As we’ve pointed out on these pages, the Navy has tried to
play games with the ship numbers by counting hospital ships, logistics support
ships, and other non-combat vessels.
Congress slapped them down on that attempt but they then they tried to
include ‘commissioned’ ships that were completely non-combat functional like
the Zumwalts and the Ford. Again,
Congress slapped them down and passed legislation requiring the ship to be
counted in the fleet totals only after it was actually combat-capable.
The most recent mini-controversy involved suggestions by
various people inside and outside of the Navy that the ship counting rules
should be modified to include unmanned vessels.
However, CNO Gilday recently stated that unmanned ships would not be
part of the fleet count (see, “Unmanned Ships Won’t Count”).
In short, the Navy is heavily invested in pushing for a
larger fleet size since it means a bigger slice of the budget pie for
them. To that end, they’re playing games
with the fleet size requirements and the counting methodology. Congress and outside observers are also
caught up in the fleet size and closely related ship counting issue. However, what the Navy and all the interested
parties are failing to grasp is that the fleet size, and ship count, is utterly
irrelevant.
If fleet size was the only thing that mattered we could
simply buy a few thousand combat canoes and all our problems would be
solved. Of course, any rational person
instantly recognizes that despite the description as ‘combat canoes’, the
canoes would have no useful combat power and would be utterly useless.
Wait … what now?
Are we saying that combat power is more important than ship
numbers?
Of course we are! In
fact, it’s the only relevant measure of a navy.
Nothing else is relevant. Not
tonnage. Not numbers. Not ship types. Not average fleet age. Nothing.
It’s all about what the fleet can accomplish in combat. That’s it.
Nothing else. Pure and simple.
Okay, so what’s the problem?
Let’s add up the combat power and be done with this. Well, therein lies the problem. It’s very difficult to quantify combat
power. You can describe some of the
peripheral factors that contribute to combat power, like number of VLS cells,
but those factors only tell a small part of the story. VLS cells, to continue the example, don’t
indicate the size of the missile inventory (what’s the point of having 10,000
VLS cells in the fleet if your totally missile inventory is only 3,000 and
wartime production is limited to 100 new missiles per year?), they don’t
contribute to anti-swarm defense (VLS is only good against certain target
types), they may not be usable in some combat scenarios (surface ships with VLS
can’t get within range of many desirable targets without exposing themselves to
enemy fire), they may not contain the appropriate missile mix for a given
situation, and so on. So, yes, VLS is a descriptor
of combat power but only in a partial and imperfect way.
The other major aspect of ‘combat power’ is that it depends
on the scenario. For example, if our
goal in a war with China is to simply execute a distant blockade, that requires
far less combat power than if we want to scrub the entire South/East China Seas
of all enemy assets. So, the combat
power that might be adequate for one scenario may be inadequate for another.
When we talk about combat power, what we’re really talking
about is strategy and its derivative, operational planning.
Strategy and operational planning are what tell us how much
and what type of combat power we need.
Strategy gives us our objectives and operational planning tells us what
specific capabilities and assets we need to accomplish the objectives. That’s our combat power requirement.
For example, we might feel good that we have 150 VLS cells
distributed on 15 small, unmanned missile ‘barges’ but if those barges can’t
survive long enough to get into launch position then they’re useless and don’t
actually represent useful combat power.
Perhaps we really need a single guided missile submarine (SSGN) that has
a very good chance of surviving to reach launch position – in other words, useful
combat power.
So, is the Navy recognizing that combat power is the real
measure of a useful fleet? Read the
following comments from Acting SecNav Modly and then decide for yourself.
“We
haven’t done a really comprehensive force structure assessment in a couple of
years; 2016 was the last one. So we started on a new path for that last fall,
and what we’re finding in that force structure assessment is that the number of
ships we need are going to be more than 355. And when you add in some of the
unmanned vessels and things like that that we’re going through experimental
phases on, it’s probably going to be significantly more than [355],” he [Acting
SecNav Modly] said.
Modly,
when asked why the Navy was betting so much of its ability to get to 355 ships
by the end of the decade on quickly acquiring brand new ship classes that
haven’t gone through the Navy and industry design and construction process yet,
said, “I think ‘quickly’ is going to have to define everything we do, because
the world is changing pretty quickly and we’re going to have to react more
quickly.”
“This
year, this budget will keep us on a path to grow to over 300, but the ultimate
goal was to grow to an even bigger fleet than that,” and the Navy is already
looking at its 2022 planning and eyeing multiple paths to grow faster.
We’re
trying to make the case for a bigger Navy, and I will continue to make the case
for a bigger Navy … Modly continued. (1)
Do you see the focus on numbers rather than any coherent
vision of useful combat power?
