By now, you've undoubtedly seen the news about the USS Bonhomme Richard burning. The fire started yesterday morning and still continues. Photo evidence seems to indicate that the fire is spreading, uncontrolled. The photo below, taken this morning, shows massive flames at the top of the forward superstructure. Smoke sources appear to extend from near the bow to at least midships and up through the superstructure which is, likely, gutted.
This is not some minor maintenance fire. This is a ship fighting for its very survival. Reports indicate that, so far, around 60 firefighters have been injured with smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion. Fire fighting crews are working in shifts to try to contain the fire.
Early photos clearly show that the fire originated, and was contained, in the midships area. Later photos show the fire spreading all the way to the bow and throughout the superstructure. The photo below is an earlier one. Note the smoke is limited to the midships area. Compare this photo to the one at the top which shows the fire has spread to the bow.
I'll post more on this when more is known. For now, just consider the implications for damage control and the Navy's obsessive desire for minimal manning.
This is not some minor maintenance fire. This is a ship fighting for its very survival. Reports indicate that, so far, around 60 firefighters have been injured with smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion. Fire fighting crews are working in shifts to try to contain the fire.
Early photos clearly show that the fire originated, and was contained, in the midships area. Later photos show the fire spreading all the way to the bow and throughout the superstructure. The photo below is an earlier one. Note the smoke is limited to the midships area. Compare this photo to the one at the top which shows the fire has spread to the bow.
I'll post more on this when more is known. For now, just consider the implications for damage control and the Navy's obsessive desire for minimal manning.
Cant find a picture but recent reports are top superstructure has melted forward and leaning bad. Also reports of hull twisting...if true, she's been gutted, I think she's a total lose. Bad day for USN.
ReplyDeleteTrue sad. But at least a few new LCS will be around to keep fleet levels up. Sad more can't laugh at Russia for loosing its last CV in dock
DeleteI really hate it when people made fun of Russian or Chinese ships burning in drydock or maintenance, this crap happens to everybody.
DeleteI know that but really with our budget you would think it would rather be something we could avoid. Its not like we are spending chump chance. But for the money spent we do seem to be cutting corners.
Delete"recent reports are top superstructure has melted forward and leaning bad."
DeletePhotos show the forward mast has collapsed.
"For now, just consider the implications for damage control and the Navy's obsessive desire for minimal manning."
ReplyDeleteNothing about the navy has annoyed me more than its business driven template to have minimal crew size. You suggested the Kirov class was hit wonder but essentially the glowing ideal in the 'smart ship' plan from what the 90's was just ecstatic about how you could cut damage control parties because whatever techno advance and thus crew. The result I think is most US ships are at least one hit effectively out of combat wonders. Maybe not a CV... But if a something the size of Wasp class can run out of control at dock with all the available local resources to buttress the fire fighting. What does the same ship do in the middle of the ocean.
"What does the same ship do in the middle of the ocean."
DeleteShe might very well be over had this happened at sea, frankly.
Weak steel, insufficient manning and general disregard for damage control in all its forms are a lethal combination.
"What does the same ship do in the middle of the ocean?"
DeleteSink.
"Sink"
DeleteThat's a bit harsh!.
A more politically correct and socially acceptable message in keeping with todays' sensibilities would be to say "it submerges to let the ocean water put the fires out".
:)
Well, technically speaking if your ship is sunk then she's not on fire anymore.
DeleteCheckmate!
Very sad. Island burn up raises the ante to a few hundred mil. as a guess. I think we are seeing a ship die.
ReplyDeleteI think she's too broken for repairs but let's see when fire out. Maybe they can fix her....I got my doubts.
DeleteWhy in the hell has only 1/3 of the crew on board anyway. Apparently the fire watch that was there was asleep at the wheel.
ReplyDeleteIt was a Sunday and she's in maintenance. Its early to place blame IMO, let's find out what happened.
DeleteIt wasn't even a 1/3. I heard they said it was 160/1000... but she's been in dock /maint for 2 years now.. would have been done except for Covid.
DeleteI remember fire fighting school, and fire fighting drills onboard. And I was a RD. And I’m old enough to remember the Enterprise and Forrestal fires and the Newport News turret explosion. You never know when things are going to go bad in a hurry. Right now, we don’t know what happened, let’s delay the blame game until we have at least a few facts.
ReplyDeleteI mean jointness went too far when the navy is delivering a press conference in green camo.
ReplyDeleteMaybe they thought they could hide from the reporters.
DeleteThe automated halon FF system was off. There were extra fire fighting teams pier side in case a fire happened, as it did. The question is what were the marines storing where the fire started and why was it still onboard?
ReplyDelete"There were extra fire fighting teams pier side in case a fire happened,"
DeleteI've not seen that reported. Do you have a reference?
Marines? 12 cases of porn?
DeleteHeard something similar yesterday, that since the fire extinguishing system was taken off line during maintenance period, it sounded to me that they had a fire team on the pier as a requirement. Sounded like that was some kind of SOP for taking off the fire extinguishing system. Be interesting to see if it was in place or wasn't.
DeleteLatest is that it might have been a space where they were storing all kinds of gear and boxes that started the fire.
Found it: From the War Zone:
"No welding was reported in the area of the fire when it broke out.
At least significant parts of the automated halon firefighting systems were offline at the time of the fire. Enhanced pier-side fire watch readiness posture was supposedly in place."
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34801/two-decks-are-thought-to-separate-fire-on-uss-bonhomme-richard-from-1m-gallons-of-fuel
Thank Nico for finding my source. Also from there is
Delete_•The area where the fire started, which was the lower vehicle storage area, was filled with cardboard, rags, drywall, and other combustible material._
Why stuff a ship full of cardboard and rags. I don't know what drywall is.
Drywall = sheetrock. Why would any of that be on a ship to begin with?
DeletePlasterboard. 15% lighter armor (ha ha).
DeleteTRI-WALL, not Drywall. Big 3-ply (hence triwall) cardboard boxes on pallets used for temporary storage.
DeleteHalon is not used in the Lower Vehicle deck which is where they believe the fire began. Halon is used in the enclosed engineering spaces. AFFF is used in the vehicle decks but it, like the halon system, was probably disabled for maintenance.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-xsCZE4RFU
ReplyDeleteThis the feed from CBS 8 San Diego. I got some still shots from the footage but I don't know how to post them. You can see quite a lot of damage thru the top superstructure, radar and ceiling looked like they caved in. The rear top superstructure also seems to be have burned thru. That's a lot of radars, electronics,etc that are gone. There's also footage of the front of the ship that seems to have discolored, wonder if that is the heat?
ReplyDeleteSorry for not being able to post the pictures. I recommend the video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-xsCZE4RFU&feature=youtu.be
I've been out of the Marines 20 years, but I recall at least three officers complaining that Admirals insist on adding nice vinyl flooring on ships that can be waxed and buffed. They said it was nice but a serious fire hazard. Do ships still have this?
ReplyDeleteWell it suits the Marine Corp, they don't want all their ships anyway. It probably won't be repaired, even if it could.
ReplyDeleteComNavOps, we may disagree on some things about fleet structure and ship design, but two things that I think we agree totally about are:
ReplyDelete1) The need for armor, and
2) The need for damage control.
And I'll add a third, the stupidity of absurdly undersizing crews.
DeletePictures of the inside of USS Bonhomme Richard are appearing on Twitter. I think USN will go thru the motions and say they will fix her....and then in a few months, quietly announce she's not worth it. She's too far gone.
ReplyDeleteJust like the USS Miami after the fire that made her pressure hull glow red.
DeleteI'll add one more: putting flammable and unnecessary equipment on ships. Even if it doesn't burn, I remember exercise equipment being an obstacle to damage control in one of the Burke collisions.
ReplyDeleteI doubt at this point she is economically salvageable and I doubt she'll be replaced.
ReplyDeleteThankfully, theres been no loss of life so far, the avaition wing wasn't, reportedly, on board, and this didn't happen in one of our precious drydocks.
