The four fast combat support ships of the Supply class
provide underway replenishment for Navy ships and are the only such ships
capable of keeping up with Navy surface/carrier groups.
 |
| Supply Class |
Around 2003, the ships were transferred from the Navy to the
Military Sealift Command (MSC) and are now designated United States Naval Ship
(USNS).
Bafflingly, the Navy has begun retiring them in a misguided
attempt at cost savings because of their fuel consumption due to their turbine
engines. USNS Ranier and Bridge have
been decommissioned and placed in reserve leaving the Navy with just two active
fast combat support ships.
Ship
|
Hull Number
|
Commissioned
|
Status
|
Supply
|
T-AOE-6
|
1994
|
Active
|
Ranier
|
T-AOE-7
|
1995
|
Reserve
|
Arctic
|
T-AOE-8
|
1995
|
Active
|
Bridge
|
T-AOE-10
|
1998
|
Reserve
|
Here’s a few specs on the ships:
Displacement：19,700 tons (empty),
49,000 tons (full)
Length：754 ft
(229.8 m) (overall)Beam：107 ft (32.6 m) (extreme beam)
Draft: 39 ft (11.9 m)
Maximum speed：25 knots
Range : 6,000 nm
Crew : 160 civilian + 40 military
Propulsion：4 x General Electric LM2500, 2 shafts, 105,000 hp
Aviation : 3x CH-46E Sea Knight or 3x MH-60S Seahawk (1)
Here’s a few specs on the cargo capacity of the ships:
Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM): 1,965,600 US gallons (7,441,000 l)
JP-5 fuel: 2,620,800
US gallons (9,921,000 l)Bottled gas: 800 bottles
Ordnance stowage: 2,150 short tons (1,950 t)
Chill and freeze stowage: 250 short tons (230 t)
Water: 20,000 US gallons (76,000 l)
As built, the ships were equipped with several defensive
systems:
1 x NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System (NSSMS)
2 x 20mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWSs)
2 x 25mm Dual-Purpose (DP) autocannons
4 x 12.7mm Browning heavy machine guns
4 x Decoy Launchers
1 x NIXIE Torpedo Decoy System
2 x 20mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWSs)
2 x 25mm Dual-Purpose (DP) autocannons
4 x 12.7mm Browning heavy machine guns
4 x Decoy Launchers
1 x NIXIE Torpedo Decoy System
Incredibly, the defensive systems were removed when the
ships were transferred to the MSC.
Here’s a brief description of the ship’s cargo handling
capabilities as described for Rainier:
To
successfully handle their given resupply-at-sea roles, such ships as the
Rainier were appropriately equipped with industrial-strength transfer equipment
to move stores to recipient vessels. It was not uncommon to resupply ships to
service up to three awaiting vessels simultaneously especially during wartime.
Rainier was outfitted with a sliding padeye station allowing the receiving ship
to transfer heavy loads and providing excellent control of the load during
transfer. Between the bridge and the single funnel were 4 x 10-ton cargo booms,
two located along portside and two along starboard. There were 3 x double-probe
steam-powered fueling stations and two single-probe steam fueling stations -
these stations able to pump water, ship diesel fuel or aircraft fuel
simultaneously using different probes to the same ship. Her aft deck held a
large helicopter flight deck connected to elevators able to bring freight from
below to the surface so two of the three available CH-46E "Sea
Knight" transport helicopters could deliver dry and refrigerated supplies
(via cargo nets) under their fuselages (this particular delivery system
recognized as "vertical replenishment"). A third CH-46E Sea Knight
helicopter remained in hanger in reserve. (1)
What prompted the Navy to decommission two of the
ships? It was purely a budgetary cost
savings measure. According to USNI News
website,
Supply-class
ships USNS Bridge (T-AOE-10) will decommission in 2014 and
USNS Rainier (T-AOE-7) and will decommission in 2015
based on the 2012 Navy Force Structure Assessment,
Navy officials said. The FSA reduced the number of Fleet oilers from
19 to 17, leaving two Supply-class and 15 Henry J Kaiser class oilers. …
The
decision to decommission the Supply-class ships was based on the
higher operations and support costs for the class. The Navy estimated maintaining
the ships would be $32 million more than the Kaiser-class support ships … (2)
So, for a measly $32 million savings (likely optimistic –
probably much less) the Navy gave up two of the most valuable ships in the
world. And yet, the Navy doesn’t
hesitate to spend $15B on a carrier or $600M on a worthless LCS. Does this make sense in any sane
reality? The $32M isn’t even round off
error in the Navy’s budget. This is the
kind of insane decision Navy leadership makes on a daily basis.