We need to stop focusing on ship numbers and counting methodology
and start focusing on strategy, operational planning, and real combat
power. The Zumwalt may represent an
increment of ‘1’ in the fleet size quest but it doesn’t represent any
substantial increase in useful combat power.
The same can be said of the entire LCS class. Submarines make up a substantial portion of
our fleet count but many of our submarines are laid up, non-operational, due to
a massive backlog of submarine maintenance.
They may contribute to fleet size but not to combat power.
The focus on numbers is a potential wrong-way street in the
quest for a suitable Navy and, given the current fixation on unproven, unmanned
vessels, a very likely wrong-way street.
Stop counting and start planning!
(1)USNI News website, “SECNAV Modly: Path to 355 Ships Will
Rely on New Classes of Warships”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Feb-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/02/03/secnav-modly-path-to-355-ships-will-rely-on-new-classes-of-warships
Do the sailors know how to operate the ship systems in combat? Does the Captain know how to fight his ship,
ReplyDeleteDoes the Admiral know how to handle a task force ?
If you answer yes to the 3 Qs, then you have combat power.
"then you have combat power."
DeleteBut not necessarily useful combat power. For example, the Navy's Pacific fleet battleships of pre-WWII could answer yes to your three questions but they didn't represent useful combat power. The operations of the Pacific required carriers, not battleships. Sure, the battleships eventually played a supporting role but they no longer represented front line, useful combat power.
Australian Combat Canoes sunk 6 Japanese ships in WW2. Don't write off the combat canoe. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Jaywick
ReplyDeleteWell, there you go! It's a shame the money we wasted on carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers when canoes could have defeated the Japanese Navy!
DeleteToday, though, we'll use unmanned canoes, thereby saving personnel costs.
Im curious about this "Force Structure Assessment"... Whos doing it?? Whats it comprised of?? It sounds like somthing that if done wrong, can send the Navy further down the wrong path... In my mind, it would identify the top half dozen threats ie; China, Russia, etc. Then it would play out massive amounts of wargames using our current and near-future assets and capabilities. Then the flaws would be translated into future fleet structure and ship designs. So whats ACTUALLY taking place??
ReplyDeleteThe Force Structure Assessment (FSA) process starts with the Navy picking a number of ships it wants and then commissioning a study to justify that number. They won't say it quite that blatantly but that's the process. For instance, prior to the most recent FSA, several Navy leaders stated that the likely outcome would be the need for more ships (what a surprise conclusion!).
DeleteFrom the 2016 FSA Executive Summary,
" This FSA assumes that the future plans for our Navy, in ship types and numbers of ships, continues to replace the ships we have today with ships of similar capability and in similar numbers as we transition to the future Navy"
Again, no focus on warfighting requirements but, instead, on justifying more ships - as many more as possible.
the 2016 FSA started with a request to the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to provide their unconstrained desire for Navy forces in their respective theaters. In order to fully resource these platform-specific demands, with very little risk in any theater while still supporting enduring missions and ongoing operations, the Navy would be required to double its current annual budget, which is essentially unrealistic in both current and expected future fiscal environments.
Here's the FSA description of how the process worked:
"... the 2016 FSA started with a request to the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to provide their unconstrained desire for Navy forces in their respective theaters. ... After identifying instances where forces were being requested for redundant missions or where enduring force levels were not required, while also looking at areas where we could take some risk in mission success or identify a new way to accomplish the mission, we were able to identify an FSA force level better aligned with resources available."
The Combatant Commanders requests include all kinds of non-war, peacetime tasks. So, again, no focus on combat needs.
The FSAs are a joke.
Well isnt that disingenious!?!?!
Delete"continues to replace the ships we have today with ships of similar capability and in similar numbers "
Historically the ship numbers have been in decline for half a century, and capabilities??? Fords and the LCS say otherwise!! The only possible "like for like" or improvement is the replacement of Spruances with Burkes. Every other replacement has been a reduction of warfighting capability for increased cost. Youre right. Evidently the FSA is not worth much!!!
"Perhaps we really need a single guided missile submarine (SSGN) that has a very good chance of surviving to reach launch position – in other words, useful combat power."
ReplyDeleteIf they serve 42 years, the last of the 4 Ohio SSGNs will be retired in 6 years. The only viable replacement is an SSGN version of the Columbia class, the first of which wouldn't available until the early 2040's after all 12 boomers were built.
After the first Columbia is built, the remaining 11 are supposed to have an average cost of $4.9 billion. Assuming 14 of the 16 tubes are modified, they would only carry 98 Tomahawks. So, six would be needed to replace the 4 Ohio SSGNs, which would run about $30 billion.
Is that the right use of that kind of money?
"Is that the right use of that kind of money? "
DeleteYou ask exactly the right question. Another way to state your question is, is there another asset that can deliver that quantity of firepower with that degree of survivable penetration? If there is, we might want to consider channeling the money that way. If not, then it's money well spent.