At this point Id think the ship is a total loss. While anything can be fixed, I dont believe the Navy will spend the money on a ship that had 10 or so years of life left. Its a tragedy for the Navy...
ReplyDeleteTragedy unless the Navy learns a few lessons from it. Given that there are apparently no lives lost, this could be a huge positive experience if it causes the Navy to rethink its approach. Will that happen? Probably not unless LockMart and Boeing and HII want it to happen. But we can hope.
Delete"Tragedy unless the Navy learns a few lessons from it."
DeleteHave you seen the Navy learn lessons from any of its tragedies?
"But we can hope."
That's why I keep buying lottery tickets no matter how unlikely!
Sure. Being in a maintenance status, everything that could go wrong and contribute to this probably did. Im not sure any huge lessons are there to be learned. There are probably some smaller items that will cause adjustments like the size of an inport duty section, how many are trained for firefighting teams, as well as a tightening of safety regs while in the yards.I imagine the amount of doors and hatches unable to be quickly closed due to different hoses and lines passing thru them was a major contributor, in spite of regs that require quick disconnects at each hatch (and were those followed, or ignored by lax inspectors, crew, and yard personnel??). Certainly it speaks to minimal manning, and while the "sunday, in port, in the shipyard" is a specific circumstance that 'ol Murphy clearly took advantage of, the availibility of enough damage control bodies on board at any time is somthing that has to come under scrutiny. I very much believe that if this fire started while underway, it wouldnt have been a big deal, and wouldve been handled in short order. I imagine the "sunday, in the yards" scenario will be used by the Navy to explain away the ships loss though, and the multi-billion dollar tragedy will disappear in a pile of reports that will be unread and forgotten in short order if the current track record continues...
Delete(Don McCollor)...Brings back the memory of the French liner Normandie burning and sinking while being converted in NY harbor in 1942. She would have been the equal of the two British Queens as a troop transport...
DeleteCould this event, plus Commandant Berger's statements, cause the Navy to rethink their approach in this area. This fire exhibits the major fault that we in the gator navy saw with the LHA/LHD concept--take out one ship and you wipe out a whole amphibious assault. Berger has at least indirectly pointed out another--you can't do an assault with armor and artillery from an LHA/LHD.
ReplyDeleteMaybe it is time to go back to a real amphib squadron with LPHs, LPDs/LSDs, LSTs and LPAs/LKAs, and NGFS ships, and maybe smaller LHAs/LHDs like the Spanish Juan Carlos. Then turn these into interim smaller carriers until we come up with a design for something like a modern Kitty Hawk--conventional power, 80 aircraft--to extend the numbers of our carrier force. We could probably do 12 Nimizes and 12 Kittys for about the cost of 12 Fords, and I know which one I'd rather have when the balloon goes up.
"you can't do an assault with armor and artillery from an LHA/LHD."
DeleteI see no need for amphibious assaults, at all. That aside, and ignoring the LHA issue, the question of how to get armor and artillery ashore early in an assault is an appealing problem from a purely theoretical perspective.
We figured it out in WWII by using the LVT(A), essentially a lightly armored but powerful amphibious tank. Today, the challenges in getting an incredibly heavy Abrams ashore seem beyond our technical ability but there is no reason why we couldn't re-develop an amphibious tank. Heck, the Chinese have produced what looks to be a very nice one! Why can't we? Again, I see no need for assaults but if the Marines want to claim to be able to do assaults (and Berger seems to be backing full speed away from that!) then an amphibious tank would seem a natural requirement and it could be launched from any vessel - no LHA needed but an LHA could certainly launch them, if desired, just as they can launch AAVs.
Agree totally on an amphibious tank.
DeleteDon't agree totally on no need for assaults, but we've been through that before. I don't see mounting an opposed assault directly against China or Russia, but I can see a need for assaults around the first island chain (particularly if our strategy is to hold them against China) or in the eastern Med or Baltic, or many places in the Mideast. What I don't see is a rationale for totally abandoning the capability altogether.
Sticking to the theoretical, amphibious light tanks are obvious enough but the problem remains how to get other heavy vehicles like self-propelled artillery or combat engineering vehicles ashore. My only solution to that is the one-vehicle Higgins boat.
DeleteOf course, a completely different approach is for the Navy to move in real close and provide the needed firepower, anti-air protection, C-RAM, counterbattery, etc.
None of this will happen, of course ...
"What I don't see is a rationale for totally abandoning the capability altogether."
DeleteWho's in favor of that? Not me!
"Of course, a completely different approach is for the Navy to move in real close and provide the needed firepower, anti-air protection, C-RAM, counterbattery, etc."
DeleteWhich is the approach I favor.
Re Amphib Tank:
DeleteAustralia is buying new IFVs. And out new urgent Force Structure Plan released last week have us buying an extra ship for supplying amphib forces.
Either Rheinmetall (who are supplying Combat Recon Vehicle) or South Korea's Hanwha (who are supplying 155mm SPA) IFVs. We are also buying from the winner an amphibious variant for our Amphib Landing capability.
There is almost no detail on how either intends to make a 30 - 45 tonne vehicle float. But both claim they can do it.
"I see no need for amphibious assaults, at all."
ReplyDelete"'What I don't see is a rationale for totally abandoning the capability altogether.'
Who's in favor of that? Not me"
I must admit, I am having a bit of a problem trying to reconcile those two comments. Perhaps you could elaborate a bit. If there is no need for amphibious assaults, then why not abandon the capability?
"why not abandon the capability?"
DeleteBecause you just never know! If you look at my Fleet Structure page, you'll see a small fleet of amphibious ships which serve the purpose of,
1. Retaining the institutional knowledge of how to conduct an amphibious assault in case we ever need to reconstitute it.
2. Allows for low end, 'peacetime' assaults (probably more like administrative landings!) against low end opponents in Africa, SAmerica, or wherever.
What you won't see is 33+ big deck amphibious ships!
Okay, so you're saying maintain a very low-level capability? I guess my problem with that is that I don't think it's something that is that easy to ramp up.
DeleteI also think you're going to have a problem launching your amphibious tanks from a phib force of nothing but LHA/LHD big deck amphibs and LPAs. They need to come out of a well deck or tank deck, and if you fill up your LHA/LHD well deck with amphibious tanks, then you don't have room for any other connectors except for the relatively small boats you carry on the LPA. I'm also skeptical about how much heavy cargo you can actually carry on an LPA. The way I understood it, during the 1950s and 1960s, the LPAs carried troops and light equipment, and the LKAs carried tanks and heavy artillery. I've kind of thought about a combo LPA/LKA that would have two holds with heavy equipment and heavy-duty cranes, and the rest would be accommodations for about 900 troops. Both LPAs and LKAs kind of went out in the 1970s, as we got more LPDs and shifted to the LHAs/LHDs. I still think the LST is probably your best amphibious armor carrier since it can be trimmed to shallow enough draft to get closer inshore to drop them off.
" I don't think it's something that is that easy to ramp up."
DeleteReally? Why not? We did it in WWII starting from almost no existing base of institutional knowledge. I see no problem!
"you're going to have a problem launching your amphibious tanks from a phib force of nothing but LHA/LHD big deck amphibs and LPAs. They need to come out of a well deck or tank deck"
Well, first, we have no amphibious tanks so it's not an actual problem. That aside, we launched Higgins boats over the side of APAs in WWII so I see no reason why we couldn't do the same for amphibious tanks, if we had them. We also managed to launch LVTs and LVT(A)s from all manner of vessels in WWII so, again, I see no reason why we couldn't launch amphibious tanks (essentially, an LVT(A)) from all manner of vessels, today.
" then you don't have room for any other connectors"
Our WWII APAs carried two dozen landing craft on their decks. I see no reason we couldn't do the same, today. We've forgotten what we used to be able to do!
"I'm also skeptical about how much heavy cargo you can actually carry on an LPA."
This is going to sound like a broken record but … you got it … we managed to carry entire divisions worth of gear in WWII APAs and other vessels. I see no reason why we can't do so today. If that means we need to add LSTs or LKAs or whatever, that's fine.