Hey Navy, how’s the logistical support planning for those
far Pacific operations coming?
(1)Military Factory website, “USNS Rainier (T-AOE-7) / USS
Rainer (AOE-7)”, JR Potts,
https://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=USNS-Rainier-TAOE7
(2)USNI News website, “Navy to Decommission Two Oilers in
Cost Saving Scheme”, Sam LaGrone, 29-Apr-2013,
https://news.usni.org/2013/04/29/navy-to-decommission-two-oilers-in-cost-saving-scheme
KathFebruary 20, 2020 at 10:48 AM
ReplyDelete"1 x NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System (NSSMS)
2 x 20mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWSs)
2 x 25mm Dual-Purpose (DP) autocannons
4 x 12.7mm Browning heavy machine guns
4 x Decoy Launchers
1 x NIXIE Torpedo Decoy System"
Somebody was thinking when they designed that defensive load. Given that was what an 8 box Sea sparrow launcher - could be an ESSM box if upgraded. The 25mm mounts could field a typhoon or mini typhoon set ups, and toss in one SeaRam for one Phalanx. You a fine supply ship that is not a liability at the front line. One no sailor could complain about serving on (assuming anyone gets any training on actually firing their weapons). Un escorted that could be a ship that can run into a Iranian small boat harassment and walk away. Well maybe add some hellfire missiles bolted on... Rank stupidity. With that load of weapons/defenses the USN could have called them combat ships anyway given their other attempts at that. Why toss away a fairly good candidate for inflated fleet numbers. Give it link 11 or 14 or whatever the number is now and its defensive armament capacity becomes distributed defense - that would sell better I would think than the fanatically over priced cost of the USS Detroit do anti drug duty.
Sorry for the double post a bit too many errors in typing
Thought the same thing, that weapons fit is better than a LCS!
DeleteThe defensive load could easily be reinstalled. If we're squeamish about CIVMARs manning the gear, embark a USN Armed Guard det a'la WW II.
DeleteSo, does this mean that replenishment at sea is a capability slowly going away? Kind of like ASW, we just pretend we still have but really never practice it anymore? Does this mean more time tied in ports?
ReplyDeleteThese ships are immensely capable. They were a massive upgrade from previous auxilliaries. I served aboard USS Sylvania AFS-2 in the early 90s in the Med. We only added a fueling station capability around 92, how much fuel we carried i dont recall. We didn't carry any ordanance, leaving that to ammo-specific ships. We carried two helos for vertrep. We had two twin 3in mounts two CIWS, and a half dozen .50. We could eek out 21kts when steaming downhill on our 600psi plant. She was a capable ship but the Supply class is head and shoulders above in all respects. The Mars class was trsnsferred to MSC only due to their age and being replaced. With the exception of their somewhat light ammo load capacity in a major war scenario, they're not only major assets, but a near-perfect pattern for yet more to be built. The Supplys being laid up is absolute idiocy, as theyre probably the best all around logistics ships in existence.
ReplyDeleteI have to think its crew size. The navy has been all about sizing down crew to the bone with MBA logic for decades. ~200 crew all USN or Merchant marine. My god you could fill what 3-4 wonder tool LCS with that manpower (the original rosy estimates). Clearly a ship standing in the way of more hulls.
ReplyDeleteThe carrier and escorts can all hit 30kts, so the T-AOEs can't exactly keep up with them if the warships go all out.
ReplyDeleteThey're better able to keep up with them, for sure. But does that extra 5kts really matter that much? I don't know.
I think it is worthwhile over greater distances, like the Pacific. In the Med, 20kts (normal travel at 15kts) sufficed. But then again, we didnt stay with the carrier groups. We'd meet, unrep a ship or three, then meet others somewhere else, with frequent port stops in betweeen...
Delete"30kts, so the T-AOEs can't exactly keep up with them if the warships go all out."
DeleteIf a carrier group is sustaining 30 kts it's because they're in the combat phase of a mission which is no place for a logistics ship. The rest of the time, the Supply ships can keep up and, more importantly, can make good time to a rendezvous.
I'm wondering, does this have an impact on operations? Not having them around, in numbers or any recent practice,etc, seems to me, this is seriously short sighted and couldn't potentially reduce some options BECAUSE we don't have them where we need them?!?
DeleteI cannot understand taking the T-AOEs out of the USN and placing in MSC (Military Sealift Command)(USNS), especially since the USN added the Expeditionary Transfer Dock and the Expeditionary Mobile Base to the warship fleet(USS). The T-AOEs can provide direct support to the carrier groups, were adequately armed until the handover to MSC, built to military combat standards and shock hardened. I really don't know what to make of the Expeditionary Vessel other than they will be easy targets. Vessels with no weapons, based on a commercial design and they get to be warships (USS), while they neuter ships designed for war and call them commercial transports (USNS). I really don't understand the USN.