My opinion is that there is no other platform that can deliver that degree of firepower with that degree of survivable penetration. Now, that doesn't mean we eliminate every other cruise missile launch platform. It just means that the money, while expensive, is money well spent. In other words, SSGNs provide excellent value (capability for the dollar).
"The only viable replacement is an SSGN version of the Columbia class"
An extended length Virginia SSGN has also been proposed.
Question as it's a very expensive platform with slow build rate, possible better options?
DeleteDec 2019 Navy placed MYP contract for nine Virginia's, with option for 10th, one a Block IV and eight new Block V's with 84-foot hull plug that will include four large diameter Trident tubes rated for 7 Tomahawks each/ 28 in total, in addition to the 12 in the bow, that means each Block V will have the capacity for 40 Tomahawks. The Ohio's use 22 of their 24 Trident tubes for 154 Tomahawks, 616 in total for the 4 boats.
Understand Navy plans to fit their new hypersonic glide body missile (live test firing this year), which as a larger dia. missile than Tomahawk the total will drop from 40 to 30?, not sure the fwd tubes can take hypersonic as shorter then those in hull plug.
Contract placed with General Dynamics Electric Boat and Ingalls Newport News, $22.2 billion plus additional ~$10 billion for GFE, insidedefense quoted nearly $34 billion total, rough estimate Block V boat cost $3.9 billion each, five year buy, if remember correctly build plan build 5 years per boat but actual has been up to 7 years in past. Both shipyards expanding but with the Columbia SSBN(X) coming on line and the larger Virginia Blook V expect build schedule to be under severe pressure.
SSGNs are a frightfully expensive way to deliver a handful of missiles.
Delete"SSGNs are a frightfully expensive way to deliver a handful of missiles."
DeleteWar is a frightfully expensive way to achieve geopolitical objectives. What's your point?
There are better ways to spend $4.5+ billion that can deliver more than a pinprick strike.
DeleteWe need to be thinking how do we deliver 10,000 or 100,000 weapons, not 100. You can't scale SSGNs to that level without bankrupting the country.
There is also the Dreadnought class submarine. The UK will only build 4 of the class so you could add an order of 4-8 more subs that would be SSGN's for the USA. The increased order would reduce the program cost for the UK and fill a gap for the USA. The Dreadnought uses a USA design for the nuclear reactor, so there will be commonality in the nuclear plant. The UK does not use the control system that we do for nuclear weapons so we could not use it as an American SSBN we could only use it as a SSGN. The Dreadnought SSGNs could be sold back to UK or placed in ready reserve after the Columbia SSGNs are produced.
DeleteI would also buy some Astute class submarines with PWR3 reactors to fill the gaps as the Los Angeles Class retire. The Astute class are well regarded attack submarines.
An order of Dreadnought SSGNs and Astute class submarines from the UK may also make the US submarine manufacturers a little more responsive.
Delete"There are better ways to spend $4.5+ billion that can deliver more than a pinprick strike."
DeleteGive an example.
"pinprick strike"
154 missiles is a bit more than a pinprick.
"We need to be thinking how do we deliver 10,000 or 100,000 weapons"
You understand that's just absurd on many levels, right? Our entire Tomahawk inventory is only around 3000 missiles. It's not even remotely possible to deliver 10000 weapons on a coordinated basis with any technology that exists today.
I assume you're indulging in a bit of hyperbole - nothing wrong with that. Now, why don't you offer a semi-realistic idea of what you think can/should be done.
"SSGNs are a frightfully expensive way to deliver a handful of missiles."
DeleteSSGNs are actually a fairly cost effective means of delivering a significant pulse of firepower. A Burke, by comparison, costs $2B and can deliver around 30 missiles (typical loadout) or 96 missiles if it had no AAW missiles loaded.
Another aspect that makes a SSGN cost effective is that it's the least likely platform to be lost during the mission - meaning, it can be used again and again. Bombers or surface ships are much more likely to be lost during the course of the mission.
If you know of a more cost effective delivery system, please tell me!
"An extended length Virginia SSGN has also been proposed."
DeleteThe Navy is building 10 Virginia Block V submarines, the first two are on order, that will carry a total of 40 Tomahawks each. But, that means a coordinated attack from 4 submarines to deliver the same firepower from a single Ohio SSGN.
"There is also the Dreadnought class submarine."
DeleteEven if that were possible, which I doubt for a variety of political and technical reasons, they carry only 12 tubes each for a total of 84 Tomahawks.
"Virginia Block V submarines"
DeleteAn extended length version has been proposed for the SSGN. As I vaguely recall, it would be sized for 100+ missiles. The Navy did not react with any great interest. Alternatively, one of the Navy's [many] future force plans called for a run of Columbia SSGNs when the SSBN production was finished.
