Before the Navy embarks on their insane fantasy of arming amphibious and logistic ships with anti-ship cruise missiles and sending them out alone (distributed lethality) to sink fleets of Chinese warships, perhaps it would be better to start by arming them with a useful AAW defensive weapons fit.
For example, a WWII attack transport (APA) such as the Haskell class (455 ft long, 15,000 ton displacement) mounted:
- 1x 5"/38 dual-purpose gun
- 1x quad 40 mm gun
- 4x twin 40 mm guns
- 10x 20 mm guns
That’s 16 mounts with a total of 23 gun barrels of various calibers!
Compare that to today’s larger San Antonio (LPD) class (684 ft long, 25,300 ton displacement):
- 2x Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launchers (2x21 missiles)
The San Antonio is 68% larger displacement and has only 2 defensive weapon mounts!
Well, what about the mammothly larger America class LHA? Surely that has many more weapon mounts, right? The America (LHA) class (844 ft long, 45,000 ton displacement) AAW defensive mounts are:
- 2x Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launchers (2x21 missiles)
- 2x Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile launchers (16 missiles)
- 2x CIWS
The America is 2x-3x larger than the Haskell and has only 6 weapon mounts. I know that a direct comparison of weapons from two different eras is meaningless but the point is the weapon density on the Haskells puts current ship designs to shame. We built warships in WWII; now, build nearly defenseless cruise ships.
Alright, those are amphibious ships. What about combat ships?
The Baltimore class heavy cruiser is crudely analogous to today’s Burke and mounted:
- 6x twin 5"/38 dual-purpose gun
- 12x quad 40 mm gun
- 24x 20 mm guns
That’s 42 mounts with a total of 84 gun barrels of various calibers!
Compare that to the Burke Flt IIA class:
- 1x 32-cell VLS
- 1x 64-cell VLS
- 1x CIWS
That’s 3 mounts.
Now, before anyone gets all worked up, I know there’s no way to directly compare a WWII gun system to a modern multi-cell missile system. They’re just two different animals. The salient point is the mount density relative to the size of the ship. Even this is an imperfect comparison because the size of the mounts vary widely.
While a direct comparison between WWII weapons and today’s weapons is pointless, the overarching conclusion is inescapable: WWII ships were built with a significantly greater weapon density. We have lost sight of what the role of a WARship is today and how to design one. Our ships are deployment cruise ships with weapons added almost as an afterthought.
Rather than get caught up in a meaningless attempt to directly compare defensive weapon fits of WWII and now, let’s instead take a look the defensive weapon fits of our current surface ships compared to what we’ve learned from this blog about defensive requirements, all the while bearing in mind the mount density lesson from WWII.
|
|
Has a |
Should Have |
|
Nimitz |
|
|
|
ESSM/Sea Sparrow |
2 |
4 |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
2 |
7 |
|
CIWS |
2 |
8 |
|
Ford |
|
|
|
ESSM/Sea Sparrow |
2 |
4 |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
2 |
7 |
|
CIWS |
3 |
8 |
|
Zumwalt b |
|
|
|
ESSM |
? mounts, ?20? cells |
? mounts, 20 cells |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
0 |
6 |
|
CIWS |
0 |
8 |
|
Ticonderoga |
|
|
|
ESSM |
2 mounts, ?30? cells |
4 mounts, 30 cells |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
0 |
6 |
|
CIWS |
2 |
8 |
|
Burke, Flt IIA |
|
|
|
ESSM |
2 mounts, ?24? cells |
4 mounts, 24 cells |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
0 |
6 |
|
CIWS |
1 |
8 |
|
LCS |
|
|
|
ESSM |
0 |
1 mount, 8 cells |
|
RAM/SeaRAM |
1 |
2 |
|
CIWS |
0 |
4 |
a The phrase ‘mounts’ refers to the number of VLS missile clusters. Each cluster is a single missile mount and represents a single point of failure in the event of an enemy hit. A single cluster, no matter how large, can be destroyed by a single hit. It stands to reason that more mounts, spread out over the length of the ship, are less susceptible to damage. This is simple dispersal of risk. A Burke can only absorb two hits on its unarmored VLS clusters before being rendered BOTH OFFENSIVELY AND DEFENSIVELY INEFFECTIVE! Two hits!