ReplyDeleteTraditionally, ships transferred to MSC as they were replaced by newer ships. Being crewed by civilians and in significantly smaller numbers is a cost saving measure. They are demilitarised beforehand as usually they only have a token Naval presence aboard. Most of the Mars-class became MSC ships, although mine went to the reserve fleet, then the scrappers.
ReplyDeleteAgree completely. "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics". See my comment above on rearmament for these beauties.
ReplyDeletePerhaps the Navy brass need to read a few history books. I can think of more than a few examples where a lack of logistics caused an armed forces a few headaches!!
DeletePerhaps the US Military has perfected wormhole technology & can transport material instantly to wherever is needed? That would appear to be the only logical explanation for decisions such as these!
CNO,
ReplyDeleteDidn't know about this class of ship before. It's certainly better than what most Europeans and Australia have, at least on paper. IT carries a HUGE amount, and has well thought out defences.
It's crazy how the USN has allocated money.
Is the USn incompetent, or has a foreign nation infiltrated the US military to make it bankrupt and unable to fight a peer war?
Andrew
I doubt the Navy has been infiltrated but there's no need for a foreign govt to do that. No foreign govt could do as good a job hollowing out the Navy as the Navy as done to themselves!
Delete"Incredibly, the defensive systems were removed when the ships were transferred to the MSC."
ReplyDeleteAs I understand it, only commissioned ships are armed. When the Supply-class were transfered to the Military Sealift Command, each were decomissioned and then designated as a United States Naval Ship.
Ah, the memory this article brings back. I always wonder what the Navy could have done with these ships if they did a Santee type CVE modification for helicopter operations. Mostly I envisioned as ASW and Mine warfare, in addition to VERTREP. And yes I could also see adding Harpoon,( for "defensive" use.)
ReplyDeleteBack in Vietnam, the "dedicated AOE" used to hang out with the carriers on Yankee Station, and the rest of the UNREP/RAS (to use the Brit/NATO acronym as well as our own) ships would work the gun lines. It would seem to make sense to have one AOE for every carrier task group, so 12 if we are going to have 12 carrier groups. 25 knots is plenty to keep up with the carriers. They only do 30+ for flight ops, and you don't want an UNREP/RAS ship in the way when you are launching or recovering aircraft. You can rendezvous later for replenishment. A carrier task force is going to transit at maybe 20 or 22 knots, and the AOE can keep up with that. The rest of the UNREP/RAS ships do not have to be that fast, nor do they need all of the cargo and replenishment capacity, so the Kaiser class or others would work for them. Most of the defensive armament could be bolted on as needed, the way the Brits do their RFAs. Just have them fitted for but not with, and set up and easy conversion.
ReplyDelete"It would seem to make sense to have one AOE for every carrier task group, so 12 if we are going to have 12 carrier groups."
DeleteI keep hammering on this point … carriers don't fight as individual carrier groups. They'll fight, as carriers have always done, in groups of 4. In war, we won't have 12 (we're actually at 9+1+1) carrier groups, we'll have one or two at any given moment.
As far as supply ships sailing with a carrier group, that's not normally how it's done. The carrier group goes out, executes a mission, and retires with resupply rendezvous points along the way, as necessary.
Off hand, I can't recall many (any?) instances of supply ships sailing with carrier groups in WWII. I'm sure it happened somewhere/sometime but as far as I know, that wasn't the norm. The carriers, themselves, tended to be the resupply ships for their group during the execution phase of the mission.
It would be fascinating to study the resupply patterns of the USN in WWII but, short of reading the individual ship logs, I don't know any way to get that information.
There is one operational oddity I recall where a supply ship was tasked to stick with a carrier. We were told with short notice to follow the America (Saratoga? Its been a long time and the memory is rusty lol)in the Adriatic in support of operations in Bosnia. We followed them around (and absolutely froze)for two weeks before being detached and returning to the western Med. Strange thing is, we never even UNREPd the carrier, only one, possibly two escorts. I recall this mostly because it ruined my plans for taking leave. We had been scheduled for a long port visit in Cannes, and Id planned a few days in Paris and a week skiing the French Alps...