No hyperbole. Fighting China could involve expending hundreds of thousands of weapons.
DeleteColumbias only have 16 tubes, so at most they will carry 112 missiles, but more likely 96.
$4.9 billion imaginary dollars could be spent on,
(almost) 9 x B-21 Raiders (imaginary $550m each)
Assuming a loadout of 8 missiles, they could deliver 72 cruise missiles per sortie, or more JDAMs. That's ~70% of the load of a Columbia every 2-3 days for as long as you have basing, munitions, fuel and surviving aircraft within a few thousand miles of the target.
Let's assume the following
- A cruise missile costs $2M each
- A Columbia SSGN costs $4.9B each.
- A 500 cell arsenal ship costs $1B each.
2 x Columbias with 192 cruise missiles costs a bit over $10B.
5 x Arsenal ships with 2,500 cruise missiles costs the same, $10B.
But the arsenal ships carry 13 times the firepower.
Most Chinese targets will be within 250 miles of the coast. With 1,000 mile range cruise missiles, arsenal ships could sit out, in relatively safety, 750 miles offshore. A future, longer-range cruise missile could afford more standoff, or hit deeper targets.
And you could lose four of the five arsenal ships and still deliver more than twice the firepower of the two SSGNs.
"Fighting China could involve expending hundreds of thousands of weapons."
DeleteNot in one mission!
"arsenal ships could sit out, in relatively safety, 750 miles offshore. "
The degree of Chinese cooperation in their own destruction that you seem to imagine is staggering! Would we allow an enemy to 'sit out in relative safety' 750 miles off our shore and leisurely lob missiles at us for days on end? I'm pretty sure we wouldn't. So why would you think the Chinese will allow that?
The case is even worse for bombers. Setting aside that modern stealth bombers can't maintain a sortie rate of every 2-3 days (the required maintenance between flights is staggering!), bombers will be attrited into extinction in very short order unless you, again, assume China will sit back and cooperate in their own destruction.
"5 x Arsenal ships with 2,500 cruise missiles"
Wow! Arsenal ships with 500 VLS!!! You're imagining a single ship with 1/6 of our entire cruise missile inventory? Doesn't that strike you as just a bit risky? Lose a ship and you lose 1/6 of the entire national inventory of missiles! If you've got a million missiles then, sure, build 500-VLS arsenal ships. If you don't, you have to spread the risk.
If China knew we had 500-VLS arsenal ships, don't you think they'd make absolutely sure they knew where they were at all times? We would, if China had them.
As I said, the degree of cooperation from China to enable your view of war is just a touch optimistic, don't you think?
The arsenal ship concept seems attractive at first glance. But assuming China as an opponent, with their lack of emphasis on nuclear forces, would certainly make them their priority target. In fact, they would be higher priority than a CVBG, since they would be an immediate threat to home-based assets. Id imagine a surge of all their subs in an all-out effort to eliminate them. Unless the arsenal ships were put into the CVBGs(which due to vastly different mission profiles, and their "flaming datum" being a locational giveaway to the carriers, they shouldnt be), theyd be a major drain on escorts and other assets. So while "distributed lethality" is mostly a dumb Navyspeak buzzword, in this case it makes more sense than building missile barges that carry a disproportionately large amount of our offensive power. SSGNs are the "best choice".
DeleteIn fact, strategically, Id certainly be willing to convert two more (the youngest?) Ohios and give up some nuclear capability. A resurgent Russia isnt the worry to me that China is. So the deterrent that 8-10 SSBNs gives is enough.
DeleteFinancially, Id certainly sacrifice a couple Burkes to put more SSGNs in the water. In fact, with the fragile and still untested Ford debacle, Id think about "2nd RCOH-ing" a couple early Nimitzes, skip a Ford until they're sorted out, and divert the funds to SSGN efforts... Maybe radical ideas I know, but we need some radical rethinking if we're going to extricate ourselves from the mess that our Navy has become...
@ Fighting Irish
DeleteAgree the Dreadnought is undersized compared to the Columbia/Ohio. I wonder if an extra 4 tubes could be fitted so it would be equal to the Columbia, similar to the addition of a Virginia payload module. It should be easier to add extra tubes to the Dreadnought than the Virginia since the missile tubes likely come in 2 or 4 tube modules and should be the same as the surrounding tube modules. The missile tube modules are likely designed to mate with adjacent modules.
The politics might be hard but if you purchased the first 4 from the UK and the next 4-8 from a BAE shipyard in the USA it might go a long way to increasing submarine building capacity in the USA. BAE could start building the USA shipyard if they knew they a firm contract for the USA version. The contract could stipulate that 50% of the value of the submarine was USA made. It could be structured to beneficial for both countries.