Compare this to a WWII cruiser/battleship with three heavily armored main mounts and several armored secondary mounts as well as dozens of defensive mounts, all scattered along the length and width of the ship.
b For the Zumwalt, the concept of missile clusters doesn’t really apply since the unarmored VLS cells are dispersed around the periphery of the ship. This is both good and bad since any single hit has a very high chance of destroying some VLS cells but, on the other hand, the number of cells affected by a single hit is limited. Also, placing the VLS cells on the periphery of the ship almost assures that a hit will destroy several of the cells as opposed to placing the cells in a more centerline position.
There are, undoubtedly, going to be some people who look at the ‘Should Have’ column of the table and complain that the numbers are far too high, that the numbers simply aren’t realistic for modern ships. These people are laboring under a constraining paradigm that they don’t even recognize as such. I would remind those people of two things:
1. WWII ships had a much greater density of defensive weapons.
2. The cost – in money and ship’s space – for these extra weapons is miniscule compared to the construction cost of a new ship to replace the sunken ship – lost due to the penny wise, pound foolish lack of a some extra defensive weapons.
Some might also suggest that modern weapons, being more accurate, are not needed in large numbers like inaccurate WWII 5”/40mm/20mm AA fits. On the face of it, this is appealing. However, there are a couple of problems with this line of thought:
1. No one knows that modern AAW weapons are actually more accurate. In fact, the entire history of modern defensive systems strongly indicates otherwise. The best, most successful set of data I can think of is the British in the Falklands and they only managed to achieve around a 25% success rate and even that rate was skewed by many of the targets being non-maneuvering, defenseless drones, for all practical purposes.
2. In WWII, attacking aircraft generally attacked individual ships singly or in spaced out intervals despite their attempts to conduct simultaneous attacks. Modern naval theory suggests the use of massed, simultaneous missile attacks. So, even if one accepts the belief that modern defensive weapons have a higher accuracy, the massed attacks will require as many defensive weapons as possible to deal with the much greater numbers of simultaneous attacking missiles.
Conclusion
The rot of peace has eroded our design practices for WARships. We’ve come to emphasize habitability for our glorified cruise ships rather than emphasizing weapons, armor, and sensors for combat.
Our lax peacetime mentality has led us to believe that our ships will never take a hit and, therefore, our ship design philosophy has all but abandoned defensive AAW weapons. The poster child for this is the Zumwalt with no AAW defensive weapons at all !!!!!
In a peer war, ALL ships will be subject to aerial attack. Our WWII fathers knew this and armed even the logistic and amphibious ships accordingly. We need to relearn those lessons and begin arming our ships for war, not for leisurely peacetime cruises.
Before we can even begin to contemplate idiotic ideas like distributed lethality, we need to arm our ships so that they at least have some chance of defending themselves.
I often wonder what is the effectiveness of Phalanx and SeaRAM.
ReplyDeleteIf they are effective, an armored ship with an array of CIWS, each with their own sector, should be able to deal with quite a few incoming missiles.
A battle group of ships with layers of AAW; standard missiles, ESSM, SeaRAM, Goalkeeper, Phalanx might be able to withstand attack from a large number of anti-ship missiles.
How many anti-ship missiles will an enemy have available before their inventory is expended?
Lutefisk
I think the problem comes down to the Navies priorities with warships. Ship design seems more focused on economy and ease of use more than War. We could design ships with good armor that are damn hard to kill...but that would mean they use more fuel. This is expensive of course.
ReplyDeleteLook at phalanx. Its good but just against a few missiles then it takes forever to reload apparently. We need something better.
How long has the navy beem recycling its 5in gun mounts now? I honestly think our navy has gotten to the point it just refuses to develop or buy anything that isnt a sexy new fighter or plane that will get them support in a congressional district.
The Navy is obsessed with having a high top speed for its ships yet its supply ships barely manage a crawl and are few and wearing out.
Distributed lethality makes sense but only if all the ships are capable of it and you can afford to lose ships in a fleet.
When the tankers sink can we fight?
When the logistics vessels sink can we fight?
Are we willing to lose carriers? I think not then distributed lethality makes little sense in their plan at least.
Turns out the great thinkers of the 2000's who said real war was over are wrong.
Sames as 1990, 1945, 1920, etc. the experts.
"and you can afford to lose ships in a fleet"
DeleteIt is this aspect that concerns me as much as any. A focus on speed. Not only lightly armoured but almost completely unarmoured ships. Distributed lethality = ships operating separately. All this implies, not just a willingness, but a deliberate intent to engage in attrition warfare on a staggering scale.