You seem to be looking for problems where none exist!
I think the answers to the problems cited lie in the doctrine, or the poor one we have. Ignoring the "eggs in one basket" debate, the big ships are still useful (and NOT as Lighting Carriers!) in their previous incarnations. But whether amphib or port assault, we have to be able to get them and their smaller brethren in closer!! The 50 mile offshore idea kills the project before it starts for many reasons, including turnaround time, mechanical failures, condition of troops and equipment when they arrive, ability to generate meaningfully large "waves", etc. Its unworkable unless major changes in planning, procurement, and strategy are made to get in and sufficiently suppress an area to the point that the 'phibs, in whatever form, can get in close and disgorge their troops/cargo rapidly. Without sweeping changes, the Marines ARE without a purpose, and these nutty scenarios that are being pushed to continue their existence will not only continue, but neuter the Corps in the process...
Delete"Really? Why not? We did it in WWII starting from almost no existing base of institutional knowledge.”
DeleteYes, and we made a lot of mistakes early, but learned. If we can accept that kind of learning curve again, then okay. But we are not going to build the required institutional knowledge base without numbers and realistic training.
"Well, first, we have no amphibious tanks so it's not an actual problem.”
I would fix the amphibious tank problem fairly quickly (as, I understand, would you).
"I see no reason why we couldn't launch amphibious tanks (essentially, an LVT(A)) from all manner of vessels, today. Our WWII APAs carried two dozen landing craft on their decks. I see no reason we couldn't do the same, today. We've forgotten what we used to be able to do!”
They can carry LCMs and LCVPs. And those landing craft can carry Marines and cargo ashore. The question is not can we do it but what is the best way to do it, and at least for this CPA, the most cost-effective way to do it. Hint: the LHA/LHD isn’t.
“This is going to sound like a broken record but … you got it … we managed to carry entire divisions worth of gear in WWII APAs and other vessels.”
The key wording there is, “and other vessels.” I think you need a lot more than just APA/LPAs in order to handle the range of cargo most effectively. Amphibious operations require transporting Marines and cargo to the amphibious operating area (AOA), and then getting those Marines and cargo ashore. What has changed over time is the manner of getting Marines and cargo from the ships to the ship-to-shore connectors to the shore.
In WWII we put the connector landing craft in the water with cranes and loaded them over the side—either with cranes or crawling down nets. We converted merchant ships to APAs/LPAs for troops and smaller equipment and AKAs/LKAs with bigger boats and bigger cranes for heavy equipment. We used LSTs for the really heavy equipment and sent LSTs to the beach earlier than we do now. The first wave at Incheon was LSTs. We decided that it was quicker and better to load landing craft by docking with an amphib ship and rolling or walking on, so we started building LSDs and eventually phased out the LPAs/LKAs. In the 1960s the Marines got enthused about vertical envelopment, so we started building LPDs—LSDs with greater helo capability—and LPHs, which were helo-only. We had been using some smaller carriers to support assaults since WWII, and that idea eventually morphed into the LHA and LHD in the 1970s. What hasn’t evolved sufficiently is connectors, and now that doctrine says we keep the LHAs/LHDs 25-50 miles offshore, we have no connector that works for anything more than light infantry. So the Marines’ choices are become light infantry, or looking at the beach from offshore instead of assaulting it.
So to recap we started with LPAs for troops and light equipment, LKAs for heavy equipment and their drivers, and LSTs for really heavy stuff. Then LSDs replaced the LPAs/LKAs. We went more toward helos with LPDs/LPHs. Then the air side pretty much took over with the LHAs/LHDs. Somewhere along the line we decided we needed a 20+ knot SOA, which gets very expensive and precludes an actual LST.. I’d do a smaller LHA/LHD, an LPH with a well deck, an LSD/LPD combination, an LPA/LKA combination, an LST, and a NGFS frigate. They are all very versatile and relatively cheap, as long as you can live with an 18 knot SOA.
“You seem to be looking for problems where none exist!”
No, just identifying problems that do exist, and solutions to them. Any time we fight anywhere in the world other than Canada or Mexico, we have to do either amphibious or airborne, or both, to get boots on the ground. It’s not a capability that I think we should neglect. I spent time in mine warfare and time in the gator navy, so I see what not-so-benign-neglect has done to mine warfare and I don’t want to see the same happen to amphibs and the Marines.
“I think the answers to the problems cited lie in the doctrine, or the poor one we have. Ignoring the "eggs in one basket" debate, the big ships are still useful (and NOT as Lighting Carriers!) in their previous incarnations. But whether amphib or port assault, we have to be able to get them and their smaller brethren in closer!! The 50 mile offshore idea kills the project before it starts for many reasons, including turnaround time, mechanical failures, condition of troops and equipment when they arrive, ability to generate meaningfully large "waves", etc. Its unworkable unless major changes in planning, procurement, and strategy are made to get in and sufficiently suppress an area to the point that the 'phibs, in whatever form, can get in close and disgorge their troops/cargo rapidly. Without sweeping changes, the Marines ARE without a purpose, and these nutty scenarios that are being pushed to continue their existence will not only continue, but neuter the Corps in the process.”
DeleteHow do you get something in closer when doctrine says it has to stay 25-50 miles offshore? You don’t. You’re right, that kills the assault, and with it the Marines.
That’s why I suggest a “return to the basics” Marine expeditionary unit, with infantry, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, air, and special forces components, carried by a phib force composed of:
- Smaller LHA/LHD (like SP Juan Carlos, $1.5B) – primary air element, 913 Marines, 10-12 AV-8/F-35, 10-12 AH-1 Super Cobra, tanks and other equipment for augmentation
- LPH with a well deck (like FR Mistral, $600MM) – primary tank element, 450 troops, 40 tanks or 13 tanks and 46 other vehicles, 16 heavy or 35 light helos, 2 LCAC or EDA-R
- Simpler LPD/LSD (like RN Albion, $500MM) – primary artillery element, 405 Marines, 67 vehicles, 4 LCVP, 4 LCU or similar, 2 large helos
- LST (like Newport/AU Kanimbla but with conventional LST bow so it can beach, $400MM) – primary amphib armor element, 431 Marines, up to 29 LVT/amphibious tanks, 2 LCM, 4 LCVP, 3 helos
- LPA/LKA (two holds forward with equipment, troop berthing aft, $300MM) – primary infantry, 900 marines, helo pad, LCMs and LCVPs
- NGFS frigate (like ComNavOps’s Assault Support Ship or CAPT Wayne Hughes’s NNFM Gunfire Support Ship, $200MM) – 100 special forces, with ability to put them ashore by helo (pad) or boat
That’s an entire squadron for $3.5B, which is about the cost of one current LHA/LHD. We are saving a lot of money by deciding to live with an 18 knot SOA instead of the Navy’s current 20+ knot SOA. That also lets us include a true LST than can actually get a dry ramp on the beach. The primary distribution of elements is as shown, but some of each element would be spread around to mitigate the risk of one missile or torpedo taking out a whole component.
Until the beach is secured, the LHA/LHD would operate aircraft from 25-50 miles offshore, to define the seaward end of the amphibious operating area (AOA), then move in closer to offload additional tanks, artillery, and equipment to supplement troops ashore. The rest would operate within 3-5 miles of beach in the AOA. The LST would launch the LVTs and amphibious tanks as the first wave, and then proceed to anchor in the AOA. Second, third, and other waves would follow. The NGFS frigate would supply on-call fire support, along with cruiser(s) with 8” guns and battleship(s) with 16” guns
"Any time we fight anywhere in the world other than Canada or Mexico, we have to do either amphibious or airborne, or both, to get boots on the ground."
DeleteActually, that's not quite right. What we actually do is use a port: Inchon, Kuwait/Desert Storm, Iraq, Vietnam, etc. The amphibious assaults that we've done have generally been to secure a port facility. This is why I view port seizure as the Marine's core mission. Our Maritime Pre-positioning ships, which are so key to our forward combat presence, for example, are not amphibious ships. They require a port to unload.
