When the Gloves Come Off

-A Predator UAV launches a Hellfire missile at a terrorist.
-A Ukraine unmanned surface drone attacks a Russian ship.
-A drone drops a grenade on Russian troops.
-A Russian base in Syria is attacked by a drone swarm.
-A US base in Syria is attacked by drones.
-Unmanned drones are being developed as ‘wingmen’ for manned aircraft.
-Turkey has built a UAV carrier and various unmanned aircraft to equip it.
-Russian UAVs attack Kiev.
 
 

The future of warfare seems clear and it’s all about unmanned assets, right?  The various conflicts around the world are proving the value of unmanned assets in combat every day, right?
 
Before we jump feet first into the deep end of the unmanned combat pool, let’s take note of one tiny, almost insignificant, detail that no one seems to be paying any attention to:  all the unmanned combat that supposedly proves the worth of unmanned assets is taking place in low intensity combat situations.
 
Many of you are already pounding out replies, screaming that the Ukraine-Russia conflict is anything but low intensity.  Thousands of artillery shells are being fired every hour.  How much more high intensity can you get?  Well, I’m sorry but you’re wrong.  The Ukraine-Russia war may be wasting using lots of artillery shells but the overall conflict is decidedly low intensity for a variety of reasons.  Neither side is fighting with any operational or tactical expertise.  The Russian air force is almost absent.  Top of the line Russian armor seems to have been withheld from combat.  Ukraine doesn’t have an air force.  There’s no naval combat.  Neither side is using electronic warfare to any great extent or effect.  Neither side is using concentrated armored divisions in maneuver warfare.  Neither side is exhibiting any semblance of joint warfare.  Infantry forces appear to be content with occupying whatever territory they have rather than conducting intelligent offensives.  The Ukraine-Russia conflict is much closer to WWI trench warfare than the WWII European combat of an all-out, high intensity war. 
 
I’ve made my point.  You can agree or disagree but I’m not going to entertain a debate about the intensity of the Ukraine-Russia war.  Be forewarned.  Moving on …
 
Other low intensity conflicts include Afghanistan, Iraq/Iran, anti-terrorist actions, Israel-Hamas, Syria, Yemen, and many others.  It’s not even debatable that these are low intensity.
 
So … low intensity.  How is this relevant to unmanned combat?
 
Low intensity, by definition, means that combat forces and effects are artificially limited, often severely so.  Avoidance of collateral damage takes precedence over achievement of military objectives.  Rules of Engagement (ROE) actively and intentionally limit the application of force and kinetic effects.  In short, the engaged force is fighting with one (or both!) hands tied and is only able to apply a fraction of its available capabilities.
 
The continuous Israeli conflicts with Hamas are an example of self-imposed ROE restrictions that, with occasional periods of reduced restrictions, severely hamper combat effectiveness.
 
The US conflict in Vietnam was another example of a low intensity conflict in that the US unilaterally limited its use of force.  Enemy forces were granted sanctuary across the Vietnam-Laos border.  North Vietnam was allowed to freely resupply via Haiphong harbor.  Hanoi was generally off-limits.  And so on.
 
The US anti-terrorist effort in Afghanistan was a low intensity conflict with terrorists allowed to escape into the sanctuary of Pakistan.
 
The battle against ISIS was decidedly low intensity as avoidance of collateral damage was the primary objective.
 
Let’s now consider the case of a true, high intensity conflict in which the ‘gloves come off’ and the engaged forces are free to use all of their capabilities (excepting nuclear, of course).  How does this impact unmanned asset combat use and effectiveness?
 
Sanctuary – As noted in the examples, sanctuary is one of the most ludicrous artificially imposed constraints imaginable.  Unmanned assets require a safe, calm, quiet location to prepare, maintain, launch, and control the assets … a sanctuary of some sort.  Once the concept of sanctuaries is eliminated, overwhelming force can be applied to the source of unmanned assets rather than trying to fight those assets individually, as they attack.  If the enemy is given no sanctuary, his ability to employ unmanned assets is drastically decreased.
 
Cost Ratio – turned loose, why not use a Standard missile to shoot down a UAV if it protects a multi-billion dollar ship?  Sure, we’d prefer to use a low cost method to stop a drone but when protection becomes more important than the defensive cost, a Standard missile (or ESSM or RAM) makes a very effective anti-UAV weapon.
 
Collateral Damage – Who cares if that unmanned asset is near a civilian structure?  Destroy it and ignore the collateral damage.  Unmanned assets lose a lot of effectiveness when they can’t ‘hide’ among non-combatant people and structures.
 
Pre-emptive Strikes – In low intensity conflicts, forces are often reduced to defensive stances.  In a high intensity conflict there is no need to sit on the defensive and, indeed, every reason to attack.  Rather than wait for the enemy to attack with unmanned assets, wipe out that base where the unmanned assets are being built, stored, and operated from and the unmanned threat vanishes.  Constant offensives will hinder the enemy’s ability to pause long enough to assemble and operate unmanned assets.  Unless co-located with some other type of heavily defended facility, an unmanned base would likely be an easy, highly vulnerable target requiring a minimum of missiles or artillery to eliminate.
 
Electronic Warfare – Currently, as best we can tell, the US keeps its electronic warfare capabilities under wraps.  In an all-out, high intensity war those capabilities get fully utilized and unmanned assets will be severely disrupted, I suspect.
 
Identification – In high intensity combat, you no longer care about identification.  There’s only ‘yours’ and ‘not yours’ and no one cares about identifying the ‘not yours’.  If it’s ‘not yours’, kill it.
 
 
Conclusion
 
A major part of the reason why unmanned assets are enjoying some success around the world is because they’re being used in very restricted conflicts where the defenses are constrained by hindering ROEs. 
 
Let’s also be honest and acknowledge that another reason for unmanned successes is that the defenders have largely been fairly inept and/or ill-equipped to deal with them.  This would not be the case for the US, one hopes.  We have plenty of effective weapons to deal with unmanned assets even if some of them would not be considered cost-effective.
 
It’s difficult to imagine unmanned assets having much success against a US or Chinese military that is fighting with the ‘gloves off’.  When the gloves come off in high intensity combat, unmanned assets will be found to be a minor, niche asset, at best.
 
So, imagine the US military operating with no restrictions and every capability in play.  Can you really see unmanned assets presenting any real threat?  Of course not!  Now, turn that imagination around.  If unmanned assets would present no real threat to us, do we really think they’ll present any real threat to China?  Again, of course not!  So, why are we so myopically fixated on unmanned assets if we don’t believe they can be effective in high intensity combat?
 
We need to pause our headlong pursuit of unmanned assets and take a serious look at how effective they can be in high intensity combat.  An honest assessment will leave us wondering why we’re pursuing unmanned technology.
 
Note:  I’m not advocating dropping all unmanned work.  Unmanned assets can certainly be useful in low intensity scenarios which is, after all, the bulk of the military’s efforts.  However, we cannot allow low intensity assets to filter into our high intensity combat doctrine and tactics.