Leaving aside the obvious point that WW1 trench warfare should not be anyone's preferred first option, unless really forced to. The likely peer opponent in this case has greater shipbuilding capacity. Much greater shipbuilding capacity. It continues to astound me that more people don't call out the Navy on this.
I don't think they are prepared for that I think they believe we will never be in a war thats not against 3rd world powers with no navies.
DeleteThe Zumwalts and LCSs shouldn't have any, because they aren't warships and should never be treated as such.
ReplyDeleteOtherwise, very interesting. One may argue that they take up too much room to be on Nimitzes and Fords in the numbers you suggest, but with the reduction in sizes of the air wings, there should be plenty of extra room. Overall, I would agree with your numbers.
My understanding was the 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors guns did not have the explosive power to stop a Kamikaze a/c even though hitting it with their shells as they were unable to deflect Kamikaze off its ballistic course before hitting ship due to its much higher kinetic energy, Navy relied on the 55 lbs shells of the 5"/38. The plan was to develop a new 3"/70 gun, Mk 23, 24, 25 and 26 with Mount Mk 37 Mod 0, but end of war came before in-service.
ReplyDeleteWould guess the current subsonic ASCMs, lighter in weight than a Kamikaze but faster would have similar kinetic energy? and the heavyweight supersonic Mach 2.8 Brahmos much, much higher kinetic energy.
Consequently doubt the Phalanx or the 57mm even with the DARPA MadFires round both relatively short range will have the power to stop an ASCM and the DEW Helios 60 kW laser not a chance as only spec'd to take out Class II drones
Left with the longer ranges of RAM and ESSM missiles, but are they effective, recently came across QinetiQ Rattler target drone, as supersonic and small looks like Rattler or similar would be a stiff test of the capabilities of the RAM and ESSM, trials need to be funded.
As opposed to hard kill soft kill needed, not always the cheap option, the latest full fat SEWIP Blk 3 with its jammer ~$70 million reserved for carriers and Burke Flight IIIs, how effective are the Nulka decoys?
https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/qinetiq-brings-to-market-the-airlaunched-rattler-uav-supersonic-target
"doubt the Phalanx or the 57mm even with the DARPA MadFires round both relatively short range will have the power to stop an ASCM"
DeleteYou may be misunderstanding a few aspects of this. Let me see if I can offer some thoughts.
The CIWS is NOT meant to be a primary anti-air weapon. It is the LAST RESORT after every other anti-air capability has failed. As such, it is not expected to totally obliterate an incoming missile. Rather, it is just intended to deflect or mitigate the missile/impact.
CIWS is not intended as a complete destructive weapon that instantaneously vaporizes the incoming missile. Instead, it is intended to deflect the missile just enough to cause a miss. If it can vaporize the missile that's even better but that's not the minimum requirement. Deflection is accomplished by damaging steering fins, altering the attacking missile's shape, etc. Complete and total destruction is NOT required to deflect a missile.
An incoming missile that has been broken into pieces may continue, in part or in whole, to impact the target ship but that is far less damaging to the ship than to have the intact, fully functional missile hit the ship.
So, to sum up, the job of CIWS is to deflect or break up the attacking missile so as to avoid a hit or mitigate the damage if impact does occur. Too many people want to criticize CIWS because it doesn't instantly vaporize missiles. Well, that's not its job. It's job is to be the last ditch, deflect/break defense and, in that, it appears to be successful.
Hopefully, this gives you some perspective on the CIWS' role.
My Dad told me that when his ship (USS Ralph Talbot) was attacked by a kamikaze off Okinawa - first spotted about 12,000 yards away - that even with all weapons trained on it, it took a hit by the 5" gun about 80 years from the ship - right on the plane's engine - to stop the attack.
DeleteThe USN can't armor its warships because the US lacks domestic manufacturers capable of manufacturing armor plates of the necessary size. When the One World Trade Center was being built, the builders had to import steel beams from a steel mill in Luxembourg.
ReplyDeleteOur only hope is the possibility adversaries simply aped the Arleigh Burke's design, and left their Aegis warship analogues as poorly armored as ours, while we spend decades building new factories capable of manufacturing armor plate of the necessary size- not necessarily steel mills, if we could build kevlar or ceramic plates large enough to fit a DDG, we might as well fit the resulting armor on a testbed, and shoot her up to see how well she holds together- new shipyards capable of putting the armor plate to use, design new ships that are properly protected...