Yes, we make use of air transport which is marginally useful for troop movements, if we have sufficient time, but are nearly useless for cargo transport. They simply can't move any significant tonnage in a useful time frame.
It is, and always has been, all about ports.
I still think the, "eggs in one basket," discussion is one worth having. As I have said before, when I was in gator navy that was the biggest problem we saw with the concept. We didn't really know about the 25-50 miles offshore doctrine, so we didn't consider the problem that posed for ship-to-shore connectors. I think that doctrine was a later, "OMG, we can't afford to lose one of these, ever," types of decisions.
DeleteWell, we've lost one now, not to a cause that probably any of us expected. But I think we will realize just how big a hole that knocks in our plans, and maybe the, "eggs in one basket," issue will be revisited.
" If we can accept that kind of learning curve again, then okay. But we are not going to build the required institutional knowledge base without numbers and realistic training."
DeleteWe can maintain institutional knowledge of amphibious operations with a single ship, if need be. All the requisite component operations (loading, unloading, movement to shore, fuel supply, water supply, sustainment, etc.) are fully executed by a single ship. No, I'm not saying a single ship can conduct an assault. I'm saying that a single ship executes all the required individual component operations that make up an assault.
A single ship and Marine unit, training every day for amphibious assault, could maintain the institutional knowledge. Of course, a few more ships would help and would provide additional training in group coordination but the point is that the basics can be trained and maintained by a very small cadre.
This cadre would also function as an experimental unit. They could contract for all kinds of one-off prototype connectors and try them out. When war comes, if we need to conduct amphibious assaults, we'd know what works and what doesn't and we'd have plans in hand for construction of whatever connectors we found worked best.
"Actually, that's not quite right. What we actually do is use a port: Inchon, Kuwait/Desert Storm, Iraq, Vietnam, etc. The amphibious assaults that we've done have generally been to secure a port facility. This is why I view port seizure as the Marine's core mission. Our Maritime Pre-positioning ships, which are so key to our forward combat presence, for example, are not amphibious ships. They require a port to unload.
DeleteYes, we make use of air transport which is marginally useful for troop movements, if we have sufficient time, but are nearly useless for cargo transport. They simply can't move any significant tonnage in a useful time frame.
It is, and always has been, all about ports."
Port seizure is obviously an ultimate objective, because that facilitates moving larger amounts of troops and equipment. But port seizure is really a form of amphibious assault. Sometimes we go directly to the port, and sometimes we go indirectly.
We went directly into Incheon because we guessed (correctly) that is would be lightly armed and defended. Normandy was about taking Cherbourg and Le Havre, but both were heavily defended, so we landed on a less heavily defended beach in between, consolidated our forces ashore, and took Cherbourg within a month and Le Havre within three. I find it interesting that from the time we got Cherbourg back up and running until the end of the war, it was the busiest port in the world.
"We can maintain institutional knowledge of amphibious operations with a single ship, if need be. All the requisite component operations (loading, unloading, movement to shore, fuel supply, water supply, sustainment, etc.) are fully executed by a single ship. No, I'm not saying a single ship can conduct an assault. I'm saying that a single ship executes all the required individual component operations that make up an assault."
DeleteWe can maintain knowledge among those who actually serve on that ship. But that's not institutional knowledge. You're not going to maintain, for example, crane operator skills without actually working cranes on a consistent basis. So we end up with one ship's crew with a lot of knowledge, and a lot of other people who know how to spell amphibious but whose skills are not current.
"A single ship and Marine unit, training every day for amphibious assault, could maintain the institutional knowledge. Of course, a few more ships would help and would provide additional training in group coordination but the point is that the basics can be trained and maintained by a very small cadre."
But ramping that cadre up to a sufficient number to conduct sizable operations is not an overnight task. And operating cranes on a LPA/LKA is a very different skill from bringing boat into/out of the well deck on an LPD/LSD, and very different again from beaching an LST. I was a young JO on the fast track upward when I got to the LST, and I learned in a hurry that amphib ops are a skill that requires a lot of knowledge that I didn't have, and a lot of constant practice.
"This cadre would also function as an experimental unit. They could contract for all kinds of one-off prototype connectors and try them out. When war comes, if we need to conduct amphibious assaults, we'd know what works and what doesn't and we'd have plans in hand for construction of whatever connectors we found worked best."
I like the idea of an experimental unit a lot. I think we've tried implementing way too much across the Navy without experimenting with it first to see if it works. Why, for example, could we not have built one Ford to test everything, and then kept building Nimitzes until we made the Ford work? Why could we not have built one or two LCSs (one of each variant) and kept the Spruances and Perrys around until we found out whether or not they worked? Why did we have to build 10-12 LHAs/LHDs before somebody figured out that you can't do a credible amphibious assault from 25-50 miles out? The list goes on. An experimental squadron has a lot of value. But I think it has to be one part of a larger force, not the entire force.
I saw what not-so-benign neglect did to the mine warfare force, and I don't want to see the same thing happen to gator navy and the Marines.
"So we end up with one ship's crew with a lot of knowledge"
DeleteThat's what institutional knowledge is - a 'library', so to speak, of knowledge that can be called on to expand to the rest of the organization if/as needed.
"But ramping that cadre up to a sufficient number to conduct sizable operations is not an overnight task."
Did someone say it was? How long did it take us to ramp up for Normandy? Too many people seem to think we should have the capability of conducting a D-Day operation on day one of a war. That's patently ridiculous. As long as you have the core knowledge, you can ramp it up if/when needed.
"I don't want to see the same thing happen to gator navy and the Marines."
It already did!!!! Marine generals have already publicly admitted that the Corps lost its institutional knowledge about amphibious assault over the course of the decades long land wars in the Iraq, Afg, and elsewhere. I posted their quotes on this quite some time ago. At that time, they acknowledged the loss of institutional knowledge and were proudly claiming that they were re-learning how to do an assault. The Corps lost its way during the land wars.
Now, that brings up the fascinating possibility that Commandant Berger is down on amphibious assault BECAUSE HE DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT. Yeah, think about that one. He 'grew up' while the Marines were land-locked. Now, he's trying to come up with some kind of maritime relevancy for the Corps WITH NO ACTUAL MARITIME EXPERIENCE … and it shows in the wacky ideas he's spouting. It's quite possible that simple lack of knowledge - ignorance, in the purest definition of the word - is what's driving his madness.
"How do you get something in closer when doctrine says it has to stay 25-50 miles offshore? You don’t. You’re right, that kills the assault, and with it the Marines."
DeleteThat was exactly my point. The DOCTRINE has to change. We have to suppress the landing area so that they dont have to hide 50 miles offshore!! I dont care how... Use 2-4 SSGNs first and unload them into the target area. Then bring in the CVNs for a day or two. Task half the escorts with strike missions. Then NGFS, maybe navalize some A-10s for close in work before/during an assault. Whatever it takes to reasonably sanitize a target area BEFORE the Marines "hit the boats"!! However we do it, rather than trying to work from over the horizon, we have to be able to get in close!!!
“That's what institutional knowledge is - a 'library', so to speak, of knowledge that can be called on to expand to the rest of the organization if/as needed.”
DeleteI would call that a theoretical capability—in theory, we have the capability. And in theory, theory works well in practice. Unfortunately, in practice it doesn’t. Say we have a squadron in San Diego, because that seems to be where do a lot of experimentation. And say we suddenly have a need to put Marines ashore in, oh I don’t know, let’s say Benghazi. How does that work?
This is one problem. The Marines are best suited to be our response force to rogue nations and irregular terrorists who threaten Americans’ lives, liberty, and property. And that can happen anywhere on the globe. We need somebody who can get in, solve a problem, and get out. We’ve proved in Afghanistan and Iraq, if not Vietnam before them, that we can’t.
“How long did it take us to ramp up for Normandy? Too many people seem to think we should have the capability of conducting a D-Day operation on day one of a war. That's patently ridiculous. As long as you have the core knowledge, you can ramp it up if/when needed.”