We cannot build replacement submarines fast enough to keep up with retirements. An extra shipyard would be helpful to meet demand.
"We cannot build replacement submarines fast enough to keep up with retirements."
DeleteThis is not quite right. It's true that we can't keep up with the pace of retirements that the Navy is imposing. HOWEVER, the Navy is retiring Los Angeles class subs long before their service life is used up. I did a post on this (see, Los Angeles Class Retirements)
If the Navy would stop early retiring ships, maybe our manufacturing (as pitiful as it is) could keep pace. This sub shortage is mostly self-inflicted.
The design of the Dreadnought is done and production has started. The Navy could get a look at the first operational boat and decide if it would fit the operational needs for a SSGN. Spend a billion on a new shipyard and you get replacement SSGNs much earlier and cheaper than waiting for the Columbias to be built.
Delete"The degree of Chinese cooperation in their own destruction that you seem to imagine is staggering! Would we allow an enemy to 'sit out in relative safety' 750 miles off our shore and leisurely lob missiles at us for days on end? I'm pretty sure we wouldn't. So why would you think the Chinese will allow that?"
DeleteA) You yourself have spent a lot of bandwidth describing how difficult it is to find ships in the open ocean. Why is this different for arsenal ships?
B) Why days on end? Against pre-planned targets, 5 arsenal ships could fire their entire warload in under an hour.
"Wow! Arsenal ships with 500 VLS!!! You're imagining a single ship with 1/6 of our entire cruise missile inventory? Doesn't that strike you as just a bit risky? Lose a ship and you lose 1/6 of the entire national inventory of missiles! "
We would have to buy more missiles. I thought this was obvious.
"how difficult it is to find ships in the open ocean. Why is this different for arsenal ships?"
DeleteThe South/East China Seas extend 600-1000 miles from the Chinese coast, depending on where one chooses to measure. That puts the launching ships anywhere from one to two hundred miles inside the first island chain to one to two hundred miles just outside the chain. One has only to draw a line paralleling the Chinese coast 1000 miles out and the possible launch locations are significantly narrowed down. Remove some of the obvious non-launch locations and the possibilities are further narrowed. The S/E China Seas are heavily 'fortified' (and growing more so, daily) and patrolled. Trying to operate and launch inside the first island chain is a non-starter until/unless we can first significantly roll back defenses. Trying to operate launch just a one or two hundred miles outside is well within heavy Chinese surveillance. The launch platforms would be restricted to fairly predictable locations. That's a far cry from operating in the open ocean.
"We would have to buy more missiles. I thought this was obvious."
Where would these missiles come from? Our current production capacity is around 100-200 per year. In war, it's reasonable to think we might be able to double production in the short term to 200-400. That's going to leave us just a bit short of your goal of 10,000 to 100,000. We just don't have the production capacity. I thought this was obvious.
"Against pre-planned targets, 5 arsenal ships could fire their entire warload in under an hour."
So, you're thinking that at the start of a war, when China still has its full capabilities, they're going to allow us to sail these arsenal ships up to the S/E China Sea unhindered and politely wait for us to launch a couple thousand missiles at them? Our carrier battle groups won't be able to survive that close to China, initially, but arsenal ships will have no difficulty? Again, the degree of cooperation you expect from China is stunning.
""Fighting China could involve expending hundreds of thousands of weapons."
DeleteNot in one mission!"
Well, yes, we could easily find that many pre-planned target we could hit, especially when you factor in missile attrition from air defenses, failures, and just plain missing.
It takes 50-100 (or more) missiles to knock out a decent-sized air base for a little while. Five arsenal ships could severely damage the 25 most important Chinese airbases in the first few hours of a conflict. A Columbia SSGN could severely damage one.
CNO,
DeleteThanks for the link to the post on the Los Angeles Class retirements. That was before I started following your blog. Holy cow! There are a lot of really capable submarines waiting to be refueled. I realize the Navy wanting to build submarines that don't require refueling, but you could reactivate four Los Angeles Class subs for the cost of a Virginia, or six if it is a Virginia with the 4 extra missile tubes. The Virginias are said to be quieter at speed than the Los Angeles class at the pier but my guess is the Los Angeles class is still pretty quiet. And if you wanted to make them quieter replace the aft of the submarine (nuclear plant and propeller). Chop them up and stick a new tail on them. It may be cheaper than refueling the current reactor since most of the work would not need to be done around a "hot" reactor. You could fit a nice new S9G reactor with a 32 year life span in there so the engine room would be similar to the Virginias.
Also you could put in a Magnomatics reduction gear set if you really wanted to reduce the noise level, with the side benefit of completely sealing the drive shaft of the submarine. No potential for leaks around the driveshaft.