"The USN can't armor its warships because..."
DeleteThats potentially misleading. Not having armor factories isnt why we cant. We chose to stop doing it, and the mills went away. While thats a huge piece of military infrastructure gone, if we chose to reintroduce armor, we'd simply build new ones. Sure, thats not going to be cheap, but if the military and political will($$$) was there, they'd appear!!
"US lacks domestic manufacturers capable of manufacturing armor plates of the necessary size."
DeleteWhile that may be a technically true statement if you attempted to buy such a plate today, we could certainly learn/relearn the techniques quickly. A good example is the truly massive superstructure plates that were assembled for the Zumwalt. We didn't have that capability prior to ordering the ship but quickly developed it.
Hi Aim9snake,
DeleteWhile what you say is technically true, there is a very easy solution, at least on paper. Canada is building icebreakers, and their steal is about 2 inches thick. It should be easy to throw US money at Canada to expand their facilities, or transfer the knowledge across the border. Hell, be a basta*d and offer higher pay to lure Canadian engineers from their icebreaker project over to the US ;)
Andrew
All good points. Although we probably shouldn't imply that the US Navy is unique in this. Many of our allies are even worse. For example, the new British carriers make ours look like veritable fortresses. While a Nimitz class carrier has 2 each of ESSM launchers, RAM/SEARAM launchers, and Phalanx CIWS, the Queen Elizabeth carrier has 3 Phalanx CIWS. Period. Nothing else.
ReplyDeleteThat's because the British QE class will never get within 10000km of China if war breaks out.
DeleteIt's for use against enemies the UK can deal with on it's own and not for use against peers to the US!
The UK if it's stupid enough to get involved in a US war against China in more than a 'we offer our full moral support' way will only send subs and surface combatants to increase anti air and anti sub defence of US fleets.
If I were to build a Burke destroyer with the VLS cells distributed in 8-cell groups, much how like the AA guns on the Baltimore-class were distributed, would that give me 13 mounts instead?
ReplyDeleteLast couple of "conflicts", like Syria,Iraq, even Afghanistan with Taliban using drones and especially Azerbaijan Armenia conflict was noticeable not just how many drones were used but especially decoys to bring up or alert defenses that could then be easily taken down....my worry is China has hundreds if not THOUSANDS of old J6s or other copies of old MIGs could be used to spoof and empty out USN ship magazines then when Chinese ASMs come raining down, we got nothing left.....USN doesn't just need a $10 million dollar anti ballistic missile but a really cheap plenty AA gun to take out that first wave of drones, we can't waste the "good" stuff on Chinese copies before the ASMs arrive.
ReplyDeleteRight??? In many of these blog scenarios we talk about, it makes me remember the part of "Red Storm Rising" (Clancy novel) where our CVBG defenses were spoofed by decoys. Nimitz got clobbered and barely survived. Shipboard magazines are finite. Land based aggressors, not so much...
Delete@Jjabatie. Its almost US DoD thinks we are so above from being spoofed or decoyed. We don't expect anybody else to do it to us! Our missiles magazine aren't that big, few if any replacements, production ramp up is extremely limited BUT USA expects no one and especially CHINA NOT to use that against us?!?!? I cant think of anything better for China to do is just send wave after wave of old beat up Mig19s or Mig21s to empty out our magazines and beat up fightpilot hours and AMRAMMS. All that takes fuel, missiles, pilots, tankers, etc....how long could USN get away with it? Its stand our "ground" and get exhausted or get out of the area for the carriers,escorts and crews....and all that using old jets that should be in museums or desert graveyard....
Delete"how long could USN get away with it?"
DeleteAs ever, I'll remind you and everyone that carriers don't 'stand and fight'. They approach (hopefully undetected), launch/execute the mission, and hastily retire back to port. If a carrier group were to be spotted and attacked in the manner you describe, the only possible command decision would be to immediately turn away and retire.
The USN is seriously behind the curve compared to our most likely opponents.
ReplyDeleteRussian Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate:
1 - 130mm gun
2 to 4 - VLS cell packs for anti-ship missiles
4 - VLS cell packs for anti-air missiles
2 - CIWS mounts (guns and anti-missile missiles on mount)
2 - ASW mounts.