Well, let’s see, we had done quite a few by the time of Normandy. A quick and very unofficial count:
August 1942 – Tulagi, Guadalcanal
November 1942 – North Africa
January 1943 – New Guinea
July 1943 – Sicily
September 1943 – Italy
November 1943 – Bougainville, Makin, Tarawa
December 1943 – New Britain
January 1944 – Kwajalein, Anzio
February 1944 – Majura
I’m sorry, but I just don’t see “ramping up” as quite as simple a process as you appear to.
“Marine generals … acknowledged the loss of institutional knowledge and were proudly claiming that they were re-learning how to do an assault. The Corps lost its way during the land wars.
Now, that brings up the fascinating possibility that Commandant Berger is down on amphibious assault BECAUSE HE DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT. … It's quite possible that simple lack of knowledge - ignorance, in the purest definition of the word - is what's driving his madness.”
I think you may be onto something with the ignorance comment. At least ignorance is better than stupidity.
Looking at his bio, Berger got commissioned in 1961, about the time the Marines went from being an amphibious force to a light infantry in Vietnam. Westmoreland really screwed up Vietnam, although how much was dictated by Washington is questionable, but one of has stupidest moves has to have been assigning the mountainous I Corps to the Marines and the riverine Mekong delta to the Army. A Marine-Navy team would have made far more sense in the delta. I can’t say it would have won the war, but it would have made a heck of a lot more sense. That’s probably where the Marines got off track, and they stayed off track by being employed as a land force in Desert Storm, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq. Marines haven’t been allowed to be Marines since maybe Korea. I would say this kind of runs counter to your argument that as long as we have one ship or squadron somewhere that knows how to do it, we have institutional knowledge. Even with 33 big-deck amphibs, we obviously haven’t maintained the institutional knowledge.
In the last 50 years, the Navy has been building these LHAs and LHDs that Marine aviators like because they get to fly jets off them, but nobody has really tried to do an assault off one of them, because the Marines haven’t been doing assaults. Now Marines are looking at them and saying, “We don’t know how to assaults off these, one, because none of us have actually done assaults, and two, because you can’t actually do an assault off one of them.” That second point, has of course been obscured by the first—Marines haven’t done assaults since Korea.
"I think the answers to the problems cited lie in the doctrine, or the poor one we have. Ignoring the "eggs in one basket" debate, the big ships are still useful (and NOT as Lighting Carriers!) in their previous incarnations."
DeleteI don't think the "eggs in one basket" issue should be avoided. As I said, these were coming in when I was in gator navy, and at that time that was our primary concern. The 25-50 mile offshore doctrine and the resulting impossibility to mount a credible assault came later. It's the bigger problem perhaps, but both are big problems IMO. And the second is at least in large part because of the first.
My thinking about "Lightning Carriers" comes about as follows. I start from the idea that the LHAs/LHDs tie up a lot of money and crew for very little utility as amphibs. They are almost too much money to tie up and forget them; I can imagine a lot of trouble in congressional funding hearings if we did that. Then I look at carriers and think that we need 2 carriers per CVBG and we need 12 CVBGs. We're not going to build 24 Fords, nor should we. I don't even know if we can build 12, but let's take that as a working number. We could build 12 more Nimitzes for about $8-9B each and 12 updated Kitty Hawks for about $5-6B each, or $15B for a pair, about the cost of one Ford, or 12 2-carrier CVBGs for the cost of 12 Fords. We have to relearn some things about 2 carrier strategies and tactics in order for the 2-carrier CVBG to be most effective. In WWII, we had lots of CVBGs with one CV and one CVL or CVE, and we made those work. A lot of the criticisms of the "Lightning Carrier" such as the lack of AEW, would be lessened if it operates in a group with a big carrier. So what I see the "Lightning Carrier" as being is kind of a cheap interim step toward building 2-carrier CVBGs. I think they are more useful in that role than as amphibs that can't get equipment ashore.
"The DOCTRINE has to change. We have to suppress the landing area so that they dont have to hide 50 miles offshore!! I dont care how."
I don't think we can change the DOCTRINE until we change the PLATFORM. In my proposed fleet, I have included 8 battleships with 16" guns, 20 cruisers with 8" guns, and within the PhibRon itself a NGFS frigate with 5" guns, missiles, rockets, and counterbattery. I'm obviously recognizing that the Navy's NGFS resources are pathetic, as are its mine countermeasures and ASW resources. You really do have to wonder exactly what they've been thinking.
Even with all that, I think the risk calculus involved in bringing an LHA/LHD in that close is pretty negative. I'm going with smaller and more conventional amphib ships in large part because the risk of bringing them in close is less, and the impact of losing one is less severe.
"That was exactly my point. The DOCTRINE has to change. We have to suppress the landing area so that they dont have to hide 50 miles offshore!! I dont care how... Use 2-4 SSGNs first and unload them into the target area. Then bring in the CVNs for a day or two. Task half the escorts with strike missions. Then NGFS, maybe navalize some A-10s for close in work before/during an assault. Whatever it takes to reasonably sanitize a target area BEFORE the Marines "hit the boats"!! However we do it, rather than trying to work from over the horizon, we have to be able to get in close!!!"
DeleteOne problem with that approach. There is always a tradeoff between pounding an area to sanitize it versus giving up the element of surprise. If you have enough resources to do massive deception fire elsewhere, then maybe it will work. But just pounding and pounding one area pretty much tells the bad guys where you are going to land. We guessed (correctly) that Incheon was going to be lightly defended. We did fairly extensive diversionary tactics before Normandy, and went at an area that we expected to be more lightly defended that the objective ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre.
"And say we suddenly have a need to put Marines ashore in, oh I don’t know, let’s say Benghazi."
DeleteYou're proving my point that we don't need a standing, full featured, 33+ big deck, 180000 man amphibious assault force. To use your own example, a landing in Benghazi would not be an opposed landing requiring an amphibious assault. It would be an unopposed administrative landing - one that could likely just as easily be done via air transport from the US or some regional center since the Marines are nothing more than very light infantry now.
" theory works well in practice. Unfortunately, in practice it doesn’t."
You seem to be confusing and conflating institutional (library) knowledge with actual practice. Institutional knowledge is what let's us train up to a useful capability, IF NEEDED. It's not an actual, fielded capability. It's a cadre that can train up a larger group, IF NEEDED. It cannot, itself, go conduct an assault.
"I just don’t see “ramping up” as quite as simple a process as you appear to."
It's not simple. It's a time consuming effort that will require construction and acquisition of the right equipment and formation and training of the right people. What it gives us is a starting point that's already at the end of the knowledge path - the institutional knowledge - so that we won't have to go through years of experimentation. We'll already know what works and what doesn't. We'll already know what equipment we need. We'll already know how to properly train people. You're taking a simple concept and trying to make it seem like some kind of impossible task.
Do you think we have a ready for peer-world-war mine countermeasures right now? Of course not! What we have is a cadre of MCM capability (I'm being generous with that) that can be ramped up (not overnight) in the event of war. This is no different.
"Even with 33 big-deck amphibs, we obviously haven’t maintained the institutional knowledge."
DeleteShips don't maintain institutional knowledge, PEOPLE DO! We could have a thousand amphibious ships but if we don't have PEOPLE training daily for the mission, the techniques and capability gets lost. THAT'S what happened to the Marines. They stopped practicing amphibious assaults and everyone became land warriors. Sure, we sent MEUs to float around but they didn't do amphibious assault exercises. They lost the knowledge. You, yourself, acknowledge this:
"but nobody has really tried to do an assault off one of them, because the Marines haven’t been doing assaults. "
You have to do it or lose it. We lost it. We need a cadre to do it and maintain the knowledge. We need the keepers of institutional knowledge.
"But just pounding and pounding one area pretty much tells the bad guys where you are going to land."
DeleteI addressed this exact issue in a post. There's good and bad about this. History seems to suggest that the good outweighs the bad.
The number one counter to your view that prolonged bombardment is bad is that the enemy, while warned, can't just instantaneously jump on their matter transporters and warp to the - now revealed - location. It takes days/weeks to relocate substantial forces. It's a logistical challenge, to put it mildly.