"Magnetic Gear Key Benefits
Transmission through a sealed wall"
http://www.magnomatics.com/pages/technology/low-ratio-magnetic-gears.htm
"The South/East China Seas extend 600-1000 miles from the Chinese coast, depending on where one chooses to measure. That puts the launching ships anywhere from one to two hundred miles inside the first island chain to one to two hundred miles just outside the chain."
DeleteThey could operate hundreds of miles east of Taiwan in the Philippine Sea and still hit mainland targets a couple hundred miles inland. A next-generation missile with greater range would let them operate further out, or strike deeper.
"Our current production capacity is around 100-200 per year. In war, it's reasonable to think we might be able to double production in the short term to 200-400. That's going to leave us just a bit short of your goal of 10,000 to 100,000. We just don't have the production capacity. I thought this was obvious."
We build more capacity to build missiles. I thought this was obvious.
You include battleships in your fleet structure. By your logic, we just don't have the production capacity (or capability) build battleships, their guns or their munitions. So why include them?
"Unless the arsenal ships were put into the CVBGs"
DeleteThat is just how I would do it.
If the arsenal ship is the "main attacker" of the fleet, it obviously need the best possible protections, which means carrier groups.
If US carrier groups are not able to protect the arsenal ship(s), then they won't be able to protect themselves either.
That is just how I would do it.
DeleteIf the arsenal ship is the "main attacker" of the fleet, it obviously need the best possible protections, which means carrier groups.
"If US carrier groups are not able to protect the arsenal ship(s), then they won't be able to protect themselves either."
As I see it, arsenal ships, SSNs, SSGNs, none are the "main attacker" as you put it. They are the heavy hitters that can weaken or roll back defenses, allowing CVBGs to go on the offensive. Carriers are the platforms that can apply repeated, loitering combat power, once they can get into range. Missles can't take and hold air/sea space like carriers can. Once the carriers can join the offensive fight, then come the troops to start taking/retaking ground once an avenue has been opened for them. Using carrier-based air power in a defensive role defeats its purpose. Its a successsion of different tools used at the appropriate time...
"They could operate hundreds of miles east of Taiwan in the Philippine sea"
DeleteIn a conflict, every mile of air/sea space west of the Guam-Tokyo line (or possibly even further out) will be heavilly contested, and have to be taken...
anon2,
DeleteWhy even have the arsenal ships? We own territory and lease territory as close or closer than the arsenal ship will be able to operate with support. Just create hardened missile silos with intermediate range ballistic missiles (2-4k mile range) in Guam, Attu Island, Korea, and Japan. The hardened silos will be more survivable than the arsenal ship. If we have to build 10k -100k missiles, build better ones. We could create artificial islands off the shore of Guam to house the missiles to direct the attack away from civilians.
Actually not a bad idea honestly. Politically itd be quite unpopular, and would probably never be allowed in Japan or Korea. Guam will probably get hammered day one in a conflict, but hardened silos there certainly have merit.
Deletemichael woltman,
DeleteIRBM tend to be an order of magnitude more expensive than cruise missiles.
Silos housing cruise missiles in Taiwan or Japan might make sense though. Interesting idea.
CNO writes, "An extended length version has been proposed for the SSGN. As I vaguely recall, it would be sized for 100+ missiles."
DeleteThe only extension to the Virginia-class that I'm aware of is the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), which contains 4 tubes for 7 missiles each. With 12 Tomahawks in the bow, each VPM-equipped Virginia submarine would be able to carry 40 Tomahawks.
And, according to Wiki, the Navy could eventually field 20 VPM-equipped submarines (10 Block V, 5 Block VI, and 5 Block VII).
"The only extension to the Virginia-class that I'm aware of"
DeleteAs I noted, it was a proposal and the Navy expressed no interest.
SSGNs are a bit of a favorite platform for me. The conversion of the four Ohios was one of the smarter things the Navy has done. The mistake was in putting off the build of Columbias for so long, that theres no opportunity to do more conversions due to the Ohios age when theyre replaced. Also, any Columbia based SSGNs would have to follow the SSBNs, so they could only appear long after the current ones have been retired. We certainly made a mistake in not mirroring the Soviets interest in SSGNs. The Virginia Block V is better than nothing of course, but in a China conflict, we will certainly wish we'd made different choices in regard to SSGNs I think...
ReplyDeleteOut of curiosity, how much of a missiles internals require "rare earth" minerals?
ReplyDeleteThat 100-200 a year figure I seen could prove optimistic if we go to war with the nation providing us the materials...
No shortage of rare earth minerals in US, it's just the Chinese process costs so much cheaper they have killed off all competition.
DeleteSo, in order to have a ready source of rare earth metals, we have to essentially rebuild a industry and its workforce.
DeleteUntil that happens, we have a shortage in rare earth metals...