DeleteIn Vietnam and Desert Storm, we had two carriers working together and supporting them with one dedicated AOE. In Vietnam we had Yankee Station and in Desert Storm we had two in the Med and two in the Arabian Gulf. One AOE can probably support two carriers, but for more you would probably need another AOE. And no, the AOEs don't follow the carriers around, but they need to be close enough at hand to replenish bombs and jet fuel when they are needed. 25 knots works fine for that.
ReplyDeleteI was on an AE in the Tonkin Gulf. We came out of Subic with a full load, went up to Yankee Station and caught whichever carrier was off cycle and gave them as many bombs as we could. Then we hooked up with the AOE and gave them all the rest of our bombs, and headed south to the gun lines to sell 5-inch and 8-inch shells. The AOE stayed out with the carriers for an extended period and kept getting consolidation replenishments from AEs and AOs. I'd see someting similar where carriers would be deployed to locations from which they could launch strikes, and replenishment ships would be far enough back to be safe, but close enough to replenish any carrier on off cycle. That's pretty much the same approach that the Royal Navy used in the Falklands, although they probably kept their carriers pretty far withdrawn because their expectation that the loss of either carrier would have doomed the operation.
"carriers would be deployed to locations from which they could launch strikes,"
DeleteGeez, no! That's not at all how a modern naval war between peers would be conducted. Study WWII for the template. A carrier that 'sits' on a location will shortly be sunk. Carriers execute a mission and then retire. I don't know how else I can explain it. This deployment stuff is an artifact of peacetime conflicts where the other side has not anti-ship capability. China isn't going to allow us to 'deploy a carrier to a location from which they could launch strikes' anymore than we would allow them to do so.
The Falklands was an aberration in so many ways and has almost no relevance to a modern peer war. It was a restricted battle, not a war, confined to an agreed upon, limited geographical location with only a single objective. And because the conditions were so artificial and the RN thus violated every precept of naval combat, they paid a heavy price in what should have been a no-contest conflict with a barely capable military.
Vietnam was just a systematic, live fire exercise from a naval perspective and Desert Storm was the same. Neither had any relevance to modern peer naval warfare. Study WWII and the Cold War preparations for an understanding of carrier warfare and naval operations.
OK, my terminology was a bit sloppy. Carriers would not sit anywhere. They would, as you note, execute a mission and then retire. If the mission took several days, at some point they would presumably need replenishment, of bombs and rockets and jet fuel is nothing else, and the AOE could be positioned so that the carrier could make a quick run, fill up, and return.
DeleteI agree that peer warfare is different from Vietnam or the Falklands or Desert Storm. But we've been in a state of peer-to-peer uneasiness to a greater of lesser degree for 75 years, and what we have fought in that time are Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, the Balkans, and the two Gulf wars. So maybe, just maybe, we need a capability to fight those sorts of engagements as well.
I know you see us trying to punch it out toe-to-toe with China or Russia in a peer war, but I just don't see that happening. I certainly don't see an invasion of mainland China, nor Russia, for that matter. I still think they are basically land powers, and we succeed on the naval side by bottling them up and keeping them from expanding their threats geographically.
" If the mission took several days,"
DeleteI'm going to keep hammering on this point. No carrier mission would ever take 'several days' of strikes. That's simply too much time in one place to survive. Again, read the history of WWII carrier ops. It's in and out, hit and run. Even the pitched battles such as Coral Sea or Midway were short term affairs with the actual strikes occurring over just a couple days. If a carrier stays in one place for longer than a few days you'll see bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, subs, and guys in combat canoes showing up to sink the carrier. There is no replenishment during the strike phase of the mission. You can replenish before, during approach, or after, during retirement but there is no return to the scene of the crime. There just isn't.
"maybe, we need a capability to fight those sorts of engagements as well. "
Of course we do! However, if we have the capability to fight the high end peer war then we automatically have the capability to fight a lesser war. Now, if it's way, way down the level of war, like fighting terrorists or third world impotent militaries then, yes, maybe we need a very low end set of assets to avoid wearing out our good stuff - something like the light attack aircraft that the Air Force just nixed in the face of all common sense.
" we succeed on the naval side by bottling them up and keeping them from expanding their threats geographically."
So, you see 'victory' as maintaining the status quo? The problem with that is that it ensures an endless series of wars. If we succeed in 'bottling' up China the first time, they'll learn lessons, rebuild, and come at us harder the next time … endlessly. Is that really your vision? An endless series of wars where the soldiers die for nothing?
Try a mind exercise. Imagine if we had simply 'bottled' up Hitler. What do you think the long term result would have been? Yes, a lot of soldiers and people died to eradicate Hitler's Germany but they died for a worthy cause and they produced a PERMANENT solution to the problem. Your approach would produce a temporary solution that would continually recur.