If the enemy forces just happened to be within an hour's drive of the assault site then it didn't matter one way or the other.
The way you deal with giving up the element of surprise is by interdicting the movement of reinforcements, as we did at Normandy and elsewhere. The enemy may see where your assault is coming but if he can't get there, so what?
There's always the matter of very long range missiles but that applies whether you bombard or not.
One of the [debated] conclusions from Normandy was that we DIDN'T apply enough pre-assault bombardment.
" institutional knowledge … I would call that a theoretical capability"
DeleteWe've always done this cadre approach. You served on an amphib ship, didn't you? Forgive me if I'm confusing you with someone else. I talk to a lot of people and hear a lot of backgrounds! The point is that even back when we supposedly did amphibious exercises, we didn't actually unload an entire amphib ship. We'd launch a few AAVs and call it an exercise with the assumption that if we could launch a few, we could unload the entire ship. In other words, we'd launch a few to maintain institutional knowledge onboard the ship without having to go through the entire unloading. That's institutional knowledge on a localized scale.
Now, one could - and I would - argue that's insufficient and that you have to actually unload the entire ship because that's where you find the devil who's hidden in the details but that's another issue. Hence, my cadre that exercises FULLY on a regular basis.
"Now, one could - and I would - argue that's insufficient and that you have to actually unload the entire ship because that's where you find the devil who's hidden in the details but that's another issue. Hence, my cadre that exercises FULLY on a regular basis."
DeleteHeck no, that's not remotely sufficient.
We had a required annual exercise where we had to control an amphibious landing, three waves. We did it with the ship's 3 LCVPs--one per "wave"--and with the captain's gig in the water directing them, with a radar that measured how far to the beach. We had the ops officer from an LSD in the squadron grade it, and then I went over after lunch and graded the same exercise for them. The two captains were friends, and the other ops officer and I had been NROTC classmates. We both aced it, of course. There wasn't one thing realistic about that. Of course, two weeks later we trained with Brazilian and Venezuelan LSTs, and we were way aead of both of them, so I guess we had acquired some "institutional" knowledge.
But no, I was ops officer on an LST for my last year on active duty, and we made two deployments back-to-back, and that "exercise" was the only time we ever did anything remotely approaching an assault. We actually put one together for about 8 amphibs when we were sitting in Souda Bay waiting for orders during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Took a few days to get all the clearances, and by the time we got all that, we got the order to get underway about 8 hours before we were supposed to do the exercise. It would have been very, very interesting to see how that would have gone.
We did an administrative landing as part of a NATO exercise near Mecidiye, on Saros Bay in Turkey, and a couple in Vieques, but that was it. The Saros Bay one was particularly interesting to me because it was right across the bay from Gallipoli. Looking across the bay, Gallipoli was terrible terrain for an assault. Very mountainous, and the Turks just sat on top of the cliffs and picked off the Brits and ANZACs. Where we landed was flat with wide beach. It seems to me that our side of the bay would have been a much more sensible place to land. It wouldn't give you control of the Dardanelles, but it was about equidistant from Istanbul, and you could have gotten ashore there, consolidated forces, and from there launched an attack on either Istanbul or the Gallipoli peninsula, or gone between them to cut them off from each other. But nobody asked me.
"One of the [debated] conclusions from Normandy was that we DIDN'T apply enough pre-assault bombardment."
DeleteThe reason it is debated is because there are always tradeoffs. Based on the results, I'd say we got Normandy about right. We pretty much hammered intermittently everything from Calais to Brittany, and the Germans were actually expecting the invasion to come through Calais.
I can tell you that the days of contractors storing stuff on the ship like the tri-walls of garbage they are blaming for the fire in the lower vehicle deck are over. When the Norfolk newspaper did an expose on the USS San Antonio's botched repair availability, ship repair literally changed overnight. You are about to witness a major shift in how maintenance availabilities are carried out and overseen. CO's will be on the hook for manning better than the liberal leave and liberty policies that they swing to when in a long avail. there will be almost draconian rules for the storage of equipment on board the vessels.
ReplyDeleteNow, if the navy is smart, and there is no reason sometimes to believe they are, they would make up their mind quickly about the disposition of this vessel. If they do decide to decommission her, at least have the foresight to strip her of the valuable parts she has before selling her to the scrappers. They can avoid what happened when they scrapped the old Tarawa class LHA's where they were paying premium dollar from the scrappers for critical valves and hardware.
"You're proving my point that we don't need a standing, full featured, 33+ big deck, 180000 man amphibious assault force. To use your own example, a landing in Benghazi would not be an opposed landing requiring an amphibious assault. It would be an unopposed administrative landing - one that could likely just as easily be done via air transport from the US or some regional center since the Marines are nothing more than very light infantry now."
ReplyDeleteNo, we obviously didn't need 33 full-featured big-deck amphib ships and 180,000 Marines in Benghazi. But trying to avoid politics, what we needed was 1 ship and 500 Marines, with equipment, IN BENGHAZI. Because of reduced numbers resulting from our fascination with big-deck amphibs, the closest gators we had were in Bad el Mandeb (mouth of Red Sea) and off the coast of Morocco west of Gibraltar, neither one even remotely close enough to matter. The US and the nearest regional center were both too far away to get enough troops there in time to make a difference. And to have one ship in Benghazi, we have to have a bunch more in other places that could to wrong. There are a whole lot of "theres" in the world. And six smaller amphibs can do one thing that no LHA/LHD can do--be in six places at once. One amphib squadron fully trained, with a Marine battalion embarked, would be awesome if the problem is in Tijuana. But WestPac or the Med and it's pretty useless.
As far as cadre, if we have 10 LHA/LHDs with 1000 crew each, and 23 LPD/LSDs with 400 crew each, that's about 19,000 sailors. My proposed PhibRon includes a Juan Carlos LHA/LHD with 430 crew (including air wing), a Mistral LPH with 160 crew, an Albion LPD/LSD with 325 crew, a Newport/Kanimbla LST with 240 crew, a Paul Revere/Charleston LPA/LKA with 400 crew, and a NGFS frigate with 200 crew, or 1755 per squadron (for US purposes, probably need more on the Mistral and we can offset that by cutting down the number on the LPA/LKA by replacing steam with gas turbine propulsion). For 10 squadrons, that's 17,550, slightly less than the Navy's current amphib fleet. That's not an overwhelming number for a cadre. Let them be the cadre and you will add merchant ships (just like the Brits did with STUFT for the Falklands) and new construction (if you have long enough). Those additional ships will take training, and I would use the cadre to train them.
And it's not like book knowledge. You can't memorize how to operate a crane, or a boat in surf, take a test, and be ready to go out and do it. You actually have to do it, over and over. See USS Barbour County (LST-1195) for a picture of how wrong you can get it. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0c/USS_Barbour_County_(LST-1195)_aground_on_Silver_Strand_1984.JPEG/1200px-USS_Barbour_County_(LST-1195)_aground_on_Silver_Strand_1984.JPEG
You're right, you have to do it repeatedly. And we have to have enough people doing it repeatedly to build up a usefully-sized cadre. The problem is that every time you do it fully, somebody is going to fall and break a leg and there goes some captain's career. We need to get out of that mindset in order to accomplish meaningful training. Chester Nimitz ran a destroyer aground and got court-martialed for it. We'd have been worse off if he hadn't been around to lead the Pacific Fleet in WWII.
"what we needed was 1 ship and 500 Marines, with equipment, IN BENGHAZI."
DeleteNo. What we needed was an appropriately sized (company?) embassy guard stationed at the embassy. Which is cheaper to maintain, an amphibious ship and 500 Marines or an on-site embassy guard? Which is more useful, a remote ship and Marines who may or may not arrive in time or an on-site guard?
On a seemingly unrelated note, since 1960 the US military has used every capability it has except two. Do you know what the two unused capabilities are? Hint: one is strategic nuclear strike. The other is near and dear to your military vision.
"What we needed was an appropriately sized (company?) embassy guard stationed at the embassy."