Very dubious about effectiveness of Tomahawk, it's slow ~ Mach 0.74
ReplyDeleteThe April 2017 attack on Syria with approx. 100 had no noticeable effect but more importantly think Chinese would be able replicate modern equivalent of WWII AAW defense in England against German V-1 flying bombs when over 80%+ destroyed.
59 Tomahawks.
DeleteIt certainly did have a noticeable effect. They hit aircraft shelters, ammo and POL storage, and workshops. But that doesn't mean the airfield was knocked out. It was certainly degraded and aircraft were destroyed.
A Tomahawk normally carries a 1,000lb warhead. So it can only do what a single 1,000lb warhead can do. It can hit a single HAS or munitions bunker.
Military airfields are inherently dispersed, contain a lot of targets, and thus require a lot of munitions.
In WWII, Germany didn't fire huge masses of V-1s per salvo. They fired a few, then a few more, then a few more. A defense that works well against one or two munitions can be overwhelmed when 100 arrive nearly simultaneously.
I'm in favor of replacing the Tomahawk with a stealthy missile derived from JASSM.
"The April 2017 attack on Syria with approx. 100 had no noticeable effect"
DeleteIt most certainly had an effect as the bomb damage photos clearly show. However, it was NOT intended to destroy the base. Many targets were intentionally bypassed that would have been routine targets if destruction of the base were the intent. The strike was NOT a military strike - it was a political strike intended to send a message. One can debate the wisdom of that but that's what it was.
We would probably be better looking at a new generation of aircraft (that we don't have) capable of delivering fairly large numbers of the new high-supersonic or hypersonic cruise missile (that we don't have) at stand-off ranges of better than 2000 miles.
DeleteIf we are thinking in terms of even Iran, let alone China, we BETTER be thinking about dealing with seriously hardened targets (which we don't have either, looking at you Guam).
If we are looking at building new capability to last say 40 years, why are we even considering Tomahawk in the discussion?
No sooner do I open my figurative mouth than look what pops up!
DeleteRead it and weep in terms of what really would be needed to fight a peer enemy. Or even Iran.
Speaking of Iran, did anyone notice the TBI numbers are now up to 106 from the strike on Iraq, and a strategic study last year established that China provides 97% of key pharmaceuticals the US needs to survive.
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/heres-how-many-bombs-the-us-plans-to-buy-in-the-next-year/?utm_campaign=Socialflow+DFN&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR2J5QBSakoBAz-PbRVVlVvAnD8JbYyRdnDhjeXKu0-gyObod5Ogovjm2vg
"high-supersonic or hypersonic cruise missile ... at stand-off ranges of better than 2000 miles."
DeleteAt that point, we're into short-mid range ballistic missile territory. Might it be better to put a practical limit on cruise missile range, beyond which ballistic missiles take over?
One answer is that ballistic missile are expensive but, realistically, what would a 2000+ mile range, super/hypersonic cruise missile cost? Would they be different?
Also, a cruise missile capable of that performance is going to be big - big to the point that it might require a single aircraft to launch a single missile. Is that operationally effective when you might need 100-200 missiles to neutralize one target? In a war, are we going to have 100-200 aircraft sitting around to do the launches?
Just wondering out loud.
Good point. I think there might be an argument to be made that historically, ballistic missiles may be easier to intercept. I'm not sure that still applies when you consider all the new stuff has maneuvering warheads.
DeleteThe possible advantage of cruise missiles is that you don't need forward basing. Conceptually, an aircraft sized to operate out of a major international airport would work. Say B-777 or so. Not stealthy, just a lot of carrying capacity similar to the idea of a militarized 747 arsenal aircraft.
That would keep the costs down and the basing flexible.
I think your point that war is expensive holds true no matter what approach is taken. I feel the logical successor to Tomahawk is going to be much larger and heavier as something small won't be survivable. So a submarine as a delivery system is going to be expensive at the weapon quantity we need, and an aircraft will too. But possibly the aircraft might be cheaper when we consider it doesn't need to be a penetrating stealth bomber. The Air Force tanker scenario might be the one to pursue where we take an existing civilian aircraft and modify appropriately.
There was an excellent article that came out last evening after these posts. It shows that the Air Force had recognized the issues and is starting to concentrate on them now.
https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/singapore-airshow/2020/02/11/the-us-air-force-has-unconventional-plans-to-win-a-war-in-the-asia-pacific/
"It shows that the Air Force had recognized the issues and is starting to concentrate on them now."
DeleteIt's a baby first step. That's good but not even remotely significant, yet. There's a reason why airbases exist - it's because it's supremely more cost effective and efficient to operate large clusters of aircraft rather than small, disbursed clusters.
