurt feelings.
 
One argument against a modern PT boat is that they’re rendered ineffective by the whole ‘don’t fire until fired upon’ philosophy that so many people believe is some kind of ironclad, mandatory requirement that prevents us from using force.  This, however, is complete bilgewater.  There is nothing in the law or the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) that prohibits US forces from firing first if they feel sufficiently threatened.  That a prohibition against firing first appears in some Rules of Engagement is a purely self-imposed constraint and, arguably, contradicts the military Code of Conduct.
 
For example, if an Iranian boat makes an attack run on a US vessel, we should assume it’s real and fire first.  We are not responsible for reading the enemy’s mind.  We cannot depend on past behavior to know for certain that the attack run is just a bluff.  Indeed, the local commander would be derelict for not taking action if it did turn out to be a real attack.  Most importantly, after a few Iranian boats are destroyed while attempting reckless harassment, they would stop harassing us, knowing that to do so is fatal.  Iran is responsible for the consequences of its own stupid acts.  It’s not our job to be responsible for their stupid behavior and to rescue them from the consequences of their own stupid behavior.
 
Additional benefits of a PT gunboat, authorized to take appropriate action, would be that it would provide low level command opportunities and would be a great way to begin identifying personnel with actual combat mindsets and promoting them into higher commands instead of the cowering crap we have for captains and admirals today.
 
What do you think?  Are there useful missions for a modern PT gunboat?
 
 
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Note:  For a fictional story describing the use of a PT gunboats, see, “MkVI –Gunboat Diplomacy Story”

ET, Phone Home

Here’s a little tidbit from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict about radio signal security. 

On top of the strikes themselves, Lebanese civilians describe shock at Israel’s ability to obstruct and overtake radio frequencies in Lebanon in order to broadcast an announcement warning people to stay away from Hezbollah sites and forecasting the air strikes to come.[1]

One of the foundational beliefs among US military planners is that our communications will be secure … despite no evidence supporting that belief and a fair amount of evidence to the contrary (see, “Communications Vulnerability”).
 
So many of our weapon systems depend on guidance signals, telemetry, data flow, and so forth and the security of those communications has been taken as an article of faith despite evidence to the contrary.  For example, Iran has had success disrupting and/or capturing our UAV control signals resulting in loss or capture of UAVs.
 
The US military consistently refuses to test communications under realistic conditions during field exercises and, in a display of unbelievable illogic, has publicly stated that using our full capabilities would be too disruptive during an exercise.  Do we not believe that China will have capabilities at least equal to our own?  Should we not, then, subject our communications to the maximum disruption possible in exercises to see what works and what doesn’t and to learn how to work in the face of disruptions?
 
I have consistently heard from military communications specialists that our communications are nowhere near as secure as we’d like to believe.  That doesn’t necessarily mean that China can decrypt our signals.  Decryption is not need to learn a great deal.  Signal frequency (number of signals, not wavelength), strength, location, etc. can offer a great deal of information as the British found out in the Battle of Heligoland Bight (see, ”The Battle of Heligoland Bight”).
 
I would hope that the military has conducted extensive and realistic tests and just aren’t sharing the information publicly but I doubt that’s the case.  It’s simply impossible to keep large scale tests of that nature a secret.  It might be possible to keep the results secret but not the event.
 
This is just a brief post to remind us about our potential communications vulnerability.  We need to begin realistic tests and exercises yesterday or we’re going to be rudely surprised when war comes.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “For Lebanon, a war in all but name has finally arrived: Experts”,   Agnes Helou, 25-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/for-lebanon-a-war-in-all-but-name-has-finally-arrived-experts/