DeleteTrying to avoid politics here, but a company-sized embassy guard would command a lot bigger payroll than a company of Marines. It might still be a net savings, when you don't have to operate the ship, but it would not be nearly as portable as a ship.
And the embassy was in Tripoli, and this was on the other side of the country in Benghazi. So when you go to Benghazi, do you take the guard force with you and abandon the embassy, or do you split the guard, or what?
Also, is an embassy guard, or part of that guard force, going to be armed sufficiently heavily to overcome a mob? I think you need combat troops with combat arms.
I don't think we can get much further into it without getting into politics.
"a company-sized embassy guard would command a lot bigger payroll than a company of Marines."
Delete???? They're the same thing. Marine Corps Embassy Security Guard is a standard Marine mission.
"it would not be nearly as portable as a ship."
???? The whole idea is that it's the right amount at the right place. Do you know how many embassy guard units you can get out of 500 Marines? You can cover dozens of embassies!
"is an embassy guard, or part of that guard force, going to be armed"
You arm to whatever threat level you anticipate. I know you know this.
You're trying so hard to justify your concept of amphibious assault that you're ignoring common sense!
"You're trying so hard to justify your concept of amphibious assault that you're ignoring common sense!"
DeleteActually, I'm not justifying amphibious assault at all. I'm justifying having a capability that can be used for amphibious assault or for other missions. My objective would be to have the biggest, baddest military in the world, and never use it because nobody dares pick on us and we don't go around picking on them.
"You arm to whatever threat level you anticipate. I know you know this."
Actually, I prefer to arm to the point that there is not threat, because nobody dares pick on you. The problem with that, for the US, has been that when we have that kind of power we tend to run around picking on other people. Arguably, picking on Libya is how we got into this whole mess to begin with.
"Marine Corps Embassy Security Guard is a standard Marine mission."
But embassy security guards are usually a small detachment. If you're planning to put a company-sized unit as an embassy guard, then that prompts the question of should be be having an embassy there in the first place.
"Do you know how many embassy guard units you can get out of 500 Marines? You can cover dozens of embassies!"
Yes, that's my point. If you have 15-20 Marines per embassy, that's 25 embassies. The problem is that facing the kind of mob we had in Benghazi, 20 Marines aren't going to do very much. And you wouldn't have 20, because you'd have to leave a bunch of them behind in Tripoli to protect the real embassy.
Again, treading closely on the political, but there was a big furor over whether a "stand down" order was issued. My comment is that if I had been on-scene commander, there would definitely have been a "stand-down" issued, because I would have issued it. I don't see the value in getting your people killed in an effort that has no chance to succeed. 20 Marines or other security guards in Benghazi wouldn't have been enough to overcome the mob. A company with combat weapons would have been enough, and probably enough to intimidate people from trying in the first place, which is really the desired objective.
"that prompts the question of should be be having an embassy there in the first place."
DeleteOf course it does! It's not politics to observe that we should not have had an embassy there, at all.
"The problem is that facing the kind of mob we had in Benghazi, 20 Marines aren't going to do very much."
This is a straw man argument. You defined an artificially low number and then claim it isn't enough! You may have noted that I've stated both that we shouldn't have had an embassy in a place that danagerous and, if we did, we needed a ?company? size guard force. You size the force for the threat. Come on, you're better than this. Don't disappoint me!
Well, we really didn't have an embassy there, it was just a trip to what might have been described as a consulate. That prompts the question as to why they were there in the first place, which is the question that has never been answered.
DeleteI think you're playing games a bit. You say that a company of Marines would provide enough people to form embassy guards for a number of embassies. If you divide 400 Marines among 20 embassies, you get 20 Marines per embassy. Maybe my 20 number is a bit arbitrary, but you're not going to take a company of Marines, divide them up among a bunch of embassies, and end up with 400 Marines at one embassy.
I think we agree that the situation in Benghazi was absurd in that nothing remotely approaching adequate security was provided. I think we just leave it at that.
"400 Marines at one embassy."
Delete???? A company is around 100 troops.
As far as dividing up 500 marines (your initial shipboard number), most embassies would require far, far less than a company of guards!
"As far as dividing up 500 marines (your initial shipboard number), most embassies would require far, far less than a company of guards!"
DeleteI agree. But when it's not an embassy but a consulate and there is an angry mob of hundreds, if not thousands, outside, a standard embassy complement is going to be of little use.
I'm not sure what we are really debating here. I think we both would agree that the situation in Benghazi would have required way more security than was provided. Whether 100, or 400, or 500 would be enough is debatable. But I think it clearly called for something more than the standard embassy security force. And most of that standard embassy security force would have been at the real embassy, in Tripoli.
I guess back in my day we would have had a 6th fleet amphibious force of 4-6 ships and we would have parked one offshore at each place we expected a potential problem, and we had a standing plan to evacuate Americans from trouble spots. 9/11 would have been an obvious day for potential problems. Given what was going on in the world at the time, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi, Alexandria/Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Beirut would have seemed logical places where trouble would have been expected. Benghazi perhaps not always, but at this time particularly given the unusual nature of what was going on there, certainly at that time. Now with 1700 Marines on one big-deck LHA/LHD, it's hard to be 6 places at once, and that gives up a capability that would have been useful in at least one place. Hard to discuss Benghazi much more without getting into politics, so I think we just leave it there.
Sorry about the confusion over numbers. Most of the amphibs that I'm looking at carry a little over 400, and the LHA/LHD and LPA/LKA carry 900, so roughly twice as many on those. I meant 400 per ship. It looks like a Marine company is about 180--4 per fire team, 3 fire teams +1 per squad (13), 3 squads +5 per rifle platoon (44), 3 rifle platoons (132) plus a weapons platoon (looks like about 45) and a CO and XO makes a company.
"But when it's not an embassy but a consulate and there is an angry mob of hundreds, if not thousands, outside, a standard embassy complement is going to be of little use."
DeleteYou adjust the guard to the anticipated threat. This is as simple a concept as you can get. What are you not understanding???
"called for something more than the standard embassy security force."
There is no standard security force. YOU ADJUST THE FORCE TO THE ANTICIPATED THREAT!!!!!
"YOU ADJUST THE FORCE TO THE ANTICIPATED THREAT!!!!!"
DeleteAnd that's what didn't happen at Benghazi. The regular embassy staff wasn't enough to handle both normal guard duty in both Tripoli and whatever threats were encounters on the side trip to Benghazi. The additional people to make that adjustment had to come from somewhere. All I'm saying is that in the old days, when we had more and smaller amphibs, we would have parked one offshore with a load of Marines ready to go in if any trouble materialized. You could also have dealt with it by enlarging the embassy security staff or by bringing in additional security for he Benghazi trip. I'm not sure 20 to 50 additional security personnel would have been enough to handle the mob that materialized. I do think 400 combat Marines would have been able to do it, and I think an amphib sitting offshore with those 400 Marines onboard would have been enough to discourage it in the first place.
" I think an amphib sitting offshore with those 400 Marines onboard would have been enough to discourage it in the first place."
DeleteYou're deluding yourself that a crowd of terrorists is going to be dissuaded by a ship that they can't see floating offshore. You're also ignoring history.
Somalia, for example, had the area surrounded by Rangers, Army, armor, and seemingly every unit under the sun INCLUDING MARINE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS and yet the people in the city were not discouraged in the slightest.
Hamas/Hezbollah terrorists have one of the world's strongest militaries sitting right on top of them, almost, and they aren't discouraged, in the least, from performing acts of terror.
We have military units surrounding Iran and they aren't discouraged one bit from performing terrorist acts and attacking shipping.
Geez, I can list these examples all night …
The point is that your belief about the presence of military forces acting to discourage bad behavior would be perfectly reasonable if it was directed at perfectly reasonable people. HOWEVER, terrorists, by definition, ARE NOT PERFECTLY REASONABLE PEOPLE. They don't care about some threat they can't see and, likely, wouldn't care even if they could see it.