The problem with dispersing aircraft is that works for a one or two sorties but quickly falls apart if you're trying to operate dispersed on an on-going basis. Logistics quickly rears its ugly head and you find you can't efficiently (or at all!) supply the needed munitions, fuel, maintenance, personnel, computers, mission planning, etc. to many different locations, all at the same time. You've seen the posts on the pitiful state of our Navy logistics fleet. How are we going to supply fuel to, say, 30 dispersed locations when we can clearly see that we'll be hard-pressed to supply just Guam?
So, much like an alcoholic, the first step is to admit you have a problem. If this is the AF's first step then good but there's much more to be done not the least of which is getting the Navy to admit they have a logistics problem because the AF can't supply its own logistics at Pacific theater bases. At the moment, the Navy shows no sign of even admitting it has a problem, let alone doing anything about it.
Amen. At least the AF has recognized they have a problem and they are starting to think about solutions.
Delete"At that point, we're into short-mid range ballistic missile territory. Might it be better to put a practical limit on cruise missile range, beyond which ballistic missiles take over?"
DeleteBallistic missiles will be more expensive than cruise missiles, for a given range and payload. A lot more expensive.
Yes, a 2,000 mile range cruise missile will be larger than a Tomahawk, but a 2,000 mile range ballistic missile will be much larger still.
For a size comparison consider,
Pershing II
Range: 1,100 miles
Warhead: 880lbs
Weight: 16,500lbs
Tomahawk
Range: 1,000 miles
Warhead: 1,000lbs
Weight: 3,500lbs
The Pershing II is almost 5 times as heavy as the Tomahawk.
A DF-26 IRBM with a range of 1,800-2,400 miles weighs 2.6 times as much as a Pershing II, carrying twice the payload.
Cruise missiles don't have to carry their oxidizer with them, don't have to push up to high supersonic speeds and don't have to deal with atmospheric reentry.
Your points are valid, to an extent, hence the statement, 'just wondering out loud'. Also, bear in mind that propulsion technology has come a long way from the Pershing and a brand new short-mid ballistic missile would likely be smaller, weigh less, and cost less than a Pershing.
DeleteWhile not directly comparable, the ATACMS and its successor with new, advanced propulsion tech, are small, cheap ballistic missiles and their range will be extended to what has been described as, well beyond the 300 mile treaty limit. It merely illustrates the advances in ballistic missile technology.
"Ballistic missiles will be more expensive than cruise missiles, for a given range and payload. A lot more expensive."
This is true only for today's weapons which means very old weapons since we haven't developed a new short-mid range ballistic missile in quite some time.
Finally, and most importantly, the only cost that is valid is the cost to achieve a result. If it requires, say, ten cruise missiles to accomplish what a single ballistic missile can, then the effective cost of a cruise missile is ten times the individual purchase price. At the moment, cruise missiles are generally considered much easier to defend against than ballistic missiles and it will require many more cruise missiles to equal the effective power of a ballistic missile. Thus, depending on the effective ratio of cruise to ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles may well be more cost effective. Hypersonic cruise missiles may alter this situation - that remains to be seen.
You're also ignoring the launch platform numbers issue.
The point, absent arguing for the sake of arguing about something that no one actually stated, is that there may come a tipping point where ballistic missiles are more suited than cruise missiles - or not. It's simply something worth thinking about.
"At least the AF has recognized they have a problem and they are starting to think about solutions."
DeleteThe problem for the AF is that their logistics problem is intimately tied to the Navy who shows no inclination to even admit a problem exists. The AF would do well to think about solutions that don't involve the Navy. I'm not an AF guy and I have solutions to offer them but they'll make a lot more progress, and faster, if they can find a solution that bypasses the Navy. A difficult task but worth some effort on their part. If they depend on the Navy, they'll be waiting a very long time for a workable solution.
AF logistics ships??? The Army has a navy, why not the AF? Again, just thinking out loud!
The cost of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles depends on the production rate. A space launch company, Astra, is looking to have an orbital launch vehicle that can put 150 kg in low earth orbit (much larger payload if it was used as a ballistic missile). They think they can produce the rocket for $250,000 with volume production. The missile is RP1/LOX fueled so not as useful as a ballistic missile, however, a return to hypergolic fuels similar to the Titan II would provide a storable propellant in a relatively inexpensive missile. The USA doesn't like to use hypergolic fuels but many nations are just fine with hypergolic fuel and have cheap missiles because of it, Iran, North Korea, Russia.
DeleteSolid fuels can be made less expensive as well but the production process for the missile is more dangerous than liquid fuels and drives up the cost of production. You can produce a liquid fueled rocket with no possibility of explosion at the production plant, solid rockets always have a possibility of explosion.
liquid:
https://spacenews.com/astra-emphasizes-rapid-iteration-in-its-quest-for-low-cost-rapid-launch/
solid:
http://www.wickmanspacecraft.com/slv.html