Chinese Type 054A Frigate:
1 - VLS cell for anti-air and ASW
2 - Anti-ship missile mounts
1 - 76mm gun
2 - 30mm CIWS mounts
2 - ASW torpedo mounts
2 - ASW rocket mounts
I'll agree we are under-armed, but I'll go back to an example I've used before. Look at the post war designs. Weapon count immediately goes down as they increased standardization around 3" and 5" mounts and moved to missiles and ASROC. Albany's were built off Baltimore's and were cut to 4 missile mounts, The ASROC, tubes, and 2 open 5" mounts. Albany had 2 enclosed mounts but one less Talos compared to Baltimore, also a cruiser.
ReplyDeleteNorthampton with 8 gun mounts total on a cruiser. And these were on heavy cruiser hulls. Zumwalt with 4 banks of missiles is more like an Albany in that sense than any other class of ship, and it could have had the guns to boot. Korea seems to pack the gear on best and they are still below what you are shooting for above.
I'm more interested in evaluating and getting better capability to the fleet ASAP. For example, Mk38 is nice as a bolt on whereas the mk 46 GWS needs built in. Both use linked ammo and I hear often of their fickleness and jamming. With the Kongsberg linkless 30mm remote turret coming to ACV, why not evaluate them for point defense in our ships. Use the option to increase their elevation to 60 degrees. Maybe switch to the 40mm super shot. This evolution should be continual on non deck penetrating mounts so we can change quickly. Really' I'd like this across the board, but baby steps. I often wonder if we'd be better off with the 76mm Sovraponte and 127/64 Oto Breda.
That's because those old missile systems were fucking huge.
DeleteThe Talos was basically a wingless F-86 in size and an Albany carried over 50 of them. A Baltimore was big but not that big.
And yet now we are trying to fit hypersonic missiles bigger than Talos or Regulus. The old whoppers.
Delete"now we are trying to fit hypersonic missiles bigger than Talos or Regulus."
DeleteWhich hypersonic weapons are you referring to?
"post war designs. Weapon count immediately goes down as they increased standardization around 3" and 5" mounts and moved to missiles and ASROC"
DeleteYou may be simplifying things a bit too much. As WWII ended, the missile age began which resulted in new and different weapon fits. Thus, guns were de-emphasized and defensive (AAW) weapons were emphasized. This results in the same mount-definition issues that I noted in the post.
Also, this is the same time period where significant changes in the role and definition (meaning design) of a cruiser occurred. The Albanys were not designed, dedicated new cruisers. They were a 3-ship sub-class that was modified as a technology demonstrator. The following Leahy class was designed and built as a AAW escort rather than a traditional cruiser. Indeed, the original designation was a Destroyer Leader. As such, the gun fit was completely removed. One can debate the wisdom of that but the result was a 'cruiser' with many fewer 'mounts' though, as with today's ships, a potent missile package.
The Leahy class was succeeded by the Belknap class which continued this trend.
It should also be noted that saturation missile attack tactics had not yet been developed. At that time, there was only the need to deal with individual aircraft attacks and a couple of deadly accurate AAW missile mounts were deemed adequate to address the threat. Of course, as it turned out, the effectiveness of AAW missiles was far less than had been theorized and, in hindsight, weapon 'mount' counts wound up being far too low but it took many years for that to become apparent.
What's disturbing is that now that we recognize the marginal effectiveness of AAW defenses, we still refuse to design high 'mount' densities into our ships to compensate.
Interesting, from H.I Sutton, looks like new carrier target has been spotted on satellite pictures in a Chinese firing range. This thing isn't just a painted target, looks more like a real carrier and apparently it's on rails?!?! So I guess they practicing firing on a moving target and probably also practicing shooting down ASMs? I mean, seems like a great way to practice both offense and defense!!! Can't wait to hear more about this in Jane's review!
ReplyDeleteI don't really understand the purpose of that target. They've already done moving targets at sea for the ASBM.
Delete8 CIwS on the Carrier that every AShM is programmed to prioritize and aim for. The more the merrier, I say. Can they take their 60-90% success rate for C-RAM and accept a hit or two on the flat top?
ReplyDeleteI wonder how many hits to a carrier it takes before most of the CBG retires from the area.
At what point do these systems start to interfere with one another? As it stands there are 3 layers of defense each with 360 degree coverage. It seems that volume of shots that may be needed is part of the issue.
Delete