You have this same problem when it comes to China. You believe that more ships will discourage China but you ignore the fact that China just doesn't care how many military units we have in the region. China is not led by reasonable people. They're led by evil zealots. They don't think the way we do. YOU NEED TO ACKNOWLEDGE REALITY AND ADJUST YOUR THINKING to deal with them!
"You're deluding yourself that a crowd of terrorists is going to be dissuaded by a ship that they can't see floating offshore. You're also ignoring history."
DeleteNumber one, they can see it. This is not an LHA/LHD 50 miles offshore, this is an LST/LSD/LPD 3-5 miles offshore. So they can see it very clearly.
Now, there is certainly an argument that, depending on the nature of what was actually going on that required the ambassador to go there in the first place (and we have never known that, because as far as I know it has never been asked), some might argue that a visible military presence might have interfered with the deal. That I don't know.
"The point is that your belief about the presence of military forces acting to discourage bad behavior would be perfectly reasonable if it was directed at perfectly reasonable people. HOWEVER, terrorists, by definition, ARE NOT PERFECTLY REASONABLE PEOPLE. They don't care about some threat they can't see and, likely, wouldn't care even if they could see it."
Your examples generally describe situations where our range of actions was terribly (and I think unreasonbly) encumbered by "don't shoot back until you are dead" rules of engagement. One policy change I'm thinking of implementing is if we have military forces anywhere, they are there for two, and only two, purposes--to kill anybody that needs killing and to break anything that needs breaking. I think that would get people's attention. Maybe I'm wrong, but I would very much prefer to try it and find out.
"You have this same problem when it comes to China. You believe that more ships will discourage China but you ignore the fact that China just doesn't care how many military units we have in the region. China is not led by reasonable people. They're led by evil zealots. They don't think the way we do. YOU NEED TO ACKNOWLEDGE REALITY AND ADJUST YOUR THINKING to deal with them!"
China may not care about how many military units we have in the area, but they sure as heck care if we could shut down their economy. They are imposing their will by force on a billion people who basically hate them. It doesn't take much to go wrong for that to come unglued. And I think they do care how many military units we have in the region. They are not building a military to take us on, they are building one to intimidate their neighbors. They're not really building a blue-water navy, they are building a navy to do amphib assaults on any of their neighbors that they want to, starting probably with Taiwan. And as long as they are the bully that can overpower any of those neighbors, they can get away with it.
It's like remember when you were in grade school and there was this bully who picked on you on your way to school and back--until one day your big brother showed up, and he didn't bully you any more after that? Right now China is the bully. They take what they want, including the "islands" in the South China Sea. We show up as big brother (recognizing that term is loaded with connotations that I don't mean to imply here) and all of a sudden the game changes.
My concept of terrorists is that they have a number of foot soldiers who are wiling to die for Allah, but the guys at the top really don't want to do any dying. As long as they can hide behind human shields and send the zealots out to do their dirty work, they are fine. But you start cutting off the heads and the snakes start to die. If whoever put this mob together figures he can come out of it unscathed, he will do it. Put a few hundred people who are looking to kill him a few miles offshore, and my guess is the he decides to live another day. You will note that the leaders of these movements don't lead the troops on the battlefield. They're not interested in dying. They just find other folks who are willing to die to do that for them. And if you understand 1) what their lives are like, and 2) what Islam teaches about death, then you can understand how they get a lot of volunteers.
DeleteAnd as long as we take a half-assed approach to fighting them, there is no incentive for them to do anything else. Change our approach, and they will have to change theirs.
"On a seemingly unrelated note, since 1960 the US military has used every capability it has except two. Do you know what the two unused capabilities are? Hint: one is strategic nuclear strike. The other is near and dear to your military vision."
ReplyDeleteSo is that your argument that we don't need an amphibious capability? Would you extent that to argue that we don't need a strategic nuclear strike capability? I don't think so.
And while we haven't done an opposed amphibious landing since Korea, we have used our amphibious forces to do a lot of useful things. I understand that you don't put a lot of stock in things that don't contribute to fighting a peer war, but I take a more geopolitical view and see some things that may help avoid such a war as useful. Humanitarian aid doesn't help fight a war, but humanitarian aid to a country that we are wanting as an ally, say anyone around the first island chain (where they have earthquakes and hurricanes and tsunamis, among other disasters), could be extremely useful in gaining and ally and preventing a war.
"So is that your argument that we don't need an amphibious capability?"
DeleteWe don't need it but that's based on strategic anticipation where there is no realistic, foreseeable need. That aside, the lack of use demonstrates that we don't need a 33+ ship fleet and a 180,000 man Marine Corps. All we need is a cadre.
Nuclear strike is a completely different beast. It's specifically made to NOT be used. Again, I know you know this.
"humanitarian aid"
I still defy anyone to provide a verifiable example where humanitarian aid has gained us anything. If we provide it to our friends, we don't gain anything because they're already our friends. If we provide it to our 'less than friends' we don't gain anything because they remain less than friends. There's not a single example, that I'm aware of, where our aid has provided a long term in improvement in relations. Humanitarian aid is a concept that sounds good on paper but has utterly failed to deliver any benefits. Despite this complete lack of evidence, people still cling to the concept. At some point, we have to face reality.
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Delete"I think some times we just have to live up to being caring and generous and compassionate people."
DeleteIf that's what we, as a nation want, that's fine but it's a non-military function and can be far better and far cheaper executed by semi-civilian organizations or other governmental groups such as USAID. A non-military function cannot be used to justify a military organization.
"I can think of places where not doing it would hurt. "
Again, an appealing notion that is not backed up by a single example. Logic would suggest the concept is completely wrong because, by definition, disasters are rare occasions and rare occasions cannot produce significant or lasting change in attitudes. Sure, you sail in one and make one appearance for a week or two every 20 years and then vanish. No one's attitudes are going to be changed one way or the other. You've got a romantic notion of humanitarian aid that is contradicted by history. We've been supplying aid for how many decades and what has it gotten us? Not a thing that anyone can demonstrate. I'm sorry to burst your bubble but humanitarian aid happens far too seldom to change any attitudes.
"That aside, the lack of use demonstrates that we don't need a 33+ ship fleet and a 180,000 man Marine Corps. All we need is a cadre."
DeleteFirst, I don't think we need the current overpriced 33+ ship big-deck amphibious fleet, nor a 180,000-man Marine Corps, so don't put me in the position of defending either.
I have described a 140,000-man active-duty Marine Corps, and a structure of 10 PhibRons of 6 smaller and cheaper and more versatile ships, that will cost less and require fewer sailors than the current Navy amphibious force. I think that is a reasonable allocation of resources.
"I still defy anyone to provide a verifiable example where humanitarian aid has gained us anything."
"I still defy anyone to provide a verifiable example where humanitarian aid has gained us anything."
I think there is some obligation as a caring and honorable people to provide assistance to those less fortunate in times of emergency.
Beyond that, I'm not exactly sure how to meet your definition. If you are asking for a situation where we turned an enemy into a friend simply by providing humanitarian assistance, then I agree that it hasn't happened, but I think that is an unreasonable standard. Have humanitarian assistance missions helped keep allies on our side, or helped soften resistance of enemies--absolutely so, although I would not know how to apply metrics to the situations. I can make a pretty strong guess that if there were a hurricane or tsunami or earthquake (all of which happen often) in the first island chain area, and China sent humanitarian aid but we didn't, that would be a strike against us in building allies in that area.
Actually, I can think of a place where humanitarian assistance made a huge difference--the Berlin Airlift.
DeleteIt made no difference. No one's attitude or political affiliation was changed.
DeleteI guess our bottom lines are that I see a need to maintain an amphibious capability somewhere near current levels, but in a force configured totally differently, more smaller and more varied units rather than 33 big-deck amphibs, whereas you would cut the force back substantially.
ReplyDeleteFound this on the Marine website:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Command%20Briefs/Why%20Do%20We%20Need%20Amphibious%20Forces.pdf
Obviously propaganda, but it does make some interesting points. What it doesn't do is explain why the LHA/LHD is a good amphib platform. It isn't.